Release ipx 1.0.0, ipx-directory 1.0.0 and ipx-web 1.0.0, as Gitea releases

Each release is now a Gitea release as well as an image: scripts/release.sh takes the binary (or
the page's files) out of the deployed image, checks its version, and attaches it as a tarball with
the changelog section as the notes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.agents/skills/security-audit/AI-AND-LLM.md

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+# AI, LLM, and Agent Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when a language model participates in a trust-sensitive decision: chatbots and assistants, RAG pipelines, persistent agent memory, agent/tool-calling loops, MCP servers and clients, code that builds prompts from untrusted input, or code that consumes model output and acts on it. The important data flow is *untrusted content → model or memory → capability, authority, or sink*.
+
+Use this alongside `ATTACK-CLASSES.md`, not instead of it. Transport, access control, query construction, filesystem use, and output rendering remain ordinary trust boundaries. This file covers the model-specific delegation layer. Split large targets by retrieval, memory, tool dispatch, MCP, and output handling.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- Prompt injection alone is not a finding. Require a code-level boundary failure: content reaches another principal's context, invokes authority the requester lacks, discloses data they cannot read, or drives a sink they cannot reach directly.
+- Model output, memory, tool descriptions, and MCP responses are untrusted inputs. Point to the code that grants authority, trusts output, writes durable state, or feeds a sink.
+- A guardrail prompt is not a security boundary. Count only deterministic checks, resource-scoped authorization, isolation, binding, and constrained credentials.
+- State the attacker, affected principal, effective execution identity, resource, exact action, authority used, and observable impact. An intentional direct request to use the requester's existing authority is not a delegation defect merely because a model executes it.
+- Authorization and action binding are separate controls. Attacker-controlled content that causes an action under an affected principal's valid authority is an action-binding failure when that principal did not intentionally request or approve the exact action.
+- Classify every candidate as `confirmed` only after source evidence and bounded local validation establish the boundary and result. Use `needs_validation` when a required provider, deployment, model, renderer, or identity behavior is not observable locally.
+```
+
+## Context, retrieval, and memory attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Indirect injection through retrieved or ingested content**
+An attacker can write a RAG document, indexed page, file, email, issue body, tool response, or metadata that enters a different principal's model context. Trace who can write each source, how retrieval scopes it, whose session consumes it, and what capability is enabled there. Check isolation, resource authorization, and binding to the consuming principal's intent separately. The defect is a missing deterministic control, not persuasive text by itself.
+
+**Cross-session or cross-tenant context bleed**
+Conversation history, embeddings, retrieval results, or prompt caches are keyed too broadly. Verify tenant and ACL filters in the query itself and every cache key. A tenant field stored on an object is not enforcement if an alternate query, shared cache, or batch path omits it.
+
+**Persistent memory poisoning**
+Attacker-controlled content or model summaries are written into memory that later shapes another task, user, or privileged session. Review who may create, update, merge, and delete memory; its provenance and tenant scope; whether low-trust observations become durable instructions or facts; and whether retrieval distinguishes user preferences from tool policy. Memory intentionally saved by a user and used only for that user's intentional, allowed requests is not a cross-boundary finding.
+
+**Prompt role and provenance confusion**
+Prompt assembly lets untrusted text impersonate a system message, prior turn, tool result, policy, or memory record. Look for string concatenation, untyped history, caller-controlled role fields, and serialization round trips that lose source labels. Confirm that the forged provenance changes a deterministic trust decision or reaches a meaningful capability.
+
+## Tool and action attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Tool-argument injection into a downstream sink**
+Model-produced arguments reach SQL, shell, file, URL-fetch, or privileged APIs without handler-side validation. Treat the tool schema as input parsing, then follow each field from decoded call to sink. Structured output narrows shape; it does not establish authorization, safe paths, safe URLs, or query semantics.
+
+**Excessive agency and confused-deputy authority**
+The agent uses a service identity or broad credential, while the tool handler does not re-check the requesting principal's permission on the named resource. Verify both the effective identity and whether the caller could perform that exact operation through the normal product interface. A shared credential with enforced per-user query scope is not a defect.
+
+**Action-confirmation and approval binding**
+A user approves one described action but execution can use changed arguments, a different resource, a different principal, or a later model turn. An action-binding defect also exists when attacker-controlled content causes a side effect under a victim's valid authority without the victim's intentional request or approval, even if generic authorization permits the victim to perform it. Review whether intent or confirmation binds the normalized tool name, complete argument object, requester, target, amount, expiry, and batch membership. Check retries and resumed sessions: an approval must not authorize a mutated or duplicate side effect.
+
+**Tool-schema and dispatcher disagreement**
+The schema accepts aliases, extra fields, duplicate keys, coercions, nested free-form objects, or out-of-range values that the dispatcher or handler interprets differently. Compare schema validation, canonicalization, generated bindings, and handler defaults. Validate again where values become resource selectors or security-relevant options.
+
+**Unbounded delegated action loops**
+A bounded request can enqueue repeated spend, send, mutation, or external API work without a per-request budget, per-action authorization, cancellation, or idempotency control. Confirm impact on shared cost, quotas, other users, or durable state. Do not test by exhausting a service; use code-level accounting and a locally bounded loop.
+
+## MCP and sub-agent trust classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Sub-agent and MCP trust inheritance**
+A delegated task receives the full session, credentials, memory, or capabilities rather than the least authority required. Check the principal and tenant carried into each call, capability narrowing, credential audience, and whether delegated results are treated as untrusted on return.
+
+**MCP server and tool identity confusion**
+Calls or results are routed by attacker-influenceable server names, tool names, request IDs, resource URIs, or model-selected aliases rather than the authenticated connection and outstanding request. Check whether two servers can claim the same tool or resource identity, whether reconnect changes the binding, and whether a response from one server can satisfy another server's pending call.
+
+**MCP metadata and schema as policy**
+Tool descriptions, resource metadata, prompts, completion hints, or schemas supplied by an MCP peer are trusted as policy or authorization. These fields can guide the model but cannot grant capability. Find the deterministic allowlist, server identity check, and handler authorization that remain authoritative when metadata conflicts.
+
+## Output and disclosure attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Insecure output rendering**
+Model output reaches an executing HTML, Markdown, template, URL, or command sink without the sink's required encoding and policy. For browser rendering, verify auto-loaded resources and CSP or sanitization in `CLIENT-SIDE.md`; renderer behavior outside the repository makes the candidate `needs_validation`.
+
+**Sensitive context extraction**
+The assembled context contains credentials, another user's data, private source, or policy values that themselves grant access, and user-influenced output exposes them. Read prompt assembly and data-fetch code. Disclosure of generic instructions or behavior that does not cross a data boundary is not a finding.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Draw four maps first: each execution identity, each capability, every writable context or memory source, and each output destination. Then connect the principal at the start to the authority at the end.
+- Start at side-effecting tools and work backward through dispatcher, schema, confirmation, model context, retrieval, and ingestion. Start at durable memory reads and trace every writer.
+- Compare direct, queued, retry, resume, batch, and delegated paths for the same action. The strongest gate must apply after arguments are final and before every side effect.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Name the crossed boundary and observable result: attacker, affected principal or shared resource, execution identity, target, and unauthorized or unrequested action or disclosure.
+2. For confused-deputy authority claims, prove the tool lacks requester-and-resource authorization and that the attacker cannot perform the same action normally. For action-binding claims, instead prove attacker-controlled content caused an action under the affected principal's authority that the principal did not intentionally request or approve. Valid generic authorization does not establish that intent.
+3. For memory or retrieval claims, cite both the attacker-controlled write and the later cross-principal read or privileged decision. A shared record without a reachable consumer is not enough.
+4. For action binding, establish the intentional request or normalized approved object, if any, and compare it with the object the handler uses. Confirm a locally observable unrequested action, mutation, duplicate, or authority change without extending the test into harmful execution. For schema disagreement, compare the normalized validated object with the handler's object.
+5. For MCP identity claims, verify the authenticated connection, request correlation, tool namespace, and effective credential. Mark `needs_validation` if external server identity or deployment routing is required.
+6. Return `confirmed` findings only with a complete source trace and meaningful result. Return `needs_validation` for a specific unresolved boundary fact and state the bounded local or owner-observed check needed to resolve it.

.agents/skills/security-audit/ATTACK-CLASSES.md

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+# Attack Classes
+
+#### Attack classes — choose and split based on Phase 1
+
+Select attack classes relevant to the application type. Not every class applies to every codebase. The list below is a starting point; add application-specific classes from Phase 1 and split large codebases per subsystem. Frame work as finding, validating, fixing, and prioritizing vulnerabilities. Keep validation to source review and bounded local fixtures; do not develop payload chains, test availability on live services, or take action in shared environments.
+
+Use `confirmed` only when source evidence and bounded validation establish the full boundary and meaningful result. Use `needs_validation` when a specific deployment, provider, platform, identity, or runtime fact is unavailable; state the missing fact and the safe owner-observed or local check that resolves it.
+
+> **Native / binary / kernel targets** (C/C++/Rust-unsafe, kernel modules, parsers and decoders, FFI, concurrent runtimes, binary loaders, JITs, firmware): use the memory-safety, integer/ABI, concurrency, binary-loader, and privileged-interface classes in [MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md](MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md).
+>
+> **AI / LLM / agent targets** (chatbots, RAG, persistent memory, tool-calling agents, MCP servers/clients, prompt assembly, or model-controlled actions): use the context, memory-poisoning, action-binding, tool-schema, MCP-identity, and output classes in [AI-AND-LLM.md](AI-AND-LLM.md).
+>
+> **HTTP, web, and identity targets** (ordinary web apps, APIs, reverse proxies, CDNs, gateways, custom HTTP parsers, sessions, CSRF, JWT, OAuth/OIDC, SAML, MFA, passkeys, account recovery/linking, API keys, or mTLS): use [WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md](WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md).
+>
+> **Client-side and browser targets** (SPAs, browser extensions, embedded webviews, service workers, browser storage, cross-window messaging, CORS, WebSockets, or DOM rendering): use [CLIENT-SIDE.md](CLIENT-SIDE.md).
+>
+> **Supply-chain and release targets** (dependency resolution, generated inputs, CI, release/signing/promotion, updates, plugins, or extensions): use [SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md](SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md).
+>
+> **Cloud and deployment targets** (IAM, infrastructure as code, containers/Kubernetes, service mesh, serverless/edge, ingress, provider events, or runtime configuration): use [CLOUD-AND-DEPLOYMENT.md](CLOUD-AND-DEPLOYMENT.md).
+>
+> **Protocol, RPC, and messaging targets** (gRPC, GraphQL transports, Protobuf/Cap'n Proto/Thrift, custom protocols, queues, brokers, pub/sub, webhooks, or streaming RPC): use [PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md](PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md).
+>
+> **Resource-exhaustion and availability targets** (untrusted work can consume shared CPU, memory, disk, connections, workers, queues, quotas, or operator-owned spend): use [RESOURCE-EXHAUSTION-AND-AVAILABILITY.md](RESOURCE-EXHAUSTION-AND-AVAILABILITY.md).
+>
+> **Data-isolation and lifecycle targets** (multi-tenant stores, caches/search, object links, analytics, export/backup, migration, deletion, retention, or restore): use [DATA-ISOLATION-AND-LIFECYCLE.md](DATA-ISOLATION-AND-LIFECYCLE.md).
+>
+> **Desktop, mobile, and local-IPC targets** (native apps, deep links, webview bridges, exported components, privileged helpers, local daemons, Unix sockets/XPC/Binder/D-Bus): use [DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md](DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md).
+
+**Injection** (subagent_type: `general`)
+Trace untrusted input from entry point to dangerous sink. What counts as a "dangerous sink" depends on the application:
+- Web apps: SQL queries, HTML output, shell commands, template engines, file paths, HTTP redirects, deserialization
+- Libraries: any function that processes caller-supplied data without validation — buffer operations, parsers, format strings
+- CLI tools: shell command construction, file path handling, environment variable interpolation
+- Services: query construction, message serialization, log injection, LDAP/XPATH queries
+- Client-side (browser/JS): DOM XSS, prototype pollution, `postMessage`/origin trust, and other browser-side classes — covered by the [CLIENT-SIDE.md](CLIENT-SIDE.md) companion blocks when selected
+
+Do not stop at the obvious direct paths. Look for indirect injection: data stored safely, then retrieved and used in a dangerous context by different code. Look for injection through field names, keys, headers, and metadata — not just values. Look for injection into secondary systems (logs, caches, search indexes, analytics).
+
+**Access control** (subagent_type: `general`)
+Verify that a caller cannot do something outside its authority. Go beyond checking whether permission checks exist — verify they check the *right* permission for the *right* resource via the *right* mechanism:
+- Is there a path to the same state change that checks a different (weaker) permission?
+- Can a field in the request body override what the permission system intended to restrict?
+- Are there endpoints that gate on authentication but forget authorization?
+- Does the same resource have multiple access paths with inconsistent checks?
+- What about bulk/batch/export/import operations — do they enforce per-item permissions?
+
+For complex access models, split into separate agents for auth bypass vs authorization logic.
+
+**Resource and file handling** (subagent_type: `general`)
+- Path traversal (reading/writing outside intended directories) — including through symlinks, encoded sequences, and null bytes
+- SSRF (making the application fetch attacker-controlled URLs) — including through redirects, DNS rebinding, and URL parser differentials
+- Unsafe deserialization, archive extraction (zip slip), temp file handling
+- Memory safety (if applicable): buffer overflows, use-after-free, integer overflow
+- Race conditions on file operations (TOCTOU between check and use)
+
+**Cryptography and secrets** (subagent_type: `general`)
+- Weak randomness for security-critical values (tokens, keys, nonces)
+- Hardcoded secrets, secrets in logs, error messages, URLs, or client-visible responses
+- Broken key derivation, missing HMAC verification, nonce reuse
+- Timing side-channels on secret comparison
+- Misuse of crypto primitives (ECB mode, unauthenticated encryption, static IVs, etc.)
+- What happens when crypto operations fail? Does the error path fall back to no-crypto?
+
+**Business logic** (subagent_type: `general`)
+Hunt logic errors by hand: standard scanners cannot find them, and they yield high-impact findings. For each major workflow:
+- **State machine violations**: Can you skip steps? Go backwards? Reach an invalid state? What happens if you replay a completed flow? What about partial failure — if step 2 of 3 fails, is step 1 rolled back?
+- **Race conditions with business impact**: Concurrent operations that produce invalid states (double-spend, double-approve, lost updates). Focus on operations that check-then-act non-atomically.
+- **Numeric/quantity manipulation**: Negative values, zero values, overflow, precision loss, type coercion between string and number.
+- **Access boundary violations**: Not "does the permission check exist" but "is it the right check for the business rule?" Can input to one operation bypass a restriction enforced on a different operation for the same effect?
+- **Implicit trust assumptions**: Data from storage, config, other components, or plugins assumed safe because "we validated it on the way in." What if a different code path wrote it?
+- **Time-based logic**: Expiry checks, scheduling, rate windows, clock skew. What happens at exact boundary moments? What about timezone differences between components?
+- **Default and fallback behavior**: What is the security posture when config is missing? When a feature flag is off? When a dependency is unavailable? When the system is mid-migration?
+
+**Feature abuse and data leakage** (subagent_type: `general`)
+Legitimate features used for unintended purposes. Look for bugs in the design, not only in the code:
+- **Export/backup as exfiltration**: Can a low-privilege user trigger an export, snapshot, or backup that includes data above their access level? Can they export other users' data? Does the export include deleted/draft/private content? Revision history that was supposed to be pruned?
+- **Import/restore as injection**: Can import overwrite existing data? Can it create records that bypass normal validation? Can it inject content into collections the user has no write access to? Does it respect the same permission model as the UI?
+- **Search/filter/sort as oracle**: Can search queries reveal whether content exists that the user cannot directly access? Do filter parameters let users probe statuses, roles, or fields they should not know about? Does sorting by a hidden field reveal its values through result ordering?
+- **Enumeration through side effects**: Do error messages differ between "does not exist" and "no access"? Do response times differ? Response sizes? HTTP status codes? Can you enumerate users through password reset, invite, or registration flows?
+- **Preview/draft/staging leakage**: Are preview tokens scoped to one item or do they unlock broader access? Can draft content be discovered through search, RSS feeds, sitemaps, or API listing endpoints? Can cache headers cause a CDN to serve private content publicly?
+- **Notification/webhook as SSRF**: Can a user set a notification URL, webhook URL, or callback URL that the server fetches? Is it validated against internal networks? What about after a redirect?
+
+**Chained vulnerabilities and trust boundaries** (subagent_type: `general`)
+Individually allowed or contained behavior can become a vulnerability when another component or lifecycle step relies on a stronger guarantee:
+- **Multi-step boundary failures**: Map what a low-privilege principal may read, write, invoke, and retain, then connect only concrete outputs to later trust decisions. Confirm each prerequisite and do not assume a downstream effect.
+- **Cross-component trust gaps**: Component A validates input and passes it to component B. Compare the exact guarantee A produces with what B assumes, including truncation, type coercion, normalization, tenant scope, and plugin/extension access.
+- **Second-order use**: Data safe when stored may become dangerous in a later context. A field name becomes a JSON path, a slug becomes a file path, escaped text enters raw rendering, or a stored string becomes a URL, regex, template, or policy expression.
+- **Scope and capability growth**: Token, API-key, plugin, OAuth, MCP, or AI capabilities become broader after delegation, refresh, caching, role change, or composition. Name the concrete operation the resulting principal should not have.
+- **Timing and ordering**: Review setup, migration, soft-delete, revoke/cache expiry, check/use, and validate/consume windows. Confirm stale state is accepted before reporting.
+- **Rollback and recovery**: Undelete, restore, revision rollback, and cancellation must apply current ownership, validation, and authorization. Confirm which invalid state is restored.
+
+**Wildcard** (subagent_type: `general`)
+You are not given a category. Find vulnerabilities outside the standard classes already assigned.
+
+Read code that looks boring or disconnected from security. Follow incomplete, experimental, compatibility, and fallback features, but retain the same concrete boundary and validation requirements as every other class.
+
+Use these starting points, but do not limit yourself to them:
+- What is the strangest code in the codebase? Why does it exist? What happens if it is abused?
+- Are there any features that feel half-finished, experimental, or bolted on? Those have the weakest security because they got the least review.
+- What happens if you use the API in a way the frontend never would? The UI constrains users, but the API does not. What API calls are possible but never made by the client?
+- Are there any hidden or undocumented endpoints, parameters, headers, or features? Look at route registrations, middleware, and config for things that are not in the docs.
+- What happens when you mix features that were not designed to work together? Localization + preview + caching. Import + plugins + webhooks. OAuth + impersonation + API keys.
+- Is there anything interesting in the git history? Reverted security fixes, commented-out auth checks, secrets that were committed then removed (still in history).
+- Which valid-account actions affect other users, shared integrity, availability, or operator-owned cost? Verify containment, quotas, authorization, and recovery around those actions.
+- Which operations are irreversible or require elevated confirmation? Bind authorization and approval to the final principal, action, and resource.
+- What assumptions does the code make about the environment? That the database is local, that the clock is accurate, that DNS is trustworthy, that the filesystem is case-sensitive?
+- Look at the test files — what are they **not** testing? Compare the edge cases the developer thought about (tests exist) with the ones they did not (no tests).
+
+Pursue anomalies inside your assigned scope until the invariant is settled. If something looks strange, read it until you can state whether it is safe. If a function has a comment explaining why it is safe, verify the explanation. If a variable is named `temp` or `hack` or `legacy`, read it closely.
+
+**Obvious things** (subagent_type: `general`)
+Other agents hunt subtle bugs. This agent checks the basic exposures that are easy to overlook because everyone assumes someone else already checked them:
+- Are there any hardcoded passwords, API keys, tokens, or secrets in the source? (grep for `password`, `secret`, `apikey`, `token`, `Bearer`, `-----BEGIN`, common default passwords)
+- Are there any TODO/FIXME/HACK/XXX comments that reference security? (`TODO: add auth`, `FIXME: validate input`, `HACK: skip permission check`)
+- Is debug mode / dev mode properly gated? Can it be enabled in production via environment variable, query parameter, or header?
+- Are there test/example/seed credentials that work in production?
+- Is there a `/debug`, `/admin`, `/test`, `/status`, `/health`, `/metrics`, `/env`, `/.env`, `/config` endpoint that is unprotected?
+- Are there any `.env`, `.env.local`, `credentials.json`, `*.pem`, `*.key` files checked into the repo?
+- Does the `.gitignore` actually cover secrets, uploads, and local config?
+- Are dependencies pinned? Are there known CVEs in the dependency tree? (check lockfiles)
+- Are there any `eval()`, `exec()`, `child_process`, `Function()`, `vm.runInContext`, `import()` with dynamic input?
+- Are CORS headers set to `*` or overly permissive? Is `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` combined with a wildcard origin?
+- Are cookies missing `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, or `SameSite` attributes?
+- Are there any open redirects? (parameters named `redirect`, `return`, `next`, `url`, `goto`, `continue` that feed into redirects without validation)
+- Is TLS enforced? Are there any HTTP-only endpoints?
+- Are error responses in production returning stack traces, internal paths, or SQL errors?
+
+This agent does not need to be creative. It needs to be thorough and literal. Check every item. Report each result.
+
+**Important**: For any finding this agent reports, it must verify the full code path, not just surface appearance. If a cookie is missing `HttpOnly`, check whether the cookie contains security-sensitive data and whether JS needs to read it by design. If an error message contains a field name, check whether the field is ever actually populated with sensitive data. A flag is not a finding — trace the impact before reporting.

.agents/skills/security-audit/CLIENT-SIDE.md

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+# Client-Side and Browser Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when meaningful trust decisions or untrusted rendering happen in a browser: single-page apps, browser extensions, embedded webviews, service workers, offline applications, and code that renders attacker-influenceable content into the DOM, receives cross-window messages, or uses browser storage. These paths include sources the server never sees, such as URL fragments, `window.name`, `postMessage`, and previously cached content.
+
+Use alongside `ATTACK-CLASSES.md`. This file covers browser sources and sinks, origin boundaries, browser persistence, and cross-site state oracles. Use `DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md` for the native side of a webview bridge, and `WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md` for server-side CSRF, sessions, and auth callbacks.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- A client-side candidate needs a controllable source and an executing or disclosing sink. Name both and show attacker-influenced data reaching the sink.
+- The impact must reach a victim's session, another origin, or shared persistence. Self-injection and disclosure of the attacker's own data are not findings.
+- Framework escaping, browser same-origin policy, CSP, COOP/CORP, service-worker scope, and modern noopener defaults are real controls. Verify them before assigning impact.
+- Browser storage and caches are shared by origin and may outlive login state. Identify who writes, who reads, and which account, tenant, or worker lifecycle clears each record.
+- Use `confirmed` only for complete source evidence plus bounded local browser tests. Use `needs_validation` when renderer, extension permission, deployed header, or browser-policy behavior is required but unavailable.
+```
+
+## DOM and object-state attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**DOM-based XSS**
+Trace `location` fields, `document.referrer`, `window.name`, message data, storage, and browser-controlled document state into `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `document.write`, string-evaluating APIs, executable URLs, jQuery HTML APIs, or framework escape hatches. Interpolation escaped by the framework is not a finding.
+
+**DOM clobbering**
+Attacker-injected `id` or `name` attributes shadow a global, form property, configuration object, or initialization flag later trusted by code. Require both a markup path that preserves the attribute and a security-relevant use of the clobbered value.
+
+**Prototype pollution and gadget chain**
+An attacker-controlled key reaches a recursive write such as deep merge or path assignment and modifies prototype state. Then a reachable gadget consumes the polluted property to change authorization, execution, navigation, or rendering. `JSON.parse`, a shallow copy, or pollution without a gadget is not enough.
+
+## Cross-origin messaging and network attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**`postMessage` origin and source trust**
+A handler performs a sensitive action with `event.data` without an exact origin allowlist and, where multiple frames share an origin, the expected `event.source`. On the send side, sensitive data sent to `*` reaches an unintended embedder. Weak substring, prefix, suffix, or unanchored-regex origin matching is not an origin check.
+
+**Cross-site WebSocket request use**
+A WebSocket upgrade accepts ambient cookies from an untrusted origin without an `Origin` check or channel-specific token, allowing the victim's session to read or mutate data. Confirm both the upgrade behavior and a security-relevant message handler.
+
+**Credentialed CORS trust**
+The server reflects or weakly matches `Origin` while allowing credentials and returns sensitive responses. A bare wildcard with credentials is rejected by browsers; report only the actual reflected/allowed origin path and cross-origin data or mutation.
+
+## Service-worker and browser-storage attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Service-worker registration and scope takeover**
+Attacker-influenceable content can become the registered worker script, control a path that receives an over-broad `Service-Worker-Allowed` scope, or alter update imports without integrity control. Verify the final script URL, response MIME type, origin, scope, and who controls every imported script. A normal same-origin worker with intended scope is not a defect.
+
+**Service-worker cache and identity confusion**
+The worker caches personalized responses without including account, tenant, authorization state, or request mode in its policy, then serves them after account switch or logout. Review fetch-event routing, cache names and keys, navigation fallbacks, cache cleanup, and whether error/offline paths return another user's prior response.
+
+**Browser-storage disclosure and stale authorization**
+Tokens, private responses, draft data, or authorization decisions remain in `localStorage`, `sessionStorage`, IndexedDB, Cache Storage, extension storage, or client state and become readable by another account or less-trusted same-origin component. Storage of a token alone is not a finding; require a realistic reader with less authority, or continued use after revocation/logout.
+
+**Cross-context storage and broadcast confusion**
+`storage` events, `BroadcastChannel`, shared workers, or origin-wide caches carry identity or commands between tabs without binding them to the current session. Check account switching, private/public windows, tenant changes, and stale tabs that can overwrite newer auth state.
+
+## Cross-site information leak classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**XS-Leaks and cross-origin state oracles**
+An attacker page can distinguish protected cross-origin state through resource load/error events, frame or window state, redirect behavior, timing, cache state, or response size while the browser attaches victim credentials. Require one concrete secret-bearing predicate such as whether a private object, role, or account exists. Generic timing variance or public-resource availability is not a finding.
+
+**Window and opener state disclosure**
+A cross-origin window's permitted metadata or navigation result reveals protected state, or a retained opener/named-window relationship lets an attacker-controlled page influence a privileged navigation. Check COOP, frame protections, `noopener`, exact origin, and whether the observable state is confidential.
+
+## UI-redress and navigation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Clickjacking**
+A framed, state-changing action lacks effective `frame-ancestors`, `X-Frame-Options`, or equivalent UI isolation. Require the sensitive action and confirm it can complete in the framed state; missing headers on read-only content are hardening notes.
+
+**Client-side navigation confusion**
+A client source controls redirect or navigation without scheme and destination policy, including executable `javascript:` or `data:` destinations. Reverse tabnabbing applies only where code explicitly keeps `window.opener`, uses `window.open` without isolation, or supports a browser without implicit `noopener`.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Start from DOM, navigation, worker, message, and storage sinks, then trace backward to browser-only and server-controlled sources. Record the browser policy that should stop the path.
+- Test account switch, logout, worker update, offline fallback, and stale-tab state with a local test origin and dummy accounts. Do not use production users, origins, or shared services.
+- For XS-Leaks, list only predicates proved by source and local browser behavior. Then identify the response headers or rendering choice that would remove the oracle.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Cite the source, sink, browser policy, affected origin/session, and observable mutation or disclosure.
+2. For prototype pollution, prove the recursive write and a security-relevant gadget. For DOM clobbering, prove the markup survives and the shadowed value is used.
+3. For service workers and storage, prove lifecycle reachability: an attacker-controlled write or cache entry must reach a different account, tenant, or later authorization state.
+4. For messaging, CORS, WebSocket, and XS-Leaks, show exact origin/source validation and the protected state or action exposed. Confirm that CSP, COOP/CORP, cookies, and SameSite policy do not already block it.
+5. Return `confirmed` findings only with a complete client path and bounded local evidence. Return `needs_validation` with the precise deployed header, extension permission, browser version, or renderer behavior an owner must verify.

.agents/skills/security-audit/CLOUD-AND-DEPLOYMENT.md

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+# Cloud and Deployment Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when the repository defines cloud identity, infrastructure, containers, Kubernetes, service mesh, serverless functions, edge workers, ingress, object storage, managed services, or environment-specific configuration. This domain asks whether deployed components receive the intended identity, isolation, network reachability, secrets, and policy. Source often expresses intent rather than live fact, so separate source-confirmed defects from deployment validation needs.
+
+Use `SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md` for build and promotion trust, `WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md` for HTTP proxy semantics, and `DATA-ISOLATION-AND-LIFECYCLE.md` for data-store tenant scope.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- Do not infer a live exposure from a manifest alone. Establish which environment consumes it, what defaults or overlays modify it, and whether the source path is active.
+- Map each workload's identity to specific operations and resources. Broad policy is a finding only when lower-trust input can reach an unauthorized action.
+- Ingress, proxies, service mesh, metadata services, and admission policy are real boundaries, but only count a control when its configuration and attachment are visible.
+- Secret references are not secret disclosure. Require a lower-trust reader, output, artifact, log path, or unsafe fallback.
+- Use `confirmed` for active in-repo configurations and local rendering/policy validation. Use `needs_validation` for account policy, network attachment, runtime admission, hosted metadata, or drift that needs owner observation.
+```
+
+## Workload identity and IAM attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Workload identity overreach**
+A workload, pod, function, edge worker, or node identity can act on tenants, accounts, resources, or APIs beyond its role, and untrusted request or job input selects that target. Review cloud policy conditions, resource patterns, service-account attachment, namespace mapping, and fallback credentials.
+
+**Cross-account or cross-tenant role confusion**
+Role assumption, external IDs, token exchange, workload federation, or resource policies accept identity claims not bound to the intended source account, audience, repository, namespace, or workload. Establish both trust policy and caller-controlled claim.
+
+**Application authorization delegated to cloud metadata**
+An app trusts caller-supplied identity headers, tags, labels, account IDs, or resource metadata without verifying they came from the cloud control plane or a trusted proxy. Cloud IAM and application authorization are separate checks.
+
+## Ingress, network, and control-plane attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Unexpected service or management-plane reachability**
+An ingress, service, listener, security group, load-balancer annotation, port mapping, or server bind exposes an admin, debug, metrics, node, control-plane, or internal API to a lower-trust network. Missing network controls alone are `needs_validation`; a repository-controlled public route to a sensitive handler can be `confirmed`.
+
+**Trusted-proxy and mesh identity bypass**
+A backend accepts forwarded identity, mTLS subject, or authorization metadata from peers outside the intended ingress/sidecar, or an alternate port and health/legacy path bypasses the mesh. Verify header stripping, peer reachability, and fail-open behavior when the proxy is absent.
+
+**Metadata and internal-service reachability**
+An untrusted URL, destination, or protocol selection reaches instance/container metadata, control-plane sockets, or internal APIs with workload credentials. Trace URL parsing and redirect handling under `ATTACK-CLASSES.md`; here establish deployed network, metadata-version, and identity boundaries.
+
+## Container and orchestration attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Host or control-plane capability exposure**
+A lower-trust workload can select privileged mode, capabilities, host namespaces, host paths, device mounts, container runtime sockets, or service-account tokens that cross into node/control-plane authority. Bare absence of seccomp or read-only filesystem is hardening unless a reachable operation crosses that boundary.
+
+**Admission and policy path inconsistency**
+One deployment route enforces image identity, namespace, resource, secret, or privilege policy while another controller, job, upgrade, restore, or compatibility path does not. Confirm the alternate route and resulting deployed object.
+
+**Namespace and label trust confusion**
+Network, admission, secret, or workload-identity policy relies on labels, annotations, names, or namespaces that a less-trusted principal can set. Compare who controls selectors with what authority matching grants.
+
+## Configuration and secret lifecycle attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Security-control precedence drift**
+Development values, chart defaults, environment variables, command-line flags, feature gates, sidecar injection, or per-region overlays disable authentication, transport security, tenant scoping, or audit policy in a deployed environment. Render the final configuration for each maintained deployment, not just the base file.
+
+**Secret exposure across workload boundaries**
+Secrets enter logs, crash reports, process arguments, shared environment, broad volumes, build outputs, service discovery, or read APIs accessible to another workload or tenant. Check secret type and authority; a public endpoint or key ID is not a credential.
+
+**Credential renewal and outage fallback**
+Failure to mount, refresh, rotate, or revoke a workload credential causes stale credentials to remain active or an app to accept a less trusted identity mode. Review startup, readiness, reconnect, and cached-client behavior.
+
+## Managed storage, events, and edge attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Object and signed-URL policy confusion**
+Bucket/container policy, object keys, CDN origins, or signed URLs fail to bind principal, operation, object namespace, audience, or expiry. Review list/version operations and write paths as well as reads.
+
+**Event-source identity confusion**
+A function or worker trusts event body fields as source identity without validating provider-signed envelope, subscription/topic, account, region, and replay state. Compare push, pull, retry, and dead-letter paths.
+
+**Edge/runtime boundary mismatch**
+An edge or serverless runtime assumes a secret, API, filesystem, isolation, or tenant policy that differs from the origin runtime, and fallback to origin changes authority or cache behavior. Confirm which configuration selects each path.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Render every maintained environment and make a matrix of external port, workload identity, network peers, mounted secrets, and cloud resources. Differences require an owner or policy explanation.
+- Follow a lower-trust request, object, label, or event into cloud policy. Show which workload credential performs the final operation and what condition should scope it.
+- Diff normal deploy, migration, restore, node maintenance, failover, and local/emulator paths. Review behavior when mesh, admission, identity, secret, or policy service is unavailable.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Establish the active source path and effective deployment object; otherwise use `needs_validation` and state which rendered manifest or owner-observed attachment is missing.
+2. Name the lower-trust caller/workload, cloud or application identity, controllable selector, affected resource, and unauthorized operation or disclosure.
+3. Verify provider and orchestrator defaults at the pinned version. Do not assume a public IP, reachable metadata service, permissive firewall, or absent admission attachment.
+4. Local validation may render templates, evaluate policy, inspect container/user namespaces in an isolated fixture, or run an emulator with dummy identities. Do not probe live endpoints or alter shared cloud resources.
+5. Return `confirmed` only with a complete active source trace and concrete boundary result. Return `needs_validation` with the exact deployed policy, identity attachment, overlay, network, or drift observation needed.

.agents/skills/security-audit/DATA-ISOLATION-AND-LIFECYCLE.md

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+# Data Isolation and Lifecycle Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when the target stores multi-tenant or access-controlled data, derives search/index/cache/analytics copies, issues object links, exports or restores records, migrates schemas, or promises deletion, revocation, and retention behavior. This domain follows one data item through every copy and state transition. Use `ATTACK-CLASSES.md` for endpoint-level access control and `CLOUD-AND-DEPLOYMENT.md` for provider-level storage policy.
+
+Split large targets by primary storage, cache/search, object/blob storage, analytics/logging, export/backup, deletion/revocation, and migration.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- A tenant or owner field on a record is not isolation. Find the query, key, path, policy, or row-level control that enforces it for each read and write path.
+- Trace derived copies. Sanitized primary data can become unsafe in search, cache, analytics, export, previews, logs, replicas, and backups with different ACL and retention rules.
+- Deletion and revocation are lifecycle contracts. Check current, historical, cached, indexed, exported, restored, and queued copies within the product's stated boundary.
+- Privacy or retention preference is not automatically a security vulnerability. Require an explicit data-access boundary or deletion/revocation guarantee and an unauthorized reader or later operation.
+- Use `confirmed` for complete source-visible lineage and bounded dummy-tenant tests. Use `needs_validation` when external storage policy, retention, CDN behavior, replica lag, or backup access is unavailable.
+```
+
+## Tenant and object-isolation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Missing tenant or owner enforcement**
+A read, update, delete, list, count, or bulk query identifies an object without binding it to the authenticated tenant/owner, or trusts body fields to supply that identity. Compare direct lookup, nested relationship, background, admin, import, and legacy paths.
+
+**Composite-key and namespace collision**
+Cache keys, object paths, database uniqueness, search document IDs, temporary files, or deduplication keys omit tenant or environment. Two principals can overwrite or retrieve the same logical key even though application records carry separate owners.
+
+**Policy and query disagreement**
+Row-level policy, ORM default scopes, authorization filters, and raw/bypass clients apply different predicates. Check joins, aggregates, aliases, views, transactions, `unscoped` or service clients, and error paths where context is missing.
+
+**Blob and signed-reference overreach**
+Object keys, attachment IDs, version IDs, shared links, or signed URLs permit operations or namespaces beyond the issuing principal's access, or remain valid after the underlying ACL changes. Bind operation, exact object/version, audience, expiry, and tenant.
+
+## Derived-data and disclosure attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Search, cache, and index ACL drift**
+A primary record's ACL or lifecycle changes without invalidating a searchable, cached, embedded, thumbnail, RSS, preview, or index copy. Validate filtering at retrieval time as well as document ingestion and invalidation.
+
+**Analytics, logs, traces, and diagnostics as alternate readers**
+Private content or credentials are emitted into systems with broader access, longer retention, or tenant mixing. Confirm the data class and realistic reader; field names, public identifiers, and operator-only content under intended policy are not enough.
+
+**Enumeration and aggregate oracles**
+Counts, filters, ordering, errors, unique constraints, timings, notification behavior, or existence checks disclose protected object or account state. Require a concrete confidential predicate and observable distinction, not general response variance.
+
+## Export, backup, restore, and migration attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Export and backup scope expansion**
+An export, snapshot, portability package, report, or backup includes other tenants, inaccessible object fields, soft-deleted data, secret values, or history above the requester's access. Check per-item authorization after selection and authorization to download the final artifact.
+
+**Import and restore authority expansion**
+Restore/import bypasses owner, schema, ACL, uniqueness, or validation rules, overwrites existing resources, or recreates records in a tenant the requester cannot write. Validate archive contents as untrusted and authorize the resulting operation rather than trusting prior provenance.
+
+**Migration default and ownership confusion**
+Old records lack tenant/ACL/lifecycle fields, incompatible IDs collide, or partial rollout makes new and old readers apply different defaults. Review backfill, dual-read/write, compatibility, rollback, and resumed-migration paths.
+
+**Backup and replication boundary drift**
+Encryption keys, storage accounts, cross-region replicas, restoration environments, or support snapshots have broader identity or tenant scope than primary data. Source can confirm only in-repo policy; hosted access and retention require `needs_validation`.
+
+## Deletion, revocation, and lifecycle attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Soft-delete and tombstone bypass**
+Direct lookup, search, relation traversal, object link, background processor, or restore ignores the lifecycle predicate and returns or acts on a deleted/revoked record. Check whether soft-deleted identifiers can be re-registered before all references are gone.
+
+**Stale authorization and derived copy use**
+Membership removal, ACL update, consent withdrawal, secret revocation, or role downgrade does not invalidate sessions, caches, subscriptions, jobs, or materialized data that continue to authorize future operations.
+
+**Retention and queued-work overrun**
+Deletion completes in primary storage while queued processors, retries, exports, analytics, or generated artifacts recreate or retain the data beyond the promised boundary. Find idempotent deletion and tombstone propagation.
+
+**Restore reintroduces invalid state**
+Backup, undo, undelete, or replica recovery restores data, credentials, memberships, or permissions that current policy no longer allows. Re-authorize restored state and reapply lifecycle changes made after the snapshot.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Pick one protected record and draw primary write, query, cache, index, event, export, backup, deletion, and restore paths. Mark principal and tenant at every edge.
+- Compare two dummy tenants through the same local service methods, then repeat after ACL change, deletion, account switch, and restore. Do not use real user data.
+- Start at bypass clients, background jobs, migrations, global uniqueness, and cache keys. These paths commonly omit request-scoped identity that interactive endpoints carry.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Name attacker or lower-trust principal, protected data/state, affected owner/tenant, alternate copy or operation, and unauthorized disclosure or mutation.
+2. Cite both intended source-of-truth policy and the path that omits or disagrees with it. Confirm another layer does not enforce the same tenant/lifecycle condition.
+3. Use local dummy tenants and non-sensitive fixtures to prove cross-scope access or stale lifecycle behavior. Stop at the minimum observable record or operation.
+4. If external cache, object storage, replicas, analytics, backup, or retention policy is required, classify `needs_validation` and state the owner-observed check.
+5. Return `confirmed` only with complete lineage and concrete boundary impact. Return `needs_validation` with the exact unresolved storage, ACL, invalidation, retention, or restore fact.

.agents/skills/security-audit/DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# Desktop, Mobile, and Local IPC Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when the target is a desktop or mobile app, privileged helper, updater, local daemon, webview host, deep-link handler, browser native-messaging host, or local IPC client/server. Relevant untrusted actors may be a downloaded document, remote web content, another local app, another OS user, a sandboxed process, or a lower-privilege account. State that starting capability instead of treating all local users as equivalent.
+
+Use `CLIENT-SIDE.md` for browser-side webview behavior, `MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md` for native memory and loader safety, and `SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md` for update authenticity.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- Establish the realistic local or remote-content attacker: another app, another OS user, a sandboxed child, an untrusted document, or a remote origin. Self-harm within the same account and authority is not a boundary violation.
+- Paths, process names, bundle/package IDs, and claimed sender fields are not peer authentication. Use OS peer credentials, code identity, capability handles, or protected channel state.
+- The native bridge or helper must authorize each operation and final resource after parsing. A trusted UI or broker does not make attacker-influenceable arguments trusted.
+- OS sandbox, signing, entitlements, permissions, keychain ACLs, exported-component policy, and prompt behavior are real controls when pinned and visible.
+- Use `confirmed` for source evidence plus bounded local/emulator tests. Use `needs_validation` when signing, manifest merge, OS version, device policy, installer ACL, or packaging is required but not observable.
+```
+
+## Deep-link, callback, and navigation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Custom-scheme and deep-link ambiguity**
+Another app or page can invoke a route that mutates state, imports data, completes authentication, or selects an account without a current-session and one-time callback binding. Review URI normalization, duplicate query fields, scheme/host/path matching, exported activity/handler policy, and stale/replayed links.
+
+**App and account handoff confusion**
+OAuth, SSO, magic-link, invite, device pairing, passwordless, or payment callbacks return to the wrong installed app, profile, tenant, or pending transaction. Bind state to the initiating app identity, current session, account, provider, operation, and expiry.
+
+**File-open and intent authority confusion**
+An associated file, share intent, drag/drop item, pasteboard/clipboard record, notification action, or open-file event triggers a privileged operation without confirming content type, sender trust where applicable, current user intent, and final target.
+
+## Webview and native-bridge attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Navigation-origin to bridge confusion**
+Remote or attacker-controlled frames can reach a JavaScript/native bridge intended only for packaged content. Validate origin at call time and after every navigation, redirect, subframe creation, popup, and error/fallback page. URL-prefix checks and initial-load checks are insufficient.
+
+**Over-broad native bridge capabilities**
+Web content can select arbitrary files, commands, IPC methods, credentials, or system actions through a generic bridge. Check method allowlists, normalized arguments, user/tenant authority, gesture/confirmation requirements, and return-value disclosure.
+
+**Webview file and universal access**
+Remote content can read app-local files, privileged custom schemes, or internal origins because file access, universal access, mixed content, debug interfaces, or custom protocol handlers join origins unexpectedly. Missing a restrictive setting without reachable protected content is hardening.
+
+## Local IPC and exported-component attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**IPC peer-authentication gaps**
+Unix sockets, named pipes, XPC, Binder, D-Bus, native messaging, RPC, shared memory, or loopback listeners accept a lower-trust peer without checking OS credentials, code identity, sandbox token, or channel ownership. Require a meaningful method or disclosure behind the channel.
+
+**Claimed principal versus channel identity**
+The authenticated process/channel belongs to one app or user, but request fields select another user, tenant, profile, or capability. Bind each method and resource to the peer credential rather than a caller-declared identifier.
+
+**Exported service, activity, receiver, or provider overreach**
+A mobile component or local automation endpoint is externally invokable and performs an operation intended for the app itself. Review final merged manifests, intent filters, permission/signature level, path grants, and alternate aliases. Manifest status unknown after packaging requires `needs_validation`.
+
+**IPC lifecycle and correlation confusion**
+Predictable request IDs, reused handles, stale channels, inherited descriptors, world-writable socket paths, or restart behavior lets one peer answer, cancel, or reuse another peer's operation. Review creation permissions and cleanup of socket files, locks, ports, and shared mappings.
+
+## Privileged-helper and local-file attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Privileged helper as confused deputy**
+A low-privilege caller can select a privileged command, file, service, user, or system setting without per-operation authorization. Review sudo/polkit/UAC/XPC helper rules and ensure the helper independently validates normalized arguments.
+
+**Install, update, and repair path trust**
+A privileged installer/helper reads manifests, scripts, packages, symlinks, working directories, or repair state writable by a lower-trust actor after authorization. Bind authorization to immutable content and safe destination paths.
+
+**Local file ownership and TOCTOU**
+The app checks a file/path then follows replacement, symlink, mount, or case/normalization changes during a privileged read/write. Use descriptor-relative operations and verify final ownership. Focus `MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md` on parsing after the file is opened.
+
+**Credential-store and local-secret boundary mismatch**
+A keychain/keystore item, token file, backup, log, clipboard, notification preview, or local config is readable by another app/profile/user with less authority. Plaintext readable only by the same intended OS account is not automatically a vulnerability; state the lower-trust reader and credential power.
+
+## Application-state and device-lifecycle attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Account switch, logout, and device restore leakage**
+Cached data, background tasks, widgets, notifications, local databases, webview storage, or biometric approvals survive logout/account change and appear under a later account. Review backup/restore and multi-profile behavior.
+
+**Pending-action and user-presence confusion**
+Notification, widget, shortcut, share sheet, biometric prompt, or deferred operation authorizes a different action than displayed, executes after expiry, or uses another profile's pending state. Bind confirmation to normalized action, resource, account, and current foreground state.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Enumerate every process, app component, local endpoint, URI scheme, file association, webview origin, and helper. Record OS identity, runtime privilege, caller, and callable operation.
+- Read final packaging inputs: merged manifest, entitlements, installer rules, native-messaging registration, protocol handlers, and ACL creation. Source declarations can be overwritten downstream.
+- Validate with dummy profiles and non-sensitive local fixtures on an isolated machine/emulator. Do not interact with other users' apps, credentials, or production services.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Name the attacker starting capability, OS/app principal crossed, entry channel, accepted argument or state, and unauthorized operation or disclosure.
+2. Confirm OS sandbox, peer credential, signing, entitlement, permission, user-consent, and installer controls that apply. Unknown packaging/runtime facts require `needs_validation`.
+3. For webview bridges, cite both navigation/origin control and privileged native sink. For IPC, cite peer authentication and per-resource authorization. For helpers, verify final normalized destination.
+4. Keep local tests bounded and use dummy content/accounts. Stop after proving the boundary result; do not extend proof into persistence or broader system modification.
+5. Return `confirmed` only with a complete source and local evidence chain. Return `needs_validation` with the exact OS, manifest, signing, ACL, or device-lifecycle fact required.

.agents/skills/security-audit/HUNTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+# Vulnerability Hunting
+
+### Phase 2: Run coverage-led hunting waves
+
+The parent assigns `planned` ledger units to `general` agents. Use enough focused hunters to cover the units without combining unrelated boundaries. One hunter may own closely related units in one subsystem; no unit may be silently unassigned because of an agent-count limit — a unit the budget cannot reach is explicitly `deferred` with reason `budget_cannot_reserve_critics_and_validation`.
+
+When a budget or profile caps hunter count, assign units in priority order and record the ordering rationale in the ledger. Rank by: (1) unauthenticated or lowest-trust entry surfaces before authenticated ones; (2) boundaries protecting the most valuable resources (credentials, cross-tenant data, code execution, release authority); (3) prior-run gaps, revalidation targets, and changed source before same-source re-passes; (4) units whose class historically yields confirmed findings for this target type over speculative ones. Ties break lexicographically by `coverage_id` so runs stay deterministic.
+
+Before launch, the parent changes assigned units to `in_progress`, sets a canonical lowercase `agent_id`, and creates that agent's `scratch/` and parent-owned `artifacts/`. Hunters read source and parent-provided context, write only to their unique `scratch/`, and return one structured result through the Task tool. They never write retained artifacts or edit target source, `architecture.md`, `coverage-ledger.json`, `findings.json`, or another agent's files.
+
+## Required hunter prompt
+
+Every hunter prompt contains these parts in this order:
+
+1. A two-sentence role preamble: the hunter's goal is to find source-grounded security invariant failures in its assigned units, and it must return exactly one JSON object matching the structured-result contract at the end of this prompt.
+2. `architecture.md` verbatim.
+3. Assigned coverage IDs, subsystem, boundary, repository-relative starting paths, and each unit's assignment block map from `coverage-ledger.json`.
+4. The exact selected blocks, copied verbatim: each selected ordinary attack-class block from `ATTACK-CLASSES.md`, and from each selected companion its `Core discipline`, each chosen attack-class subsection, `Universal moves`, and `Validation rules`. Ordinary blocks are self-contained and carry no companion-style `Core discipline`, `Universal moves`, or `Validation rules` sections. Do not send block or companion names alone.
+5. Explicit excluded ordinary and companion blocks with a reason for each exclusion.
+6. The core hunting method below, followed by the promotion procedure block.
+7. The core validation rules below.
+8. Carried same-source prior confirmed exclusions, each limited to fingerprint, title, and root cause, plus peer-owned current coverage IDs that this hunter must not duplicate.
+9. The unique scratch/artifact paths, safe agent ID, predeclared promotion allowlist and byte limits, and the structured-result contract, including the Structured hunter result block below and the `confirmed` and `needs_validation` branches of `report-schema.json` copied verbatim.
+
+A prompt may select several companion blocks when the same path crosses several domains. Keep their constraints together. Scope is the hunter's coverage obligation, not permission to duplicate excluded work. If an unexpected different boundary appears, return it under `uncovered` so the parent creates a stable ledger unit and assigns it in the next wave.
+
+#### Core hunting method — include in every hunter prompt
+
+```text
+## Defensive vulnerability-finding method
+
+Your goal is to find source-grounded security invariant failures and the smallest fix,
+not to expand harm beyond the boundary result. Stay within source review and bounded local execution.
+Do not contact deployed endpoints, provider APIs, registries, identity systems,
+message brokers, shared services, or other users. Use local dummy data only.
+
+READ THE CODE AT DEPTH. Follow each assigned input through parsing, identity,
+authorization, normalization, state, derived copies, and the final sink. Read sibling,
+legacy, batch, retry, cancellation, migration, and error paths that produce the same
+effect. Compare sibling controls for equivalence, not only presence, and compare what
+one component guarantees with what the next component assumes.
+
+WORK FROM A CONCRETE INVARIANT:
+1. Name the lower-trust principal and starting capability.
+2. Name the accepted value, action, state transition, or resource selector.
+3. Locate the control that should reject, bind, isolate, limit, or revoke it.
+4. Trace the exact source path after that decision.
+5. Stop at the smallest affected dummy record, wrong return value, process-integrity
+   effect, or locally observable shared-resource effect.
+6. State a source-level change and regression case that enforce the invariant.
+
+DEPTH BOUND: trace only paths that can reach your assigned boundary or whose
+guarantees that boundary relies on. Stop a line of investigation as soon as the
+invariant is settled either way, and record the result in your structured output —
+a covered, candidate, or blocked disposition, or an `uncovered` entry — instead of
+continuing to search.
+
+TEST SAD PATHS AND DISAGREEMENTS. Check absent, empty, zero, negative, maximum,
+over-limit, duplicate, mixed encoding, stale, revoked, reordered, concurrent,
+partially migrated, failed dependency, and rollback state only where the interface
+accepts them. Compare canonicalization and units at every parser or policy handoff.
+For multi-step issues, treat each output as a prerequisite and do not assume a later
+boundary. If any prerequisite is not established, record a blocker.
+
+When a proposed high or critical candidate reveals a reusable root cause, search paths
+owned by the assigned coverage IDs for lexical, structural, and logical variants.
+Consolidate the same root cause, but establish each variant's conditions and impact
+independently. Do not investigate peer-owned units. Return a variant with no current
+coverage unit as `uncovered`.
+
+USE THE NARROWEST LOCAL CHECK THAT SETTLES THE CLAIM. Target-controlled builds,
+tests, processes, browsers, emulators, fuzzers, and fixture processing may run only
+inside the parent-approved OS-enforced sandbox. It must disable external networking,
+start from an empty allowlisted environment, expose target and tools read-only, permit
+writes only to your scratch directory, and apply low CPU, memory, process, file-size,
+disk, and wall-clock limits. Isolated loopback is allowed only for a local fixture.
+If any control is unavailable, do not execute: return needs_validation with that exact
+blocker. Prefer an existing unit test, minimal function harness, dummy-tenant service
+call, small malformed fixture, deterministic race schedule, or locally rendered policy.
+Do not install or fetch tools.
+
+Record the exact input, command, limits, and minimum result. For the environment,
+record only allowlisted variable names and safe non-secret values needed to reproduce
+the check. Never capture the ambient environment, inherited variables, credentials,
+authentication state, or unrelated host paths. The target-controlled process writes
+only in scratch. After the sandbox and all its processes terminate, only trusted
+parent-side code may promote predeclared scratch-relative files, following the
+promotion procedure block included verbatim in this prompt. You and target code never
+write retained artifacts. If promotion is unavailable or fails for decisive evidence,
+return needs_validation with the exact promotion blocker.
+Never stress availability, invoke a live target, use a real credential, publish an
+artifact, or continue past the minimum observed effect.
+
+A deployment, browser, provider, broker, OS, proxy, package, secret, or identity fact
+outside source is not proof either way. If one such fact is decisive, return a
+needs_validation record with the exact missing observation and safe owner-observed check.
+```
+
+#### Promotion procedure — copy this promotion procedure verbatim into every hunter prompt
+
+```text
+Artifact promotion procedure (trusted parent-side code only):
+Reference only for you: the parent performs these steps; you never perform them.
+
+Before execution, the parent opens and retains trusted, non-inheritable directory
+descriptors for the agent's scratch/ and artifacts/ roots, and records an allowlist
+of expected scratch-relative artifact files plus explicit per-file and cumulative
+byte limits. Never pass those descriptors to the agent or sandbox. After the sandbox
+and all its processes terminate, trusted parent-side code promotes each allowlisted
+file separately:
+
+1. Validate the declared relative path: reject absolute, empty, `.`, `..`, or
+   symlinked components.
+2. Walk each parent component from the retained scratch-root descriptor with
+   no-follow directory-relative operations; never reopen by path.
+3. Open the leaf no-follow and nonblocking.
+4. Verify with `fstat` that it is a regular file with link count exactly one and
+   within the recorded per-file and cumulative byte limits.
+5. Enforce those limits again while reading from that descriptor.
+6. Copy exactly the verified size, repeat `fstat`, and reject a changed identity,
+   type, link count, or size.
+7. For the destination, walk every parent component from the retained
+   artifacts-root descriptor with no-follow directory-relative operations; require
+   each existing component to be a real directory, and create any missing directory
+   exclusively before reopening and verifying it no-follow.
+8. Create the leaf exclusively without following links, verify that the opened
+   destination is a regular file with link count exactly one, and copy from the
+   verified source descriptor without reopening either path.
+9. Use equivalent race-safe APIs on non-POSIX systems.
+10. Never recursively copy or glob scratch, extract an archive into artifacts, or
+    open or promote a symlink, FIFO, socket, device, directory, hard-linked file,
+    changing file, or file that exceeds its bound.
+11. If any check is unavailable, cannot be enforced, or fails, discard the scratch
+    entry; if it is decisive evidence, retain `needs_validation` with the exact
+    promotion blocker.
+```
+
+#### Core validation rules — include in every hunter prompt
+
+```text
+## Candidate gate
+
+1. A candidate needs a complete repository-relative source trace and evidence for the
+   claimed root cause, including the strongest source-visible control.
+2. A proposed confirmed record needs a bounded local observed result, meaningful impact
+   across a stated boundary, complete conditions, and no visible preventing layer.
+3. Do not strengthen a crash into code execution, ordinary work into shared availability,
+   or a same-principal action into privilege gain.
+4. If a required fact is not source-visible or locally observable, use
+   needs_validation. Name exact blockers; do not give it severity or speculative completion.
+5. A missing best practice with no affected principal/resource is excluded or hardening,
+   not a finding. A candidate disproved by source is not needs_validation.
+6. Use the same source-derived fingerprint for the same root cause in every state.
+   It must match `^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$` and must not include a line,
+   wave, agent, severity, or verdict.
+7. Return an empty candidate array when nothing survives these gates.
+```
+
+## Local validation boundaries
+
+Local execution is for confirmation, not impact expansion:
+
+- **Allowed only in the required OS sandbox:** offline builds with present dependencies; isolated-loopback processes using dummy state; unit and integration tests; small fixture processing; sanitizers; bounded fuzz/regression tests; deterministic concurrency checks; local browser/emulator tests with dummy accounts; rendered manifests and policy evaluation with dummy identities; mocked external or paid calls.
+- **Disallowed:** live or deployed traffic; requests to services not started for this isolated check; network dependency installation; real accounts or credentials; production data; shared queues, cloud resources, runners, registries, signing or release services; publishing; stress, saturation, or cost generation; any work after the minimum dummy-data boundary result.
+
+The sandbox starts with an empty environment, gives target code no external network or host writable path, and enforces explicit low resource and time limits for every check, not only checks expected to be expensive. Scratch output remains target-controlled after exit. Promote it only with the no-follow, path-confined, regular-file, bounded-size host procedure in `SKILL.md`. Missing any sandbox or promotion capability does not erase a source-grounded candidate; represent the exact blocker in `needs_validation`.
+
+## Structured hunter result
+
+Return exactly one JSON object, with no surrounding prose:
+
+```json
+{
+  "units": [
+    {
+      "coverage_id": "one assigned ID",
+      "disposition": "covered|candidate|blocked",
+      "reviewed_paths": ["repo/relative/path"],
+      "checks": [
+        {
+          "agent_id": "canonical owner of this check",
+          "reviewed_paths": ["repo/relative/path owned by this check"],
+          "invariant": "specific control checked for this unit",
+          "method": "source|local",
+          "result": "what source or the bounded check established",
+          "artifact": "agents/<agent-id>/artifacts/file for local, null for source"
+        }
+      ],
+      "candidate_fingerprints": [],
+      "unresolved": []
+    }
+  ],
+  "candidates": [],
+  "hardening": ["concrete non-finding note"],
+  "uncovered": [
+    {
+      "surface": "...",
+      "boundary": "...",
+      "subsystem": "...",
+      "attack_class": "...",
+      "starting_paths": ["repo/relative/path"],
+      "reason": "why this needs its own deterministic coverage unit"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+Each `candidates` entry is schema-shaped except that it uses `proposed_verdict` in place of `verdict`:
+
+- `proposed_verdict: "confirmed"`: include every field required by the `confirmed` branch of `report-schema.json` other than `verdict`: `fingerprint`, title, description, `root_cause`, `intended_behavior`, ordered `trace`, `evidence`, `conditions`, target-neutral `execution`, `remediation`, `severity`, and `confidence`. The execution instructions describe only the bounded local check already performed. `payloads` holds the minimum test input, fixture, or native invocation. `observed_result` records actual local output. Overall severity must not exceed observed impact.
+- `proposed_verdict: "needs_validation"`: include every field required by that schema branch other than `verdict`: `fingerprint`, title, description, `claimed_root_cause`, ordered `trace`, `evidence`, nonempty `blockers`, and `validation_plan` with at least one applicable `local` or `deployment` step. Do not invent an inapplicable context. Do not include severity, execution, remediation, reason, or a confirmed `root_cause`. `deployment` is an owner-observed check, not a request to probe a live target.
+
+Every assigned coverage ID appears exactly once in `units`. A `covered` unit needs an owner, nonempty `reviewed_paths` and `checks`, no unresolved fact, and no candidate. A `candidate` unit has the same owned evidence and is the only state that carries linked fingerprints. A `blocked` unit is an owned partial review with nonempty paths, checks, and unresolved facts but no fingerprint. All source paths are repository-relative, never absolute or traversal paths. A trace with several entries begins at `entrypoint`, ends at `sink`, and labels intermediate steps `propagation`. Every check has its own canonical lowercase `agent_id` and nonempty `reviewed_paths`; the unit-level list is exactly the union of those owned paths. A `source` check uses `artifact: null`. A `local` check uses one successfully parent-promoted regular file beneath `agents/<check.agent_id>/artifacts/`; this permits a verifier to add independently owned evidence without taking ownership from the hunter. Never link scratch, an output-root file, or another check owner's artifact.
+
+## Parent consolidation and ledger update
+
+The parent validates each unit result, maps it to exactly one assigned `coverage_id`, and updates only that ledger unit. Reject duplicate or absent IDs, unsafe unit or check agent IDs, source checks with artifacts, and local artifacts that trusted parent-side code did not promote into the check owner's artifacts subtree. Copy the unit's `reviewed_paths`, its `checks` into the unit's `local_checks`, linked artifact paths, candidate fingerprints, and unresolved facts into the ledger. Retain each hunter's `hardening` list in a parent bookkeeping field on the relevant units (outside the semantic fields) so Phase 6 can report it. A failed, malformed, or unsupported conclusion leaves that unit `planned` for reassignment. Untouched budget/profile units become unassigned `deferred` units with empty evidence and a reason; do not hide partial evidence in `deferred`. Run `validate-coverage-ledger.cjs` after the update; an invalid ledger cannot drive another assignment. This per-unit contract allows one hunter to close one unit while returning a candidate or blocker for another.
+
+Consolidate candidate entries by fingerprint and then by root cause. One root cause that exposes several entry paths or effects is one candidate with the strongest complete trace. Related but independent missing controls use separate fingerprints. Record duplicate fingerprints in the relevant ledger unit and do not send duplicate candidates to validation.
+
+## Coverage-critic waves
+
+Immediately after each hunter wave, spend the reserved invocation on one fresh `research` post-wave coverage critic. It receives `architecture.md`, the full coverage ledger including each assignment block map, current candidate fingerprints and states, and the prior-ledger gap summary. It reads source but does not write or run targets. Require exactly this JSON:
+
+```json
+{
+  "missing_units": [
+    {
+      "surface": "...",
+      "boundary": "...",
+      "subsystem": "...",
+      "attack_class": "...",
+      "starting_paths": ["repo/relative/path"],
+      "selected_companion_blocks": ["FILE.md#section"],
+      "excluded_blocks": [{"block": "FILE.md#section", "reason": "..."}],
+      "reason": "source-backed coverage gap"
+    }
+  ],
+  "reassign_ids": ["existing-id-that-did-not-close"],
+  "resolved_prior_leads": ["fingerprint"],
+  "stop": false
+}
+```
+
+The critic checks for unmapped entry points, unchecked parallel paths, missing lifecycle modes, selected companion classes without a unit, unjustified exclusions, units closed without paths/checks, and prior `needs_validation` or changed-source gaps that no unit addresses. It proposes coverage, not findings. `stop` is the critic's own assessment: `true` only when it accepts no `missing_units` and no `reassign_ids`; the parent's loop condition below, not `stop` alone, decides whether another wave runs. For each fingerprint in `resolved_prior_leads`, the parent marks the linked unit or prior-lead entry resolved and records the critic's source-backed reason.
+
+The parent rejects proposed units outside the review scope or source/local boundary, derives canonical IDs for accepted units, and deduplicates them against current units. A prior same-source completed unit may supply evidence; prior `deferred`, `blocked`, `out_of_scope`, or changed-source units become current work and never suppress an accepted unit. Fail rather than merge a canonical ID collision. For each legitimate `reassign_id` with live `blocked`, `covered`, or `candidate` evidence, append that exact terminal record to the unit's `attempts` with the critic's source-backed `reassignment_reason`. Preserve its owner, checks, artifacts, fingerprints, and unresolved facts in that archive. Increment the live `wave`; the next hunter must be a fresh owner and receives an `in_progress` unit with empty live evidence. The hunter's terminal result writes only its new evidence into the live fields. Never copy an archived owner's checks or artifacts into the new live attempt. Sort IDs and validate the ledger before another assignment. In `standard` and `deep`, when the post-wave critic reports no accepted `missing_units` or legitimate `reassign_ids` and no `planned` units remain, spend the separately reserved invocation on a distinct final-clean critic. Complete coverage only when that critic also returns no accepted work. If it finds work, queue it and repeat the wave, post-wave critic, and final-clean process. If time or resources force an early stop, mark every untouched unit `deferred`, preserve the critic's reason, and disclose the gap in the report. Never use a silent wave or agent cap as evidence of complete coverage.
+
+The run profile bounds this loop. A `quick` run has exactly one hunter wave followed by exactly one final critic pass. Add each accepted `missing_unit` to the current ledger and mark it `deferred` with reason `quick_profile_final_critic`. For each legitimate evidence-bearing `reassign_id`, archive the live terminal state in `attempts`, increment `wave`, and set the live state to unassigned `deferred` with empty evidence and reason `quick_profile_final_critic`. Do not launch a second hunter wave or another critic. In a scoped run, the critic still reports out-of-scope gaps it notices, but the parent records them as `out_of_scope` with the critic's reason instead of assigning them. The early-stop rule above is the same mechanism: `quick` is a pre-declared early stop, not evidence of complete coverage.
+
+A budget bounds it the same way. Before assigning each wave, compare remaining budget against its hunter count, the validation reserve, the immediate post-wave critic, and the retained final-clean critic (`quick` reserves only its single final post-wave critic). Shrink the hunter wave to fit, taking units in priority order. If those mandatory reserves do not fit, launch no hunter from that wave and mark its planned units `deferred` with reason `budget_cannot_reserve_critics_and_validation`. Critic-proposed units enter the same ranked queue rather than extending the budget. If surviving candidates exceed the validation reserve, follow the incomplete-run rule in `SKILL.md`: stop hunting, validate in fingerprint order, retain unvalidated units as unresolved candidates, and never present them as findings.

.agents/skills/security-audit/MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# Memory Safety, Binary, and Kernel Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when the target processes untrusted bytes in a memory-unsafe or privileged context: C/C++/Objective-C, Rust `unsafe`, FFI, kernel modules and drivers, parsers and decoders, network daemons, firmware, binary loaders, language runtimes, and JITs. Use `PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md` for protocol authorization and state-machine logic, and this file for process integrity, memory safety, ABI boundaries, and loader behavior.
+
+Pick relevant classes from Phase 1 and split large targets by parser, allocator/lifetime, FFI, concurrency, loader, runtime, or privileged interface.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- Re-derive every bound and lifetime from attacker-controlled inputs and all callers. Validate against the worst accepted case, not a typical test vector.
+- A panic, sanitizer finding, or crash proves a defect only when a realistic untrusted input reaches it. Do not infer memory corruption, code execution, or shared availability impact from a label alone.
+- Validate in a local harness with sanitizers, deterministic concurrency tests, existing fuzz targets, and debugger-assisted fault classification. Stop after proving the violated invariant and observable impact; do not develop post-corruption techniques.
+- Assembly, JIT code, custom allocators, intra-object accesses, and foreign libraries can escape sanitizer coverage. Identify which relevant instructions are instrumented.
+- Classify as `confirmed` only after source evidence and bounded local validation establish the defect and effect. Use `needs_validation` when ABI, allocator, architecture, feature, deployment, or reachability facts remain unknown.
+```
+
+## Bounds, integer, and representation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Out-of-bounds read or write**
+A length, offset, index, or terminator reaches a fixed or allocated buffer without a correct bound. Recalculate available headroom after prefixes, alignment, padding, and terminators. Check both source and destination capacity, and whether a short input is read before its declared length is trusted.
+
+**Integer overflow, underflow, truncation, and signedness**
+Review attacker-controlled arithmetic before allocation, copy, loop, indexing, and pointer operations. High-hit patterns include `a - b` with `b > a`, `count * element_size`, additions near the type maximum, negative values converted to unsigned, 64-bit lengths narrowed to 32-bit fields, and sentinel values such as `-1` becoming a large size. Confirm which checked representation is later used.
+
+**Unit and pointer-depth confusion**
+Code mixes bytes, elements, code units, pages, words, wire units, or nested pointer element sizes. Compare the unit at parse, validation, allocation, API boundary, and copy. A bounds check using the same wrong unit as the allocation is still wrong.
+
+**Uninitialized or partially initialized data**
+A buffer, padding, struct field, or vector capacity is returned, compared, hashed, serialized, or passed across a trust boundary before initialization. Require an observable consumer and realistic output length; stack allocation by itself is not disclosure.
+
+## Lifetime, type, and concurrency attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Use-after-free, stale view, and double free**
+Owners are released while callbacks, wait queues, timers, iterators, borrowed slices, or cached raw pointers can still use them. Review every error, cancellation, close, and realloc path. For embedded notification anchors, each free path must drain or detach all observers.
+
+**Type confusion and invalid downcast**
+A tag, vtable, union discriminator, object kind, or foreign handle is checked differently from the representation later read. Look for unchecked dynamic casts, stale tags after reuse, and serialized types whose validated element differs from the element consumed. Confirm a wrong-type read or write locally without extending the test beyond the violated invariant.
+
+**Reference-count and ownership races**
+Non-atomic retain/release, a check followed by an unlocked use, or inconsistent ownership across threads can free or mutate an object during access. Compare fast, error, shutdown, and compatibility paths for the same lock and ownership rules.
+
+**Shared-state races and TOCTOU**
+Concurrent parser streams, global caches, lazy initialization, signal handlers, and resource teardown can invalidate bounds, policy, or pointers established earlier. Verify the race with a repeatable local schedule, barrier, or thread sanitizer; a hypothetical interleaving without a security-relevant state transition remains `needs_validation`.
+
+**Lock-order, deadlock, and starvation**
+Externally reachable operations acquire locks in inconsistent order or hold them across callbacks and blocking I/O. Report under availability only when bounded input can stop shared progress; otherwise record it for fixing as a concurrency defect.
+
+## FFI and ABI attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Pointer-length and ownership contract mismatch**
+Caller and callee disagree on who allocates, frees, pins, or mutates a buffer, how long a pointer remains valid, or whether a length is bytes or elements. Trace both sides of every `extern`, CGo/JNI/Python/native binding, and generated wrapper. Check null, zero length, aliasing, and callback retention.
+
+**Layout, alignment, and enum disagreement**
+Foreign code receives a struct, bitfield, packed record, callback signature, integer width, enum, or calling convention that differs by architecture or build flag. Verify `repr`, packing, alignment, endianness, and ABI-specific types. An in-repo declaration mismatch can be confirmed locally; an opaque foreign implementation requires `needs_validation`.
+
+**Unwind, exception, and thread-affinity violations**
+Exceptions or panics cross an ABI that forbids unwinding, callbacks run after teardown, or APIs requiring one runtime thread are invoked elsewhere. Review error conversion and cancellation. Confirm whether the process aborts or state is corrupted before assigning impact.
+
+## Binary loading and runtime attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Library, plugin, and executable search-order trust**
+A privileged process loads a library, plugin, runtime image, or helper from a path writable by a less-trusted principal, or resolves a bare name through an attacker-influenceable working directory or environment. Compare intended installation ownership with each fallback and compatibility search path. A user loading their own plugin into their own process is not a boundary violation.
+
+**Missing artifact identity or signature binding**
+A loader verifies one file or metadata record but maps a different image because path resolution, file replacement, architecture slices, or embedded resources are not bound to the check. Supply-channel authenticity belongs in `SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md`; this class covers the local verification-to-map gap.
+
+**Malformed binary metadata and relocation handling**
+Offsets, counts, sections, relocations, symbols, bytecode, or debug metadata are trusted before range, overlap, and representation checks. Test parsers with bounded local fixtures and sanitizers. Separate memory corruption from a safely rejected malformed file.
+
+**JIT and generated-code consistency**
+Validator, interpreter, optimizer, and generated code disagree about types, bounds, side effects, or lifetime. Diff optimized and unoptimized paths using the same local input. Confirm a process-integrity effect; output variance that stays within language semantics is not a finding.
+
+**Unload, reload, and teardown safety**
+Live function pointers, callbacks, worker threads, or data views survive module unload or runtime reset. Review shutdown and failed-load cleanup as closely as startup.
+
+## Kernel and privileged-interface attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**User-copy bounds and repeated reads**
+A syscall, ioctl, driver, or kernel parser derives a trusted fact from user memory then reads the same mutable address again. Copy the full request once or revalidate the later copy. Also audit size, direction, and access checks at each user-copy primitive.
+
+**Privileged object lifecycle and dispatch consistency**
+Externally reachable objects have unbalanced retain/release, teardown without observer drain, unchecked selector/table indices, or duplicated compatibility paths that omit a guard. Diff each dispatch and free path side by side.
+
+**Under-authorized powerful interfaces**
+A device node, admin socket, helper, or management API validates shape but not the caller's authority over the resource. Establish actual interface ownership and reachability; permissions or sandbox policy outside the repository make this `needs_validation`.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Audit fixes and duplicated paths for the same source-to-sink shape. A check in one caller, architecture, protocol role, feature flag, or compatibility path does not protect its siblings.
+- Build a table for every parser or FFI boundary: accepted length/type, checked representation, allocation owner, consumer, thread, and teardown. Most native findings are one disagreement in that table.
+- Use existing corpora and small locally generated boundary fixtures. Save exact sanitizer/runtime output and the input property that triggers it; avoid large resource consumption and any live target.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Establish a realistic untrusted entry and exact operation that violates a bounds, type, lifetime, ABI, concurrency, loader, or authority invariant.
+2. Classify the observable effect: invalid read, invalid write, stale alias, wrong object, uninitialized output, unauthorized image load, deadlock, or safe process termination. Do not claim a stronger effect than observed.
+3. Run the narrowest local harness, existing test, sanitizer, or fuzzer needed to reproduce the effect. Verify sanitizer coverage of the faulting operation and record architecture/build conditions.
+4. For concurrency, use a deterministic schedule or sanitizer trace. For binary loading, prove the checked identity differs from the mapped identity and name the lower-trust writer.
+5. Return `confirmed` findings only with exact input, source trace, and observed result. Return `needs_validation` for a specific unresolved reachability, ABI, build, deployment, or runtime fact and state the bounded check needed.

.agents/skills/security-audit/PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Protocols, RPC, and Messaging Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when the target uses gRPC, GraphQL transports, Cap'n Proto, Thrift, Protobuf, custom binary protocols, streaming RPC, webhooks, brokers, queues, pub/sub, or event buses. It covers peer identity, logical message interpretation, routing, replay, ordering, and delivery semantics. Use `MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md` for parser memory safety, `WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md` for HTTP framing, and `RESOURCE-EXHAUSTION-AND-AVAILABILITY.md` for availability impact.
+
+Split large systems by producer/consumer pair, external/internal peer role, synchronous RPC, streaming, and asynchronous message path.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- "Internal" is not authentication. Name the peer identity at every hop and show how it becomes the application principal used for authorization.
+- Schema validation proves message shape, not provenance, resource authority, ordering, or safe values. Follow decoded fields to policy and side effects.
+- Broker guarantees and application guarantees differ. Write down retry, ordering, acknowledgement, deduplication, and transaction behavior before evaluating state changes.
+- Parser disagreement requires two concrete consumers, schema versions, or wire representations and one security-relevant divergent value.
+- Use `confirmed` for source-complete paths plus bounded local producer/consumer tests. Use `needs_validation` for broker ACL, service-mesh identity, topic attachment, or compatibility behavior outside the repository.
+```
+
+## Framing, schema, and interpretation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Message boundary and canonicalization disagreement**
+Components disagree on length, compression, duplicate fields, unknown fields, encoding, numeric width, normalization, or envelope/body precedence. Compare generated and custom parsers, gateways, language bindings, and version converters. Confirm which principal, resource, or operation differs after decoding.
+
+**Union, enum, and default confusion**
+Unknown variants, missing discriminators, zero values, default privileges, or compatibility mappings reach code that assumes a validated case. Review exhaustive dispatch, default branches, and how old consumers interpret newly added fields.
+
+**Envelope and payload identity mismatch**
+Authorization uses trusted-looking routing or envelope metadata while the handler acts on a conflicting tenant, account, subject, object, or sender in the body. Identify which source is authoritative and ensure clients cannot override it.
+
+## RPC identity and authorization attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Interceptor and method-path inconsistency**
+An authn/authz interceptor applies to unary methods but not streams, reflection, health, gateway-transcoded paths, compatibility services, or individual stream messages. Compare every registration and route to the same operation.
+
+**Peer identity to application-principal confusion**
+mTLS, workload identity, bearer metadata, forwarded identity, or broker credentials authenticate a channel, but a caller-controlled field selects the user or tenant. The channel identity and claimed principal must be bound by deterministic policy.
+
+**Per-item and streaming authorization gaps**
+A stream, subscription, batch, or bulk message is authorized once, then later items name different resources or continue after role, membership, or token revocation. Re-check where scope can change and bind subscriptions to their original principal.
+
+**Callback and reply-correlation confusion**
+Predictable, reused, or cross-tenant correlation IDs let a response, webhook, cancellation, or acknowledgment satisfy another caller's pending operation. Bind each outstanding request to authenticated peer, tenant, operation, and lifecycle.
+
+## Broker and queue isolation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Topic, routing-key, and subscription scope gaps**
+A publisher or subscriber can select another tenant's topic, wildcard, consumer group, partition, reply queue, or dead-letter route. Check broker-enforced ACLs where visible and application-side namespace construction. Tenant text inside a payload is not isolation.
+
+**Dead-letter, retry, and diagnostic disclosure**
+Messages routed to dead-letter queues, error topics, tracing, or operator views contain secrets or cross-tenant payloads accessible to a lower-trust consumer. Review policy and redaction at the failure path, not just normal delivery.
+
+**Untrusted producer treated as control plane**
+A message body can declare itself an admin event, provider callback, replication record, or migration instruction without an independently authenticated producer and event type. Verify signatures and source/account/audience binding before privileged handling.
+
+## Replay, ordering, and transaction attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Duplicate delivery and idempotency gaps**
+Retries or redelivery repeat a side effect because deduplication is absent, occurs after mutation, or uses a key that collides across tenants or operations. Confirm the broker's delivery model and the side effect that is not naturally idempotent.
+
+**Out-of-order and stale message acceptance**
+Older state, revoked membership, canceled work, or pre-step-up authorization arrives after newer state and overwrites it. Review sequence/version checks, tombstones, partition changes, and restore/replay workflows.
+
+**Acknowledgment/commit ordering defects**
+Acknowledgment occurs before durable commit and loses security-relevant work, or commit happens before an unreliable acknowledgment and duplicates a mutation. Evaluate transactional outbox/inbox behavior and failure recovery.
+
+**Partial multi-consumer transitions**
+Several consumers jointly implement one authorization or business transition, but retries and partial failure leave only a subset committed. Identify invariants that must become durable atomically or compensate with current authorization.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Draw producer → broker/transport → gateway → consumer → storage for each message family. At each hop record authenticated peer, authoritative tenant/resource fields, validation, and side effect.
+- Feed the same small fixture to every in-repo schema version or language binding. Test duplicate, missing, unknown, boundary, replayed, and reordered messages without producing load.
+- Compare normal, retry, dead-letter, replay, migration, reflection, stream, and gateway-transcoded routes. Security policy must survive transport changes.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Name the realistic producer or peer, accepted message, authenticated channel identity, affected principal/resource, and unauthorized mutation or disclosure.
+2. For disagreement claims, cite both parsers/consumers and the divergent decoded value. Safe rejection by either side prevents confirmation.
+3. For replay/order claims, establish actual delivery guarantees and reproduce the invariant failure with a bounded local/in-memory transport.
+4. For authorization and isolation, verify all interceptor, broker ACL, gateway, and consumer layers visible in source. External attachments make the candidate `needs_validation`.
+5. Return `confirmed` only with the complete message lifecycle and observed meaningful result. Return `needs_validation` with the exact broker, service identity, route, or delivery fact required.

.agents/skills/security-audit/RECONNAISSANCE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+# Reconnaissance
+
+### Phase 1: Map the source and plan coverage
+
+The parent initializes `run-metadata.json`, applies the strict pre-reconnaissance budget gate in `SKILL.md`, then creates agent scratch roots and the shared ledger before hunting. If the gate fails, record the incomplete status in metadata and launch no reconnaissance agent. Reconnaissance reads the target and locally available build/configuration state only. It does not contact deployed endpoints, external identity providers, registries, brokers, cloud APIs, or other shared services.
+
+Launch several `research` agents in parallel. They return structured facts to the parent and do not write files.
+
+**Agent 1a: Product, stack, and local operation**
+
+```text
+Read the target at <target>. Do not use network access. Return:
+1. Product type, users, operators, and ordinary trust-sensitive actions.
+2. Languages, frameworks, build system, runtimes, and locally visible deployment models.
+3. Repository-relative entry points and subsystem boundaries.
+4. Exact build and test commands that could run offline with local dependencies, their expected write locations, and the target-controlled inputs they process. Do not run them during reconnaissance.
+5. Comparable software or protocol visible from local documentation and dependencies. If no useful comparison is source-grounded, say so.
+6. Missing local toolchains or runtime facts that limit bounded execution.
+Return only source facts with repository-relative file:line references.
+```
+
+**Agent 1b: Principals, authority, and controls**
+
+```text
+Read all source that establishes identity, authorization, isolation, and privilege. Map:
+1. Each lower-trust principal and the actions it has by design.
+2. Authentication or peer identity at each entry surface.
+3. Per-resource authorization and tenant/owner scope.
+4. Process, browser, workload, CI, plugin, model/tool, device, or local-IPC authority.
+5. Privilege changes, confirmation, revocation, recovery, and fallback paths.
+6. Which controls are source-visible and which depend on an unobserved deployment fact.
+Return trust boundaries and control locations with repository-relative file:line references. Do not infer live reachability.
+```
+
+**Agent 1c: Entry surfaces, copies, and sinks**
+
+```text
+Inventory every source-visible place external or lower-trust input enters:
+- HTTP/browser, RPC/message/protocol, files/archive/document, CLI/env/config, plugins/dependencies/CI, cloud events/IAM selectors, model context/tool arguments, mobile/deep-link/webview, and local IPC.
+For each surface, follow major transformations, stored or derived copies, and security-relevant sinks. Record source-visible limits and parallel paths to the same effect.
+Return repository-relative paths and line numbers. Be complete, but do not execute or send inputs.
+```
+
+**Agent 1d: Local execution and deployment visibility**
+
+```text
+Read tests, build definitions, manifests, packaging, and maintained environment overlays. Return:
+1. Small offline tests or existing fixtures that could validate trust boundaries with dummy data inside the required OS-enforced sandbox.
+2. Processes that could use an isolated loopback network namespace without external or shared dependencies.
+3. Commands that would fetch dependencies, publish artifacts, contact paid/provider APIs, or affect shared state; mark them prohibited for this run.
+4. Deployed controls and attachments that source cannot establish and therefore require needs_validation if decisive.
+5. The final active source path for each deployment mode only where the repository selects it deterministically.
+6. Whether the local platform can enforce an empty allowlisted environment, no external network, read-only target/toolchain mounts, scratch-only writes, and explicit CPU, memory, process, file-size, disk, and wall-clock limits. Missing controls block target-controlled execution.
+7. Whether trusted parent-side code can promote predeclared scratch files with path-confined no-follow descriptor traversal, nonblocking regular-file checks, no-follow traversal of every destination parent, exclusive regular-file destination creation, and explicit per-file and cumulative size bounds. Missing promotion controls block use of scratch files as evidence.
+```
+
+Add focused reconnaissance agents for materially distinct deployment modes or subsystems that these four do not map. Do not silently omit them: if the budget gate in `SKILL.md` blocks a focused agent, launch nothing for it, seed the unmapped area as a `deferred` ledger unit with reason `budget_cannot_reserve_critics_and_validation`, and disclose the gap in the report.
+
+## Prior-run input
+
+Before selecting work, the parent reads every available prior `coverage-ledger.json` and `findings.json` for the same repo:
+
+- Compare the source locations, controls, conditions, and source-derived identity for every prior record and unit against the current source.
+- Carry an unchanged prior `confirmed` record into the current candidate set, with the same fingerprint, only when its relevant source, conditions, and qualifying evidence still apply. Link it to a current `planned` unit with `prior_status: "prior_confirmed_same_source"` and put only that root cause on the hunter exclusion list. The Phase 3 verifier that re-verifies the carried record becomes that unit's assignment owner; its source re-check is the unit's first check and moves the unit to `candidate` with the carried fingerprint.
+- Build a current planned `prior_confirmed_changed_source` revalidation unit when any relevant source or condition changed. Do not exclude that root cause from hunting or assume the prior verdict still applies.
+- Build current work units for every prior `needs_validation`, `deferred`, `blocked`, `out_of_scope`, and changed-source unit. These states are priority input, never deduplication or suppression keys.
+- Carry a still-blocked prior `needs_validation` record with the same fingerprint only after current source supports its trace. Link it to a current `planned` unit with `prior_status: "prior_needs_validation"`; the record keeps the unresolved blocker. The Phase 3 verifier that re-checks the carried record becomes that unit's assignment owner; its re-check is the unit's first check and moves the unit to `candidate` with the carried fingerprint. Include the record in final verification.
+- Treat prior rejected records as stale claims unless current evidence changes the failed trace or missing condition. An unchanged rejection suppresses only that exact claim, not review of the coverage unit.
+- Record missing or incompatible ledgers instead of treating them as empty coverage.
+
+State paths and source refs used in `run-metadata.json`. Summarize only the coverage consequences in `architecture.md`.
+
+## Architecture summary and companion selection
+
+The parent synthesizes `<output-dir>/architecture.md`, with a hard cap of about 1,000 words. Include:
+
+1. Product, principals, normal authority, and protected resources.
+2. The comparable-software baseline from Agent 1a, when one is source-grounded: what security trade-offs the comparable accepts. Use it to calibrate effort and severity, never to dismiss a demonstrated finding; if the comparable shares a defect pattern that has mattered in practice, that strengthens the finding. Omit this line when no meaningful comparable exists.
+3. Tech stack, source-visible deployment paths, and offline build/test limits.
+4. Entry surfaces and the important source-to-sink or lifecycle paths.
+5. Trust boundaries and the strongest source-visible control on each.
+6. Repository-relative starting paths.
+7. Prior coverage gaps, changed-source and blocked revalidation targets, and same-source confirmed exclusions.
+8. A short companion-selection summary derived from [ATTACK-CLASSES.md](ATTACK-CLASSES.md): selected files and the source-visible boundaries that require them.
+
+Keep the assignment-level ordinary block, selected companion blocks, and excluded blocks with reasons in each ledger unit, not in `architecture.md`. This keeps the architecture cap valid for large runs and makes the exact hunter prompt map machine-checkable.
+
+Do not select a companion file merely because the language or dependency name appears. Select it because reconnaissance found the trust-sensitive boundary described by its `When to use this file` section. Do not exclude a visible boundary just because another agent will review a related class.
+
+## Deterministic coverage ledger
+
+The parent writes `<output-dir>/coverage-ledger.json` as a top-level JSON array. Derive one unit for every material combination of entry surface, trust boundary, subsystem, and applicable ordinary or companion attack class at the granularity the run profile sets (`quick` uses one all-in-scope subsystem identity; `deep` adds lifecycle modes). For a scoped run, seed in-scope surfaces for assignment and retain discovered excluded surfaces as `out_of_scope` units so later full runs can turn them into current work.
+
+Each dimension has a human label and a stable source-derived value in `canonical_refs`. Use the same canonical reference for the same source object across runs even if its display label changes. Suitable references include a repository-relative entry path plus exported scope, a route or message identity defined in source, the source control that defines a boundary, a repository package path, and the exact attack-class block reference. A block reference is `FILE.md#` plus the exact class name as written in bold or as a heading in that file — a stable identifier matched against the file text, not a rendered HTML anchor. For companion section blocks, use the heading text before any parenthetical qualifier (for example `Core discipline`). Do not derive references by lowercasing or slugging display labels.
+
+Derive `coverage_id` without lossy slugs:
+
+1. Require every reference to be Unicode NFC with valid scalar values, visible content, no control, format, line/paragraph separator, or default-ignorable code point, and no surrounding whitespace.
+2. Encode its UTF-8 bytes with RFC 3986 percent encoding: leave only `A-Z a-z 0-9 - . _ ~` unescaped and use uppercase `%HH` for every other byte.
+3. Join encoded `surface`, `boundary`, `subsystem`, and `attack_class` references with `::`; append encoded `lifecycle` when present.
+
+Use the fixed canonical value `profile/quick/all-in-scope-subsystems` for the quick profile's coarsened subsystem dimension. Do not include wave number, agent, verdict, severity, or line number in a reference or ID. Sort units lexicographically by `coverage_id` before each assignment. Fail on every duplicate ID. If duplicate IDs have different semantic fields, treat that as a canonical identity collision; never merge or silently overwrite them. The validator also rejects one semantic tuple represented by different canonical references.
+
+Each unit records:
+
+```json
+{
+  "coverage_id": "...",
+  "canonical_refs": {
+    "surface": "src/router.ts#POST /users/:id",
+    "boundary": "src/authz.ts#requireOwner",
+    "subsystem": "packages/api",
+    "attack_class": "ATTACK-CLASSES.md#Access control"
+  },
+  "surface": "...",
+  "boundary": "...",
+  "subsystem": "...",
+  "attack_class": "...",
+  "starting_paths": ["repo/relative/path"],
+  "ordinary_attack_class_block": "ATTACK-CLASSES.md#Access control",
+  "selected_companion_blocks": ["FILE.md#section"],
+  "excluded_blocks": [{"block": "FILE.md#section", "reason": "..."}],
+  "prior_status": "new|prior_confirmed_same_source|prior_confirmed_changed_source|prior_needs_validation|prior_deferred|prior_blocked|prior_out_of_scope|prior_covered_same_source|prior_covered_changed_source|prior_rejected_claim_changed|none",
+  "attempts": [],
+  "wave": 1,
+  "status": "planned",
+  "agent_id": null,
+  "reviewed_paths": [],
+  "local_checks": [],
+  "result_fingerprints": [],
+  "unresolved": []
+}
+```
+
+When `lifecycle` is material, add both `canonical_refs.lifecycle` and a human `lifecycle` field. `ordinary_attack_class_block` is null only when no ordinary block applies. The selected companion list includes each applicable class plus its companion `Core discipline`, `Universal moves`, and `Validation rules`; `excluded_blocks` records every considered but unselected block and the source fact that excludes it.
+
+The parent may add bookkeeping fields but keeps the semantic fields above stable. In `prior_status`, `new` marks a surface first seen in this run when compatible prior ledgers exist; `none` marks a unit seeded when no compatible prior ledger is available. Prior `deferred`, `blocked`, `out_of_scope`, and changed-source units initialize as current `planned` work when now in scope. A prior same-source covered unit remains visible in the current ledger; assign changed source, important lifecycle paths, and exact conflicts first, then use the coverage critic to decide whether it needs another pass.
+
+`attempts` is an append-only archive for evidence-bearing assignments that a coverage critic reopens. Before reassignment, append the prior unit's exact `wave`, `status`, `agent_id`, `reviewed_paths`, `local_checks`, `result_fingerprints`, and `unresolved`, plus the critic's source-backed `reassignment_reason`. Only `blocked`, `covered`, and `candidate` states can be archived. Archived attempts retain the same state and evidence invariants as live units, use strictly increasing waves below the current wave, and retain their producing owners and artifacts. The next assignment increments `wave`, uses a fresh owner, and starts with empty live evidence. If the profile or budget prevents another assignment, increment `wave` and use live `deferred` state with null owner, empty evidence, and the stop reason. Never copy an archived owner's checks or artifacts into the live state. A later live terminal state contains only the new attempt's evidence; the archive remains unchanged.
+
+Enforce this state table exactly:
+
+| Status | Unit `agent_id` | `reviewed_paths` / `local_checks` | `result_fingerprints` | `unresolved` |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `planned` | null | empty | empty | empty |
+| `not_applicable`, `out_of_scope`, `deferred` | null | empty | empty | nonempty reason |
+| `in_progress` | canonical owner | empty | empty | empty |
+| `blocked` | canonical owner | both nonempty owned partial evidence | empty | nonempty blocker |
+| `covered` | canonical owner | both nonempty | empty | empty |
+| `candidate` | canonical owner | both nonempty | nonempty | optional |
+
+Canonical agent IDs match `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$` and are not Windows device names. Lowercase is mandatory, so one ledger cannot contain case-fold aliases. The unit `agent_id` records the assignment owner. Every check records its own `agent_id` and nonempty `reviewed_paths`; the unit-level `reviewed_paths` is exactly their union. A source-only check uses `artifact: null`. A local check requires a regular file promoted only by trusted parent-side code under exactly `agents/<check.agent_id>/artifacts/`. This lets hunter and verifier checks coexist in one unit. Scratch paths, output-root files, symlinks, special files, and another check owner's artifacts are not evidence.
+
+The ledger is the coverage claim. An architecture summary, agent count, or generic "auth reviewed" sentence is not coverage evidence. Phase 2 closes units only from the paths and checks in a hunter's structured result.
+
+Run `node <skill-dir>/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs <output-dir>/coverage-ledger.json` after seeding, after every parent update, and before Phase 6. The validator rejects input beyond 5 MiB, 64 nesting levels, 10,000 units, 1,000 entries in a nested collection, or 500,000 traversed values, and caps reported validation errors at 100. In practice the 5 MiB byte limit holds roughly 2,000-5,000 realistic units, so it binds before the 10,000-unit cap. Fix every error before assigning work or making a coverage claim.

.agents/skills/security-audit/RESOURCE-EXHAUSTION-AND-AVAILABILITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+# Resource Exhaustion and Availability Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when untrusted requests, messages, files, tenant state, or agent work can consume CPU, memory, disk, connections, worker slots, paid APIs, or queue capacity, or can deadlock/crash a shared service. This domain distinguishes a source-reviewable availability vulnerability from a general performance issue. Never validate by stressing a shared or live service.
+
+Use `MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md` for memory-integrity defects and `PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md` for broker delivery logic. A reachable fatal error belongs here for shared impact even when the underlying parser is covered elsewhere.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- Require an input-to-cost path, a missing effective bound, and impact on another user, shared service, safety function, or operator-owned spend. Self-limiting work in the requester's own process is not a service vulnerability.
+- A missing rate limit is not enough. Check body/message/file caps, concurrency, queues, deadlines, database constraints, upstream gateways, and per-tenant quotas before calling a path unbounded.
+- Do not run stress, saturation, or production tests. Use asymptotic analysis, small boundary fixtures, mocked paid calls, strict local resource limits, and deterministic cancellation tests.
+- State attacker cost, service work, persistence, scope, and recovery. One bounded input with superlinear or persistent shared effect is materially different from sustained volume.
+- Use `confirmed` for source-visible bounds failures demonstrated safely. Use `needs_validation` when upstream caps, deployed topology, autoscaling, paid quota, or recovery behavior is outside the repository.
+```
+
+## Computational amplification attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Superlinear parsing, matching, or evaluation**
+Small accepted input drives catastrophic regex backtracking, nested parsing, recursive validation, symbolic evaluation, graph traversal, template expansion, or adversarial sort/hash behavior. Derive accepted depth/cardinality and complexity, then demonstrate a bounded growth curve locally.
+
+**Decompression and representation amplification**
+Compressed, sparse, nested, aliased, or encoded input expands far beyond the checked transfer or file size. Verify limits after every expansion and across parser stages, including archives, images, fonts, structured documents, and protocol compression tables.
+
+**Database and downstream query amplification**
+A small request creates broad scans, pathological joins, fan-out, unbounded sort/aggregation, or many downstream calls because query depth, filter cardinality, pagination, or expansion fields are not bounded. Confirm authorization does not intentionally permit the same resource scope.
+
+## Resource accumulation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Unbounded buffering and cardinality**
+Bodies, out-of-order streams, uploads, sessions, unique cache keys, metrics labels, log fields, subscriptions, or pending jobs accumulate without per-item and aggregate limits. Find cleanup and expiration on disconnect, timeout, cancellation, and partial parse.
+
+**File descriptor, handle, and temporary-resource leaks**
+Malformed or canceled work misses cleanup and retains sockets, files, database cursors, timers, subprocesses, temporary files, or object references. Confirm the leak repeats through bounded local iterations and affects a shared pool.
+
+**Detached work after cancellation**
+Client timeout, disconnect, canceled job, or failed authorization returns control but leaves database, model, network, or worker work running. Trace cancellation and deadline propagation through every layer.
+
+## Quota and scheduling attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Pre-authentication work imbalance**
+Expensive parsing, key lookup, cryptography, decompression, or external requests happen before authentication and the earliest size/rate gate. Compare minimal requester effort to shared service cost and check upstream limits.
+
+**Quota-accounting scope and reset gaps**
+Accounting uses attacker-influenceable IP, route, tenant, key prefix, task ID, or other dimension, allowing one principal's work to escape its intended budget or consume another principal's allocation. Review integer overflow, distributed races, retries, reconnects, and account switching.
+
+**Worker, pool, and priority starvation**
+Low-priority or attacker-controlled jobs hold shared locks, workers, database pools, event-loop turns, or scheduler priority needed by unrelated users. Require a path that bypasses queue/concurrency fairness or retains a slot beyond its deadline.
+
+## Failure and recovery attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Reachable fatal error or deadlock**
+An untrusted input reaches `panic`, abort, fatal assertion, unhandled exception, process exit, lock cycle, or infinite loop in a shared process. Confirm supervisor scope and whether one worker or the whole service becomes unavailable. A restarted isolated worker may reduce impact but does not erase the defect.
+
+**Retry storm and fail-open amplification**
+Timeouts, dependency errors, partially processed messages, or health-check failures trigger synchronized or unbounded retries without jitter, ceilings, circuit breaking, or deduplication. Verify one bounded failure source can create persistent aggregate work.
+
+**Poison-record and head-of-line blocking**
+One malformed record or message repeatedly fails at the front of a shared queue, partition, startup scan, migration, or recovery loop. Review skip/quarantine policy, offsets, and whether other tenants share the blocked unit.
+
+**Unsafe recovery and capacity rollback**
+A restart, restore, fallback, or cleanup path rebuilds unbounded state, ignores current quotas, or restores the input that immediately repeats failure. Recovery correctness is part of availability.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Build an input-to-resource table: earliest accepted size/cardinality, work before auth, downstream fan-out, persistence, shared pool, limit and cleanup owner, recovery.
+- Compare aggregate limits with per-object limits. Ten thousand valid one-byte items may evade a per-message cap while exhausting tenant-wide or process-wide state.
+- Validate only in an isolated fixture with strict CPU/memory/time limits and small growth points. Mock external and paid calls and stop once the missing bound or cancellation is observable.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Name untrusted input, requester work, service amplification or retained resource, shared blast radius, and recovery. Missing limits without concrete shared impact are hardening.
+2. Confirm no source-visible upstream, parser, queue, tenant, or framework bound prevents the path. Unknown deployed controls require `needs_validation`.
+3. For superlinear behavior, establish the accepted complexity and bounded local growth. For leaks, show repeatable retention after cleanup should occur. For fatal paths, identify process/supervisor isolation.
+4. Prioritize by low requester work, unauthenticated reachability, cross-tenant scope, persistence, and poor recovery; do not validate with availability impact.
+5. Return `confirmed` only with safe local proof and meaningful shared effect. Return `needs_validation` with the exact upstream limit, topology, quota, or recovery observation an owner must check.

.agents/skills/security-audit/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+---
+name: security-audit
+description: Security guidance and vulnerability review for codebases, APIs, services, CLI tools, libraries, and daemons. Use for security questions, focused reviews, vulnerability research, security audits, or pen tests. Run the complete workflow only for explicit codebase audit or pen-test requests, full/comprehensive/end-to-end reviews, or requested report artifacts.
+---
+
+# Security Audit
+
+Find vulnerabilities that violate a real trust boundary, then give owners the source evidence, safe reproduction, priority, and smallest effective fix. This is a defensive, source-first workflow. A candidate without a concrete affected principal, resource, or security outcome is not a confirmed finding.
+
+## Operating modes
+
+This skill is guidance by default. Loading it does not authorize the complete audit workflow or file creation.
+
+- **Guidance mode**: For security questions, focused reviews, methodology, triage, or investigation of specific findings, use only the relevant parts of this skill. Do not automatically run all six phases, create an output directory, or write audit artifacts. You may launch focused agents when useful; they return results to the current task.
+- **Full audit mode**: Use the complete workflow when the user explicitly asks to audit or pen-test a codebase, asks for a full, comprehensive, or end-to-end security review, or requests report artifacts. Run all six phases and write the files defined below.
+
+If the request could mean either mode, ask one focused question before creating files or starting the complete workflow.
+
+## Platform terminology
+
+This skill is agent-neutral:
+
+- **Parent** is the agent that coordinates the run and owns shared state.
+- **Task tool** is the platform's delegation or sub-agent mechanism.
+- **`research` agent** is a delegated agent for focused source exploration and factual verification.
+- **`general` agent** is a delegated agent for broad investigation and bounded local execution.
+- **`subagent_type:`** in a heading names which of these two delegated agent roles runs that work.
+
+Use equivalent platform capabilities while preserving role, write-isolation, prompt, and independence boundaries.
+
+## Universal execution safety
+
+These rules apply in both operating modes. Source inspection is read-only. Run target-controlled builds, tests, processes, browsers, emulators, fuzzers, and fixture processing only inside an OS-enforced sandbox that provides all of these controls:
+
+- no external network; use only an isolated loopback namespace when the check needs local client/server traffic;
+- an empty environment populated from an explicit allowlist with safe values, with scratch-local `HOME`, temporary directories, and caches;
+- a read-only target and toolchain, with the target-controlled process able to write only inside its assigned `scratch/` directory; and
+- explicit low CPU, memory, process, file-size, disk, and wall-clock limits.
+
+The agent, outside the target-controlled process, may make a disposable source copy in an assigned `scratch/` directory when a build must write beside source. In guidance mode, do not retain target-controlled files. In full audit mode, only trusted parent-side code may promote the minimum non-secret result to retained `artifacts/` using the procedure under Write isolation. Never expose a retained output directory (other than the agent's own assigned `scratch/`), another agent's directory, the host home directory, credentials, sockets, or shared services to target code. Do not install dependencies or let builds fetch them. Use only tools and dependencies already available locally. If every control cannot be enforced, do not execute target code: report the missing sandbox capability as a needs-validation blocker and give a safe validation plan.
+
+Use dummy principals, fixtures, and secrets. Do not probe deployed endpoints, external services, shared infrastructure, production identities, other users' data, or live control planes. Do not test availability against a live or shared process, publish artifacts, alter releases, spend paid API quota, or continue beyond the minimum local effect needed to establish a defect. If the decisive fact is outside source or the sandboxed fixture, report it as needing validation.
+
+## Full audit setup
+
+In full audit mode, resolve these values before reconnaissance:
+
+- **Skill directory**: the absolute directory containing this `SKILL.md`.
+- **Target**: the absolute repository root under review.
+- **Repo name**: a stable repository identifier from the directory or local Git remote.
+- **Output directory**: a new writable directory outside the target, defaulting to `~/security-audit-skill/<repo-name>/run-<N>`, where `<N>` is the next unused integer. Use a directory inside the target only when the user explicitly selects it and the parent verifies that version control ignores the whole directory. Otherwise stop and request an external path.
+- **Source ref**: the reviewed commit and whether the worktree is dirty. Do not treat unreviewed generated or modified files as another revision.
+
+### Write isolation
+
+The parent creates and is the only writer of shared run files:
+
+- `run-metadata.json`
+- `architecture.md`
+- `coverage-ledger.json`
+- `findings.json`
+- `REPORT.md`
+- `FINDINGS-DETAIL.md`
+- `NEEDS-VALIDATION.md`
+
+Each hunter or verifier receives a unique root under `<output-dir>/agents/<agent-id>/`, with separate `scratch/` and `artifacts/` directories. Canonical agent IDs match `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$` and must not equal a Windows device name such as `con`, `prn`, `aux`, `nul`, `com1` through `com9`, or `lpt1` through `lpt9`. Lowercase IDs prevent case-fold collisions. The agent and every target-controlled process may write only to `scratch/`; retained `artifacts/` is parent-owned, is never exposed to the sandbox, and is writable only by trusted parent-side promotion code. Agents may not change shared files, target source, retained artifacts, or another agent's directory. Do not use `/tmp` or the host home directory as a writable fallback.
+
+Before execution, the parent opens and retains trusted, non-inheritable directory descriptors for the agent's `scratch/` and `artifacts/` roots, and records an allowlist of expected scratch-relative artifact files plus explicit per-file and cumulative byte limits. Never pass those descriptors to the agent or sandbox. After the sandbox and all its processes terminate, trusted parent-side code promotes each allowlisted file separately:
+
+1. Validate the declared relative path: reject absolute, empty, `.`, `..`, or symlinked components.
+2. Walk each parent component from the retained scratch-root descriptor with no-follow directory-relative operations; never reopen by path.
+3. Open the leaf no-follow and nonblocking.
+4. Verify with `fstat` that it is a regular file with link count exactly one and within the recorded per-file and cumulative byte limits.
+5. Enforce those limits again while reading from that descriptor.
+6. Copy exactly the verified size, repeat `fstat`, and reject a changed identity, type, link count, or size.
+7. For the destination, walk every parent component from the retained artifacts-root descriptor with no-follow directory-relative operations; require each existing component to be a real directory, and create any missing directory exclusively before reopening and verifying it no-follow.
+8. Create the leaf exclusively without following links, verify that the opened destination is a regular file with link count exactly one, and copy from the verified source descriptor without reopening either path.
+9. Use equivalent race-safe APIs on non-POSIX systems.
+10. Never recursively copy or glob scratch, extract an archive into artifacts, or open or promote a symlink, FIFO, socket, device, directory, hard-linked file, changing file, or file that exceeds its bound.
+11. If any check is unavailable, cannot be enforced, or fails, discard the scratch entry; if it is decisive evidence, retain `needs_validation` with the exact promotion blocker.
+
+[HUNTING.md](HUNTING.md) and [VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md](VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md) carry this procedure as one identical fenced block for hunter and verifier prompts; it states the same rules in the same order as this list.
+
+For a reproduced check, record the command, exact test input, sandbox limits, and only the allowlisted environment variable names plus safe non-secret values needed to reproduce it. Never capture or copy the ambient environment, inherited variables, credential values, authentication state, or unrelated host paths. Launch from an empty environment rather than trying to redact one after execution.
+
+Before delegation, the parent writes `run-metadata.json` with at least `run_id`, `repo`, `target`, `source_ref`, `profile`, `scope_paths`, `budget` (null if unset), `execution_policy: "sandboxed-source-and-local-only"`, selected companion files, prior-run paths, shared-file owners, and `run_status: "in_progress"`. Update metadata only when those facts change; candidate state belongs in the coverage ledger and `findings.json`.
+
+## Full audit planning
+
+The coverage, prior-run, profile, and budget requirements in this section apply only in full audit mode.
+
+### Coverage and prior runs
+
+No one pass is complete. Build a deterministic coverage plan before hunting and update it after every agent result. [RECONNAISSANCE.md](RECONNAISSANCE.md) defines the stable coverage units and [HUNTING.md](HUNTING.md) defines coverage-critic waves. The parent alone updates the ledger.
+
+If prior runs exist, read every compatible `coverage-ledger.json` and `findings.json` before planning the current run:
+
+1. Compare the relevant current source with each prior record and unit. A prior source ref alone is not evidence that a path is unchanged.
+2. Carry a prior `confirmed` record into the current candidate set only when its relevant source and conditions are unchanged and its evidence still meets the current contract. Link it to a current ledger unit seeded `planned`, preserve its fingerprint, exclude only that carried root cause from hunters, and send the carried record through the current final verification path; the Phase 3 verifier that re-checks it becomes that unit's assignment owner and moves it to `candidate`.
+3. When relevant source for a prior `confirmed` record changed, create a current planned revalidation unit. Do not put that record on the hunter exclusion list. It remains confirmed only if current independent validation establishes the current path and result.
+4. Make prior `needs_validation`, `deferred`, `blocked`, `out_of_scope`, and any changed-source unit current work. A still-external `needs_validation` record may be carried only after the current source trace is checked and linked by fingerprint to a current `planned` unit whose verifier re-check supplies its owner and evidence; the record keeps the unresolved blocker. These prior states never suppress a current unit.
+5. A prior same-source covered unit may inform priority, but it remains visible in the current ledger. A prior `rejected` record suppresses only the unchanged failed claim, not coverage of its unit; changed evidence creates current work.
+6. Read the prior profile and scope. A prior `quick` or scoped ledger contributes only its recorded evidence and gaps, never an implied "rest is fine."
+
+If no prior ledger exists, say so in the final coverage statement. Never imply that one run exhausts the target.
+
+### Run profiles and scope
+
+During full audit setup, pick a profile from the user's request or propose one from the target's size and stakes. Record it in `run-metadata.json` (`profile`, `scope_paths`) and state it in the report. The default is `standard`.
+
+- **`quick`** — a bounded pass for small targets, re-runs, or a fast first look. Coarsen ledger units to surface × boundary × attack class (subsystem uses the fixed canonical `profile/quick/all-in-scope-subsystems` identifier), run exactly one hunter wave followed by exactly one final coverage-critic pass, and use one fresh verifier per candidate for both candidate validation and final record verification. Do not launch a follow-up hunter wave: record the critic's accepted discoveries and reassignments as `deferred`.
+- **`standard`** — the workflow as written.
+- **`deep`** — for high-stakes or large targets. Split ledger units per subsystem and lifecycle mode, run critic waves to a clean pass, keep candidate validation and final record verification as separate fresh agents, and give `prior_covered_same_source` units an independent second pass.
+
+A **scoped run** audits a subset: named paths, one subsystem, one companion domain, or the diff between two source refs. Seed ledger units only for in-scope surfaces and record everything else as `out_of_scope` — never as `covered`. A scoped or `quick` run must present itself as partial coverage.
+
+Profiles change breadth and redundancy, never the evidence bar. Do not scale away the candidate gate, the source/local execution boundary, `needs_validation` discipline, schema validation, or independent verification of `confirmed` records.
+
+#### Cost budget
+
+The ledger makes spend countable: one unit is roughly one hunter assignment, and one surviving candidate is one or two verifier assignments depending on profile. When the user sets a budget — or the parent proposes one for a large target — record `budget` in `run-metadata.json` as a maximum number of agent invocations across all phases.
+
+Apply the strict budget gate before launching any reconnaissance agent. Reserve the four baseline reconnaissance calls, one final post-wave critic for `quick` or one post-wave plus one distinct final-clean critic for `standard`/`deep`, and at least one verifier call. Add focused reconnaissance only after repeating this gate for each extra call. If the requested budget cannot fund that minimum, launch no agent: ask for a larger budget, narrower scope, or different profile. If the request remains unchanged, set `run_status: "incomplete"` with `incomplete_reason: "budget_cannot_fund_reconnaissance_and_reserves"` and report that no audit pass ran.
+
+Spend it in this order:
+
+1. Count reconnaissance, every post-wave critic, and the separate final-clean critic as agent invocations.
+2. **Reserve critics and validation before hunting.** For `quick`, reserve its one post-wave final critic. Before every `standard` or `deep` hunter wave, reserve one immediate post-wave critic plus one distinct final-clean critic. Also reserve verifier cost from the profile (about 1 or 2 agents per expected candidate; when in doubt reserve 30% of the balance after critic reservation). Never assign hunters into either reserve.
+3. Assign hunters to units in priority order until the hunting allowance is spent. Spend the reserved post-wave critic immediately after that wave; keep the final-clean and validation reserves intact.
+4. Before a later wave, reserve its new post-wave critic again. If the remaining budget cannot cover the required critic calls and validation reserve, launch no hunters from that wave, mark its planned units `deferred` with reason `budget_cannot_reserve_critics_and_validation`, and use the retained final-clean critic to record the resulting gap.
+
+Before wave 1, update the pre-recon estimate with seeded units, implied hunter count, mandatory critic calls, validation reserve, and whether the remaining budget covers the plan. If it clearly cannot, say so and propose either a tighter scope or a coarser profile instead of silently thinning evidence. If later facts consume the required final-critic reserve, launch no hunters, mark all planned work deferred, set the run incomplete with reason `critic_budget_exhausted`, and make no complete-coverage claim.
+
+A strict total-agent budget can still be exceeded by an unexpectedly large candidate set or by a material Phase 5 replacement that needs another independent verifier. If the remaining budget cannot validate every candidate, stop hunting, validate candidates in fingerprint order while the budget permits, and set `run_status: "incomplete"` plus `incomplete_reason: "validation_budget_exhausted"`. Keep each unvalidated fingerprint linked to a `candidate` ledger unit with that unresolved reason. Do not put an unvalidated candidate in `findings.json`, relabel it `needs_validation`, or report the run as complete. Phase 6 may produce a partial report only if its first section states that candidate validation is incomplete and lists the affected fingerprints and units. Never exceed a user-set strict budget silently.
+
+## Core principles
+
+### Require a boundary and result
+
+For every candidate, name the lower-trust principal, accepted input or action, intended control, crossed boundary, affected principal or resource, and concrete observed or owner-observable result. Do not elevate a missing best practice, guessed deployment behavior, generic parser crash, or self-impact into a security finding.
+
+### Use bounded local evidence
+
+Static analysis establishes the source path. Sandboxed local tests resolve behavior when all execution controls are available: a minimal function harness, existing unit test, small parser fixture, dummy-tenant integration test, locally rendered configuration, or bounded isolated-loopback client. Stop at a wrong return value, unauthorized dummy record, sanitizer finding, policy difference, or other minimum effect. Do not extend the local check beyond the minimum boundary result or produce persistence, post-fault, or concealment material.
+
+### Respect source visibility
+
+Deployment controls, proxy behavior, provider settings, browser headers, identity policy, broker ACLs, packaging, and topology are real controls. If they are required and absent from the repository, do not assume either presence or absence. Use `needs_validation` with the exact missing fact and a safe owner-observed or local plan.
+
+### Separate priority from certainty
+
+Only `confirmed` records receive severity. Likelihood and impact must reflect the demonstrated conditions and result; overall severity cannot exceed demonstrated impact. `needs_validation` means a specific source-grounded boundary hypothesis is blocked, not a low-confidence confirmed vulnerability, and it has no severity.
+
+Calibrate overall severity with these anchors:
+
+- **critical** — an unauthenticated actor gains code execution, full data-store access, or takeover of arbitrary accounts.
+- **high** — an actor fully defeats an explicit security control with real consequences: authentication bypass, cross-tenant read or write, stored script execution affecting other users, authenticated code execution, or an unauthenticated remote stop of a shared service.
+- **medium** — a real boundary violation with limited blast radius, uncommon preconditions, or consequences confined to a narrow resource set.
+- **low** — disclosure of non-secret internals, or an effect requiring sustained effort for minimal gain.
+- **informational** — a confirmed but minimal-impact observation, useful mainly as a prerequisite inside a larger finding.
+
+The high/medium discriminator: does the demonstrated result fully defeat an explicit control for an action with real consequences, or only weaken it? If you cannot state the concrete damage, the severity is lower than it feels.
+
+### Recommend the smallest effective source fix
+
+For each confirmed finding, identify the invariant the code must enforce and the narrowest source change that enforces it at the last trusted decision point. Prefer specific repository-relative changes and regression tests over generic hardening advice. The audit describes fixes; it does not modify target source.
+
+## Full audit workflow
+
+In full audit mode, follow all six phases in order:
+
+1. **Reconnaissance** — map the source, trust boundaries, local build paths, companion selections, prior evidence, and initial deterministic coverage ledger with [RECONNAISSANCE.md](RECONNAISSANCE.md).
+2. **Coverage-led hunting waves** — assign isolated hunters from the ledger and collect structured candidate results with [HUNTING.md](HUNTING.md), [ATTACK-CLASSES.md](ATTACK-CLASSES.md), and the selected domain companions.
+3. **Candidate validation** — consolidate fingerprints and give every candidate to a fresh source verifier as defined in [VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md](VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md).
+4. **Structured output** — write all final `confirmed`, `needs_validation`, and `rejected` records to `findings.json`; validate it with `report-schema.json` and `validate-findings.cjs`, and validate the coverage claim with `validate-coverage-ledger.cjs`.
+5. **Independent record verification** — use fresh agents to verify final source claims and reconcile corrections or state changes.
+6. **Target-neutral report** — derive `REPORT.md`, `FINDINGS-DETAIL.md`, and `NEEDS-VALIDATION.md` from the final records, with no live-probe instructions.
+
+Do not end the run before one of exactly two terminal states: (a) all Phase 6 artifacts are written and both validators pass, or (b) `run_status: "incomplete"` is recorded with its exact reason and the gap is disclosed in the report. Never stop mid-phase.
+
+## Anti-patterns
+
+1. Checklist deviations presented as vulnerabilities.
+2. Defense-in-depth advice with no reachable boundary violation.
+3. Live or shared-environment testing where bounded local evidence is insufficient.
+4. Guessing provider, proxy, browser, identity, or deployment behavior not present in source.
+5. Treating intended same-principal authority or self-impact as a cross-boundary result.
+6. Reporting a parser or runtime effect stronger than the observed effect.
+7. Emitting prose-only hunter results that cannot be deduplicated or verified.
+8. Re-reporting carried same-source prior confirmed records or using them as exemplars that anchor the hunt.
+9. Assigning severity to `needs_validation` records.
+10. Writing the report before independent verification or letting prose and JSON disagree.

.agents/skills/security-audit/SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# Supply Chain and Release Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when the target resolves dependencies, builds from untrusted contributions, runs CI, creates release artifacts, signs or promotes builds, loads plugins, or updates deployed software. This domain covers trust handoffs from source and dependency to the artifact a user runs. Use `MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md` for flaws inside a local binary loader and `CLOUD-AND-DEPLOYMENT.md` for runtime workload authority.
+
+Split large targets into dependency resolution, CI isolation, artifact provenance, release authorization, and updater/plugin trust.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- A mutable or known-vulnerable dependency is not a finding by itself. Show who can influence resolution, which build consumes it, and what execution or release boundary follows.
+- Follow integrity across every handoff: source identity, resolved inputs, build worker, artifact identity, test result, signature/attestation, promotion, and update consumer.
+- CI configuration is authorization code. Establish which event triggered a workflow, whose code runs, which secrets and tokens exist, and what it may publish or mutate.
+- A checksum fetched from the same untrusted location as the artifact does not establish independent integrity. Identify the trusted root and failure behavior.
+- Use `confirmed` for in-repo control-flow failures with bounded local validation. Use `needs_validation` for branch protection, hosted-runner, registry, signing-service, or production promotion facts that are not observable.
+```
+
+## Dependency and build-input attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Dependency source and namespace confusion**
+Resolver configuration can select an unintended public/private namespace, fallback registry, mirror, repository, or source URL. Review package names, source priority, lockfile and checksum use, alternate build files, platform-specific resolution, and first-install versus update behavior.
+
+**Mutable and unbound build inputs**
+Builds consume branches, tags, unverified submodules, downloaded tools, generated assets, remote includes, floating CI actions, or container tags whose content can change without source review. Require a lower-trust writer and a path into trusted build output; reproducibility by itself does not prove authenticity.
+
+**Generated-source and codegen provenance gaps**
+Schemas, vendored archives, generated clients, localization, documentation examples, or binary blobs produce executable or shipped content without the same review and integrity gate as source. Compare local regeneration with committed output and verify who controls input and generator.
+
+**Build-context inclusion**
+Secrets, local configuration, repository metadata, test fixtures, or developer artifacts enter a package or image because the build context and ignore rules exceed intended release inputs. Confirm that the resulting artifact exposes a real credential, private data, or privileged configuration.
+
+## CI and automation attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Untrusted code in a privileged workflow**
+A pull request, issue comment, fork, dependency update, or external event runs contributor-controlled code with protected secrets, write tokens, deployment authority, or a trusted runner. Compare trigger type, checkout ref, approval gate, environment protection, and permission narrowing. Do not assume repository-host defaults that are not in source.
+
+**Workflow command and expression confusion**
+Attacker-controlled branch names, commit messages, issue fields, artifact names, matrix values, or generated output enter shell commands, template expressions, paths, or privileged workflow inputs without canonical validation.
+
+**Cache, artifact, and workspace trust mixing**
+A lower-trust job can populate a cache, artifact, shared workspace, or output that a higher-trust job later restores and executes or releases. Review cache keys and namespaces, artifact producer identity, digest binding, retention, and whether promotion re-resolves by mutable name.
+
+**Automation identity overreach**
+CI jobs receive permissions beyond the operation, repository, environment, or duration needed, and untrusted job inputs can select the affected resource. Missing least privilege alone is hardening; require a reachable privileged action.
+
+## Release and update attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Build-to-promotion substitution**
+Tests, review, signature, and publication refer to mutable tags, filenames, channels, or artifact IDs rather than the same immutable digest. Check every copy, repack, architecture merge, and provenance step between build and release.
+
+**Release authorization and signing-policy gaps**
+A release or signature is accepted from the wrong workflow, repository, branch, environment, key role, or threshold. Review identity claims inside attestations and verify the consumer validates them, not just a valid signature. Rotation, expiry, and revocation must fail closed where policy requires.
+
+**Update metadata and rollback confusion**
+An updater authenticates payload bytes but not version, product, platform, channel, target path, expiry, or rollback state, or it accepts metadata and payload from different authorized transactions. Verify atomic installation and recovery behavior. A signature API call without policy binding is incomplete.
+
+**Plugin and extension trust expansion**
+An extension package gains host authority beyond its declared scope, a lower-trust publisher can replace another publisher's identity, or install/update hooks run before authenticity and capability checks. Intended installation of arbitrary same-user plugins is not a privilege boundary.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Walk backward from a released digest or installed update to every source, generated input, credential, worker, cache, test result, and authorization decision.
+- Compare untrusted and protected workflow events side by side. Mark each persisted channel crossing between them and require an immutable identity plus producer trust.
+- Review revoked key, failed download, missing attestation, partial platform release, rollback, and registry outage paths. The failure policy is part of release integrity.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Name the lower-trust actor, controllable source/cache/artifact/metadata, consuming trusted job or updater, and resulting unauthorized publication, code inclusion, secret disclosure, or privileged execution.
+2. Prove artifact identity across the broken handoff. A different mutable name or unbound digest must reach a real consumer.
+3. Verify built-in package-manager, repository-host, registry, and signing defaults for the pinned version. Unknown hosted controls require `needs_validation`.
+4. Keep local validation bounded: use a harmless fixture repository, dummy credential marker, local registry/config, and non-production artifact namespace. Do not publish or alter a real release.
+5. Return `confirmed` only with a complete source-visible handoff and meaningful result. Return `needs_validation` with the precise branch, runner, registry, signing, or deployment fact an owner must observe.

.agents/skills/security-audit/VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+# Validation, Structured Output, Verification, and Reporting
+
+### Phase 3: Independently validate every candidate
+
+After the clean coverage-critic pass or an explicitly recorded early stop, consolidate Phase 2 candidates and carried same-source prior confirmations by stable fingerprint and root cause. Give every unique proposed `confirmed` and `needs_validation` candidate to a fresh `general` verifier that did not hunt it. A carried prior confirmation follows the same current verification path even though hunters exclude that unchanged root cause. A verifier may read hunter or prior artifacts but must re-read every cited current source location and independently run any decisive check it can reproduce safely.
+
+Assign each verifier a canonical lowercase unique ID and `<output-dir>/agents/<verifier-id>/scratch/` plus parent-owned `artifacts/`. The verifier writes only to `scratch/` and never writes retained artifacts. It receives only the candidate, its linked coverage-unit checks and artifact paths, architecture facts needed to interpret the path, exact relevant companion validation blocks, the promotion procedure block below, the source/local execution boundary, the `confirmed`, `needs_validation`, and `rejected` branches of `report-schema.json` copied verbatim, and prior records with the same fingerprint. It must not receive another verifier's conclusion.
+
+#### Candidate-verifier prompt
+
+```text
+You did not write this candidate. Try to refute it from repository source and bounded
+local evidence. Do not contact deployed endpoints or external/shared services. Run
+target-controlled code only inside the approved OS-enforced sandbox: no external
+network, empty allowlisted environment, read-only target and tools, scratch-only
+writes, and explicit low resource and wall-clock limits. If any control is unavailable,
+do not execute; retain the exact missing capability as a needs_validation blocker.
+Treat every scratch entry as target-controlled after execution. After the sandbox and
+all its processes terminate, only trusted parent-side code may promote a predeclared
+scratch-relative file, following the promotion procedure block included verbatim in
+this prompt. You and target code never write retained artifacts. If promotion is
+unavailable or fails, do not use that file as evidence.
+
+1. Verify every trace and evidence file, positive line number, scope, and description.
+   Confirm the first entry is a real lower-trust entrypoint and the last is the
+   claimed sink or boundary effect.
+2. Reconstruct the strongest source-visible validation, identity, authorization,
+   normalization, lifecycle, framework, and containment controls on the path.
+   Where the architecture summary names a comparable baseline, note whether it
+   shares the pattern — as calibration, never as grounds to dismiss.
+3. For a proposed confirmed candidate, independently reproduce the minimum observed
+   result when possible. Verify inputs, interface shape, conditions, and affected
+   dummy principal/resource. Do not infer a stronger result or continue after it.
+4. Verify that likelihood, impact, confidence, and the proposed source fix match only
+   what the evidence establishes.
+5. For a proposed needs_validation candidate, decide whether the blocker is genuinely
+   outside source/local observation. If source refutes the trace, reject it. If the
+   missing fact remains decisive, keep needs_validation and make the local and
+   owner-observed plans exact and non-destructive.
+6. Preserve the fingerprint for the same source-derived root cause across every state.
+
+Return exactly one JSON object and no surrounding prose:
+{"decision": "confirmed|needs_validation|rejected", "record": { ... }}
+where record exactly matches the decision's verdict branch of the schema included
+in this prompt. A corrected record replaces the hunter's wording.
+```
+
+Copy this promotion procedure verbatim into every candidate-verifier prompt:
+
+```text
+Artifact promotion procedure (trusted parent-side code only):
+Reference only for you: the parent performs these steps; you never perform them.
+
+Before execution, the parent opens and retains trusted, non-inheritable directory
+descriptors for the agent's scratch/ and artifacts/ roots, and records an allowlist
+of expected scratch-relative artifact files plus explicit per-file and cumulative
+byte limits. Never pass those descriptors to the agent or sandbox. After the sandbox
+and all its processes terminate, trusted parent-side code promotes each allowlisted
+file separately:
+
+1. Validate the declared relative path: reject absolute, empty, `.`, `..`, or
+   symlinked components.
+2. Walk each parent component from the retained scratch-root descriptor with
+   no-follow directory-relative operations; never reopen by path.
+3. Open the leaf no-follow and nonblocking.
+4. Verify with `fstat` that it is a regular file with link count exactly one and
+   within the recorded per-file and cumulative byte limits.
+5. Enforce those limits again while reading from that descriptor.
+6. Copy exactly the verified size, repeat `fstat`, and reject a changed identity,
+   type, link count, or size.
+7. For the destination, walk every parent component from the retained
+   artifacts-root descriptor with no-follow directory-relative operations; require
+   each existing component to be a real directory, and create any missing directory
+   exclusively before reopening and verifying it no-follow.
+8. Create the leaf exclusively without following links, verify that the opened
+   destination is a regular file with link count exactly one, and copy from the
+   verified source descriptor without reopening either path.
+9. Use equivalent race-safe APIs on non-POSIX systems.
+10. Never recursively copy or glob scratch, extract an archive into artifacts, or
+    open or promote a symlink, FIFO, socket, device, directory, hard-linked file,
+    changing file, or file that exceeds its bound.
+11. If any check is unavailable, cannot be enforced, or fails, discard the scratch
+    entry; if it is decisive evidence, retain `needs_validation` with the exact
+    promotion blocker.
+```
+
+A verifier can promote `needs_validation` to `confirmed` only after independently establishing the complete path and bounded observed result. Demote proposed confirmation to `needs_validation` when a specific deployment or runtime fact remains unknown. Use `rejected` when source, local behavior, a visible control, missing meaningful impact, or an impossible prerequisite refutes the claim. `needs_validation` is never a parking place for a speculative idea.
+
+The parent checks that each verifier returned the same fingerprint unless it identified a genuinely different root cause. Merge corrections, record the decision in every linked coverage unit, and ensure there is one final record per fingerprint. Discard a malformed or prose-wrapped verifier result without repairing it; re-run that candidate with a fresh verifier when the budget permits, otherwise it remains an unvalidated ledger candidate under the incomplete-run rule.
+
+When verifier evidence updates a ledger check, set that check's `agent_id` to the verifier's canonical ID and list its nonempty repository-relative `reviewed_paths`. Keep the unit-level `reviewed_paths` equal to the union across checks. Use `method: "source"` with `artifact: null` for source-only review. Use `method: "local"` only with a file successfully promoted by trusted parent-side code below `agents/<check.agent_id>/artifacts/`. The unit retains its original assignment owner, so independently owned hunter and verifier checks can coexist. For a carried prior record's seeded `planned` unit there is no prior owner: the verifier that re-checks it becomes the unit's assignment owner, and its re-check is the unit's first check, moving the unit to `candidate` with the carried fingerprint.
+
+If a strict total-agent budget cannot cover every candidate, set the run status to incomplete and follow the deterministic budget rule in `SKILL.md`. An unvalidated candidate remains only in the ledger. It does not enter `findings.json` under any verdict.
+
+### Phase 4: Write and validate `findings.json`
+
+The parent writes all independently decided records to `<output-dir>/findings.json`, sorted by fingerprint. Include:
+
+- `confirmed`: source-grounded vulnerabilities with complete local execution evidence, conditions, specific remediation, likelihood/impact/overall severity, and confidence.
+- `needs_validation`: source-grounded candidates with an exact unresolved blocker and at least one applicable local or owner-observed deployment plan.
+- `rejected`: source-grounded candidates disproved during validation, retained so future runs do not repeat the unsupported claim without changed evidence.
+
+Read `report-schema.json` immediately before writing. It uses `additionalProperties: false`; do not carry hunter wrapper fields into a record. Keep these verdict contracts distinct:
+
+- A `confirmed` record uses `root_cause`, `intended_behavior`, `conditions`, `execution`, `remediation`, `severity`, and `confidence`. It must not use `claimed_root_cause`, `blockers`, `validation_plan`, or `reason`. `execution` is target-neutral and uses the target's native interface: API/HTTP input, CLI call, library call, message, file fixture, browser action, rendered policy, or local harness as applicable. `observed_result` is nonempty and factual.
+- A `needs_validation` record uses `claimed_root_cause`, `trace`, `evidence`, `blockers`, and at least one nonempty `validation_plan.local` or `validation_plan.deployment` field. Include both only when both contexts can resolve distinct facts. It must not use severity, execution, remediation, reason, or confirmed root cause.
+- A `rejected` record uses `claimed_root_cause`, `trace`, `evidence`, and `reason`. It must not use severity, execution, remediation, blockers, validation plan, or confirmed root cause.
+
+Every record has a stable fingerprint, title, description, and repository-relative source paths. A multi-step trace begins with `entrypoint`, ends with `sink`, and uses `propagation` only between them. One-entry traces use `entrypoint` or `sink`. Overall severity cannot exceed demonstrated impact.
+
+Run:
+
+```sh
+node <skill-dir>/validate-findings.cjs <output-dir>/findings.json
+node <skill-dir>/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs <output-dir>/coverage-ledger.json
+```
+
+Fix every structural and semantic error before continuing. The findings validator rejects input beyond 5 MiB, 1,000 top-level findings, or 64 nesting levels, and caps reported error output at 100 messages. Validator success proves format and ledger consistency only.
+
+### Phase 5: Verify the final records with fresh eyes
+
+Launch one fresh `research` verifier per final `confirmed` and `needs_validation` record, in parallel. This verifier checks the structured record, not the hunter write-up, and remains inside source/local boundaries.
+
+In a `quick` run, Phase 3 and Phase 5 merge: the Phase 3 verifier also performs these record checks and returns the final schema-shaped record, so each candidate gets one fresh independent reviewer instead of two. Every other profile keeps the two passes separate. Never skip independent review of a `confirmed` record in any profile.
+
+For `confirmed`, require it to check:
+
+1. Every repository-relative trace/evidence path, line, scope, and described operation.
+2. Real entry interface and exact local input shape.
+3. Every condition, parser/policy step, source-visible preventing layer, and observed local result.
+4. Affected principal/resource and demonstrated impact.
+5. Severity separation: realistic likelihood, demonstrated impact, overall no greater than impact.
+6. Remediation strategy and any `code_changes`, including whether the fix enforces the invariant without merely moving trust.
+
+For `needs_validation`, require it to check:
+
+1. The source path is real and supports only the `claimed_root_cause` stated.
+2. Every listed blocker is decisive and not already answerable locally.
+3. The candidate names a boundary and a possible concrete result rather than a generic concern.
+4. At least one validation-plan field is present and exact. `local` uses a bounded fixture; `deployment` asks an owner to observe a configuration, identity, route, policy, or runtime fact. Do not invent a plan for an inapplicable context, and never send audit traffic to a deployment.
+5. The fingerprint matches prior/current records for the same root cause.
+
+Each verifier returns exactly one JSON object: `{"decision":"verified","fingerprint":"..."}` or `{"decision":"replace","reason":"...","record":{...}}`, with no surrounding prose. A replacement record must match its `confirmed`, `needs_validation`, or `rejected` schema branch. Treat a malformed or prose-wrapped Phase 5 result the same way as in Phase 3: discard it without repairing it and re-run with a fresh verifier when the budget permits.
+
+Do not apply a Phase 5 replacement as final when it promotes a record to a stronger verdict, including any promotion to `confirmed`, or materially changes the root cause, trace, execution input or observed result, demonstrated impact, or severity. Give that complete replacement to a new independent verifier that did not hunt, perform Phase 3 validation, or propose the Phase 5 replacement. The new verifier rechecks the current source and independently reproduces any decisive local result under the execution boundary, then returns `verified` or another replacement. Apply a material replacement only after this fresh verification. If another material replacement results, repeat with a fresh verifier. If budget or independence is unavailable, remove the disputed record from `findings.json`, keep its ledger unit as an unresolved candidate, and set `run_status: "incomplete"` with an exact `incomplete_reason`. Non-material wording or repository-line corrections may be applied directly when they do not change meaning or evidence.
+
+After every applied replacement, rerun both validators and update linked ledger decisions. If a final verifier identifies a separate root cause, assign a new fingerprint and send it through independent candidate validation before inclusion. Set `run_status: "complete"` only when every ledger candidate has an independent final disposition and every retained record passes Phase 5.
+
+Do not verify only `confirmed` records. A misleading `needs_validation` handoff wastes owner time and can preserve a false premise.
+
+### Phase 6: Produce target-neutral reports from final records
+
+Only after Phase 5 passes for every record retained in `findings.json`, derive prose from the final records, the ledger, and the hunter `hardening` notes retained in ledger bookkeeping. An incomplete run may report independently verified records, but it must identify each unresolved ledger candidate and must not present it as a finding. The prose files never change a verdict, severity, blocker, or demonstrated impact.
+
+#### `REPORT.md`
+
+Write:
+
+1. Run profile, scope, budget (if set) with agents spent versus planned, source ref, sandboxed source-and-local-only execution statement, prior-run use, and explicit deferred and out-of-scope coverage. Name carried same-source confirmations and changed-source revalidations. A `quick`, scoped, budget-limited, or incomplete run states plainly that it is a partial pass. If candidate validation exhausted a strict budget, state that the run is incomplete and list every unvalidated fingerprint and linked unit; do not describe those candidates as findings. If the budget prevented a mandatory critic, state which critic did not run and make no clean-coverage claim.
+2. One short security posture summary.
+3. A confirmed-findings table: severity, title, affected boundary, and one-line observed result.
+4. Each confirmed finding: repository source location, lower-trust principal, target-native bounded reproduction, conditions, actual result, impact, priority rationale, and smallest source fix.
+5. A separate `NEEDS VALIDATION` table. Give each lead's title, repository trace, exact blocker, bounded local next step, and safe owner-observed deployment check. Do not assign severity or call it a confirmed vulnerability.
+6. Separate hardening notes and positive source patterns.
+7. Coverage summary from the ledger: covered, candidate, blocked, and deferred counts, plus important exclusions and the final critic result.
+
+Do not describe rejected records as findings. Mention their fingerprints only when they explain a prior disagreement or coverage decision.
+
+#### `FINDINGS-DETAIL.md`
+
+For each confirmed `medium`, `high`, or `critical` record, copy the complete source path and target-neutral local reproduction:
+
+- ordered repository-relative trace and evidence;
+- dummy attacker/principal and affected dummy resource;
+- native input, invocation, or fixture and exact bounded instructions;
+- observed output and the security invariant it proves;
+- conditions and containment;
+- source-level remediation and regression case.
+
+#### `NEEDS-VALIDATION.md`
+
+For every unresolved record, copy the source trace, verified evidence, exact blocker, affected boundary, and each applicable bounded local or owner-observed resolution plan. Keep these as prioritized leads without severity. Do not turn them into live test guidance or assume the missing deployment fact.
+
+HTTP is one possible native interface, not the default. A library finding may use a function call, a parser a fixture, a CLI a command, a desktop app an IPC or file action, and infrastructure a locally rendered policy. Do not require an endpoint, external account, or live environment that the target does not have.
+
+Keep the report proportional to the evidence. A clean run may have zero confirmed records. State that result and the remaining coverage/validation limits without inventing LOW findings.

.agents/skills/security-audit/WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+# HTTP-Protocol and Authentication Hunting
+
+#### When to use this file
+
+Reach for this file when the target speaks HTTP at a parsing, caching, browser-authentication, or identity boundary: web applications, APIs, reverse proxies, CDNs, gateways, custom HTTP servers, and services implementing sessions, JWT, OAuth/OIDC, SAML, password recovery, MFA, passkeys, API keys, or mTLS. Use this with `ATTACK-CLASSES.md`: access-control review asks whether a principal may perform an operation; this file asks whether the HTTP or identity layer can confuse which principal, request, assurance level, or token the operation belongs to.
+
+Pick classes from Phase 1. Split a large target into request framing and cache policy, browser authentication, federated identity, strong authentication and recovery, service credentials, and session lifecycle. A single server behind an unobserved managed proxy has little source-confirmable smuggling surface; a proxy or custom parser has much more.
+
+## Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
+
+```
+- Framing and cache findings require two interpretations of the same request, response, or key. Name both components and the exact normalized value on each side.
+- For every credential, find the signature or secret verification and every binding required for its role: issuer, audience, origin, RP, client, session, principal, resource, assurance, expiry, and one-time state.
+- Host, Forwarded, X-Forwarded-*, Origin, Referer, redirect targets, callback state, and request-derived URLs are trust decisions. Trace each to the affected identity or response.
+- A missing header, cookie attribute, MFA prompt, or rate limit is not a finding alone. Require an accepted invalid request, cross-principal impact, assurance downgrade, or credential disclosure.
+- Classify `confirmed` only from complete source evidence and bounded local request/token tests. Use `needs_validation` when proxy, IdP, browser, certificate, secret, or deployed configuration is required but not visible.
+```
+
+## HTTP framing and cache attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Request framing and desynchronization**
+Front end and back end disagree on request length or header normalization. Review multiple `Content-Length` values, `Transfer-Encoding`, HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 downgrade, header-name normalization, forbidden connection headers, and CR/LF conversion. Confirm which bytes one component assigns to a request and which bytes its peer assigns to the next request.
+
+**Web cache poisoning through unkeyed input**
+A request value changes cached content or security-relevant headers but is absent from the cache key. Compare cache key construction with every response variant, including forwarded host/scheme, selected cookies, query normalization, language/device headers, and authorization state.
+
+**Cache deception and private-response caching**
+Cache routing treats a private dynamic path as a public static asset, or caches a response whose identity and authorization inputs are missing from policy. Compare edge cacheability with application route parsing, suffix/path-parameter normalization, and response cache directives.
+
+**Host and forwarded-header trust**
+Untrusted host/proxy metadata determines absolute URLs, tenant routing, callbacks, reset links, cache keys, or the client address used by authorization. Confirm who can supply the header and whether trusted ingress removes client-provided copies.
+
+**Response-header injection**
+Untrusted data reaches `Location`, `Set-Cookie`, CSP, or another response header with unsafe control characters or normalization. Verify framework rejection before reporting and require a security-relevant response change.
+
+## Browser-session attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**Ordinary CSRF**
+A browser sends ambient credentials to a state-changing endpoint that accepts a cross-site request without an effective anti-CSRF token, same-site request binding, or strict Origin/Referer validation. Inventory every cookie-authenticated mutation, including form, JSON-like, multipart, method-override, and legacy routes. SameSite is effective only for the cookie and browser contexts actually used; login CSRF and cross-site subresource requests can have different requirements.
+
+**Session fixation and invalidation**
+Session identifiers are not rotated on login, account switch, MFA completion, impersonation, or other privilege changes, or remain valid after logout, password change, revocation, and account disable. Check server sessions, refresh tokens, signed cookies, websocket state, cache copies, and fallback endpoints.
+
+**Cookie scope and transport**
+A sensitive cookie has an over-broad `Domain` or `Path`, can cross an insecure transport, or conflicts with a sibling cookie that another component selects differently. Bare missing flags remain hardening notes unless a realistic less-trusted origin, network position, or browser path can gain or replace the credential.
+
+## Federated-identity attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+First establish role. Authorization-server controls such as redirect allowlisting and code issuance do not belong to a relying-party client. Verification and binding defects belong to the component consuming the artifact.
+
+**JWT verification and claim binding**
+Check signature verification, server-pinned algorithm and key source, then `exp`, `nbf`, `aud`, and `iss`. Review `kid`, `jku`, and `x5u` as untrusted key selectors, duplicate/header normalization, and decode-without-verify paths. A valid token for another service is invalid here even when signed by a trusted issuer.
+
+**OAuth/OIDC request and callback binding**
+Validate exact `redirect_uri` ownership where the target is the authorization server; session-bound `state`; PKCE and authorization-code binding where applicable; ID-token issuer/audience/signature/nonce; and selected-IdP binding in multi-provider flows. Compare initial callback, retry, mobile/deep-link, and account-link routes.
+
+**SAML signed-object and assertion binding**
+Ensure the element whose signature is validated is the element used as identity. Review unsigned/fallback paths, safe XML parser configuration, canonicalization differences, and freshness/binding fields such as validity windows, audience/recipient, request correlation, and replay state.
+
+## MFA, passkey, and account-transition attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**MFA enrollment and assurance downgrade**
+Enrollment, replacement, disablement, recovery-code generation, trusted-device creation, and fallback login require the intended prior assurance. Check that a valid first factor cannot enroll or replace the second factor without policy-required fresh authentication, and that disabled or stale factors stop authorizing sessions.
+
+**Step-up binding and bypass**
+A successful challenge upgrades the wrong session, account, tenant, action, or API request, or an alternate route omits the assurance check. Bind the challenge to principal, current session, assurance target, operation or resource when required, expiry, and one-time completion. Compare UI, API, batch, recovery, and resumed-flow paths.
+
+**WebAuthn and passkey verification**
+At registration, bind challenge, RP ID, expected origin, credential, user/userHandle, algorithm, and policy-required user verification to the initiating session. At authentication, verify challenge, RP/origin, credential membership, signature, and intended user presence/verification. Check account-discovery and linking flows for userHandle or credential-to-account confusion. Signature-counter handling is meaningful only when the product treats regressions as a clone signal.
+
+**Account linking and identity collision**
+Adding an IdP, passkey, email, phone, device, or external account to an existing account must require a current authenticated session, verified ownership of the new identity, policy-required step-up, and callback state bound to the account that initiated linking. Review unlink/relink and invite-acceptance paths for verified-identifier or tenant collisions.
+
+**Password reset and broader recovery**
+Recovery tokens, support/admin recovery, backup codes, device migration, and email or phone change often become the weakest authentication path. Verify token randomness, user/action binding, expiry, one-time state, rate/accounting controls, delivery URL trust, and invalidation of prior tokens and sessions. Different responses that only reveal public account existence are not automatically security findings.
+
+## API-key and mTLS attack classes (subagent_type: `general`)
+
+**API-key scope and resource binding**
+A key authenticates to broader tenants, resources, actions, or environments than its server-side record grants, or request parameters override those bindings. Review key lookup, prefix/full-secret verification, type confusion between publishable and secret keys, scope checks, rotation, revocation caches, and bulk endpoints.
+
+**API-key exposure and unsafe transport**
+Keys appear in client bundles, URLs, redirects, logs, error paths, build artifacts, or responses accessible to a lower-trust principal. A public identifier called a key is not a secret. Confirm key type and the authority gained by disclosure.
+
+**mTLS peer and application-identity confusion**
+A process trusts client-certificate identity headers from any network peer, verifies a chain but maps attacker-influenceable subject text to an account incorrectly, or accepts a certificate for the wrong trust domain, extended usage, audience, or validity policy. Where a trusted proxy terminates mTLS, verify only that proxy can connect, it removes incoming identity headers, and the backend binds the sanitized identity to the request.
+
+**Certificate lifecycle fallback**
+Expired, revoked, missing, or renewal-failed certificates cause silent fallback to bearer-only or anonymous operation, or long-lived pooled connections retain authorization after revocation. Missing deployment revocation data makes the result `needs_validation`; an in-repo fail-open branch is source-confirmable.
+
+## Universal moves (apply across the above)
+
+- Walk issue → store → transmit → consume → refresh → revoke for every credential and challenge. Compare normal, error, retry, migration, legacy, and account-switch paths.
+- Enumerate every door to the same identity and every route to the same sensitive operation. The effective policy is the weakest parallel path, not the most polished UI.
+- Diff parser, proxy, router, cache, and application normalization side by side. For local validation, feed identical bounded request fixtures into each component rather than sending traffic to a live deployment.
+- For recovery and linking, draw the account before/after graph. Each edge must name the current principal, proof of the new identity, required assurance, callback/session binding, and revocation effect.
+
+## Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
+
+1. Apply a source-visibility gate. Proxy chains, edge cache keys, IdP policy, certificate trust, browser cookie behavior, secrets, and deployed auth modes may be outside the repository. Record a precise `needs_validation` candidate instead of asserting missing infrastructure behavior.
+2. For framing and cache findings, name both components and the divergent parse/key. Confirm cross-request, cross-user, or private-response impact with bounded local fixtures.
+3. For token, MFA, passkey, account-link, recovery, API-key, and mTLS findings, cite the verification line and missing principal/session/resource/origin/audience/action/assurance binding. Prove the server accepts the invalid transition or credential.
+4. For CSRF, name the ambient credential, state-changing route, accepted cross-site request shape, browser cookie policy, and missing effective check. Read-only actions and routes requiring a non-ambient bearer token do not qualify.
+5. Verify framework and library defaults. If version or configuration is unknown, use `needs_validation`; do not turn an unverified critical claim into a lower-severity confirmed finding.
+6. Return `confirmed` only with a complete source trace and observable unauthorized identity, state, or disclosure. For `needs_validation`, name the missing fact and safe local or owner-observed check that resolves it.

.agents/skills/security-audit/report-schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,461 @@
+{
+  "$comment": "Top-level contract for findings.json. validate-findings.cjs interprets and checks this schema directly.",
+  "type": "array",
+  "items": {
+    "oneOf": [
+      {
+        "type": "object",
+        "description": "A source-grounded vulnerability that was independently demonstrated.",
+        "properties": {
+          "verdict": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "const": "confirmed"
+          },
+          "fingerprint": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$",
+            "description": "A stable source-derived identifier that does not change between validation states."
+          },
+          "title": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "description": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "root_cause": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "intended_behavior": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "trace": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "minItems": 1,
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "properties": {
+                "kind": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "enum": ["entrypoint", "propagation", "sink"]
+                },
+                "file": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1
+                },
+                "line": {
+                  "type": "integer",
+                  "minimum": 1
+                },
+                "scope": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                },
+                "description": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                }
+              },
+              "required": ["kind", "file", "line", "scope", "description"],
+              "additionalProperties": false
+            }
+          },
+          "evidence": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "minItems": 1,
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "properties": {
+                "file": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1
+                },
+                "line": {
+                  "type": "integer",
+                  "minimum": 1
+                },
+                "description": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                }
+              },
+              "required": ["file", "line", "description"],
+              "additionalProperties": false
+            }
+          },
+          "conditions": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "properties": {
+                "kind": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "enum": ["authentication_level", "authorization_role", "user_interaction", "system_configuration", "network_routing", "environmental_dependency", "data_state", "timing_dependency", "third_party_dependency"]
+                },
+                "description": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                }
+              },
+              "required": ["kind", "description"],
+              "additionalProperties": false
+            }
+          },
+          "execution": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "description": "Target-neutral reproduction in the target's native interface.",
+            "properties": {
+              "attacker_perspective": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1,
+                "visibleContent": true
+              },
+              "payloads": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "minItems": 1,
+                "uniqueItems": true,
+                "items": {
+                  "type": "string"
+                }
+              },
+              "instructions": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "minItems": 1,
+                "items": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                }
+              },
+              "observed_result": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1,
+                "visibleContent": true
+              }
+            },
+            "required": ["attacker_perspective", "payloads", "instructions", "observed_result"],
+            "additionalProperties": false
+          },
+          "remediation": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "properties": {
+              "strategy": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1,
+                "visibleContent": true
+              },
+              "code_changes": {
+                "type": "array",
+                "items": {
+                  "type": "object",
+                  "properties": {
+                    "file_name": {
+                      "type": "string",
+                      "minLength": 1
+                    },
+                    "fixed_code": {
+                      "type": "string"
+                    }
+                  },
+                  "required": ["file_name", "fixed_code"],
+                  "additionalProperties": false
+                }
+              }
+            },
+            "required": ["strategy"],
+            "additionalProperties": false
+          },
+          "severity": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "properties": {
+              "likelihood": {
+                "type": "object",
+                "properties": {
+                  "score": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "enum": ["informational", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]
+                  },
+                  "reason": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "visibleContent": true
+                  }
+                },
+                "required": ["score", "reason"],
+                "additionalProperties": false
+              },
+              "impact": {
+                "type": "object",
+                "properties": {
+                  "score": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "enum": ["informational", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]
+                  },
+                  "reason": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "visibleContent": true
+                  }
+                },
+                "required": ["score", "reason"],
+                "additionalProperties": false
+              },
+              "overall_severity": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "enum": ["informational", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"]
+              }
+            },
+            "required": ["likelihood", "impact", "overall_severity"],
+            "additionalProperties": false
+          },
+          "confidence": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "properties": {
+              "score": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "enum": ["low", "medium", "high"]
+              },
+              "reason": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1,
+                "visibleContent": true
+              }
+            },
+            "required": ["score", "reason"],
+            "additionalProperties": false
+          }
+        },
+        "required": ["verdict", "fingerprint", "title", "description", "root_cause", "intended_behavior", "trace", "evidence", "conditions", "execution", "remediation", "severity", "confidence"],
+        "additionalProperties": false
+      },
+      {
+        "type": "object",
+        "description": "A source-grounded candidate whose decisive validation is blocked.",
+        "properties": {
+          "verdict": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "const": "needs_validation"
+          },
+          "fingerprint": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$"
+          },
+          "title": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "description": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "claimed_root_cause": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "trace": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "minItems": 1,
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "properties": {
+                "kind": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "enum": ["entrypoint", "propagation", "sink"]
+                },
+                "file": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1
+                },
+                "line": {
+                  "type": "integer",
+                  "minimum": 1
+                },
+                "scope": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                },
+                "description": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                }
+              },
+              "required": ["kind", "file", "line", "scope", "description"],
+              "additionalProperties": false
+            }
+          },
+          "evidence": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "minItems": 1,
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "properties": {
+                "file": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1
+                },
+                "line": {
+                  "type": "integer",
+                  "minimum": 1
+                },
+                "description": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                }
+              },
+              "required": ["file", "line", "description"],
+              "additionalProperties": false
+            }
+          },
+          "blockers": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "minItems": 1,
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "items": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "visibleContent": true
+            }
+          },
+          "validation_plan": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "properties": {
+              "local": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1,
+                "visibleContent": true
+              },
+              "deployment": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1,
+                "visibleContent": true
+              }
+            },
+            "additionalProperties": false
+          }
+        },
+        "required": ["verdict", "fingerprint", "title", "description", "claimed_root_cause", "trace", "evidence", "blockers", "validation_plan"],
+        "additionalProperties": false
+      },
+      {
+        "type": "object",
+        "description": "A source-grounded candidate refuted during validation.",
+        "properties": {
+          "verdict": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "const": "rejected"
+          },
+          "fingerprint": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$"
+          },
+          "title": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "description": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "claimed_root_cause": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          },
+          "trace": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "minItems": 1,
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "properties": {
+                "kind": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "enum": ["entrypoint", "propagation", "sink"]
+                },
+                "file": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1
+                },
+                "line": {
+                  "type": "integer",
+                  "minimum": 1
+                },
+                "scope": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                },
+                "description": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                }
+              },
+              "required": ["kind", "file", "line", "scope", "description"],
+              "additionalProperties": false
+            }
+          },
+          "evidence": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "minItems": 1,
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "items": {
+              "type": "object",
+              "properties": {
+                "file": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1
+                },
+                "line": {
+                  "type": "integer",
+                  "minimum": 1
+                },
+                "description": {
+                  "type": "string",
+                  "minLength": 1,
+                  "visibleContent": true
+                }
+              },
+              "required": ["file", "line", "description"],
+              "additionalProperties": false
+            }
+          },
+          "reason": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "visibleContent": true
+          }
+        },
+        "required": ["verdict", "fingerprint", "title", "description", "claimed_root_cause", "trace", "evidence", "reason"],
+        "additionalProperties": false
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}

.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,872 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+
+/**
+ * Validates coverage-ledger.json and its canonical coverage IDs.
+ * Usage: node validate-coverage-ledger.cjs <path-to-coverage-ledger.json>
+ */
+
+const fs = require("node:fs");
+const path = require("node:path");
+const { TextDecoder } = require("node:util");
+
+// Conservative bounds apply before JSON.parse and again to the parsed document.
+const LIMITS = Object.freeze({
+  inputBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024,
+  units: 10000,
+  collectionItems: 1000,
+  objectFields: 1000,
+  nestingDepth: 64,
+  preflightValues: 500000,
+  validationErrors: 100,
+});
+const MAX_INPUT_BYTES = LIMITS.inputBytes;
+const MAX_UNITS = LIMITS.units;
+const MAX_LIST_ITEMS = LIMITS.collectionItems;
+const MAX_TEXT_LENGTH = 4096;
+const REQUIRED_FIELDS = [
+  "coverage_id",
+  "canonical_refs",
+  "surface",
+  "boundary",
+  "subsystem",
+  "attack_class",
+  "starting_paths",
+  "ordinary_attack_class_block",
+  "selected_companion_blocks",
+  "excluded_blocks",
+  "prior_status",
+  "attempts",
+  "wave",
+  "status",
+  "agent_id",
+  "reviewed_paths",
+  "local_checks",
+  "result_fingerprints",
+  "unresolved",
+];
+const REF_FIELDS = ["surface", "boundary", "subsystem", "attack_class"];
+const STATUSES = new Set([
+  "planned",
+  "not_applicable",
+  "out_of_scope",
+  "in_progress",
+  "covered",
+  "candidate",
+  "blocked",
+  "deferred",
+]);
+const ATTEMPT_STATUSES = new Set(["covered", "candidate", "blocked"]);
+const ATTEMPT_FIELDS = [
+  "wave",
+  "status",
+  "agent_id",
+  "reviewed_paths",
+  "local_checks",
+  "result_fingerprints",
+  "unresolved",
+  "reassignment_reason",
+];
+const PRIOR_STATUSES = new Set([
+  "new",
+  "prior_confirmed_same_source",
+  "prior_confirmed_changed_source",
+  "prior_needs_validation",
+  "prior_deferred",
+  "prior_blocked",
+  "prior_out_of_scope",
+  "prior_covered_same_source",
+  "prior_covered_changed_source",
+  "prior_rejected_claim_changed",
+  "none",
+]);
+const FINGERPRINT_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/@+-]*$/;
+const AGENT_ID_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$/;
+const WINDOWS_RESERVED_AGENT_ID = /^(?:con|prn|aux|nul|com[1-9]|lpt[1-9])$/;
+const VISIBLE_CONTENT = /[^\p{White_Space}\p{Cc}\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/u;
+const PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER = /[\p{Cc}\p{Cf}\p{Zl}\p{Zp}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/u;
+const WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT = /^(?:con|prn|aux|nul|clock\$|conin\$|conout\$|com[1-9\u00b9\u00b2\u00b3]|lpt[1-9\u00b9\u00b2\u00b3])(?:\.|$)/iu;
+const UTF8_DECODER = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: true });
+const UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER = /[\p{Cc}\p{Cf}\p{Cs}\p{Zl}\p{Zp}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/gu;
+const MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH = 256;
+
+const hasOwn = (value, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, key);
+
+class JsonStructureError extends Error {}
+class SafeInputError extends Error {}
+
+function escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(value) {
+  return String(value).replace(UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER, (character) => {
+    const codePoint = character.codePointAt(0);
+    return codePoint <= 0xffff
+      ? `\\u${codePoint.toString(16).padStart(4, "0")}`
+      : `\\u{${codePoint.toString(16)}}`;
+  });
+}
+
+function safeQuote(value) {
+  let serialized;
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    const clipped = value.length > MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH
+      ? `${value.slice(0, MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH)}...`
+      : value;
+    serialized = JSON.stringify(clipped);
+  } else if (value === null || typeof value === "boolean") {
+    serialized = String(value);
+  } else if (typeof value === "number" && Number.isFinite(value)) {
+    serialized = String(value);
+  } else {
+    serialized = `"<${Array.isArray(value) ? "array" : typeof value}>"`;
+  }
+  return escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(serialized);
+}
+
+function createErrorList() {
+  const errors = [];
+  Object.defineProperty(errors, "push", {
+    value(...messages) {
+      const remaining = LIMITS.validationErrors - this.length;
+      if (remaining > 0) {
+        Array.prototype.push.apply(this, messages.slice(0, remaining).map(escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters));
+      }
+      return this.length;
+    },
+  });
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function isObject(value) {
+  return value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+
+function preflightJsonText(contents) {
+  const containers = [];
+  let rootState = "value";
+  let inString = false;
+  let escaped = false;
+  let totalValues = 0;
+
+  function fail(message) {
+    throw new JsonStructureError(`input ${message}`);
+  }
+
+  function currentContainer() {
+    return containers[containers.length - 1];
+  }
+
+  function countValue() {
+    totalValues++;
+    if (totalValues > LIMITS.preflightValues) {
+      fail(`exceeds ${LIMITS.preflightValues} total value limit`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  function beginValue() {
+    const container = currentContainer();
+    if (!container) {
+      if (rootState !== "value") fail("has malformed JSON structure");
+      rootState = "end";
+    } else if (container.type === "array") {
+      if (container.state !== "firstValueOrEnd" && container.state !== "value") {
+        fail("has malformed JSON array structure");
+      }
+      container.items++;
+      const limit = container.topLevel ? MAX_UNITS : LIMITS.collectionItems;
+      if (container.items > limit) {
+        fail(container.topLevel
+          ? `exceeds ${limit} top-level unit limit`
+          : `exceeds ${limit} item array limit`);
+      }
+      container.state = "commaOrEnd";
+    } else {
+      if (container.state !== "value") fail("has malformed JSON object structure");
+      container.state = "commaOrEnd";
+    }
+    countValue();
+  }
+
+  function beginString() {
+    const container = currentContainer();
+    if (container && container.type === "object" &&
+        (container.state === "firstKeyOrEnd" || container.state === "key")) {
+      container.fields++;
+      if (container.fields > LIMITS.objectFields) {
+        fail(`exceeds ${LIMITS.objectFields} field object limit`);
+      }
+      container.state = "colon";
+    } else {
+      beginValue();
+    }
+    inString = true;
+  }
+
+  function beginContainer(type) {
+    beginValue();
+    if (containers.length >= LIMITS.nestingDepth) {
+      fail(`exceeds nesting depth limit ${LIMITS.nestingDepth}`);
+    }
+    containers.push(type === "array"
+      ? { type, state: "firstValueOrEnd", items: 0, topLevel: containers.length === 0 }
+      : { type, state: "firstKeyOrEnd", fields: 0 });
+  }
+
+  function closeContainer(type) {
+    const container = currentContainer();
+    if (!container || container.type !== type) fail("has mismatched JSON containers");
+    const canClose = type === "array"
+      ? container.state === "firstValueOrEnd" || container.state === "commaOrEnd"
+      : container.state === "firstKeyOrEnd" || container.state === "commaOrEnd";
+    if (!canClose) fail(`has malformed JSON ${type} structure`);
+    containers.pop();
+  }
+
+  function isWhitespace(character) {
+    return character === " " || character === "\t" || character === "\r" || character === "\n";
+  }
+
+  function isTokenDelimiter(character) {
+    return isWhitespace(character) || character === "," || character === ":" ||
+      character === "[" || character === "]" || character === "{" ||
+      character === "}" || character === "\"";
+  }
+
+  for (let index = 0; index < contents.length; index++) {
+    const character = contents[index];
+    if (inString) {
+      if (escaped) {
+        escaped = false;
+      } else if (character === "\\") {
+        escaped = true;
+      } else if (character === "\"") {
+        inString = false;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (isWhitespace(character)) continue;
+
+    if (character === "\"") {
+      beginString();
+    } else if (character === "[") {
+      beginContainer("array");
+    } else if (character === "{") {
+      beginContainer("object");
+    } else if (character === "]") {
+      closeContainer("array");
+    } else if (character === "}") {
+      closeContainer("object");
+    } else if (character === ":") {
+      const container = currentContainer();
+      if (!container || container.type !== "object" || container.state !== "colon") {
+        fail("has malformed JSON object structure");
+      }
+      container.state = "value";
+    } else if (character === ",") {
+      const container = currentContainer();
+      if (!container || container.state !== "commaOrEnd") fail("has malformed JSON collection structure");
+      container.state = container.type === "array" ? "value" : "key";
+    } else {
+      beginValue();
+      while (index + 1 < contents.length && !isTokenDelimiter(contents[index + 1])) index++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (inString) fail("has an unterminated JSON string");
+  if (containers.length > 0) fail("has truncated JSON structure");
+  if (rootState !== "end") fail("has no JSON value");
+}
+
+function preflightDocument(root) {
+  const errors = createErrorList();
+  const stack = [{ value: root, depth: 0, location: "$" }];
+  let visited = 0;
+
+  while (stack.length > 0) {
+    const { value, depth, location } = stack.pop();
+    visited++;
+    if (visited > LIMITS.preflightValues) {
+      errors.push(`$: exceeds ${LIMITS.preflightValues} total values`);
+      return errors;
+    }
+    if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") continue;
+    if (depth >= LIMITS.nestingDepth) {
+      errors.push(`${location}: exceeds nesting depth limit ${LIMITS.nestingDepth}`);
+      return errors;
+    }
+
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+      const limit = location === "$" ? MAX_UNITS : MAX_LIST_ITEMS;
+      if (value.length > limit) {
+        errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${limit} entries`);
+        return errors;
+      }
+      for (let index = value.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
+        stack.push({ value: value[index], depth: depth + 1, location: `${location}[${index}]` });
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    const keys = Object.keys(value);
+    if (keys.length > LIMITS.objectFields) {
+      errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${LIMITS.objectFields} object fields`);
+      return errors;
+    }
+    for (let index = keys.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
+      const key = keys[index];
+      stack.push({ value: value[key], depth: depth + 1, location: `${location}{${index}}` });
+    }
+  }
+
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) {
+  let index = 0;
+  while (index < value.length) {
+    const first = value.charCodeAt(index++);
+    if (first >= 0xd800 && first <= 0xdbff) {
+      if (index >= value.length) return false;
+      const second = value.charCodeAt(index++);
+      if (second < 0xdc00 || second > 0xdfff) return false;
+    } else if (first >= 0xdc00 && first <= 0xdfff) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+function hasVisibleProse(value) {
+  return hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) && VISIBLE_CONTENT.test(value);
+}
+
+function isVisibleText(value, maxLength = MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) {
+  return typeof value === "string" &&
+    value.length > 0 &&
+    value.length <= maxLength &&
+    value.trim() === value &&
+    hasVisibleProse(value);
+}
+
+function isCanonicalRef(value) {
+  return isVisibleText(value, 1024) &&
+    !PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER.test(value) &&
+    value.normalize("NFC") === value;
+}
+
+function encodeCanonicalRef(value) {
+  if (!isCanonicalRef(value)) throw new TypeError("invalid canonical reference");
+  let encoded = "";
+  for (const byte of Buffer.from(value, "utf8")) {
+    const unreserved =
+      (byte >= 0x41 && byte <= 0x5a) ||
+      (byte >= 0x61 && byte <= 0x7a) ||
+      (byte >= 0x30 && byte <= 0x39) ||
+      byte === 0x2d || byte === 0x2e || byte === 0x5f || byte === 0x7e;
+    encoded += unreserved ? String.fromCharCode(byte) : `%${byte.toString(16).toUpperCase().padStart(2, "0")}`;
+  }
+  return encoded;
+}
+
+function canonicalCoverageId(refs) {
+  if (!isObject(refs)) throw new TypeError("canonical_refs must be an object");
+  const fields = hasOwn(refs, "lifecycle") ? [...REF_FIELDS, "lifecycle"] : REF_FIELDS;
+  if (Object.keys(refs).length !== fields.length || fields.some((field) => !hasOwn(refs, field))) {
+    throw new TypeError("canonical_refs has missing or unexpected fields");
+  }
+  return fields.map((field) => encodeCanonicalRef(refs[field])).join("::");
+}
+
+function isSafeRelativePath(value) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || !hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) || value.trim() !== value || PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER.test(value) || value.includes("\\") || value.includes(":")) return false;
+  if (path.posix.isAbsolute(value) || path.win32.isAbsolute(value) || /^[A-Za-z]:/.test(value) || value.startsWith("~")) return false;
+  return value.split("/").every((segment) =>
+    segment !== "" &&
+    segment !== "." &&
+    segment !== ".." &&
+    !/[ .]$/u.test(segment) &&
+    !WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT.test(segment));
+}
+
+function isSafeAgentId(value) {
+  return typeof value === "string" &&
+    AGENT_ID_PATTERN.test(value) &&
+    !WINDOWS_RESERVED_AGENT_ID.test(value);
+}
+
+function isOwnedArtifactPath(value, agentId) {
+  if (!isSafeAgentId(agentId) || !isSafeRelativePath(value)) return false;
+  const prefix = `agents/${agentId}/artifacts/`;
+  return value.startsWith(prefix) && value.length > prefix.length;
+}
+
+function validateStringArray(value, location, errors, options = {}) {
+  const { allowEmpty = true, fingerprint = false, pathValue = false } = options;
+  if (!Array.isArray(value)) {
+    errors.push(`${location}: expected array`);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!allowEmpty && value.length === 0) errors.push(`${location}: must not be empty`);
+  if (value.length > MAX_LIST_ITEMS) errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${MAX_LIST_ITEMS} entries`);
+  const seen = new Set();
+  value.slice(0, MAX_LIST_ITEMS).forEach((entry, index) => {
+    const entryLocation = `${location}[${index}]`;
+    const valid = pathValue ? isSafeRelativePath(entry) : isVisibleText(entry);
+    if (!valid) errors.push(`${entryLocation}: invalid ${pathValue ? "repository-relative path" : "text"}`);
+    if (fingerprint && typeof entry === "string" && !FINGERPRINT_PATTERN.test(entry)) {
+      errors.push(`${entryLocation}: invalid fingerprint`);
+    }
+    if (typeof entry === "string" && seen.has(entry)) errors.push(`${entryLocation}: duplicate entry`);
+    if (typeof entry === "string") seen.add(entry);
+  });
+}
+
+function validateChecks(value, location, errors) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(value)) {
+    errors.push(`${location}: expected array`);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (value.length > MAX_LIST_ITEMS) errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${MAX_LIST_ITEMS} entries`);
+  value.slice(0, MAX_LIST_ITEMS).forEach((check, index) => {
+    const base = `${location}[${index}]`;
+    if (!isObject(check)) {
+      errors.push(`${base}: expected object`);
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const field of ["agent_id", "reviewed_paths", "invariant", "method", "result", "artifact"]) {
+      if (!hasOwn(check, field)) errors.push(`${base}: missing required field ${safeQuote(field)}`);
+    }
+    if (!isSafeAgentId(check.agent_id)) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: expected a canonical lowercase agent ID`);
+    validateStringArray(check.reviewed_paths, `${base}.reviewed_paths`, errors, { allowEmpty: false, pathValue: true });
+    if (!isVisibleText(check.invariant)) errors.push(`${base}.invariant: invalid text`);
+    if (check.method !== "source" && check.method !== "local") errors.push(`${base}.method: expected "source" or "local"`);
+    if (!isVisibleText(check.result)) errors.push(`${base}.result: invalid text`);
+    if (check.method === "source" && check.artifact !== null) {
+      errors.push(`${base}.artifact: source-only check must use null`);
+    } else if (check.method === "local") {
+      if (!isOwnedArtifactPath(check.artifact, check.agent_id)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.artifact: local check requires an artifact owned by agent ${safeQuote(isSafeAgentId(check.agent_id) ? check.agent_id : "<agent-id>")}`);
+      }
+    } else if (check.method !== "source" && check.method !== "local" && check.artifact !== null && !isSafeRelativePath(check.artifact)) {
+      errors.push(`${base}.artifact: expected null or a safe output-relative path`);
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+function validateReviewedPathOwnership(unit, base, errors) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(unit.reviewed_paths) || !Array.isArray(unit.local_checks)) return;
+  const aggregatePaths = new Set(unit.reviewed_paths.filter((value) => typeof value === "string"));
+  const ownedPaths = new Set();
+  for (const check of unit.local_checks) {
+    if (!isObject(check) || !Array.isArray(check.reviewed_paths)) continue;
+    for (const reviewedPath of check.reviewed_paths) {
+      if (typeof reviewedPath === "string") ownedPaths.add(reviewedPath);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const reviewedPath of aggregatePaths) {
+    if (!ownedPaths.has(reviewedPath)) errors.push(`${base}.reviewed_paths: ${safeQuote(reviewedPath)} has no check owner`);
+  }
+  for (const reviewedPath of ownedPaths) {
+    if (!aggregatePaths.has(reviewedPath)) errors.push(`${base}.local_checks: owned path ${safeQuote(reviewedPath)} is absent from aggregate reviewed_paths`);
+  }
+}
+
+function validateExcludedBlocks(value, location, errors) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(value)) {
+    errors.push(`${location}: expected array`);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (value.length > MAX_LIST_ITEMS) errors.push(`${location}: exceeds ${MAX_LIST_ITEMS} entries`);
+  const seen = new Set();
+  value.slice(0, MAX_LIST_ITEMS).forEach((entry, index) => {
+    const base = `${location}[${index}]`;
+    if (!isObject(entry)) {
+      errors.push(`${base}: expected object`);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!isVisibleText(entry.block)) errors.push(`${base}.block: invalid text`);
+    if (!isVisibleText(entry.reason)) errors.push(`${base}.reason: invalid text`);
+    if (typeof entry.block === "string" && seen.has(entry.block)) errors.push(`${base}.block: duplicate entry`);
+    if (typeof entry.block === "string") seen.add(entry.block);
+  });
+}
+
+function semanticKey(unit) {
+  return JSON.stringify([
+    unit.surface,
+    unit.boundary,
+    unit.subsystem,
+    unit.attack_class,
+    hasOwn(unit, "lifecycle") ? unit.lifecycle : null,
+  ]);
+}
+
+function hasValidSemanticFields(unit) {
+  return ["surface", "boundary", "subsystem", "attack_class"].every((field) => isVisibleText(unit[field])) &&
+    (!hasOwn(unit, "lifecycle") || isVisibleText(unit.lifecycle));
+}
+
+function requireEmptyArray(unit, field, base, errors) {
+  if (Array.isArray(unit[field]) && unit[field].length > 0) {
+    errors.push(`${base}.${field}: unit with status ${safeQuote(unit.status)} must keep this array empty`);
+  }
+}
+
+function requireNonemptyArray(unit, field, base, errors) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(unit[field]) || unit[field].length === 0) {
+    errors.push(`${base}.${field}: unit with status ${safeQuote(unit.status)} requires entries`);
+  }
+}
+
+function validateStateInvariants(unit, base, errors) {
+  const emptyEvidence = () => {
+    requireEmptyArray(unit, "reviewed_paths", base, errors);
+    requireEmptyArray(unit, "local_checks", base, errors);
+  };
+  const requireOwner = () => {
+    if (!isSafeAgentId(unit.agent_id)) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: unit with status ${safeQuote(unit.status)} requires a canonical lowercase agent ID`);
+  };
+
+  if (unit.status !== "candidate") requireEmptyArray(unit, "result_fingerprints", base, errors);
+
+  switch (unit.status) {
+    case "planned":
+      if (unit.agent_id !== null) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: planned unit must be unassigned`);
+      emptyEvidence();
+      requireEmptyArray(unit, "unresolved", base, errors);
+      break;
+    case "not_applicable":
+    case "out_of_scope":
+    case "deferred":
+      if (unit.agent_id !== null) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: unit with status ${safeQuote(unit.status)} must be unassigned`);
+      emptyEvidence();
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "unresolved", base, errors);
+      break;
+    case "in_progress":
+      requireOwner();
+      emptyEvidence();
+      requireEmptyArray(unit, "unresolved", base, errors);
+      break;
+    case "blocked":
+      requireOwner();
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "reviewed_paths", base, errors);
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "local_checks", base, errors);
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "unresolved", base, errors);
+      break;
+    case "covered":
+      requireOwner();
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "reviewed_paths", base, errors);
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "local_checks", base, errors);
+      requireEmptyArray(unit, "unresolved", base, errors);
+      break;
+    case "candidate":
+      requireOwner();
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "reviewed_paths", base, errors);
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "local_checks", base, errors);
+      requireNonemptyArray(unit, "result_fingerprints", base, errors);
+      break;
+  }
+}
+
+function validateAttempts(value, unit, base, errors) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(value)) {
+    errors.push(`${base}.attempts: expected array`);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (value.length > MAX_LIST_ITEMS) errors.push(`${base}.attempts: exceeds ${MAX_LIST_ITEMS} entries`);
+
+  const priorOwners = new Set();
+  const priorArtifacts = new Set();
+  let previousWave = 0;
+  value.slice(0, MAX_LIST_ITEMS).forEach((attempt, index) => {
+    const attemptBase = `${base}.attempts[${index}]`;
+    if (!isObject(attempt)) {
+      errors.push(`${attemptBase}: expected object`);
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const field of ATTEMPT_FIELDS) {
+      if (!hasOwn(attempt, field)) errors.push(`${attemptBase}: missing required field ${safeQuote(field)}`);
+    }
+    if (!Number.isInteger(attempt.wave) || attempt.wave < 1) {
+      errors.push(`${attemptBase}.wave: expected a positive integer`);
+    } else {
+      if (attempt.wave <= previousWave) errors.push(`${attemptBase}.wave: archived attempt waves must be strictly increasing`);
+      if (Number.isInteger(unit.wave) && attempt.wave >= unit.wave) {
+        errors.push(`${attemptBase}.wave: archived attempt wave must precede current wave ${safeQuote(unit.wave)}`);
+      }
+      previousWave = attempt.wave;
+    }
+    if (!ATTEMPT_STATUSES.has(attempt.status)) {
+      errors.push(`${attemptBase}.status: expected "covered", "candidate", or "blocked"`);
+    }
+    let hasFreshOwner = false;
+    if (!isSafeAgentId(attempt.agent_id)) {
+      errors.push(`${attemptBase}.agent_id: archived attempt requires a canonical lowercase agent ID`);
+    } else if (priorOwners.has(attempt.agent_id)) {
+      errors.push(`${attemptBase}.agent_id: assignment owner must be fresh for each attempt`);
+    } else {
+      hasFreshOwner = true;
+    }
+    validateStringArray(attempt.reviewed_paths, `${attemptBase}.reviewed_paths`, errors, { pathValue: true });
+    validateChecks(attempt.local_checks, `${attemptBase}.local_checks`, errors);
+    validateReviewedPathOwnership(attempt, attemptBase, errors);
+    validateStringArray(attempt.result_fingerprints, `${attemptBase}.result_fingerprints`, errors, { fingerprint: true });
+    validateStringArray(attempt.unresolved, `${attemptBase}.unresolved`, errors);
+    if (!isVisibleText(attempt.reassignment_reason)) errors.push(`${attemptBase}.reassignment_reason: invalid text`);
+    validateStateInvariants(attempt, attemptBase, errors);
+
+    if (Array.isArray(attempt.local_checks)) {
+      attempt.local_checks.forEach((check, checkIndex) => {
+        if (!isObject(check)) return;
+        if (priorOwners.has(check.agent_id)) {
+          errors.push(`${attemptBase}.local_checks[${checkIndex}].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its earlier attempt`);
+        }
+        if (typeof check.artifact === "string" && priorArtifacts.has(check.artifact)) {
+          errors.push(`${attemptBase}.local_checks[${checkIndex}].artifact: artifact from an earlier attempt cannot be reused`);
+        }
+        if (check.method === "local" && typeof check.artifact === "string") priorArtifacts.add(check.artifact);
+      });
+    }
+    if (hasFreshOwner) priorOwners.add(attempt.agent_id);
+  });
+
+  if (isSafeAgentId(unit.agent_id) && priorOwners.has(unit.agent_id)) {
+    errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: current assignment owner must be fresh after reassignment`);
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(unit.local_checks)) {
+    unit.local_checks.forEach((check, index) => {
+      if (!isObject(check)) return;
+      if (priorOwners.has(check.agent_id)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.local_checks[${index}].agent_id: prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its archived attempt`);
+      }
+      if (typeof check.artifact === "string" && priorArtifacts.has(check.artifact)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.local_checks[${index}].artifact: artifact from an archived attempt cannot be reused`);
+      }
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+function collectUnitErrors(unit, index) {
+  const errors = createErrorList();
+  const base = `$[${index}]`;
+  if (!isObject(unit)) return [`${base}: expected object`];
+
+  for (const field of REQUIRED_FIELDS) {
+    if (!hasOwn(unit, field)) errors.push(`${base}: missing required field ${safeQuote(field)}`);
+  }
+  for (const field of ["surface", "boundary", "subsystem", "attack_class"]) {
+    if (!isVisibleText(unit[field])) errors.push(`${base}.${field}: invalid text`);
+  }
+  if (hasOwn(unit, "lifecycle") && !isVisibleText(unit.lifecycle)) errors.push(`${base}.lifecycle: invalid text`);
+
+  let expectedId = null;
+  if (!isObject(unit.canonical_refs)) {
+    errors.push(`${base}.canonical_refs: expected object`);
+  } else {
+    const expectedFields = hasOwn(unit.canonical_refs, "lifecycle") ? [...REF_FIELDS, "lifecycle"] : REF_FIELDS;
+    for (const field of expectedFields) {
+      if (!hasOwn(unit.canonical_refs, field)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.canonical_refs: missing required field ${safeQuote(field)}`);
+      } else if (!isCanonicalRef(unit.canonical_refs[field])) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.canonical_refs.${field}: invalid canonical reference`);
+      }
+    }
+    if (Object.keys(unit.canonical_refs).some((field) => !expectedFields.includes(field))) {
+      errors.push(`${base}.canonical_refs: contains unexpected fields`);
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(unit, "lifecycle") !== hasOwn(unit.canonical_refs, "lifecycle")) {
+      errors.push(`${base}: lifecycle and canonical_refs.lifecycle must appear together`);
+    }
+    try {
+      expectedId = canonicalCoverageId(unit.canonical_refs);
+    } catch {
+      // The specific reference errors above are more useful.
+    }
+  }
+  if (!isVisibleText(unit.coverage_id, 65536)) {
+    errors.push(`${base}.coverage_id: invalid text`);
+  } else if (expectedId !== null && unit.coverage_id !== expectedId) {
+    errors.push(`${base}.coverage_id: expected canonical ID ${safeQuote(expectedId)}`);
+  }
+
+  validateStringArray(unit.starting_paths, `${base}.starting_paths`, errors, { allowEmpty: false, pathValue: true });
+  if (unit.ordinary_attack_class_block !== null && !isVisibleText(unit.ordinary_attack_class_block)) {
+    errors.push(`${base}.ordinary_attack_class_block: expected null or non-empty text`);
+  }
+  validateStringArray(unit.selected_companion_blocks, `${base}.selected_companion_blocks`, errors);
+  validateExcludedBlocks(unit.excluded_blocks, `${base}.excluded_blocks`, errors);
+  if (Array.isArray(unit.selected_companion_blocks) && Array.isArray(unit.excluded_blocks)) {
+    const selected = new Set(unit.selected_companion_blocks);
+    unit.excluded_blocks.forEach((entry, blockIndex) => {
+      if (isObject(entry) && selected.has(entry.block)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.excluded_blocks[${blockIndex}].block: block is also selected`);
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  if (!PRIOR_STATUSES.has(unit.prior_status)) errors.push(`${base}.prior_status: invalid value ${safeQuote(unit.prior_status)}`);
+  if (!STATUSES.has(unit.status)) errors.push(`${base}.status: invalid value ${safeQuote(unit.status)}`);
+  if (!Number.isInteger(unit.wave) || unit.wave < 1) errors.push(`${base}.wave: expected a positive integer`);
+  if (unit.agent_id !== null && !isSafeAgentId(unit.agent_id)) errors.push(`${base}.agent_id: expected null or a safe agent ID`);
+
+  validateAttempts(unit.attempts, unit, base, errors);
+  validateStringArray(unit.reviewed_paths, `${base}.reviewed_paths`, errors, { pathValue: true });
+  validateChecks(unit.local_checks, `${base}.local_checks`, errors);
+  validateReviewedPathOwnership(unit, base, errors);
+  validateStringArray(unit.result_fingerprints, `${base}.result_fingerprints`, errors, { fingerprint: true });
+  validateStringArray(unit.unresolved, `${base}.unresolved`, errors);
+
+  validateStateInvariants(unit, base, errors);
+
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function readFileWithinLimit(file) {
+  const noFollow = fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW;
+  const nonBlock = fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK;
+  if (!Number.isInteger(noFollow) || noFollow === 0 || !Number.isInteger(nonBlock) || nonBlock === 0) {
+    // Node exposes no race-safe fallback on these platforms, so reject all inputs.
+    throw new SafeInputError("OS no-follow and nonblocking input protection is unavailable");
+  }
+
+  let descriptor;
+  try {
+    descriptor = fs.openSync(file, fs.constants.O_RDONLY | noFollow | nonBlock);
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error && (error.code === "ELOOP" || error.code === "EMLINK")) throw new SafeInputError("input must not be a symlink");
+    throw error;
+  }
+  try {
+    const stat = fs.fstatSync(descriptor);
+    if (!stat.isFile()) throw new SafeInputError("input must be a regular file");
+    if (stat.size > MAX_INPUT_BYTES) throw new SafeInputError(`input exceeds ${MAX_INPUT_BYTES} byte limit`);
+
+    const chunks = [];
+    const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(64 * 1024);
+    let bytesRead = 0;
+    while (true) {
+      const count = fs.readSync(descriptor, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);
+      if (count === 0) break;
+      bytesRead += count;
+      if (bytesRead > MAX_INPUT_BYTES) throw new SafeInputError(`input exceeds ${MAX_INPUT_BYTES} byte limit`);
+      chunks.push(Buffer.from(buffer.subarray(0, count)));
+    }
+    try {
+      return UTF8_DECODER.decode(Buffer.concat(chunks, bytesRead));
+    } catch {
+      throw new SafeInputError("input is not valid UTF-8");
+    }
+  } finally {
+    fs.closeSync(descriptor);
+  }
+}
+
+function validateDocument(ledger) {
+  const errors = createErrorList();
+  if (!Array.isArray(ledger)) {
+    errors.push("$: expected a top-level array");
+    return errors;
+  }
+  if (ledger.length > MAX_UNITS) {
+    errors.push(`$: exceeds ${MAX_UNITS} coverage units`);
+    return errors;
+  }
+
+  errors.push(...preflightDocument(ledger));
+  if (errors.length > 0) return errors;
+
+  const ids = new Map();
+  const semantics = new Map();
+  let previousId = null;
+  for (let index = 0; index < ledger.length && errors.length < LIMITS.validationErrors; index++) {
+    const unit = ledger[index];
+    errors.push(...collectUnitErrors(unit, index));
+    if (errors.length >= LIMITS.validationErrors) break;
+    if (!isObject(unit) || typeof unit.coverage_id !== "string") continue;
+
+    const key = hasValidSemanticFields(unit) ? semanticKey(unit) : null;
+    if (ids.has(unit.coverage_id)) {
+      const previous = ids.get(unit.coverage_id);
+      const qualifier = key !== null && previous.key !== null && previous.key !== key
+        ? "canonical identity collision with different semantic fields"
+        : "duplicate coverage ID";
+      errors.push(`$[${index}].coverage_id: ${qualifier} at $[${previous.index}]`);
+    } else {
+      ids.set(unit.coverage_id, { index, key });
+    }
+    if (key !== null && semantics.has(key) && semantics.get(key).id !== unit.coverage_id) {
+      const previous = semantics.get(key);
+      errors.push(`$[${index}].canonical_refs: semantic tuple already uses coverage ID ${safeQuote(previous.id)} at $[${previous.index}]`);
+    } else if (key !== null) {
+      semantics.set(key, { id: unit.coverage_id, index });
+    }
+    if (previousId !== null && previousId > unit.coverage_id) {
+      errors.push(`$[${index}].coverage_id: units must be sorted lexicographically`);
+    }
+    previousId = unit.coverage_id;
+  }
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function run(file) {
+  if (!file) {
+    console.error("Usage: node validate-coverage-ledger.cjs <path-to-coverage-ledger.json>");
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  let contents;
+  try {
+    contents = readFileWithinLimit(file);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const reason = error instanceof SafeInputError ? error.message : "input could not be opened or read safely";
+    console.error(`Failed to read coverage ledger: ${reason}`);
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  let ledger;
+  try {
+    preflightJsonText(contents);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const reason = error instanceof JsonStructureError ? error.message : "invalid JSON structure";
+    console.error(`Failed to parse coverage ledger: ${reason}`);
+    return 1;
+  }
+  try {
+    ledger = JSON.parse(contents);
+  } catch {
+    console.error("Failed to parse coverage ledger: invalid JSON syntax");
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  let errors;
+  try {
+    errors = validateDocument(ledger);
+  } catch {
+    console.error("Failed to validate coverage ledger: unexpected validation error");
+    return 1;
+  }
+  for (const message of errors) console.error("ERROR:", message);
+  if (errors.length > 0) {
+    const cap = errors.length === LIMITS.validationErrors ? `; output capped at ${LIMITS.validationErrors}` : "";
+    console.error(`FAIL: ${errors.length} validation error(s)${cap}`);
+    return 1;
+  }
+  console.log(`PASS: ${ledger.length} coverage units valid`);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  LIMITS,
+  PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER,
+  UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER,
+  VISIBLE_CONTENT,
+  WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT,
+  canonicalCoverageId,
+  encodeCanonicalRef,
+  hasVisibleProse,
+  isSafeAgentId,
+  isSafeRelativePath,
+  preflightJsonText,
+  readFileWithinLimit,
+  safeQuote,
+  validateDocument,
+};
+
+if (require.main === module) process.exit(run(process.argv[2]));

.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-coverage-ledger.test.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,740 @@
+const assert = require("node:assert/strict");
+const fs = require("node:fs");
+const os = require("node:os");
+const path = require("node:path");
+const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
+const test = require("node:test");
+const {
+  LIMITS,
+  canonicalCoverageId,
+  encodeCanonicalRef,
+  isSafeAgentId,
+  isSafeRelativePath,
+  preflightJsonText,
+  validateDocument,
+} = require("./validate-coverage-ledger.cjs");
+
+const validatorPath = path.join(__dirname, "validate-coverage-ledger.cjs");
+const CLI_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;
+const HOSTILE_CLI_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000;
+const HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN = Number.isInteger(fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW) &&
+  fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW !== 0 &&
+  Number.isInteger(fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK) &&
+  fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK !== 0;
+
+function unit(overrides = {}) {
+  const canonicalRefs = overrides.canonical_refs || {
+    surface: "src/router.ts#POST /users/:id",
+    boundary: "src/authz.ts#requireOwner",
+    subsystem: "packages/api",
+    attack_class: "ATTACK-CLASSES.md#Access control",
+  };
+  const value = {
+    coverage_id: canonicalCoverageId(canonicalRefs),
+    canonical_refs: canonicalRefs,
+    surface: "Update-user route",
+    boundary: "Object ownership",
+    subsystem: "API",
+    attack_class: "Access control",
+    starting_paths: ["src/router.ts", "src/authz.ts"],
+    ordinary_attack_class_block: "ATTACK-CLASSES.md#Access control",
+    selected_companion_blocks: [],
+    excluded_blocks: [{ block: "WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md#Cache behavior", reason: "The route is not cached." }],
+    prior_status: "new",
+    attempts: [],
+    wave: 1,
+    status: "planned",
+    agent_id: null,
+    reviewed_paths: [],
+    local_checks: [],
+    result_fingerprints: [],
+    unresolved: [],
+  };
+  return Object.assign(value, overrides, { canonical_refs: canonicalRefs });
+}
+
+function errorsFor(value) {
+  return validateDocument(value);
+}
+
+function runCli(contents, options = {}) {
+  const { nodeArgs = [], timeout = CLI_TIMEOUT_MS } = options;
+  const directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "validate-coverage-ledger-"));
+  const ledgerPath = path.join(directory, "coverage-ledger.json");
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(ledgerPath, contents);
+    return spawnSync(process.execPath, [...nodeArgs, validatorPath, ledgerPath], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout,
+    });
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+function cliOutput(result) {
+  return `${result.stdout}${result.stderr}`;
+}
+
+const TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD = "\u001b\u0007\u0085\u202e";
+const TERMINAL_CONTROL_BYTES = [
+  Buffer.from([0x1b]),
+  Buffer.from([0x07]),
+  Buffer.from("\u0085"),
+  Buffer.from("\u202e"),
+];
+
+function assertNoInjectedControlBytes(output) {
+  const bytes = Buffer.isBuffer(output) ? output : Buffer.from(output, "utf8");
+  for (const marker of TERMINAL_CONTROL_BYTES) {
+    assert.equal(bytes.indexOf(marker), -1, `found raw control bytes ${marker.toString("hex")}`);
+  }
+}
+
+function sourceCheck(agentId = "hunter-1", overrides = {}) {
+  return {
+    agent_id: agentId,
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    invariant: "The route checks object ownership.",
+    method: "source",
+    result: "The owner check applies before the update.",
+    artifact: null,
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+function localCheck(agentId = "hunter-1", overrides = {}) {
+  return sourceCheck(agentId, {
+    method: "local",
+    result: "The bounded fixture accepted the other owner's object.",
+    artifact: `agents/${agentId}/artifacts/result.txt`,
+    ...overrides,
+  });
+}
+
+function archivedAttempt(overrides = {}) {
+  const value = {
+    wave: 1,
+    status: "blocked",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+    result_fingerprints: [],
+    unresolved: ["The deployed policy is unavailable."],
+    reassignment_reason: "The critic found an unchecked parallel path.",
+  };
+  return Object.assign(value, overrides);
+}
+
+test("accepts an empty ledger and complete units", () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([]), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([unit()]), []);
+
+  const missingAttempts = unit();
+  delete missingAttempts.attempts;
+  assert(errorsFor([missingAttempts]).some((error) => error.includes('missing required field "attempts"')));
+
+  const covered = unit({
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([covered]), []);
+});
+
+test("accepts a complete ledger through the CLI", { skip: !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify([unit()]));
+  assert.equal(result.status, 0, cliOutput(result));
+  assert.match(result.stdout, /PASS: 1 coverage units valid/);
+});
+
+test("text preflight ignores structural characters and escapes inside strings", () => {
+  const value = unit({
+    surface: "Route \\ slash [list] {object}, colon: quoted \"value\"",
+    excluded_blocks: [{
+      block: "COMPANION.md#Literal [brackets] {braces}",
+      reason: "The text contains a backslash \\ before an escaped \"quote\".",
+    }],
+  });
+  const contents = JSON.stringify([value]);
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() => preflightJsonText(contents));
+  assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(contents), [value]);
+  if (HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN) {
+    const result = runCli(contents);
+    assert.equal(result.status, 0, cliOutput(result));
+  }
+});
+
+test("text preflight enforces structural cardinality limits", () => {
+  const depthLimit = LIMITS.nestingDepth;
+  assert.doesNotThrow(() => preflightJsonText(`${"[".repeat(depthLimit)}0${"]".repeat(depthLimit)}`));
+  assert.throws(
+    () => preflightJsonText(`${"[".repeat(depthLimit + 1)}0${"]".repeat(depthLimit + 1)}`),
+    /exceeds nesting depth limit 64/,
+  );
+
+  const tooManyUnits = `[${"null,".repeat(LIMITS.units)}null]`;
+  assert.throws(() => preflightJsonText(tooManyUnits), /exceeds 10000 top-level unit limit/);
+
+  const tooManyItems = `[[${"null,".repeat(LIMITS.collectionItems)}null]]`;
+  assert.throws(() => preflightJsonText(tooManyItems), /exceeds 1000 item array limit/);
+
+  const objectFields = Array.from(
+    { length: LIMITS.objectFields + 1 },
+    (_, index) => `"field${index}":null`,
+  ).join(",");
+  assert.throws(() => preflightJsonText(`[{${objectFields}}]`), /exceeds 1000 field object limit/);
+
+  const fullArray = `[${"null,".repeat(LIMITS.collectionItems - 1)}null]`;
+  const arraysNeeded = Math.floor(LIMITS.preflightValues / (LIMITS.collectionItems + 1)) + 1;
+  const tooManyValues = `[${Array.from({ length: arraysNeeded }, () => fullArray).join(",")}]`;
+  assert.throws(() => preflightJsonText(tooManyValues), /exceeds 500000 total value limit/);
+});
+
+test("text preflight rejects malformed structural truncation cleanly", () => {
+  assert.throws(() => preflightJsonText("["), /truncated JSON structure/);
+  assert.throws(() => preflightJsonText("[\"unterminated"), /unterminated JSON string/);
+  assert.throws(() => preflightJsonText("[{\"field\":1]"), /mismatched JSON containers/);
+});
+
+test("derives collision-free canonical IDs from exact UTF-8 references", () => {
+  assert.equal(encodeCanonicalRef("route:POST /users"), "route%3APOST%20%2Fusers");
+  assert.notEqual(encodeCanonicalRef("route name"), encodeCanonicalRef("route-name"));
+  assert.equal(
+    canonicalCoverageId({ surface: "a", boundary: "b", subsystem: "c", attack_class: "d", lifecycle: "retry" }),
+    "a::b::c::d::retry",
+  );
+  assert.throws(() => encodeCanonicalRef("e\u0301"), /invalid canonical reference/);
+  assert.throws(() => encodeCanonicalRef("bad\u0000ref"), /invalid canonical reference/);
+  assert.throws(() => encodeCanonicalRef("hidden\u200bref"), /invalid canonical reference/);
+});
+
+test("rejects noncanonical, duplicate, and colliding IDs", () => {
+  const wrong = unit({ coverage_id: "display-label-slug" });
+  assert(errorsFor([wrong]).some((error) => error.includes("expected canonical ID")));
+
+  const duplicate = unit();
+  assert(errorsFor([duplicate, unit()]).some((error) => error.includes("duplicate coverage ID")));
+
+  const collision = unit();
+  const differentMeaning = unit({ surface: "Delete-user route" });
+  assert(errorsFor([collision, differentMeaning]).some((error) => error.includes("canonical identity collision")));
+});
+
+test("requires canonical references to be own properties", () => {
+  const inherited = Object.create(unit().canonical_refs);
+  const value = unit();
+  value.canonical_refs = inherited;
+  assert(errorsFor([value]).some((error) => error.includes("missing required field")));
+});
+
+test("rejects aliases for one semantic tuple", () => {
+  const first = unit();
+  const refs = { ...first.canonical_refs, surface: "src/alias.ts#updateUser" };
+  const alias = unit({ canonical_refs: refs });
+  const ledger = [first, alias].sort((left, right) => left.coverage_id.localeCompare(right.coverage_id));
+  assert(errorsFor(ledger).some((error) => error.includes("semantic tuple already uses coverage ID")));
+});
+
+test("requires lexicographic order", () => {
+  const secondRefs = {
+    surface: "zzz",
+    boundary: "src/authz.ts#requireOwner",
+    subsystem: "packages/api",
+    attack_class: "ATTACK-CLASSES.md#Access control",
+  };
+  assert(errorsFor([unit({ canonical_refs: secondRefs }), unit()])
+    .some((error) => error.includes("sorted lexicographically")));
+});
+
+test("validates assignment block maps", () => {
+  const overlap = unit({
+    selected_companion_blocks: ["AI-AND-LLM.md#Tool calls"],
+    excluded_blocks: [{ block: "AI-AND-LLM.md#Tool calls", reason: "Claimed irrelevant." }],
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([overlap]).some((error) => error.includes("also selected")));
+
+  const noReason = unit({ excluded_blocks: [{ block: "AI-AND-LLM.md#Tool calls", reason: "" }] });
+  assert(errorsFor([noReason]).some((error) => error.includes("reason")));
+});
+
+test("requires owned artifacts for local checks and null artifacts for source checks", () => {
+  const local = unit({
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [localCheck()],
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([local]), []);
+
+  const independentlyVerified = unit({
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts", "src/authz.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck(), localCheck("verifier-1", { reviewed_paths: ["src/authz.ts"] })],
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([independentlyVerified]), []);
+
+  const unownedPath = unit({
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts", "src/authz.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([unownedPath]).some((error) => error.includes("has no check owner")));
+
+  for (const [checkAgentId, artifact] of [
+    [null, "agents/hunter-1/artifacts/result.txt"],
+    ["hunter-1", null],
+    ["hunter-1", "result.txt"],
+    ["hunter-1", "agents/hunter-2/artifacts/result.txt"],
+    ["../hunter", "agents/../hunter/artifacts/result.txt"],
+  ]) {
+    const value = unit({
+      status: "covered",
+      agent_id: "hunter-1",
+      reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+      local_checks: [localCheck(checkAgentId, { artifact })],
+    });
+    assert.notEqual(errorsFor([value]).length, 0, `${checkAgentId}: ${artifact}`);
+  }
+
+  const unownedSource = unit({
+    status: "blocked",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+    unresolved: ["The boundary behavior is not source-visible."],
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([unownedSource]).some((error) => error.includes("unit with status \"blocked\" requires a canonical lowercase agent ID")));
+
+  const sourceWithArtifact = unit({
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck("hunter-1", { artifact: "agents/hunter-1/artifacts/source.txt" })],
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([sourceWithArtifact]).some((error) => error.includes("source-only check must use null")));
+});
+
+test("requires canonical lowercase filesystem-safe agent IDs", () => {
+  for (const value of ["hunter-1", "verifier_2", "a0"]) assert.equal(isSafeAgentId(value), true, value);
+  for (const value of ["Hunter-1", "hunter.1", "hunter-1.", "hunter ", "con", "prn", "aux", "nul", "com1", "lpt9", "../hunter"]) {
+    assert.equal(isSafeAgentId(value), false, value);
+  }
+
+  const caseAlias = unit({ status: "in_progress", agent_id: "Hunter-1" });
+  assert(errorsFor([caseAlias]).some((error) => error.includes("canonical lowercase agent ID")));
+});
+
+test("enforces state evidence", () => {
+  assert(errorsFor([unit({ status: "in_progress" })]).some((error) => error.includes("unit with status \"in_progress\" requires")));
+  assert(errorsFor([unit({ status: "blocked" })]).some((error) => error.includes("unresolved")));
+  assert(errorsFor([unit({ status: "candidate" })]).some((error) => error.includes("reviewed_paths")));
+
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([unit({ status: "in_progress", agent_id: "hunter-1" })]), []);
+  const inProgressEvidence = unit({
+    status: "in_progress",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([inProgressEvidence]).some((error) => error.includes("must keep this array empty")));
+
+  const assignedPlanned = unit({
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([assignedPlanned]).some((error) => error.includes("planned unit must be unassigned")));
+
+  const candidate = unit({
+    status: "candidate",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck("hunter-1", { invariant: "Ownership is required.", result: "No check exists." })],
+    result_fingerprints: ["src-router-missing-owner-check"],
+    unresolved: ["validation_budget_exhausted"],
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([candidate]), []);
+
+  const blocked = unit({
+    status: "blocked",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+    unresolved: ["The deployed policy is unavailable."],
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([blocked]), []);
+  const blockedFingerprint = { ...blocked, result_fingerprints: ["forbidden-fingerprint"] };
+  assert(errorsFor([blockedFingerprint]).some((error) => error.includes("result_fingerprints")));
+
+  for (const status of ["not_applicable", "out_of_scope", "deferred"]) {
+    assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([unit({ status, unresolved: ["Reason recorded."] })]), []);
+    const invalid = unit({
+      status,
+      agent_id: "hunter-1",
+      reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+      local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+      result_fingerprints: ["forbidden-fingerprint"],
+      unresolved: ["Reason recorded."],
+    });
+    const errors = errorsFor([invalid]);
+    assert(errors.some((error) => error.includes("must be unassigned")), status);
+    assert(errors.some((error) => error.includes("reviewed_paths")), status);
+    assert(errors.some((error) => error.includes("result_fingerprints")), status);
+  }
+
+  const coveredFingerprint = unit({
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+    result_fingerprints: ["forbidden-fingerprint"],
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([coveredFingerprint]).some((error) => error.includes("result_fingerprints")));
+
+  const coveredUnresolved = unit({
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+    unresolved: ["Unexpected unresolved claim."],
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([coveredUnresolved]).some((error) => error.includes("unresolved")));
+});
+
+test("archives prior evidence when a critic assigns a fresh owner", () => {
+  const reassigned = unit({
+    attempts: [archivedAttempt()],
+    wave: 2,
+    status: "in_progress",
+    agent_id: "hunter-2",
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([reassigned]), []);
+
+  const finalClosure = unit({
+    attempts: [archivedAttempt()],
+    wave: 2,
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-2",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/authz.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck("hunter-2", { reviewed_paths: ["src/authz.ts"] })],
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([finalClosure]), []);
+});
+
+test("preserves candidate provenance when reassignment must be deferred", () => {
+  const candidateAttempt = archivedAttempt({
+    status: "candidate",
+    result_fingerprints: ["src-router-missing-owner-check"],
+    unresolved: ["validation_budget_exhausted"],
+  });
+  const deferred = unit({
+    attempts: [candidateAttempt],
+    wave: 2,
+    status: "deferred",
+    unresolved: ["quick_profile_final_critic"],
+  });
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([deferred]), []);
+});
+
+test("rejects reassignment owner reuse and evidence mixing", () => {
+  const reusedOwner = unit({
+    attempts: [archivedAttempt()],
+    wave: 2,
+    status: "in_progress",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([reusedOwner]).some((error) => error.includes("current assignment owner must be fresh")));
+
+  const mixedEvidence = unit({
+    attempts: [archivedAttempt({ local_checks: [localCheck()] })],
+    wave: 2,
+    status: "covered",
+    agent_id: "hunter-2",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [localCheck()],
+  });
+  const errors = errorsFor([mixedEvidence]);
+  assert(errors.some((error) => error.includes("prior assignment owner evidence must remain")));
+  assert(errors.some((error) => error.includes("artifact from an archived attempt cannot be reused")));
+
+  const mixedHistory = unit({
+    attempts: [
+      archivedAttempt({ local_checks: [localCheck()] }),
+      archivedAttempt({
+        wave: 2,
+        agent_id: "hunter-2",
+        local_checks: [localCheck()],
+      }),
+    ],
+    wave: 3,
+    status: "in_progress",
+    agent_id: "hunter-3",
+  });
+  const historyErrors = errorsFor([mixedHistory]);
+  assert(historyErrors.some((error) => error.includes("prior assignment owner evidence must remain in its earlier attempt")));
+  assert(historyErrors.some((error) => error.includes("artifact from an earlier attempt cannot be reused")));
+
+  const unordered = unit({
+    attempts: [archivedAttempt(), archivedAttempt({
+      wave: 1,
+      agent_id: "hunter-2",
+      local_checks: [sourceCheck("hunter-2")],
+    })],
+    wave: 3,
+    status: "in_progress",
+    agent_id: "hunter-3",
+  });
+  assert(errorsFor([unordered]).some((error) => error.includes("strictly increasing")));
+});
+
+test("rejects unsafe paths and malformed fingerprints", () => {
+  for (const value of [
+    "/etc/passwd",
+    "../src/file.js",
+    "src/../file.js",
+    "src/con.txt",
+    "src/PRN",
+    "src/AUX.c",
+    "src/NUL",
+    "src/CLOCK$.txt",
+    "src/conin$.txt",
+    "src/conout$",
+    "src/COM1.log",
+    "src/lpt9",
+    "src/COM\u00b9.log",
+    "src/COM\u00b2.log",
+    "src/COM\u00b3.log",
+    "src/lpt\u00b9",
+    "src/lpt\u00b2",
+    "src/lpt\u00b3",
+    "src/file.js.",
+    "C:/src/file.js",
+    "src/file\n.js",
+    "src/file\u0085.js",
+    "src/file\u2028.js",
+    "src/file\u200b.js",
+    "src/file\u034f.js",
+    "src/file\ufe0f.js",
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(isSafeRelativePath(value), false, value);
+  }
+  assert.equal(isSafeRelativePath("src/handler.js"), true);
+  assert.equal(isSafeRelativePath("src/caf\u00e9/handler.js"), true);
+  assert(errorsFor([unit({ starting_paths: ["../src/router.ts"] })]).some((error) => error.includes("repository-relative path")));
+  assert(errorsFor([unit({
+    status: "candidate",
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: ["src/router.ts"],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck("hunter-1", { invariant: "Ownership is required.", result: "No check exists." })],
+    result_fingerprints: ["not stable"],
+  })]).some((error) => error.includes("invalid fingerprint")));
+});
+
+test("rejects format, default-ignorable, and invalid-scalar prose", () => {
+  for (const invisible of ["\u200b", "\u034f", "\ufe0f", "\ud800"]) {
+    assert(errorsFor([unit({ surface: invisible })]).some((error) => error.includes("surface")), JSON.stringify(invisible));
+    assert(errorsFor([unit({
+      excluded_blocks: [{ block: "ATTACK-CLASSES.md#Access control", reason: invisible }],
+    })]).some((error) => error.includes("reason")), JSON.stringify(invisible));
+  }
+});
+
+test("quotes input-derived controls in direct validation errors", () => {
+  const invalidStatus = `invalid-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}`;
+  const invalidPath = `src/${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}.js`;
+  const value = unit({
+    status: invalidStatus,
+    agent_id: "hunter-1",
+    reviewed_paths: [invalidPath],
+    local_checks: [sourceCheck()],
+    result_fingerprints: ["force-state-error"],
+  });
+  const output = errorsFor([value]).join("\n");
+
+  assert.match(output, /\$\[0\]\.status/);
+  assert.match(output, /\$\[0\]\.reviewed_paths/);
+  assert.match(output, /\\u001b/);
+  assert.match(output, /\\u0007/);
+  assert.match(output, /\\u0085/);
+  assert.match(output, /\\u202e/);
+  assertNoInjectedControlBytes(output);
+});
+
+test("quotes input-derived controls in CLI validation errors", { skip: !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const value = unit({
+    status: `invalid-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}`,
+    result_fingerprints: ["force-state-error"],
+  });
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify([value]));
+
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, cliOutput(result));
+  assert.match(result.stderr, /\$\[0\]\.status/);
+  assert.match(result.stderr, /\\u001b/);
+  assertNoInjectedControlBytes(result.stderr);
+});
+
+test("returns a generic syntax error without parser-supplied controls", { skip: !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const malformed = Buffer.concat([
+    Buffer.from("["),
+    Buffer.from(TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD),
+    Buffer.from("]"),
+  ]);
+  const result = runCli(malformed);
+
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, cliOutput(result));
+  assert.equal(result.stderr, "Failed to parse coverage ledger: invalid JSON syntax\n");
+  assertNoInjectedControlBytes(result.stderr);
+});
+
+test("does not reflect controls from a failed CLI input path", () => {
+  const directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "validate-coverage-ledger-path-"));
+  const missingPath = path.join(directory, `missing-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}.json`);
+  try {
+    const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [validatorPath, missingPath], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout: CLI_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    });
+    assert.equal(result.status, 1, cliOutput(result));
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /Failed to read coverage ledger:/);
+    assertNoInjectedControlBytes(result.stderr);
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+test("rejects invalid UTF-8 through the CLI", { skip: !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const encoded = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([unit()]));
+  const marker = Buffer.from("Update-user route");
+  const markerOffset = encoded.indexOf(marker);
+  assert.notEqual(markerOffset, -1);
+  const malformed = Buffer.concat([
+    encoded.subarray(0, markerOffset),
+    Buffer.from([0x80]),
+    encoded.subarray(markerOffset + marker.length),
+  ]);
+
+  const result = runCli(malformed);
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, /input is not valid UTF-8/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /TypeError|stack|at validate-coverage-ledger/i);
+});
+
+test("rejects a FIFO through the CLI without blocking", { skip: process.platform === "win32" || !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "validate-coverage-ledger-fifo-"));
+  const fifoPath = path.join(directory, "coverage-ledger.json");
+  try {
+    const created = spawnSync("mkfifo", [fifoPath], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: CLI_TIMEOUT_MS });
+    assert.equal(created.status, 0, cliOutput(created));
+
+    const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [validatorPath, fifoPath], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout: CLI_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    });
+    const output = cliOutput(result);
+    assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+    assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+    assert.match(output, /input must be a regular file/);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(output, /stack|at validate-coverage-ledger/i);
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+test("rejects a symlink through the CLI", { skip: process.platform === "win32" || !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "validate-coverage-ledger-symlink-"));
+  const targetPath = path.join(directory, "target.json");
+  const symlinkPath = path.join(directory, "coverage-ledger.json");
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(targetPath, JSON.stringify([unit()]));
+    fs.symlinkSync(targetPath, symlinkPath);
+    const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [validatorPath, symlinkPath], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout: CLI_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    });
+    const output = cliOutput(result);
+    assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+    assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+    assert.match(output, /input must not be a symlink/);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(output, /stack|at validate-coverage-ledger/i);
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+test("rejects deeply nested input without recursion failure", () => {
+  let nested = 0;
+  for (let depth = 0; depth < 20000; depth++) nested = [nested];
+  assert(errorsFor(nested).some((error) => error.includes("exceeds nesting depth limit 64")));
+  if (!HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN) return;
+
+  const result = runCli(`${"[".repeat(20000)}0${"]".repeat(20000)}`);
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, /exceeds nesting depth limit 64/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /RangeError|Maximum call stack|stack|at validate-coverage-ledger/i);
+});
+
+test("rejects multi-megabyte nesting under a constrained Node heap", { skip: !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const openContainers = "[".repeat(2000000);
+  const cases = [
+    openContainers,
+    `${openContainers}0${"]".repeat(2000000)}`,
+  ];
+  for (const contents of cases) {
+    const result = runCli(contents, {
+      nodeArgs: ["--max-old-space-size=64"],
+      timeout: HOSTILE_CLI_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    });
+    const output = cliOutput(result);
+    assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+    assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+    assert.match(output, /exceeds nesting depth limit 64/);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(output, /heap out of memory|allocation failed|RangeError|Maximum call stack|stack|at validate-coverage-ledger/i);
+  }
+});
+
+test("caps malformed 10000-unit validation output", () => {
+  assert.equal(errorsFor(Array.from({ length: LIMITS.units }, () => null)).length, LIMITS.validationErrors);
+  if (!HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN) return;
+
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify(Array.from({ length: LIMITS.units }, () => null)));
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, /output capped at 100/);
+  assert(output.length < 20000, `unexpected output length ${output.length}`);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /RangeError|Maximum call stack|stack|at validate-coverage-ledger/i);
+});
+
+test("rejects malformed top-level data and excessive unit counts", () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor({ units: [] }), ["$: expected a top-level array"]);
+  const tooMany = Array.from({ length: 10001 }, () => null);
+  const errors = errorsFor(tooMany);
+  assert.deepEqual(errors, ["$: exceeds 10000 coverage units"]);
+
+  const oversizedCollection = unit({ extra: Array.from({ length: LIMITS.collectionItems + 1 }, () => null) });
+  assert(errorsFor([oversizedCollection]).some((error) => error.includes("exceeds 1000 entries")));
+});
+
+test("accepts a canonical ID derived from near-maximum multibyte references", () => {
+  const canonicalRefs = {
+    surface: "\u6f22".repeat(1024),
+    boundary: "\u00e9".repeat(1024),
+    subsystem: "packages/api",
+    attack_class: "\u6f22".repeat(1023) + "\u00e9",
+  };
+  const value = unit({ canonical_refs: canonicalRefs });
+  assert(value.coverage_id.length > 16384, `coverage_id length ${value.coverage_id.length}`);
+  assert(value.coverage_id.length <= 65536, `coverage_id length ${value.coverage_id.length}`);
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([value]), []);
+
+  if (HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN) {
+    const result = runCli(JSON.stringify([value]));
+    assert.equal(result.status, 0, cliOutput(result));
+  }
+});

.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-findings.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+
+/**
+ * Validates findings.json against report-schema.json.
+ * Usage: node validate-findings.cjs <path-to-findings.json>
+ *
+ * This is a dependency-free interpreter for the JSON Schema keywords used by
+ * report-schema.json, plus finding-specific checks that are clearer in code.
+ */
+
+const fs = require("fs");
+const path = require("path");
+const { TextDecoder } = require("util");
+
+const hasOwn = (value, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, key);
+const SUPPORTED_TYPES = new Set(["object", "array", "string", "integer", "number", "boolean", "null"]);
+const SUPPORTED_KEYWORDS = new Set([
+  "$comment",
+  "additionalProperties",
+  "const",
+  "description",
+  "enum",
+  "items",
+  "minimum",
+  "minItems",
+  "minLength",
+  "oneOf",
+  "pattern",
+  "properties",
+  "required",
+  "type",
+  "uniqueItems",
+  "visibleContent",
+]);
+const SEVERITY_RANK = new Map([
+  ["informational", 0],
+  ["low", 1],
+  ["medium", 2],
+  ["high", 3],
+  ["critical", 4],
+]);
+const LIMITS = Object.freeze({
+  inputBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024,
+  nestingDepth: 64,
+  arrayItems: 1000,
+  canonicalKeyBytes: 1024 * 1024,
+  uniqueSetBytes: 5 * 1024 * 1024,
+  validationErrors: 100,
+});
+const VISIBLE_CONTENT = /[^\p{White_Space}\p{Cc}\p{Cf}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/u;
+const PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER = /[\p{Cc}\p{Cf}\p{Zl}\p{Zp}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/u;
+const WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT = /^(?:con|prn|aux|nul|clock\$|conin\$|conout\$|com[1-9\u00b9\u00b2\u00b3]|lpt[1-9\u00b9\u00b2\u00b3])(?:\.|$)/iu;
+const UTF8_DECODER = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true, ignoreBOM: true });
+const UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER = /[\p{Cc}\p{Cf}\p{Cs}\p{Zl}\p{Zp}\p{Default_Ignorable_Code_Point}]/gu;
+const MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH = 256;
+
+class JsonStructureError extends Error {}
+class SafeInputError extends Error {}
+
+function escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(value) {
+  return String(value).replace(UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER, (character) => {
+    const codePoint = character.codePointAt(0);
+    return codePoint <= 0xffff
+      ? `\\u${codePoint.toString(16).padStart(4, "0")}`
+      : `\\u{${codePoint.toString(16)}}`;
+  });
+}
+
+function safeQuote(value) {
+  let serialized;
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    const clipped = value.length > MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH
+      ? `${value.slice(0, MAX_DIAGNOSTIC_STRING_LENGTH)}...`
+      : value;
+    serialized = JSON.stringify(clipped);
+  } else if (value === null || typeof value === "boolean") {
+    serialized = String(value);
+  } else if (typeof value === "number" && Number.isFinite(value)) {
+    serialized = String(value);
+  } else {
+    serialized = `"<${Array.isArray(value) ? "array" : typeof value}>"`;
+  }
+  return escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(serialized);
+}
+
+function propertyPath(base, key) {
+  return /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(key)
+    ? `${base}.${key}`
+    : `${base}[${safeQuote(key)}]`;
+}
+
+function createErrorList() {
+  const errors = [];
+  Object.defineProperty(errors, "push", {
+    value(...messages) {
+      const remaining = LIMITS.validationErrors - this.length;
+      if (remaining > 0) {
+        Array.prototype.push.apply(this, messages.slice(0, remaining).map(escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters));
+      }
+      return this.length;
+    },
+  });
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function typeOf(value) {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return "array";
+  if (value === null) return "null";
+  return typeof value;
+}
+
+function deepEqual(left, right) {
+  if (left === right) return true;
+  if (typeOf(left) !== typeOf(right)) return false;
+  if (Array.isArray(left)) {
+    return left.length === right.length && left.every((value, index) => deepEqual(value, right[index]));
+  }
+  if (left !== null && typeof left === "object") {
+    const leftKeys = Object.keys(left);
+    const rightKeys = Object.keys(right);
+    return leftKeys.length === rightKeys.length &&
+      leftKeys.every((key) => hasOwn(right, key) && deepEqual(left[key], right[key]));
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+function codePointLength(value) {
+  let length = 0;
+  let index = 0;
+  while (index < value.length) {
+    const first = value.charCodeAt(index++);
+    if (first >= 0xd800 && first <= 0xdbff && index < value.length) {
+      const second = value.charCodeAt(index);
+      if (second >= 0xdc00 && second <= 0xdfff) index++;
+    }
+    length++;
+  }
+  return length;
+}
+
+function hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) {
+  let index = 0;
+  while (index < value.length) {
+    const first = value.charCodeAt(index++);
+    if (first >= 0xd800 && first <= 0xdbff) {
+      if (index >= value.length) return false;
+      const second = value.charCodeAt(index++);
+      if (second < 0xdc00 || second > 0xdfff) return false;
+    } else if (first >= 0xdc00 && first <= 0xdfff) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+function hasVisibleProse(value) {
+  return hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) && VISIBLE_CONTENT.test(value);
+}
+
+function canonicalKey(value) {
+  const chunks = [];
+  let bytes = 0;
+
+  function append(chunk) {
+    bytes += Buffer.byteLength(chunk);
+    if (bytes > LIMITS.canonicalKeyBytes) {
+      throw new Error(`canonical key exceeds ${LIMITS.canonicalKeyBytes} byte limit`);
+    }
+    chunks.push(chunk);
+  }
+
+  function encode(item) {
+    const type = typeOf(item);
+    if (type === "null") {
+      append("null");
+    } else if (type === "string") {
+      append(`string:${JSON.stringify(item)}`);
+    } else if (type === "number") {
+      append(`number:${Object.is(item, -0) ? "0" : String(item)}`);
+    } else if (type === "boolean") {
+      append(`boolean:${item ? "true" : "false"}`);
+    } else if (type === "array") {
+      append("array:[");
+      item.forEach((entry, index) => {
+        if (index > 0) append(",");
+        encode(entry);
+      });
+      append("]");
+    } else if (type === "object") {
+      append("object:{");
+      Object.keys(item).sort().forEach((key, index) => {
+        if (index > 0) append(",");
+        append(JSON.stringify(key));
+        append(":");
+        encode(item[key]);
+      });
+      append("}");
+    } else {
+      append(`${type}:${String(item)}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  encode(value);
+  return { key: chunks.join(""), bytes };
+}
+
+function collectDataLimitErrors(value, location = "$data") {
+  const stack = [{ value, location, depth: value !== null && typeof value === "object" ? 1 : 0 }];
+  const seen = new WeakSet();
+
+  while (stack.length > 0) {
+    const current = stack.pop();
+    if (current.value === null || typeof current.value !== "object") continue;
+    if (current.depth > LIMITS.nestingDepth) {
+      return [escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(`${current.location}: exceeds ${LIMITS.nestingDepth} level nesting depth limit`)];
+    }
+    if (seen.has(current.value)) {
+      return [escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(`${current.location}: input must not contain repeated or cyclic object references`)];
+    }
+    seen.add(current.value);
+
+    if (Array.isArray(current.value)) {
+      if (current.value.length > LIMITS.arrayItems) {
+        return [escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(`${current.location}: exceeds ${LIMITS.arrayItems} item array limit`)];
+      }
+      for (let index = current.value.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
+        const child = current.value[index];
+        if (child !== null && typeof child === "object") {
+          stack.push({ value: child, location: `${current.location}[${index}]`, depth: current.depth + 1 });
+        }
+      }
+    } else {
+      const keys = Object.keys(current.value);
+      for (let index = keys.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
+        const key = keys[index];
+        const child = current.value[key];
+        if (child !== null && typeof child === "object") {
+          stack.push({ value: child, location: propertyPath(current.location, key), depth: current.depth + 1 });
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return [];
+}
+
+function collectSchemaErrors(schema, location = "schema") {
+  const errors = createErrorList();
+
+  function check(node, p) {
+    if (node === null || typeof node !== "object" || Array.isArray(node)) {
+      errors.push(`${p}: schema must be an object`);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    for (const key of Object.keys(node)) {
+      if (!SUPPORTED_KEYWORDS.has(key)) errors.push(`${p}: unsupported schema keyword ${safeQuote(key)}`);
+    }
+
+    if (hasOwn(node, "$comment") && typeof node.$comment !== "string") {
+      errors.push(`${p}.$comment: expected string`);
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "description") && typeof node.description !== "string") {
+      errors.push(`${p}.description: expected string`);
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "type") && (!SUPPORTED_TYPES.has(node.type))) {
+      errors.push(`${p}.type: unsupported type ${safeQuote(node.type)}`);
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "properties")) {
+      if (node.properties === null || typeof node.properties !== "object" || Array.isArray(node.properties)) {
+        errors.push(`${p}.properties: expected object`);
+      } else {
+        for (const key of Object.keys(node.properties)) check(node.properties[key], propertyPath(`${p}.properties`, key));
+      }
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "required")) {
+      if (!Array.isArray(node.required) || node.required.some((key) => typeof key !== "string")) {
+        errors.push(`${p}.required: expected an array of strings`);
+      } else if (new Set(node.required).size !== node.required.length) {
+        errors.push(`${p}.required: entries must be unique`);
+      }
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "additionalProperties") && typeof node.additionalProperties !== "boolean") {
+      errors.push(`${p}.additionalProperties: only boolean values are supported`);
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "enum")) {
+      if (!Array.isArray(node.enum) || node.enum.length === 0) {
+        errors.push(`${p}.enum: expected a non-empty array`);
+      } else {
+        const seen = new Set();
+        for (const value of node.enum) {
+          let key;
+          try {
+            key = canonicalKey(value).key;
+          } catch (error) {
+            errors.push(`${p}.enum: ${error.message}`);
+            break;
+          }
+          if (seen.has(key)) {
+            errors.push(`${p}.enum: entries must be unique`);
+            break;
+          }
+          seen.add(key);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "items")) check(node.items, `${p}.items`);
+    for (const keyword of ["minItems", "minLength"]) {
+      if (hasOwn(node, keyword) && (!Number.isInteger(node[keyword]) || node[keyword] < 0)) {
+        errors.push(`${p}.${keyword}: expected a non-negative integer`);
+      }
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "minimum") && (typeof node.minimum !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(node.minimum))) {
+      errors.push(`${p}.minimum: expected a finite number`);
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "pattern")) {
+      if (typeof node.pattern !== "string") {
+        errors.push(`${p}.pattern: expected string`);
+      } else {
+        try {
+          new RegExp(node.pattern);
+        } catch (error) {
+          errors.push(`${p}.pattern: invalid regular expression`);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "uniqueItems") && typeof node.uniqueItems !== "boolean") {
+      errors.push(`${p}.uniqueItems: expected boolean`);
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "visibleContent")) {
+      if (typeof node.visibleContent !== "boolean") {
+        errors.push(`${p}.visibleContent: expected boolean`);
+      } else if (node.visibleContent === true && node.type !== "string") {
+        errors.push(`${p}.visibleContent: requires type "string"`);
+      }
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(node, "oneOf")) {
+      if (!Array.isArray(node.oneOf) || node.oneOf.length === 0) {
+        errors.push(`${p}.oneOf: expected a non-empty array`);
+      } else {
+        node.oneOf.forEach((branch, index) => check(branch, `${p}.oneOf[${index}]`));
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  check(schema, location);
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function findDiscriminator(schema) {
+  if (!hasOwn(schema, "properties") || typeof schema.properties !== "object") return null;
+  for (const key of Object.keys(schema.properties)) {
+    const subSchema = schema.properties[key];
+    if (subSchema && typeof subSchema === "object" && hasOwn(subSchema, "const")) {
+      return { key, value: subSchema.const };
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function validate(value, schema, p, errors) {
+  if (errors.length >= LIMITS.validationErrors) return;
+  if (hasOwn(schema, "oneOf")) {
+    const results = schema.oneOf.map((branch) => collectUnchecked(value, branch, p));
+    const passingIndexes = results
+      .map((branchErrors, index) => branchErrors.length === 0 ? index : -1)
+      .filter((index) => index !== -1);
+
+    if (passingIndexes.length !== 1) {
+      errors.push(`${p}: must match exactly one schema in oneOf; matched ${passingIndexes.length}`);
+      if (passingIndexes.length === 0 && value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value)) {
+        const matchingDiscriminators = schema.oneOf
+          .map((branch, index) => ({ discriminator: findDiscriminator(branch), index }))
+          .filter(({ discriminator }) => discriminator && hasOwn(value, discriminator.key) && deepEqual(value[discriminator.key], discriminator.value));
+        if (matchingDiscriminators.length === 1) {
+          errors.push(...results[matchingDiscriminators[0].index]);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (hasOwn(schema, "const") && !deepEqual(value, schema.const)) {
+    errors.push(`${p}: must equal ${safeQuote(schema.const)}, got ${safeQuote(value)}`);
+  }
+  if (hasOwn(schema, "enum") && !schema.enum.some((allowed) => deepEqual(value, allowed))) {
+    const allowed = schema.enum.map(safeQuote).join(", ");
+    errors.push(`${p}: invalid value ${safeQuote(value)} (expected one of ${allowed})`);
+  }
+
+  if (hasOwn(schema, "type") && typeOf(value) !== schema.type && !(schema.type === "integer" && typeOf(value) === "number" && Number.isInteger(value))) {
+    errors.push(`${p}: expected ${schema.type}, got ${typeOf(value)}`);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (typeOf(value) === "object") {
+    for (const req of hasOwn(schema, "required") ? schema.required : []) {
+      if (!hasOwn(value, req)) errors.push(`${p}: missing required field ${safeQuote(req)}`);
+    }
+    for (const key of Object.keys(value)) {
+      if (hasOwn(schema, "properties") && hasOwn(schema.properties, key)) {
+        validate(value[key], schema.properties[key], propertyPath(p, key), errors);
+      } else if (hasOwn(schema, "additionalProperties") && schema.additionalProperties === false) {
+        errors.push(`${p}: unexpected field ${safeQuote(key)}`);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    if (hasOwn(schema, "minItems") && value.length < schema.minItems) {
+      errors.push(`${p}: must have at least ${schema.minItems} item(s), got ${value.length}`);
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(schema, "uniqueItems") && schema.uniqueItems === true) {
+      const seen = new Set();
+      let setBytes = 0;
+      for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {
+        let canonical;
+        try {
+          canonical = canonicalKey(value[i]);
+        } catch (error) {
+          errors.push(`${p}[${i}]: ${error.message}`);
+          break;
+        }
+        if (seen.has(canonical.key)) {
+          errors.push(`${p}: items must be unique; duplicate at index ${i}`);
+          continue;
+        }
+        setBytes += canonical.bytes;
+        if (setBytes > LIMITS.uniqueSetBytes) {
+          errors.push(`${p}: canonical uniqueness set exceeds ${LIMITS.uniqueSetBytes} byte limit`);
+          break;
+        }
+        seen.add(canonical.key);
+      }
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(schema, "items")) {
+      value.forEach((item, index) => validate(item, schema.items, `${p}[${index}]`, errors));
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    if (hasOwn(schema, "minLength") && codePointLength(value) < schema.minLength) {
+      errors.push(`${p}: must have at least ${schema.minLength} character(s)`);
+    }
+    if (schema.visibleContent === true) {
+      if (!hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value)) {
+        errors.push(`${p}: must contain only valid Unicode scalar values`);
+      } else if (!VISIBLE_CONTENT.test(value)) {
+        errors.push(`${p}: must contain a visible character`);
+      }
+    }
+    if (hasOwn(schema, "pattern") && !(new RegExp(schema.pattern).test(value))) {
+      errors.push(`${p}: must match pattern ${JSON.stringify(schema.pattern)}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (typeof value === "number" && hasOwn(schema, "minimum") && value < schema.minimum) {
+    errors.push(`${p}: must be at least ${schema.minimum}, got ${value}`);
+  }
+}
+
+function collectUnchecked(value, schema, p) {
+  const errors = createErrorList();
+  validate(value, schema, p, errors);
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function collect(value, schema, p = "$data") {
+  const limitErrors = collectDataLimitErrors(value, p);
+  if (limitErrors.length > 0) return limitErrors;
+  return collectUnchecked(value, schema, p);
+}
+
+function isSafeRelativeSourcePath(value) {
+  if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || !hasValidUnicodeScalarValues(value) || value.trim() !== value || PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER.test(value) || value.includes("\\") || value.includes(":")) return false;
+  if (path.posix.isAbsolute(value) || path.win32.isAbsolute(value) || /^[A-Za-z]:/.test(value) || value.startsWith("~")) return false;
+  const segments = value.split("/");
+  return segments.every((segment) =>
+    segment !== "" &&
+    segment !== "." &&
+    segment !== ".." &&
+    !/[ .]$/u.test(segment) &&
+    !WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT.test(segment));
+}
+
+function collectFindingSemanticErrors(findings) {
+  const errors = createErrorList();
+  if (!Array.isArray(findings)) return errors;
+
+  const fingerprints = new Map();
+  let previousFingerprint = null;
+  findings.forEach((finding, index) => {
+    if (errors.length >= LIMITS.validationErrors) return;
+    if (!finding || typeof finding !== "object" || Array.isArray(finding)) return;
+    const base = `$[${index}]`;
+
+    if (hasOwn(finding, "fingerprint") && typeof finding.fingerprint === "string") {
+      if (fingerprints.has(finding.fingerprint)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.fingerprint: duplicate of $[${fingerprints.get(finding.fingerprint)}].fingerprint`);
+      } else {
+        fingerprints.set(finding.fingerprint, index);
+      }
+      if (previousFingerprint !== null && previousFingerprint > finding.fingerprint) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.fingerprint: findings must be sorted lexicographically`);
+      }
+      previousFingerprint = finding.fingerprint;
+    }
+
+    for (const field of ["trace", "evidence"]) {
+      if (!hasOwn(finding, field) || !Array.isArray(finding[field])) continue;
+      finding[field].forEach((entry, entryIndex) => {
+        if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry)) return;
+        if (hasOwn(entry, "line") && (!Number.isInteger(entry.line) || entry.line < 1)) {
+          errors.push(`${base}.${field}[${entryIndex}].line: must be a positive integer`);
+        }
+        if (hasOwn(entry, "file") && !isSafeRelativeSourcePath(entry.file)) {
+          errors.push(`${base}.${field}[${entryIndex}].file: must be a safe repository-relative source path`);
+        }
+      });
+    }
+    if (finding.remediation && Array.isArray(finding.remediation.code_changes)) {
+      finding.remediation.code_changes.forEach((change, changeIndex) => {
+        if (change && hasOwn(change, "file_name") && !isSafeRelativeSourcePath(change.file_name)) {
+          errors.push(`${base}.remediation.code_changes[${changeIndex}].file_name: must be a safe repository-relative source path`);
+        }
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (Array.isArray(finding.trace) && finding.trace.length === 1) {
+      const kind = finding.trace[0] && finding.trace[0].kind;
+      if (kind !== "entrypoint" && kind !== "sink") {
+        errors.push(`${base}.trace[0].kind: a one-line trace must be "entrypoint" or "sink"`);
+      }
+    } else if (Array.isArray(finding.trace) && finding.trace.length > 1) {
+      const last = finding.trace.length - 1;
+      if (finding.trace[0] && finding.trace[0].kind !== "entrypoint") {
+        errors.push(`${base}.trace[0].kind: must be "entrypoint", got ${safeQuote(finding.trace[0].kind)}`);
+      }
+      if (finding.trace[last] && finding.trace[last].kind !== "sink") {
+        errors.push(`${base}.trace[${last}].kind: must be "sink", got ${safeQuote(finding.trace[last].kind)}`);
+      }
+      for (let traceIndex = 1; traceIndex < last; traceIndex++) {
+        if (finding.trace[traceIndex] && finding.trace[traceIndex].kind !== "propagation") {
+          errors.push(`${base}.trace[${traceIndex}].kind: must be "propagation", got ${safeQuote(finding.trace[traceIndex].kind)}`);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    const verdict = finding.verdict;
+    if (verdict === "confirmed") {
+      for (const forbidden of ["claimed_root_cause", "blockers", "validation_plan", "reason"]) {
+        if (hasOwn(finding, forbidden)) errors.push(`${base}: confirmed finding must not contain ${safeQuote(forbidden)}`);
+      }
+      if (!finding.execution || typeof finding.execution !== "object" || typeof finding.execution.observed_result !== "string" || !hasVisibleProse(finding.execution.observed_result)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}: confirmed finding requires a visible execution observed_result`);
+      }
+      if (!finding.remediation || typeof finding.remediation !== "object" || typeof finding.remediation.strategy !== "string" || !hasVisibleProse(finding.remediation.strategy)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}: confirmed finding requires visible remediation`);
+      }
+      const overall = finding.severity && finding.severity.overall_severity;
+      const impact = finding.severity && finding.severity.impact && finding.severity.impact.score;
+      if (SEVERITY_RANK.has(overall) && SEVERITY_RANK.has(impact) && SEVERITY_RANK.get(overall) > SEVERITY_RANK.get(impact)) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.severity.overall_severity: cannot exceed demonstrated impact ${safeQuote(impact)}`);
+      }
+    } else if (verdict === "needs_validation") {
+      if (hasOwn(finding, "severity")) errors.push(`${base}: needs_validation finding must not contain "severity"`);
+      for (const forbidden of ["execution", "remediation", "reason", "root_cause"]) {
+        if (hasOwn(finding, forbidden)) errors.push(`${base}: needs_validation finding must not contain ${safeQuote(forbidden)}`);
+      }
+      const plan = finding.validation_plan;
+      const hasLocalPlan = plan && typeof plan.local === "string" && hasVisibleProse(plan.local);
+      const hasDeploymentPlan = plan && typeof plan.deployment === "string" && hasVisibleProse(plan.deployment);
+      if (!hasLocalPlan && !hasDeploymentPlan) {
+        errors.push(`${base}.validation_plan: requires at least one visible local or deployment plan`);
+      }
+    } else if (verdict === "rejected") {
+      for (const forbidden of ["severity", "execution", "remediation", "blockers", "validation_plan", "root_cause"]) {
+        if (hasOwn(finding, forbidden)) errors.push(`${base}: rejected finding must not contain ${safeQuote(forbidden)}`);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function validateDocument(findings, schema) {
+  const schemaErrors = collectSchemaErrors(schema);
+  if (schemaErrors.length > 0) return schemaErrors;
+  const limitErrors = collectDataLimitErrors(findings, "$");
+  if (limitErrors.length > 0) return limitErrors;
+  const errors = collectUnchecked(findings, schema, "$");
+  if (errors.length < LIMITS.validationErrors) {
+    errors.push(...collectFindingSemanticErrors(findings));
+  }
+  return errors;
+}
+
+function loadSchema(schemaPath) {
+  const schema = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(schemaPath, "utf8"));
+  const errors = collectSchemaErrors(schema);
+  if (errors.length > 0) throw new Error(`unsupported or invalid report schema:\n${errors.join("\n")}`);
+  return schema;
+}
+
+function readFileWithinLimit(file) {
+  const noFollow = fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW;
+  const nonBlock = fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK;
+  if (!Number.isInteger(noFollow) || noFollow === 0 || !Number.isInteger(nonBlock) || nonBlock === 0) {
+    throw new SafeInputError("OS no-follow and nonblocking input protection is unavailable");
+  }
+
+  let descriptor;
+  try {
+    descriptor = fs.openSync(file, fs.constants.O_RDONLY | noFollow | nonBlock);
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error && (error.code === "ELOOP" || error.code === "EMLINK")) {
+      throw new SafeInputError("input must not be a symlink");
+    }
+    throw error;
+  }
+  try {
+    const stat = fs.fstatSync(descriptor);
+    if (!stat.isFile()) {
+      throw new SafeInputError("input must be a regular file");
+    }
+    if (stat.size > LIMITS.inputBytes) {
+      throw new SafeInputError(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.inputBytes} byte limit`);
+    }
+
+    const chunks = [];
+    const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(64 * 1024);
+    let bytesRead = 0;
+    while (true) {
+      const count = fs.readSync(descriptor, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);
+      if (count === 0) break;
+      bytesRead += count;
+      if (bytesRead > LIMITS.inputBytes) {
+        throw new SafeInputError(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.inputBytes} byte limit`);
+      }
+      chunks.push(Buffer.from(buffer.subarray(0, count)));
+    }
+    try {
+      return UTF8_DECODER.decode(Buffer.concat(chunks, bytesRead));
+    } catch {
+      throw new SafeInputError("input is not valid UTF-8");
+    }
+  } finally {
+    fs.closeSync(descriptor);
+  }
+}
+
+function enforceJsonTextLimits(contents) {
+  const containers = [];
+  let inString = false;
+  let escaped = false;
+
+  function markArrayItem() {
+    const container = containers[containers.length - 1];
+    if (!container || container.type !== "array" || !container.expectsItem) return;
+    container.expectsItem = false;
+    container.items++;
+    if (container.items > LIMITS.arrayItems) {
+      throw new JsonStructureError(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.arrayItems} item array limit`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (let index = 0; index < contents.length; index++) {
+    const character = contents[index];
+    if (inString) {
+      if (escaped) {
+        escaped = false;
+      } else if (character === "\\") {
+        escaped = true;
+      } else if (character === "\"") {
+        inString = false;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (character === "\"") {
+      markArrayItem();
+      inString = true;
+    } else if (character === "[" || character === "{") {
+      markArrayItem();
+      if (containers.length >= LIMITS.nestingDepth) {
+        throw new JsonStructureError(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.nestingDepth} level nesting depth limit`);
+      }
+      containers.push({
+        type: character === "[" ? "array" : "object",
+        expectsItem: character === "[",
+        items: 0,
+      });
+    } else if (character === "]" || character === "}") {
+      containers.pop();
+    } else if (character === ",") {
+      const container = containers[containers.length - 1];
+      if (container && container.type === "array") container.expectsItem = true;
+    } else if (!/\s/.test(character)) {
+      markArrayItem();
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function run(file) {
+  if (!file) {
+    console.error("Usage: node validate-findings.cjs <path-to-findings.json>");
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  let schema;
+  try {
+    schema = loadSchema(path.join(__dirname, "report-schema.json"));
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error("Failed to load report-schema.json:", error.message);
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  let contents;
+  try {
+    contents = readFileWithinLimit(file);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const reason = error instanceof SafeInputError ? error.message : "input could not be opened or read safely";
+    console.error(`Failed to read findings JSON: ${reason}`);
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  try {
+    enforceJsonTextLimits(contents);
+  } catch (error) {
+    const reason = error instanceof JsonStructureError ? error.message : "invalid JSON structure";
+    console.error(`Failed to parse findings JSON: ${reason}`);
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  let findings;
+  try {
+    findings = JSON.parse(contents);
+  } catch {
+    console.error("Failed to parse findings JSON: invalid JSON syntax");
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  let errors;
+  try {
+    errors = validateDocument(findings, schema);
+  } catch {
+    console.error("Failed to validate findings JSON: unexpected validation error");
+    return 1;
+  }
+  for (const message of errors) console.error("ERROR:", escapeUnsafeDiagnosticCharacters(message));
+  if (errors.length > 0) {
+    const cap = errors.length === LIMITS.validationErrors ? `; output capped at ${LIMITS.validationErrors}` : "";
+    console.error(`FAIL: ${errors.length} validation error(s)${cap}`);
+    return 1;
+  }
+  console.log(`PASS: ${findings.length} findings valid`);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  LIMITS,
+  PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER,
+  UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER,
+  VISIBLE_CONTENT,
+  WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT,
+  collect,
+  collectFindingSemanticErrors,
+  collectSchemaErrors,
+  hasVisibleProse,
+  isSafeRelativeSourcePath,
+  validateDocument,
+};
+
+if (require.main === module) process.exit(run(process.argv[2]));

.agents/skills/security-audit/validate-findings.test.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,652 @@
+const assert = require("node:assert/strict");
+const fs = require("node:fs");
+const os = require("node:os");
+const path = require("node:path");
+const { spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");
+const test = require("node:test");
+const schema = require("./report-schema.json");
+const {
+  LIMITS,
+  collect,
+  collectSchemaErrors,
+  validateDocument,
+} = require("./validate-findings.cjs");
+
+const validatorPath = path.join(__dirname, "validate-findings.cjs");
+const CLI_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;
+const HOSTILE_CLI_TIMEOUT_MS = 15000;
+const HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN = Number.isInteger(fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW) &&
+  fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW !== 0 &&
+  Number.isInteger(fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK) &&
+  fs.constants.O_NONBLOCK !== 0;
+const TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD = "\u001b\u0007\u0085\u202e\u034f\ufe0f";
+const TERMINAL_CONTROL_BYTES = [
+  Buffer.from([0x1b]),
+  Buffer.from([0x07]),
+  Buffer.from("\u0085"),
+  Buffer.from("\u202e"),
+  Buffer.from("\u034f"),
+  Buffer.from("\ufe0f"),
+];
+
+function source(kind = "entrypoint", file = "src/handler.c", line = 10) {
+  return { kind, file, line, scope: "handle", description: "Attacker data reaches the operation." };
+}
+
+function evidence(file = "src/handler.c", line = 10) {
+  return { file, line, description: "The source performs the operation without the required check." };
+}
+
+function confirmed() {
+  return {
+    verdict: "confirmed",
+    fingerprint: "src-handler-missing-check",
+    title: "Missing ownership check",
+    description: "An attacker can reach an operation without the intended ownership check.",
+    root_cause: "handle omits the ownership check before changing the object.",
+    intended_behavior: "Only the object's owner can change it.",
+    trace: [source("entrypoint"), source("propagation", "src/model.c", 20), source("sink", "src/store.c", 30)],
+    evidence: [evidence()],
+    conditions: [],
+    execution: {
+      attacker_perspective: "An unprivileged remote user with their own account.",
+      payloads: ["An object identifier owned by another user."],
+      instructions: ["Submit the identifier through the public operation."],
+      observed_result: "The other user's object changes.",
+    },
+    remediation: { strategy: "Check ownership before the state change." },
+    severity: {
+      likelihood: { score: "medium", reason: "The operation is directly reachable." },
+      impact: { score: "medium", reason: "The attacker changes one protected object." },
+      overall_severity: "medium",
+    },
+    confidence: { score: "high", reason: "The source path and result were reproduced." },
+  };
+}
+
+function needsValidation() {
+  return {
+    verdict: "needs_validation",
+    fingerprint: "src-parser-size-hypothesis",
+    title: "Unchecked parsed size",
+    description: "A parsed size may reach an allocation without a limit.",
+    claimed_root_cause: "parse_size may pass an unbounded value to allocate.",
+    trace: [source()],
+    evidence: [evidence()],
+    blockers: ["The generated parser source is absent from this checkout."],
+    validation_plan: {
+      local: "Generate the parser and submit the smallest input that exceeds the documented limit.",
+      deployment: "In an approved test deployment, confirm the request reaches the generated parser and record the bounded observable result.",
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function rejected() {
+  return {
+    verdict: "rejected",
+    fingerprint: "src-router-auth-bypass",
+    title: "Authorization bypass in router",
+    description: "The candidate claimed a route bypassed authorization.",
+    claimed_root_cause: "dispatch was claimed to skip the authorization wrapper.",
+    trace: [source("sink")],
+    evidence: [evidence()],
+    reason: "All routes pass through the authorization wrapper before dispatch.",
+  };
+}
+
+function errorsFor(value) {
+  return validateDocument(value, schema);
+}
+
+function runCli(contents, options = {}) {
+  const { nodeArgs = [], timeout = CLI_TIMEOUT_MS } = options;
+  const directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "validate-findings-"));
+  const findingsPath = path.join(directory, "findings.json");
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(findingsPath, contents);
+    return spawnSync(process.execPath, [...nodeArgs, validatorPath, findingsPath], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout,
+    });
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+function cliOutput(result) {
+  return `${result.stdout}${result.stderr}`;
+}
+
+function assertNoInjectedControlBytes(output) {
+  const bytes = Buffer.isBuffer(output) ? output : Buffer.from(output, "utf8");
+  for (const marker of TERMINAL_CONTROL_BYTES) {
+    assert.equal(bytes.indexOf(marker), -1, `found raw control bytes ${marker.toString("hex")}`);
+  }
+}
+
+function producerShapedFindings() {
+  const demonstrated = confirmed();
+  demonstrated.conditions = [{
+    kind: "authentication_level",
+    description: "The attacker needs a normal account.",
+  }];
+  demonstrated.execution.payloads = ["", " \t\r\n", "\u0000\u001f\u007f", "\u034f", "\ufe0f", "\ud800", "\udc00", "[{,}]\\\""];
+  demonstrated.remediation.code_changes = [{
+    file_name: "src/handler.c",
+    fixed_code: "",
+  }];
+
+  const blocked = needsValidation();
+  delete blocked.validation_plan.deployment;
+
+  return [demonstrated, blocked, rejected()];
+}
+
+function rejectMutation(factory, mutate) {
+  const value = factory();
+  mutate(value);
+  assert.notEqual(errorsFor([value]).length, 0);
+}
+
+test("schema is an actual top-level array with exactly three branches", () => {
+  assert.equal(schema.type, "array");
+  assert.equal(schema.items.oneOf.length, 3);
+  assert.deepEqual(schema.items.oneOf.map((branch) => branch.properties.verdict.const), [
+    "confirmed", "needs_validation", "rejected",
+  ]);
+  const confirmedSchema = schema.items.oneOf[0].properties;
+  assert.equal(confirmedSchema.title.visibleContent, true);
+  assert.equal(confirmedSchema.execution.properties.payloads.items.minLength, undefined);
+  assert.equal(confirmedSchema.execution.properties.payloads.items.visibleContent, undefined);
+  assert.equal(confirmedSchema.remediation.properties.code_changes.items.properties.fixed_code.minLength, undefined);
+});
+
+test("accepts a producer-shaped findings document through the CLI", () => {
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify(producerShapedFindings()));
+  assert.equal(result.status, 0, cliOutput(result));
+  assert.match(result.stdout, /PASS: 3 findings valid/);
+});
+
+test("accepts empty output and each complete branch", () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([]), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([confirmed(), needsValidation(), rejected()]), []);
+  const localOnly = needsValidation();
+  delete localOnly.validation_plan.deployment;
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([localOnly]), []);
+  const deploymentOnly = needsValidation();
+  delete deploymentOnly.validation_plan.local;
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([deploymentOnly]), []);
+});
+
+test("allows a one-line finding trace", () => {
+  const finding = confirmed();
+  finding.trace = [source("entrypoint")];
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([finding]), []);
+});
+
+test("rejects empty required content", () => {
+  const cases = [
+    [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.title = ""; }],
+    [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.title = "   "; }],
+    [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.evidence = []; }],
+    [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.execution.payloads = []; }],
+    [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.execution.instructions = []; }],
+    [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.execution.observed_result = ""; }],
+    [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.remediation.strategy = ""; }],
+    [needsValidation, (finding) => { finding.blockers = []; }],
+    [needsValidation, (finding) => { finding.validation_plan = {}; }],
+    [needsValidation, (finding) => { finding.validation_plan = { local: " " }; }],
+    [rejected, (finding) => { finding.claimed_root_cause = ""; }],
+  ];
+  for (const [factory, mutate] of cases) rejectMutation(factory, mutate);
+});
+
+test("preserves exact payload and replacement-code strings", () => {
+  const finding = confirmed();
+  const payloads = ["", " \t\r\n", "\u0000\u001f\u007f", "\u034f", "\ufe0f", "\ud800", "\udc00"];
+  const fixedCode = "\u0000 \t\r\n\u001f\u007f\u034f\ufe0f\ud800x\udc00";
+  finding.execution.payloads = payloads.slice();
+  finding.remediation.code_changes = [{ file_name: "src/handler.c", fixed_code: fixedCode }];
+
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([finding]), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(finding.execution.payloads, payloads);
+  assert.equal(finding.remediation.code_changes[0].fixed_code, fixedCode);
+});
+
+test("rejects invalid scalars and whitespace, control, format, or default-ignorable prose", () => {
+  for (const invisible of ["\u0000\t\r\n\u001f\u007f\u200b", "\u034f", "\ufe0f", "\ud800", "\udc00", "visible\ud800"]) {
+    const cases = [
+      [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.title = invisible; }],
+      [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.trace[0].scope = invisible; }],
+      [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.evidence[0].description = invisible; }],
+      [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.execution.instructions = [invisible]; }],
+      [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.remediation.strategy = invisible; }],
+      [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.severity.impact.reason = invisible; }],
+      [confirmed, (finding) => { finding.confidence.reason = invisible; }],
+      [needsValidation, (finding) => { finding.blockers = [invisible]; }],
+      [needsValidation, (finding) => { finding.validation_plan = { local: invisible }; }],
+      [rejected, (finding) => { finding.reason = invisible; }],
+    ];
+    for (const [factory, mutate] of cases) rejectMutation(factory, mutate);
+  }
+});
+
+test("quotes input-derived controls in direct validation values and paths", () => {
+  const finding = confirmed();
+  finding.trace[0].kind = `invalid-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}`;
+  finding.execution[`extra-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}`] = "value";
+
+  const cyclic = {};
+  cyclic[`path-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}`] = cyclic;
+  const output = [
+    ...errorsFor([finding]),
+    ...collect(cyclic, { type: "object" }, "$input"),
+  ].join("\n");
+
+  for (const escaped of ["\\u001b", "\\u0007", "\\u0085", "\\u202e", "\\u034f", "\\ufe0f"]) {
+    assert(output.includes(escaped), `missing escaped diagnostic ${escaped}`);
+  }
+  assertNoInjectedControlBytes(output);
+});
+
+test("rejects line zero", () => {
+  rejectMutation(confirmed, (finding) => { finding.trace[0].line = 0; });
+  rejectMutation(rejected, (finding) => { finding.evidence[0].line = 0; });
+});
+
+test("does not treat inherited or Object-prototype properties as schema properties", () => {
+  rejectMutation(confirmed, (finding) => { finding.constructor = "not allowed"; });
+  const inherited = Object.create({ verdict: "confirmed" });
+  assert(errorsFor([inherited]).some((error) => error.includes("exactly one")));
+  assert(collect(Object.create({ constructor: "inherited" }), {
+    type: "object",
+    properties: { constructor: { type: "string" } },
+    required: ["constructor"],
+    additionalProperties: false,
+  }).some((error) => error.includes("missing required")));
+});
+
+test("oneOf requires exactly one passing branch", () => {
+  assert(collect("value", { oneOf: [{ type: "string" }, { minLength: 1 }] }, "$test")
+    .some((error) => error.includes("matched 2")));
+  assert(collect(7, { oneOf: [{ type: "string" }, { minimum: 10 }] }, "$test")
+    .some((error) => error.includes("matched 0")));
+});
+
+test("rejects duplicate fingerprints and unique array entries", () => {
+  const first = confirmed();
+  const second = rejected();
+  second.fingerprint = first.fingerprint;
+  assert(errorsFor([first, second]).some((error) => error.includes("duplicate of")));
+  rejectMutation(needsValidation, (finding) => { finding.blockers = [finding.blockers[0], finding.blockers[0]]; });
+});
+
+test("uses canonical Set uniqueness for structured entries at the array limit", () => {
+  const entries = Array.from({ length: LIMITS.arrayItems }, (_, id) => ({ id, label: String(id) }));
+  assert.deepEqual(collect(entries, { type: "array", uniqueItems: true }), []);
+
+  const duplicate = entries.slice(0, -1);
+  duplicate.push({ label: "0", id: 0 });
+  assert(collect(duplicate, { type: "array", uniqueItems: true })
+    .some((error) => error.includes(`duplicate at index ${LIMITS.arrayItems - 1}`)));
+});
+
+test("bounds canonical uniqueness keys and Set storage", () => {
+  const oversizedKey = "x".repeat(LIMITS.canonicalKeyBytes + 1);
+  assert(collect([oversizedKey], { type: "array", uniqueItems: true })
+    .some((error) => error.includes("canonical key exceeds")));
+
+  const itemLength = Math.floor(LIMITS.uniqueSetBytes / 6);
+  const largeUniqueItems = Array.from({ length: 6 }, (_, index) => `${index}${"x".repeat(itemLength)}`);
+  assert(collect(largeUniqueItems, { type: "array", uniqueItems: true })
+    .some((error) => error.includes("canonical uniqueness set exceeds")));
+});
+
+test("requires findings to be sorted by fingerprint", () => {
+  const first = confirmed();
+  const second = rejected();
+  assert(errorsFor([second, first]).some((error) => error.includes("sorted lexicographically")));
+});
+
+test("rejects severity above demonstrated impact", () => {
+  rejectMutation(confirmed, (finding) => {
+    finding.severity.overall_severity = "high";
+    finding.severity.impact.score = "medium";
+  });
+});
+
+test("rejects unsafe source paths", () => {
+  const badPaths = [
+    "/etc/passwd",
+    "../src/file.c",
+    "src/../file.c",
+    "src//file.c",
+    "C:\\src\\file.c",
+    "src/file:name.c",
+    "src/file\nname.c",
+    "src/file\u0001name.c",
+    "src/file\u0085name.c",
+    "src/file\u2028name.c",
+    "src/file\u202ename.c",
+    "src/file\u2066name.c",
+    "src/file\u200dname.c",
+    "src/file\u034fname.c",
+    "src/file\ufe0fname.c",
+    "src/file\ud800name.c",
+    "src/file\udc00name.c",
+    "CON",
+    "src/con.txt",
+    "src/PRN",
+    "src/AUX.c",
+    "src/NUL",
+    "src/COM1.log",
+    "src/lpt9",
+    "src/CONIN$",
+    "src/CONOUT$.txt",
+    "src/CLOCK$.txt",
+    "src/COM\u00b9.log",
+    "src/LPT\u00b2.log",
+    "src /file.c",
+    "src./file.c",
+    "src/file.c ",
+    "src/file.c.",
+  ];
+  for (const badPath of badPaths) {
+    rejectMutation(confirmed, (finding) => { finding.trace[0].file = badPath; });
+  }
+  rejectMutation(rejected, (finding) => { finding.evidence[0].file = "NUL.txt"; });
+  rejectMutation(confirmed, (finding) => {
+    finding.remediation.code_changes = [{ file_name: "src/file:name.c", fixed_code: "replacement" }];
+  });
+});
+
+test("accepts legitimate Unicode source paths and prose", () => {
+  const finding = confirmed();
+  finding.title = "Finding \ud83d\ude00 cafe\u0301";
+  finding.trace[0].file = "src/日本語/cafe\u0301-\ud83d\ude00.ts";
+  finding.evidence[0].file = "src/mañana/файл.ts";
+  finding.remediation.code_changes = [{
+    file_name: "src/修正/éxito.ts",
+    fixed_code: "replacement",
+  }];
+  assert.deepEqual(errorsFor([finding]), []);
+});
+
+test("CLI rejects input above the byte limit without an exception trace", () => {
+  const result = runCli(Buffer.alloc(LIMITS.inputBytes + 1, 0x20));
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, new RegExp(`input exceeds ${LIMITS.inputBytes} byte limit`));
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /RangeError|Maximum call stack|heap out of memory/i);
+});
+
+test("CLI rejects invalid UTF-8 without replacement or an exception trace", () => {
+  const findings = producerShapedFindings();
+  findings[0].execution.payloads = ["INVALID_UTF8"];
+  const encoded = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(findings));
+  const marker = Buffer.from("INVALID_UTF8");
+  const markerOffset = encoded.indexOf(marker);
+  assert.notEqual(markerOffset, -1);
+  const malformed = Buffer.concat([
+    encoded.subarray(0, markerOffset),
+    Buffer.from([0x80]),
+    encoded.subarray(markerOffset + marker.length),
+  ]);
+
+  const result = runCli(malformed);
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, /input is not valid UTF-8/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /TypeError|stack|at validate-findings/i);
+});
+
+test("quotes input-derived controls in CLI validation errors", { skip: !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const finding = confirmed();
+  finding.trace[0].kind = `invalid-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}`;
+  finding.execution[`extra-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}`] = "value";
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify([finding]));
+
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, cliOutput(result));
+  assert.match(result.stderr, /\$\[0\]\.trace\[0\]\.kind/);
+  assert.match(result.stderr, /\\u001b/);
+  assert.match(result.stderr, /\\u202e/);
+  assertNoInjectedControlBytes(result.stderr);
+});
+
+test("returns a generic syntax error without parser-supplied controls", { skip: !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const malformed = Buffer.concat([
+    Buffer.from("["),
+    Buffer.from(TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD),
+    Buffer.from("]"),
+  ]);
+  const result = runCli(malformed);
+
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, cliOutput(result));
+  assert.equal(result.stderr, "Failed to parse findings JSON: invalid JSON syntax\n");
+  assertNoInjectedControlBytes(result.stderr);
+});
+
+test("does not reflect controls from a failed CLI input path", () => {
+  const directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "validate-findings-path-"));
+  const missingPath = path.join(directory, `missing-${TERMINAL_CONTROL_PAYLOAD}.json`);
+  try {
+    const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [validatorPath, missingPath], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout: CLI_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    });
+    assert.equal(result.status, 1, cliOutput(result));
+    assert.match(result.stderr, /Failed to read findings JSON:/);
+    assertNoInjectedControlBytes(result.stderr);
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+test("CLI rejects lone-surrogate prose without changing payload semantics", () => {
+  const findings = producerShapedFindings();
+  findings[0].title = "\ud800";
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify(findings));
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, /must contain only valid Unicode scalar values/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /stack|at validate-findings/i);
+});
+
+test("CLI rejects Unicode format controls in source paths", () => {
+  const findings = producerShapedFindings();
+  findings[0].trace[0].file = "src/file\u202ename.c";
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify(findings));
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, /must be a safe repository-relative source path/);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /stack|at validate-findings/i);
+});
+
+test("CLI rejects a FIFO without blocking", { skip: process.platform === "win32" || !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "validate-findings-fifo-"));
+  const fifoPath = path.join(directory, "findings.json");
+  try {
+    const created = spawnSync("mkfifo", [fifoPath], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: CLI_TIMEOUT_MS });
+    assert.equal(created.status, 0, cliOutput(created));
+
+    const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [validatorPath, fifoPath], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout: CLI_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    });
+    const output = cliOutput(result);
+    assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+    assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+    assert.match(output, /input must be a regular file/);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(output, /stack|at validate-findings/i);
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+test("CLI rejects a symlink without following it", { skip: process.platform === "win32" || !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const directory = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "validate-findings-symlink-"));
+  const targetPath = path.join(directory, "target.json");
+  const symlinkPath = path.join(directory, "findings.json");
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(targetPath, JSON.stringify(producerShapedFindings()));
+    fs.symlinkSync(targetPath, symlinkPath);
+    const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, [validatorPath, symlinkPath], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout: CLI_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    });
+    const output = cliOutput(result);
+    assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+    assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+    assert.match(output, /input must not be a symlink/);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(output, /stack|at validate-findings/i);
+  } finally {
+    fs.rmSync(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+test("CLI rejects input above the nesting-depth limit without an exception trace", () => {
+  const levels = LIMITS.nestingDepth + 1;
+  const result = runCli(`${"[".repeat(levels)}0${"]".repeat(levels)}`);
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, new RegExp(`${LIMITS.nestingDepth} level nesting depth limit`));
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /RangeError|Maximum call stack|heap out of memory/i);
+});
+
+test("CLI rejects an oversized array without an exception trace", () => {
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify(Array(LIMITS.arrayItems + 1).fill(null)));
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, new RegExp(`${LIMITS.arrayItems} item array limit`));
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /RangeError|Maximum call stack|heap out of memory/i);
+});
+
+test("checks pattern and branch invariants", () => {
+  rejectMutation(rejected, (finding) => { finding.fingerprint = "not stable"; });
+  rejectMutation(needsValidation, (finding) => {
+    finding.severity = { impact: { score: "low" }, overall_severity: "low" };
+  });
+});
+
+test("rejects unsupported and malformed schema keywords", () => {
+  assert(collectSchemaErrors({ type: "string", format: "uuid" }).some((error) => error.includes("format")));
+  assert(collectSchemaErrors({ type: "string", pattern: "[" }).some((error) => error.includes("regular expression")));
+  assert(collectSchemaErrors({ type: "string", visibleContent: "yes" }).some((error) => error.includes("expected boolean")));
+  assert(collectSchemaErrors({ type: "array", visibleContent: true }).some((error) => error.includes("requires type")));
+  assert.notEqual(validateDocument([], { type: "array", maxItems: 1 }).length, 0);
+});
+
+test("caps malformed 1000-finding validation output", () => {
+  assert.equal(errorsFor(Array.from({ length: LIMITS.arrayItems }, () => null)).length, LIMITS.validationErrors);
+  if (!HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN) return;
+
+  const result = runCli(JSON.stringify(Array.from({ length: LIMITS.arrayItems }, () => null)));
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, /output capped at 100/);
+  assert(output.length < 20000, `unexpected output length ${output.length}`);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /RangeError|Maximum call stack|stack|at validate-findings/i);
+});
+
+test("caps amplified in-limit findings output under a constrained Node heap", { skip: !HAS_SAFE_INPUT_OPEN }, () => {
+  const findings = Array.from({ length: 750 }, () => ({
+    verdict: "confirmed",
+    trace: Array.from({ length: LIMITS.arrayItems }, () => 0),
+    evidence: Array.from({ length: LIMITS.arrayItems }, () => 0),
+  }));
+  const contents = JSON.stringify(findings);
+  assert(contents.length > 3 * 1000 * 1000, `hostile input too small: ${contents.length}`);
+  assert(contents.length <= LIMITS.inputBytes, `hostile input over limit: ${contents.length}`);
+
+  const result = runCli(contents, {
+    nodeArgs: ["--max-old-space-size=64"],
+    timeout: HOSTILE_CLI_TIMEOUT_MS,
+  });
+  const output = cliOutput(result);
+  assert.notEqual(result.error && result.error.code, "ETIMEDOUT", output);
+  assert.equal(result.status, 1, output);
+  assert.match(output, /output capped at 100/);
+  assert(output.length < 20000, `unexpected output length ${output.length}`);
+  assert.doesNotMatch(output, /heap out of memory|allocation failed|RangeError|Maximum call stack/i);
+});
+
+test("keeps shared helpers aligned with the coverage-ledger validator", () => {
+  const findingsModule = require("./validate-findings.cjs");
+  const ledgerModule = require("./validate-coverage-ledger.cjs");
+
+  for (const name of [
+    "VISIBLE_CONTENT",
+    "PATH_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTER",
+    "WINDOWS_RESERVED_COMPONENT",
+    "UNSAFE_DIAGNOSTIC_CHARACTER",
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(findingsModule[name].source, ledgerModule[name].source, `${name} source`);
+    assert.equal(findingsModule[name].flags, ledgerModule[name].flags, `${name} flags`);
+  }
+
+  const sharedLimitKeys = Object.keys(findingsModule.LIMITS)
+    .filter((key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ledgerModule.LIMITS, key))
+    .sort();
+  assert.deepEqual(sharedLimitKeys, ["inputBytes", "nestingDepth", "validationErrors"]);
+  for (const key of sharedLimitKeys) {
+    assert.equal(findingsModule.LIMITS[key], ledgerModule.LIMITS[key], `LIMITS.${key}`);
+  }
+
+  const pathCorpus = [
+    "src/handler.js",
+    "src/caf\u00e9/handler.js",
+    "src/\u65e5\u672c\u8a9e/\u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b.ts",
+    "src/cloc\u212a$.txt",
+    "src/CLOCK$.txt",
+    "src/con.txt",
+    "CON",
+    "src/COM\u00b9.log",
+    "src/lpt\u00b3",
+    "/etc/passwd",
+    "../src/file.c",
+    "src/../file.c",
+    "src//file.c",
+    "src\\file.c",
+    "src/file:name.c",
+    "~home/file.c",
+    "C:/file.c",
+    "src/file.c ",
+    "src/file.c.",
+    "src/file\u202ename.c",
+    "src/file\u200b.js",
+    "src/file\u034f.js",
+    "src/file\ufe0f.js",
+    "src/file\ud800name.c",
+    "src/file\udc00name.c",
+  ];
+  for (const value of pathCorpus) {
+    assert.equal(
+      findingsModule.isSafeRelativeSourcePath(value),
+      ledgerModule.isSafeRelativePath(value),
+      `path verdict diverges for ${JSON.stringify(value)}`,
+    );
+  }
+  assert.equal(findingsModule.isSafeRelativeSourcePath("src/cloc\u212a$.txt"), false);
+  assert.equal(ledgerModule.isSafeRelativePath("src/cloc\u212a$.txt"), false);
+
+  const proseCorpus = [
+    "Valid prose.",
+    "caf\u00e9",
+    "",
+    " \t\r\n",
+    "\u200b",
+    "\u034f",
+    "\ufe0f",
+    "\ud800",
+    "\udc00",
+    "visible\ud800",
+  ];
+  for (const value of proseCorpus) {
+    assert.equal(
+      findingsModule.hasVisibleProse(value),
+      ledgerModule.hasVisibleProse(value),
+      `prose verdict diverges for ${JSON.stringify(value)}`,
+    );
+  }
+});

.claude/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "permissions": {
+    "allow": [
+      "Bash(ffprobe -v error *)",
+      "Bash(env)",
+      "mcp__outline__read_document"
+    ]
+  }
+}

.claude/skills/ipx-prod-check/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+---
+name: ipx-prod-check
+description: Look for problems in production ipx (the ipx-web, iPX and ipx-directory containers on Tower, Tower itself and the monitoring that watches them) from their logs in Loki, their traces in Tempo and the metrics in Prometheus, and file what is found as Gitea issues. Use when asked to check on production, look for issues or errors in ipx, see why something is slow or failing in production, review the logs, or investigate a report about the live site.
+---
+
+# Checking production ipx
+
+Production is three containers in the Arcane project `ipx` on Tower
+(`/mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml`), one request passing through them in this order:
+
+| container | what | logs, in Loki | traces, in Tempo | metrics, in Prometheus |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `ipx-web` | Caddy: serves the page, passes `/api` and `/media` to ipx (#203). Port 8099, the LAN and the tunnel | `{container="ipx-web"}`, JSON: a line a request (`http.log.access`), its own errors | service `ipx-web`: a span a request, passing `traceparent` on to ipx (#213) | none |
+| `iPX` | the daemon: API, scans, downloads, DeadAir | `{container="iPX"}`, JSON (`IPX_LOG_FORMAT=json`) | service `ipx`; passes `traceparent` to the directory | `job="ipx"`, its `/metrics` |
+| `ipx-directory` | the directory of public podcasts, `directory.ipxreader.app` (#204, #214) | `{container="ipx-directory"}`, JSON (`DIRECTORY_LOG_FORMAT=json`) | service `ipx-directory`: a span a request, joining ipx's trace when ipx called; a trace a refresher round (#213) | none |
+
+Under them, Tower itself: `job="node"` (the node exporter: load, CPU, memory, disks). The Grafana
+dashboard `iPX` draws all of it in that order (`grafana/dashboard.py`). A trace without the
+production tag (`resource.deployment.environment.name="production"`, on all three) is a daemon run
+by hand, not production. Since #213 a request is one trace across the services it touched: a
+Directory page is ipx-web, then ipx, then the directory, so start from the trace, not the logs. Alloy ships the logs; Loki, Tempo and
+Prometheus publish no query port to this machine, so use the script beside this file:
+
+```sh
+Q=.claude/skills/ipx-prod-check/query.py
+$Q logs    '<LogQL>'           [since]   # lines, newest first (500 at most)
+$Q metric  '<LogQL metric>'    [since]   # $range becomes `since`
+$Q traces  '<TraceQL>'         [since]   # slowest first
+$Q trace   <trace id>                    # one trace as a tree, with its log lines
+$Q prom    '<PromQL>'          [since]   # Prometheus, now; $range becomes `since`
+```
+
+`since` is `30m`, `1h`, `24h`, `7d`. Default to `24h`; widen it to see whether something is new.
+"Since the last deploy" is since that container started (each deploys on its own):
+
+```sh
+for c in iPX ipx-web ipx-directory; do S=$(docker inspect $c -f '{{.State.StartedAt}}'); echo "$c $(( ($(date +%s) - $(date -d "$S" +%s)) / 60 + 1 ))m"; done
+```
+
+Start every check by seeing that all three run, since Loki cannot see a container that is not:
+
+```sh
+docker ps -a --filter name=iPX --filter name=ipx-web --filter name=ipx-directory --format '{{.Names}} {{.Status}}'
+```
+
+All three should be `(healthy)`. Then work through ipx (the checks below), the page, the
+directory, Tower and the monitoring itself, in that order.
+
+## ipx
+
+### What the log carries
+
+Every line has `timestamp`, `level`, `message` and `target`; lines inside a span have `span` (the
+innermost: `{"name":"feed","feed":"x"}`). Loki's `| json` flattens it to `span_name`, `span_feed`.
+Lines inside a traced span, requests and scans, also carry `trace_id` and `span_id`: give the
+`trace_id` to `$Q trace` to see the whole request or scan. (From 2026-09-29 16:30 UTC; before that,
+lines had no trace id, the access log's time was `ms`, and each event was logged twice, words under
+`ipx::scan` and fields under `ipx::io`.)
+
+| target | fields | what |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ipx::http` | `method`, `path`, `route`, `status`, `duration_ms` | one per web request; `route` is the pattern, empty for an unrouted path |
+| `ipx::scan` | `ev` and the event's own: `feed`, `new`, `downloaded`, `failed`, `bytes`, `msg`, `url`, `feeds`, `reason`, `from`, `to`; on a failure `error.type` and, from an HTTP error, `http.response.status_code` | the daemon's events, one line each, in words; warnings are feed and download failures |
+| `ipx::io` | `ev`, `feeds`, `pending`, `downloaded` on the `status` reply | commands arriving (`-> {...}`) and the healthcheck's answer |
+| `ipx` | message, sometimes fields | start-up, shutdown, account and config messages |
+| `ipx::client` | `ev`, `user`, `feed`, `enclosure`, `deadair`; `msg`, `src`, `line` on an error; `ms` on a timing | what the page reports from the browser (#190): `page_error`, `rejection` and `player_error` as warnings; `play_start` (ms from play to sound) and `stall` (ms waiting mid-play) as info. Lines carry the trace of the action in the page: its API requests send `traceparent`, one trace id per tap or key |
+
+Events (`ev`): `feed_start`, `feed_done` (new, downloaded, failed, torrents), `feed_skip` (not due,
+routine), `feed_error` (msg), `feed_moved` (from, to: a permanent redirect followed, the address
+updated), `download_done` (bytes), `download_error` (msg, url),
+`torrent_deferred`, `reaped`, `scan_done` (feeds checked), `reap_done`, `status` (feeds, pending,
+downloaded: the healthcheck's, every 30s), `deadair_done` (feed, enclosure, `saved_s` at the
+default pause), `error` (msg). DeadAir also logs `DeadAir found the silences` (`cuts`, `saved_s`,
+`took_ms`) under `ipx::deadair`, and warns `DeadAir could not read a file` when ffmpeg fails on
+one, which it then passes over until the next restart.
+
+`error.type` is the HTTP status (`404`, `503`) or one of `dns`, `redirect_loop`, `timeout`, `tls`,
+`not_a_feed`, `site_message`, `connect`, `parse`, `other`; Loki's `| json` names it `error_type`.
+
+Filter on the text before `| json` where you can (`|= "\"ev\":\"feed_error\""`): it is much
+cheaper than parsing every line. Lines before 2026-09-29 14:00 UTC are text, not JSON, and
+`| json | __error__=""` drops them.
+
+### What Prometheus carries
+
+The daemon's own state between requests, which no log line or trace holds (#194): ipx serves
+`/metrics` on `[web] metrics_bind` (production: `192.168.1.130:9187`, LAN only), on a thread and
+port of its own, from memory alone, and Prometheus scrapes it every 15 s as `job="ipx"`. Kept
+from 2026-10-11 15:15 UTC. All gauges:
+
+| metric | what |
+|---|---|
+| `ipx_db_connections{state="in_use"\|"idle"}`, `ipx_db_connections_max` | the database pool: in use reaching the max means requests and scans wait for a connection |
+| `ipx_worker_queue` | commands waiting for the sequential worker (scans, downloads, adds) |
+| `ipx_event_listeners` | open pages and socket clients on the live-update stream |
+| `ipx_torrent_slots_free` | of 2 |
+| `ipx_deadair_playing` | episodes being played through DeadAir's playlist |
+| `ipx_runtime_workers`, `ipx_runtime_tasks`, `ipx_runtime_queue` | tokio: threads, live tasks, tasks waiting for a thread |
+| `ipx_process_resident_bytes`, `ipx_process_open_fds` | memory and open files and sockets |
+| `ipx_uptime_seconds`, `ipx_build_info{version}` | since the daemon started; what runs |
+| `ipx_worker_busy`, `ipx_worker_job_seconds{kind}` | the worker's job now (`scan`, `reap`, `download`, `status`, `reload`) and for how long; the healthcheck passes while it is stuck |
+| `ipx_jobs_total{kind}`, `ipx_job_seconds_total{kind}` | counters: jobs finished, and their seconds all told |
+| `ipx_last_scan_age_seconds` | since a scan last finished; absent until one has since starting |
+| `ipx_http_requests_in_flight`, `ipx_scan_feeds_fetching`, `ipx_downloads_active` | work in progress |
+| `ipx_download_bytes_total` | counter; `rate()` is the download speed |
+| `ipx_event_queue`, `ipx_events_missed_total` | live updates unread by some listener; counter of those dropped for one that fell behind |
+| `ipx_deadair_backlog`, `ipx_deadair_busy_seconds` | files of shows with DeadAir on not yet looked at (episodes everyone heard through stay counted); how long it has been on its file |
+| `ipx_feed_retries` | feeds waiting to retry a failed name lookup |
+| `ipx_art_cache_bytes`, `ipx_art_cache_limit_bytes` | artwork kept, as of the last sweep, and the most kept: kept sits at the limit by design |
+| `ipx_art_evicted_total`, `ipx_art_requests_total{result="hit"\|"miss"}` | counters: images the sweep threw out to stay under the limit, and artwork served from disk or fetched from the publisher; many evicted at every sweep with a falling hit rate means the limit is too small |
+| `ipx_feeds`, `ipx_downloads_pending`, `ipx_files_downloaded` | the library, as the healthcheck last counted it (every 30 s) |
+
+### The checks
+
+Run these, then read the lines behind whatever stands out. Most of the time is in the reading:
+a count says something happened, the lines and traces say why.
+
+1. **Warnings and errors, grouped.** What went wrong, how often, and since when.
+   ```
+   $Q metric 'sum by (target, message) (count_over_time({container="iPX"} | json | __error__="" | level=~"WARN|ERROR" [$range]))'
+   ```
+   Feed and download failures name the feed in the message; group them in the next check instead.
+2. **Failing feeds and downloads.**
+   ```
+   $Q metric 'sum by (feed, error_type) (count_over_time({container="iPX"} |= "\"ev\":\"feed_error\"" | json | __error__="" [$range]))' 7d
+   $Q metric 'sum by (feed, error_type) (count_over_time({container="iPX"} |= "\"ev\":\"download_error\"" | json | __error__="" [$range]))' 7d
+   ```
+   Tell the publisher's problems from ipx's. A 404, 410, DNS failure or 503 from the feed's own
+   server is the publisher (worth saying, since the feed may have moved; one issue for a feed
+   that has been dead for days, not for a 503 once). A parse error on a feed that loads in a
+   browser, a redirect loop ipx should follow, or the same failure on many feeds at once is ipx.
+3. **Server errors and slow requests.**
+   ```
+   $Q metric 'sum by (method, route, status) (count_over_time({container="iPX"} |= "\"target\":\"ipx::http\"" | json | __error__="" | status >= 500 [$range]))'
+   $Q metric 'topk(10, quantile_over_time(0.95, {container="iPX"} |= "\"target\":\"ipx::http\"" | json | __error__="" | route != "" | route != "/api/events" | unwrap duration_ms [$range]) by (method, route))'
+   ```
+   Any 5xx is worth a look. 401s are people signing in, not a problem unless one address is
+   hammering. For a slow route, find its traces (check 5) and see which span holds the time.
+4. **Is the worker keeping up?** Scans should finish regularly, the queue should drain, and the
+   daemon should not be restarting on its own.
+   ```
+   $Q metric 'sum(count_over_time({container="iPX"} |= "\"ev\":\"scan_done\"" [$range]))' 6h
+   $Q logs '{container="iPX"} |= "\"ev\":\"status\"" | json | line_format "{{.timestamp}} pending={{.pending}} downloaded={{.downloaded}}"' 6h
+   $Q logs '{container="iPX"} |= "daemon started"' 7d
+   ```
+   A `daemon started` not matched by a deploy (see `git log` and the image's build time) is a
+   crash or an OOM kill: check `docker inspect iPX -f '{{.State.OOMKilled}} {{.RestartCount}}'`
+   and the lines just before it. A pending count that only grows means downloads are not
+   keeping up or not running.
+
+   Since 2026-10-02 the daemon sleeps until the next feed is due (at most 10 minutes) instead of
+   scanning every minute (#114), so expect tens of scans in 6 hours, not 360, nearly all with
+   `feeds` above 0; none at all for over 10 minutes means the worker is stuck. And `pending` is
+   the real queue (#113): files a scan will download on its own. Back-catalogue files are
+   `held`, listed but not counted, so it is usually 0 or a handful.
+5. **Slow and failed traces.** All three services' (filter by `resource.service.name` for one).
+   ```
+   $Q traces '{resource.deployment.environment.name="production" && duration > 5s}'
+   $Q traces '{resource.deployment.environment.name="production" && status = error}'
+   $Q trace <id>
+   ```
+   Scans (`scan`) are long by nature, since they fetch many feeds one after another: look for one
+   `feed` or `fetch` span holding most of it, or a `download` far slower than its size explains.
+   A web request over a second is worth a look; the trace shows whether the time is in the
+   handler or a scan it waited on.
+
+   Steps are `step` spans named by `of` (#187): an item list's `entries_in`, `sanitize`,
+   `deadair`, `count_in`; the feed list's `catalogue`, `feed_list` and its queries; a `reap`'s
+   `missing_files`, `prune_abandoned_failures`, `reap_candidates`, `clean_directory` (once a day
+   since #193, so a reap is about a second), `trim_artwork`, with what it removed on the `reap`
+   span. DeadAir's work on a file is a `deadair` trace (feed, enclosure, cuts) with `probe`,
+   `silencedetect`, `frame_bytes`, `store_plans`: seconds each, more is a file ffmpeg struggles
+   with. A trace with no name in `$Q traces` started in the page (#190, #192): its root is the tap
+   in the browser, which sends no span, so it holds the requests that tap made (API calls, the
+   playlist and audio of a play, position saves, the page's own report) side by side.
+
+6. **The daemon's state, from Prometheus.** Pressure and leaks that requests and traces only
+   hint at.
+   ```
+   $Q prom 'up{job="ipx"}'
+   $Q prom 'max(max_over_time(ipx_db_connections{job="ipx",state="in_use"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'max(max_over_time(ipx_db_connections_max{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'max(max_over_time(ipx_worker_queue{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'max(max_over_time(ipx_runtime_queue{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'max(resets(ipx_uptime_seconds{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'ipx_process_resident_bytes{job="ipx"} - ipx_process_resident_bytes{job="ipx"} offset $range' 24h
+   $Q prom 'ipx_process_open_fds{job="ipx"} - ipx_process_open_fds{job="ipx"} offset $range' 24h
+   $Q prom 'ipx_runtime_tasks{job="ipx"} - ipx_runtime_tasks{job="ipx"} offset $range' 24h
+   $Q prom 'max(max_over_time(ipx_worker_job_seconds{job="ipx"}[$range])) by (kind)' 24h
+   $Q prom 'max(max_over_time(ipx_last_scan_age_seconds{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'sum by (kind) (increase(ipx_job_seconds_total{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'max(max_over_time(ipx_http_requests_in_flight{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'sum(increase(ipx_events_missed_total{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   $Q prom 'max(max_over_time(ipx_deadair_busy_seconds{job="ipx"}[$range]))' 24h
+   ```
+   `up` 0 means Prometheus cannot reach the port: the container is down or `metrics_bind` is
+   unset. Connections in use at the pool's max (20 on Postgres) means something is waiting for
+   one: find the slow requests or scan of that time in check 3 and 5. A worker queue that only
+   grows means downloads are not keeping up, or the worker is stuck on one job. A runtime queue
+   above 0 for more than a scrape or two means every thread is busy: something is blocking a
+   thread or burning one. Memory, open files or tasks only climbing across a day with no restart
+   is a leak (a file or socket not closed, a task never ending); a step after a deploy is not. A
+   reset of the uptime is a restart: match it with a deploy, or it is a crash (check 4).
+
+   The worker: one job over 30 minutes (`ipx_worker_job_seconds`), or a scan last finished over
+   15 minutes ago, is the worker stuck, which the healthcheck does not notice; its trace and the
+   log lines of that time say on what. A kind whose share of `ipx_job_seconds_total` jumps is
+   where the worker's time went (reap was most of it until #193). Web requests in flight near
+   the pool's max mean the pool is what they wait on. Live updates missed mean a page showed stale
+   counts until reloaded. DeadAir over a minute on one file is a file ffmpeg chokes on.
+
+7. **What the page saw.** The browser's own errors and timings, which no server line shows.
+   ```
+   $Q metric 'sum by (ev, msg) (count_over_time({container="iPX"} |= "\"target\":\"ipx::client\"" | json | __error__="" | level="WARN" [$range]))' 7d
+   $Q logs '{container="iPX"} |= "\"target\":\"ipx::client\"" | json | ev=~"play_start|stall" | line_format "{{.timestamp}} {{.user}} {{.ev}} {{.ms}}ms deadair={{.deadair}} {{.feed}}"' 24h
+   ```
+   A `player_error` is playback that failed in front of someone: `hls.js: ...` is DeadAir's
+   playlist (its trace has the playlist and audio requests), `media error 4` a file the browser
+   cannot play. A `page_error` or `rejection` is a bug in the page; `src` and `line` point into
+   the minified `app.js`, so match the message to `web/src`. `play_start` over 2000 ms, or a
+   `stall`, is worth a trace: was it the server, Cloudflare, or the network.
+
+`docker logs --since 10m iPX 2>&1 | tail -5` shows the newest lines when Loki is behind.
+
+## ipx-web, the page
+
+Caddy logs one JSON line a request (#210), logger `http.log.access.log0`: Loki's `| json` gives
+`request_uri`, `request_method`, `request_remote_ip`, `status`, `duration` (seconds, not ms), `size`.
+The request's headers and a `?token=` are filtered out before it is written. Its healthcheck
+requests come from `127.0.0.1` every 30 s; leave them out. `/api` and `/media` pass on to ipx and
+are in ipx's own access log too, with ipx's time; Caddy's `duration` for them adds the hop.
+
+```sh
+W='{container="ipx-web"} |= "http.log.access" | json | __error__="" | request_remote_ip != "127.0.0.1"'
+$Q metric "sum by (status) (count_over_time($W [\$range]))"
+$Q metric "sum by (request_uri) (count_over_time($W | status >= 500 [\$range]))"
+$Q metric "topk(10, quantile_over_time(0.95, $W | request_uri !~ \"/(api|media)/.*\" | unwrap duration [\$range]) by (request_uri))"
+$Q logs '{container="ipx-web"} | json | __error__="" | level=~"warn|error" | msg !~ "admin endpoint disabled|automatic HTTPS is completely disabled|HTTP/[23] skipped.*|exiting; byeee.*"'
+```
+
+A 502 is ipx not answering Caddy: a restart (match the deploy) or ipx down; Caddy's error line
+names it (`dial tcp ...:8099: connect: connection refused`). The page itself (`/`, `/admin`)
+waits on `/api/page-check` before it is sent, so a slow page is usually a slow page-check: look it
+up in ipx's access log. 401 and 303 on `/` are people signed out being sent to `/login`, not a
+problem. Caddy's own notices at each start (no admin endpoint, no HTTPS or HTTP/3, its goodbye on
+SIGTERM) are by design and filtered out above.
+
+Each access line carries the request's `traceID` (`| json` gives `traceID`): give it to `$Q trace`
+to see where the time went, Caddy's span with ipx's inside it. A slow page with ipx's span short is
+Caddy or the network; a long one is ipx.
+
+```sh
+$Q traces '{resource.service.name="ipx-web" && duration > 2s}'
+$Q traces '{resource.service.name="ipx-web" && status = error}'
+```
+
+Who reaches it: `request_remote_ip` is `192.168.64.1` for the tunnel and anything else on Tower
+(Docker's gateway), `192.168.1.130` for Tower itself, a LAN address for the LAN. Caddy passes
+Cloudflare Access's headers on only from `192.168.64.1` (`TUNNEL_PEER`), and ipx trusts them only
+from Caddy, with a valid signed token. Testing sign-in from Tower proves nothing about the tunnel
+(#209): send it from a container on another network.
+
+## ipx-directory
+
+It logs a line a request (`target` `ipx_directory::http`: `method`, `path`, `status`,
+`duration_ms`, `token`, the token's name and never the token), a line a snapshot (`message`
+`snapshot`: `instance`, `accepted`, `refused_private`, `refused_blocked`, `refused_invalid`), a
+line a refresher round (`feeds checked`: `checked`), a line a failed feed check (`feed check
+failed`: `feed`, the directory's id, and `error`), the admin's actions (`feed removed and
+blocked`, `feed unblocked`, `snapshot dropped`, each with `by`), and `config read again` when its
+token file changes. It has no metrics. Its traces (#213): a span a request (`http`), a child of
+ipx's when ipx called with a `traceparent`, and a trace a refresher round (`refresh`, `feeds`)
+with a `feed` span for each check. Its log lines carry no trace id; find the trace by time or by
+the feed.
+
+```sh
+$Q traces '{resource.service.name="ipx-directory" && duration > 2s}'
+$Q traces '{resource.service.name="ipx-directory" && name="feed" && duration > 10s}'
+$Q traces '{resource.service.name="ipx" && name="directory_share"}'
+```
+
+A slow Directory page in ipx is usually its `http` span in the directory: the trace says whether.
+A refresher round far over a minute is one publisher's feed holding it, the slow `feed` span.
+
+```sh
+D='{container="ipx-directory"} | json | __error__=""'
+$Q metric "sum by (status, token) (count_over_time({container=\"ipx-directory\"} |= \"ipx_directory::http\" | json | __error__=\"\" [\$range]))"
+$Q metric "topk(5, max_over_time({container=\"ipx-directory\"} |= \"ipx_directory::http\" | json | __error__=\"\" | unwrap duration_ms [\$range]) by (path))"
+$Q logs "$D | level=~\"WARN|ERROR\""
+$Q logs "$D | message=\"snapshot\"" 7d
+$Q metric "sum(count_over_time($D | message=\"snapshot\" [\$range])) by (instance)"
+$Q metric "sum by (feed, error) (count_over_time($D | message=\"feed check failed\" [\$range]))" 7d
+$Q metric "sum(sum_over_time($D | message=\"feeds checked\" | unwrap checked [\$range]))" 24h
+```
+
+Expect a snapshot from each server when what it shares changes and every half hour, so about 48 a
+day each; one every half minute is ipx resending what has not changed (#211, fixed). A burst of
+401s with an empty `token` is someone without a token trying the public address, expected now and
+then; a steady stream is worth an issue, since Cloudflare can rate-limit it. A snapshot whose
+`refused_private` is not 0 means an ipx server tried to send a feed that looks private: find which
+in that server's log, since the directory refuses it but the sender should not have sent it. Many
+`feed check failed` lines for one feed are the publisher's, not the directory's. Each feed is
+checked every six hours, 25 at a time, so `feeds checked` over a day should be about four times
+the feeds listed; none for over six hours means the refresher is stuck. `could not store a feed
+check` or `could not read which feeds are due` is its database (`ipx_directory` on the
+`databases` project's Postgres). A config that does not load (`config changed but does not
+load`) keeps the old tokens: worth fixing before someone's new token is needed.
+
+## Tower
+
+The three share Tower with everything else, so a slow or failing ipx can be the host. The node
+exporter (`job="node"`) has the history; twelve threads.
+
+```sh
+$Q prom 'max_over_time(node_load1{job="node"}[$range])' 24h
+$Q prom 'min_over_time(node_memory_MemAvailable_bytes{job="node"}[$range]) / 1e9' 24h
+$Q prom 'sum by (mode) (rate(node_cpu_seconds_total{job="node", mode=~"user|system|iowait"}[$range]))' 1h
+$Q prom 'max by (device) (rate(node_disk_io_time_seconds_total{job="node", device=~"nvme.*|md.*"}[$range]))' 1h
+```
+
+For when, step back with `offset`: `max_over_time(node_load1[10m] offset 60m)`. Load far above
+twelve with little CPU busy is processes waiting, on a disk or on the user shares: on 2026-10-12
+debug builds linking through `/mnt/user` (shfs, FUSE) took load to 248 with mostly system time and
+stalled everything on the shares, ipx's downloads included. Available memory near nothing makes
+it worse. Disk busy near 100% on `nvme1n1` is `/mnt/fast`, appdata and Postgres's data; on `md*`
+the array behind `/mnt/user`, the downloads. Say what was running at the time if you can tell
+(`docker stats --no-stream`); a host problem is the user's, not an ipx issue, unless ipx caused it.
+
+## The monitoring itself
+
+A quiet dashboard can be a dead exporter. Check what Prometheus scrapes and that each
+container's lines are reaching Loki:
+
+```sh
+curl -s http://192.168.1.130:9090/api/v1/targets | python3 -c 'import json,sys
+for t in json.load(sys.stdin)["data"]["activeTargets"]: print(t["health"], t["labels"]["job"], t["scrapeUrl"], t.get("lastError","")[:80])'
+for c in iPX ipx-web ipx-directory; do echo "$c $($Q metric "sum(count_over_time({container=\"$c\"} [1h]))" 1h | tail -1)"; done
+docker ps -a --filter label=com.docker.compose.project=monitoring --format '{{.Names}} {{.Status}}'
+```
+
+`ipx` and `node` should be `up`. Every monitoring container should be running; after Docker
+restarts, one can be left `Exited (255)` though its policy is `unless-stopped` (Prometheus, on
+2026-10-12, when Docker lost its exit during an overload): `docker start` it and say so. blocky
+and nut on 192.168.2.21 are another machine, not ipx's; leave them. A container with no lines in
+an hour while it runs means Alloy is not shipping it; Alloy can take a few minutes to pick up a
+container after a deploy.
+
+## Rules
+
+`docker logs` and `docker exec iPX ipx ...` are fine. Do not query production's Postgres
+directly: ask the user if a question needs the database.
+
+## What to do with what you find
+
+Follow the repository's rules in CLAUDE.md: **every problem found gets a Gitea issue**, with a
+closed stdin and a timeout on `tea`. Before filing, list the open issues and do not file one
+twice; comment on the existing issue with the new evidence instead.
+
+```sh
+R="--login git.sdf1.net --repo rays/ipx"
+t() { timeout 30 /src/tea "$@" < /dev/null; }
+t issues list $R --state open
+t issues create $R -t "<what is wrong, as the user would notice it>" -L bug -d "<what, where, since when, how often, the query or trace id that shows it>"
+```
+
+Put in each issue what would let someone pick it up cold: the LogQL or TraceQL that shows it, a
+trace id, the first time it was seen and how often. A publisher's dead feed is worth one issue
+saying so (the user may want to unsubscribe or find its new address); a single 503 is not.
+
+Finish with a short report to the user, a line for each of ipx-web, ipx, the directory, Tower and
+the monitoring: what is healthy, what is wrong (with the issue numbers), and anything you could
+not tell from logs, traces and metrics alone. Do not fix things unless asked; the
+check is for finding them.
+
+## When the checks come back empty
+
+Check that there is data before concluding all is well (the monitoring section's per-container
+count): iPX should have hundreds of lines an hour or more, ipx-web at least its healthchecks'
+120, ipx-directory a few dozen. Nothing at all means Alloy is not shipping it, or the container
+is down.

.claude/skills/ipx-prod-check/query.py

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Ask production's Loki, Tempo or Prometheus a question, from anywhere that can run docker on Tower.
+
+    query.py logs    '<LogQL log query>'    [since]   lines, newest first
+    query.py metric  '<LogQL metric query>' [since]   one value per series; $range is `since`
+    query.py traces  '<TraceQL query>'      [since]   matching traces, slowest first
+    query.py trace   <trace id>                       one trace's spans, as a tree
+    query.py prom    '<PromQL query>'       [since]   one value per series, now; $range is `since`
+
+`since` is 1h, 24h, 7d and the like (default 24h). Loki and Tempo publish no query port on the
+host, so each call runs a throwaway alpine container on the monitoring project's network.
+"""
+import json, subprocess, sys, time, urllib.parse
+
+NET = "monitoring_default"
+
+
+def fetch(url):
+    out = subprocess.run(["docker", "run", "--rm", "--network", NET, "alpine", "wget", "-qO-", url],
+                         capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)
+    if out.returncode:
+        sys.exit(f"query failed: {out.stderr.strip() or out.stdout.strip()}\n{url}")
+    return json.loads(out.stdout)
+
+
+def seconds(since):
+    return int(since[:-1]) * {"m": 60, "h": 3600, "d": 86400}[since[-1]]
+
+
+def main():
+    if len(sys.argv) < 3:
+        sys.exit(__doc__)
+    kind, q = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+    since = sys.argv[3] if len(sys.argv) > 3 else "24h"
+    now = time.time()
+    start = now - seconds(since)
+    enc = urllib.parse.quote
+    if kind == "logs":
+        r = fetch(f"http://loki:3100/loki/api/v1/query_range?query={enc(q)}&limit=500"
+                  f"&start={int(start * 1e9)}&end={int(now * 1e9)}&direction=backward")
+        lines = [(ts, line) for s in r["data"]["result"] for ts, line in s["values"]]
+        for ts, line in sorted(lines, reverse=True):
+            print(line)
+        print(f"-- {len(lines)} line(s){' (limit reached)' if len(lines) >= 500 else ''}", file=sys.stderr)
+    elif kind == "metric":
+        r = fetch(f"http://loki:3100/loki/api/v1/query?query={enc(q.replace('$range', since))}&time={int(now * 1e9)}")
+        rows = sorted(r["data"]["result"], key=lambda s: -float(s["value"][1]))
+        for s in rows:
+            labels = {k: v for k, v in s["metric"].items() if k not in ("container", "compose_project", "service_name")}
+            print(f"{s['value'][1]:>12}  {json.dumps(labels) if labels else ''}")
+        print(f"-- {len(rows)} series", file=sys.stderr)
+    elif kind == "traces":
+        r = fetch(f"http://tempo:3200/api/search?q={enc(q)}&start={int(start)}&end={int(now)}&limit=100")
+        traces = sorted(r.get("traces", []), key=lambda t: -t.get("durationMs", 0))
+        for t in traces:
+            when = time.strftime("%m-%d %H:%M:%S", time.gmtime(int(t["startTimeUnixNano"]) / 1e9))
+            # No root name: its root span is a tap in the page, which the browser never sends.
+            name = t.get("rootTraceName") or "(from the page)"
+            print(f"{t.get('durationMs', 0):>8}ms  {when}Z  {t['traceID']}  {name}")
+        print(f"-- {len(traces)} trace(s)", file=sys.stderr)
+    elif kind == "prom":
+        # ipx's /metrics (#194), scraped as job ipx; through the network like the others.
+        r = fetch(f"http://prometheus:9090/api/v1/query?query={enc(q.replace('$range', since))}&time={now}")
+        rows = sorted(r["data"]["result"], key=lambda s: -float(s["value"][1]))
+        for s in rows:
+            labels = {k: v for k, v in s["metric"].items() if k not in ("job", "instance")}
+            print(f"{float(s['value'][1]):>14g}  {json.dumps(labels) if labels else ''}")
+        print(f"-- {len(rows)} series", file=sys.stderr)
+    elif kind == "trace":
+        r = fetch(f"http://tempo:3200/api/traces/{q}")
+        spans = [sp for b in r.get("batches", r.get("resourceSpans", []))
+                 for ss in b.get("scopeSpans", b.get("instrumentationLibrarySpans", [])) for sp in ss["spans"]]
+        kids = {}
+        for sp in spans:
+            kids.setdefault(sp.get("parentSpanId", ""), []).append(sp)
+
+        def show(sp, depth):
+            ms = (int(sp["endTimeUnixNano"]) - int(sp["startTimeUnixNano"])) / 1e6
+            attrs = {a["key"]: next(iter(a["value"].values()), None) for a in sp.get("attributes", [])
+                     if not a["key"].startswith(("code.", "thread.")) and a["key"] not in ("busy_ns", "idle_ns", "target")}
+            err = " ERROR" if sp.get("status", {}).get("code") in (2, "STATUS_CODE_ERROR") else ""
+            print(f"{'  ' * depth}{sp['name']}  {ms:.0f}ms{err}  {json.dumps(attrs) if attrs else ''}")
+            for e in sp.get("events", []):
+                msg = next((a["value"].get("stringValue") for a in e.get("attributes", []) if a["key"] == "message"), e.get("name"))
+                # A scan logs a skip for every feed not due; they bury what happened.
+                if '"ev":"feed_skip"' in (msg or ""):
+                    continue
+                print(f"{'  ' * depth}  - {msg}")
+            for k in sorted(kids.get(sp["spanId"], []), key=lambda s: int(s["startTimeUnixNano"])):
+                show(k, depth + 1)
+
+        ids = {sp["spanId"] for sp in spans}
+        for root in [sp for sp in spans if sp.get("parentSpanId", "") not in ids]:
+            show(root, 0)
+    else:
+        sys.exit(__doc__)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

.claude/skills/security-audit

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+../../.agents/skills/security-audit

.gitignore

@@ -2,3 +2,8 @@
 /node_modules
 /test-results
 /playwright-report
+/web/dist
+
+.claude/settings.local.json
+__pycache__/
+site/dist/

.rtk/filters.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Project-local RTK filters — commit this file with your repo.
+# Filters here override user-global and built-in filters.
+# Docs: https://github.com/rtk-ai/rtk#custom-filters
+schema_version = 1
+
+# Example: suppress build noise from a custom tool
+# [filters.my-tool]
+# description = "Compact my-tool output"
+# match_command = "^my-tool\\s+build"
+# strip_ansi = true
+# strip_lines_matching = ["^\\s*$", "^Downloading", "^Installing"]
+# max_lines = 30
+# on_empty = "my-tool: ok"

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
-# Changelog
-
-All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
-
-The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
-and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
-
-The long form, with what was wrong before and how it was found, is in
-[docs/history.md](docs/history.md).
-
-## [Unreleased]
-
-## [0.5.3] - 2026-09-14
-
-### Added
-
-- A feed that has been failing for a day shows a plain-English reason in the sidebar and on its
-  own page, sorted from a 404, a 401/403, a 402, a name that no longer resolves, or a web page in
-  place of the feed -- with Unsubscribe or, when the page links its new feed, Use the new address.
-  A feed that fails once and reads fine again within a day is never flagged.
-
-### Changed
-
-- Unsubscribing from the last person's OPML or Patreon subscription now retires the feeds it
-  listed, the same as a feed the list itself drops: removed if nothing was downloaded, kept and
-  marked orphaned otherwise. Until now they stayed in the database and kept being scanned hourly
-  with auto-download on, which is how 922 defunct `davewiner` feeds outlived the OPML that listed
-  them.
-
-### Fixed
-
-- A feed whose XML uses a bare `&` instead of `&` (kcpw, both feedland feeds) is now read
-  instead of refused.
-- A feed URL that now serves a web page says so, and names the feed the page links to when it has
-  one, instead of a raw XML parser error.
-- A publisher answering with an empty body (British Antarctic Survey's 202) is read as nothing new
-  to report, not a parse failure.
-- A link in an item's show notes opens in a new tab instead of navigating away from ipx.
-- A video file plays as video, in a small floating pane above the player bar, instead of silently
-  as sound only.
-- On the Unread tab, opening an item no longer makes it disappear from the list -- it stays until
-  you open a different one, even if a scan finishes and refreshes the list while it is open.
-- Subscribe and Unsubscribe have their own icons (a circled check and a circled minus) instead of
-  sharing the generic plus and minus used for adding feeds, users and imports.
-- Settings no longer disappears for a non-admin account. It was hiding the whole Settings modal
-  along with the log and the users screen, but a non-admin has settings of their own in there --
-  their subscriptions' Export and Import, and the schedule and quota are worth seeing even without
-  a say in them. Only the log and the users screen, which the server also refuses them, are gone.
-
-## [0.5.2] - 2026-09-12
-
-### Added
-
-- Settings → Users and `ipx user list` show when each account was added and when it last signed
-  in, to the hour.
-- `ipx user rename <name> <new name>` renames an account and keeps its feeds, read state and admin
-  rights. An account made before the proxy was set up can take the name the proxy signs it in as.
-
-### Changed
-
-- Directory and Popular list the feeds inside an OPML one by one, and no longer the OPML itself,
-  so you can subscribe to just the shows you want.
-- The database no longer records when subscriptions and sign-in sessions were created. Nothing
-  ever read it, and an existing database drops the columns on its next start.
-
-### Fixed
-
-- Show notes that the podcast's host cut off in the middle of a tag no longer open with a scrap of
-  HTML: the item's other copy of its notes is used instead, from the next time the feed changes.
-  Daily Meditation Podcast had 57.
-- Docker no longer shows ipodderx as starting, or calls it unhealthy, while it scans or downloads:
-  `ipx status` answers at once instead of waiting for the job in progress to finish.
-- Signing out after signing in through Cloudflare Access no longer lands on ipodderx's own password
-  page. With the new `sign_out_url` set, Sign out ends the Access session, and the password page
-  sends anyone the proxy signs in straight to their feeds.
-- The sign-in guide, `docs/sso.md`, describes the setup ipodderx.sdf1.net really runs: Authentik as
-  Cloudflare Access's identity provider, and how to find the address ipx has to trust. It had never
-  been checked against a real setup, and pointed at the wrong address.
-
-## [0.5.1] - 2026-09-12
-
-### Fixed
-
-- The triangle that opens an OPML or Patreon folder was cramped against the folder's art. It has
-  more room now, and a wider target to click.
-
-## [0.5.0] - 2026-09-12
-
-### Added
-
-- A Patreon token pasted into Add feed, or a creator's RSS link without `&show=`, becomes a folder
-  of that creator's shows, kept in step on every scan like a subscribed OPML. A creator with only
-  one show stays a plain feed. One already added as a single long feed is split into its shows on
-  its next scan, keeping its files and what you had read.
-- Add feed has an "Allow items marked explicit" box, so a new feed's first scan no longer skips
-  every explicit item.
-
-### Changed
-
-- Unread counts, unread dots and download progress are amber, the colour of the icon's EQ bars.
-  Blue is kept for the primary action and links, so a count no longer looks like a button.
-- What is playing is marked by small EQ bars, in its row and in the player. They move only while it
-  plays.
-- A folder in the sidebar shows its first four shows' art as a mosaic, and its shows sit under its
-  title. Only folders have a triangle, so every feed lines up with Directory and Popular above.
-- Feeds without art get initials in a colour of their own, instead of all the same grey.
-- The Flagged tab is called Kept, as the Keep button and Settings already said.
-- A feed's header is one short line; when it checks next is in its tooltip.
-- The item list takes more of the window, and the Files pane shows only when the item has files.
-- Column headings and tags are in sentence case, and fewer things are bold.
-- Unsubscribe is a round button beside the feed's other actions.
-- Export and Import in Settings say what they do.
-- The sign-in page shows the original icon large.
-- Nothing animates when your system asks for reduced motion.
-- The pages are about 90 KB smaller: the icon is served once instead of written into each.
-- A web token generated for a new install is 64 characters instead of 32.
-- The README is a short overview of what ipx does and how to run it, and points into `docs/` for
-  the rest. It still described the layout from before 0.4.0.
-
-### Removed
-
-- The systemd units in `contrib/`. Run ipx with Docker, or point a unit of your own at
-  `ipx daemon`.
-- Upgrading from before 0.3.0 directly: what was read, kept or part-played before accounts is no
-  longer carried over to the admin, and OPML feeds that old versions wrote into `config.toml` are
-  no longer moved out of it. Upgrade through 0.4.0 first.
-- `interval_mins` in `config.toml` is ignored; use `schedule`.
-
-### Fixed
-
-- The feed list works from the keyboard: Tab reaches every feed, Enter opens it, and Right and Left
-  open and close a folder. Every button shows where the focus is, including in the toolbar, which
-  used to clip the ring.
-- "1 items" reads "1 item".
-- A selected feed without art no longer loses its initials tile in Dark and Light.
-- The player shows the feed's initials when there is no art, not the episode's.
-- Turning on Allow explicit, or changing keywords or auto-download, brings back what those settings
-  had skipped on the feed's next scan. Before, an item was judged once, when first seen, and a
-  skipped one stayed skipped whatever you changed.
-- Feeds inside an OPML or a Patreon creator follow your settings on the folder unless you set their
-  own, as the folder's settings dialog said they did. Before, the folder's settings reached nothing
-  inside it.
-- A new feed no longer takes the name of one you removed earlier and shows that feed's old items.
-  Re-adding the same feed still gets its old name, and its history, back.
-
-## [0.4.0] - 2026-09-11
-
-### Added
-
-- A Classic theme after the 2004 Mac app, beside Dark and Light: brushed-metal toolbar, Aqua
-  blue selection, red unread badges, a striped table and Lucida Grande. The theme button steps
-  through all three and remembers the choice.
-- A toolbar across the top, after the original iPodderX: add and unsubscribe, play, mark read
-  and keep for the selected item, scan, a search box for what is showing, and Settings and Log.
-- Directory, Popular and All Subscriptions at the top of the feed list, opening in the main pane.
-  Directory lists every feed anyone here subscribes to, A to Z (`GET /api/directory`). All
-  Subscriptions lists every item from every feed you subscribe to (`GET /api/entries`).
-- Items show as a table (unread, kept, title, feed, file, size, published) with a Files pane beside
-  it, and a status bar with the totals.
-- Mark everything read from All Subscriptions, across every feed you subscribe to
-  (`POST /api/read-all`). It asks first. All Subscriptions can also check every feed from its header.
-- Click a column heading in the item table to sort by it (kept, title, feed, file type, size,
-  published); click again to reverse. The server sorts, so it covers the whole list, not just the
-  fifty shown, and the choice is remembered.
-
-### Changed
-
-- Popular shows the top 10, not 20, and counts everyone, you included. Your own feeds stay on it,
-  marked Subscribed, and clicking one opens it.
-- Adding a feed scans it straight away, and an OPML import that added feeds scans them, so their
-  items show without pressing Scan.
-- A file deleted to save space, or by hand, looks as if it was never downloaded: no "reaped"
-  label, just the Download button. The retention summary says "deleted", not "reaped".
-- Buttons are icons, with the words in their tooltips: the Files pane (save, delete, view,
-  download), an item's own buttons (mark read, keep, open the original), the feed header (scan,
-  download latest, mark all read, settings, unsubscribe), and the Settings, feed settings and
-  Download latest dialogs (save, download, cancel). The icons are Font Awesome Free, embedded as
-  SVG: only the ones used, no font to download, and nothing fetched from anyone else. They
-  replace font characters such as ⟳ ⤓ ↗, which came out thin and tiny and differed from font to
-  font. Keep is a flag everywhere, as it was in the original, and mark unread is an envelope.
-- One meaning per icon. Minus unsubscribes, x closes or cancels, plus adds or subscribes, and a
-  dialog's confirm button carries the icon of what it does. The feed header's unsubscribe was an x
-  and read as closing the page. The remaining word buttons are icons too:
-  - Log, Add feed, Users, Unsubscribe and OPML.
-  - Popular's Subscribe, Copy and Sign out.
-  - The Subscribed label in Popular, the Directory and Add feed, which is now a green check.
-  - The player's back, play, forward and close, which were font characters, and the folder arrow.
-- The toolbar's read and keep buttons show the selected item's state, with the same icons as the
-  item's own buttons. Play, read and keep sit together, and Scan sits with add and unsubscribe.
-- An OPML subscription's page has the same header as a feed's, with its buttons in the same places.
-- The item table's size has its own column, apart from the file's type, and shows KB for small
-  files instead of "0 MB". The Item heading is now Title.
-- A file's type is an icon (audio, video, image, PDF, torrent, other), green once it is
-  downloaded and red when the download failed, with the details in its tooltip. One icon per
-  row keeps the column lined up. The DOWNLOADED and PENDING labels are gone.
-
-### Fixed
-
-- Playing a file from the Files pane played it twice at once, in the pane and in the player bar.
-  The pane has a play button now, and the player bar is the only player.
-- The password box in Manage users was white in the dark theme.
-- An item with no date showed a stray dot in its details.
-- Escape did not close a dialog while the cursor was in one of its boxes, so Add feed, which opens
-  in its URL box, could not be closed with Escape.
-
-### Security
-
-- Feeds from paid-feed services (Patreon, Supercast, Supporting Cast, Glow, Memberful) are never
-  listed in Popular or the Directory. A Supercast feed, which keeps its key in the URL's path
-  rather than the query, was being listed.
-
-## [0.3.0] - 2026-09-11
-
-### Added
-
-- Add feed lists what other people on this server subscribe to, most subscribers first, and
-  subscribes you by id (`GET /api/popular`, `POST /api/popular/{id}`). Feeds from an OPML, and
-  feeds with a login or a key in their URL, are never listed.
-- Upload an OPML file to import, beside the paste box. The page checks it looks like OPML before
-  sending it and clears the picker afterwards.
-- Settings → Manage users: add and remove accounts, and choose who is an admin
-  (`GET`/`POST /api/users`, `PATCH`/`DELETE /api/users/{id}`).
-- Per-user subscriptions, and per-user read, starred and playback state. The existing library is
-  adopted by the admin on first start.
-- Subscribing to a feed someone else already has costs no second fetch and no second copy. Scanning
-  merges every subscriber's wants.
-- Delete on a shared feed reads **Delete for everyone**, and the server answers `409` while anyone
-  else has starred the item or not played it (`?force=true` overrides).
-- A shared feed's header says how many other people read it.
-- `docs/` for configuration, the CLI, users, SSO and architecture, and `CLAUDE.md` for anyone
-  working on the code.
-- Browser tests for OPML import and export by every route, user admin, unread ordering, and
-  `ipx import`/`ipx export`.
-
-### Changed
-
-- Feeds inside an OPML subscription list the ones with unread items first.
-- OPML import subscribes you to every feed in the file. `ipx import` subscribes the first admin.
-- OPML export lists only your own subscriptions.
-- Production runs as a Docker image pushed to `192.168.1.130:5000` and recreated with
-  `docker compose`.
-- This changelog follows Keep a Changelog. The long-form entries moved to `docs/history.md`.
-
-### Fixed
-
-- Importing another account's OPML export subscribed nobody and reported "Imported 0 feed(s)".
-  Feeds it added had no subscriber, so they were never scanned.
-- Importing something that is not OPML answered `500`. It is now `400` "that is not an OPML file",
-  refused before anything changes.
-- Starring stopped protecting a file from the quota and age sweeps once read state became per-user.
-
-### Security
-
-- The log is admin-only (`GET /api/logs` answers `403`, and the Log button is hidden). It names
-  every account, every feed and every failed sign-in.
-- OPML export no longer hands anyone signed in the whole catalogue, including other people's
-  private feed URLs.
-
-## [0.2.0] - 2026-09-10
-
-### Added
-
-- Web UI served by the daemon: plain HTML and JS compiled into the binary, with feeds, items,
-  filters, search, sanitised show notes and live progress over SSE.
-- Player bar with resume, speed, keyboard shortcuts and lock-screen controls.
-- Three-pane layout: feeds beside, items above, and the selected item's text and files below.
-- Phone layout.
-- Accounts and sign-in: Argon2id passwords, session cookies, `ipx user add|list|passwd|rm`, and a
-  trusted proxy header for Cloudflare Zero Trust or Authentik (`docs/sso.md`).
-- Subscribing to an OPML: it is re-read every scan and its feeds show as a folder. A feed dropped
-  from it is removed unless it has downloads.
-- Scheduling: a global interval with per-feed overrides (`every 30m`, `4h`, `1d`, `2w`).
-- `[general] media_types`, default audio and video, and `max_new_per_check`, default 3.
-- Every enclosure of an item, a View link for files that are not audio or video, and per-item
-  artwork.
-- In-app log view with Daemon I/O, Scans and HTTP tabs.
-- Mark all read on an OPML subscription.
-- Editable feed URL with a copy button.
-- Docker image whose healthcheck goes through the control socket.
-- The iPodderX name, icon, and a colour scheme taken from the icon.
-- `tests/page-smoke.js` and a Playwright browser suite.
-
-### Changed
-
-- Global settings and scan schedules are admin-only. The per-feed schedule picker is gone.
-- Feeds from an OPML live in the database, not `config.toml`.
-- Opening an item marks it read. Playing it marks it read only at the end or past 90%.
-- "Episodes" became "items", since half the library is text.
-- A burst of scan events causes one refresh, not one per feed.
-- All is the default filter. OPML import and export, Settings and Log moved out of the header.
-- Torrents run detached, two at a time.
-
-### Fixed
-
-- Download fetched the next queued episodes instead of the one clicked.
-- Pressing play made an item vanish from the Unread list.
-- Clearing a folder, schedule or cap from the UI did nothing.
-- The daemon ignored SIGTERM until the current download finished.
-- A missing function stopped the page script and left the whole UI dead.
-- One download painted progress on every pending row.
-- A torrent could freeze scanning for up to an hour.
-- Downloading from an OPML feed failed with "belongs to unsubscribed feed".
-- Image enclosures were downloaded, counted as episodes and given a play button.
-- A feed whose entries had been deleted stayed empty, because the server kept answering `304`.
-- An item with several enclosures kept only the last.
-- OPML folders rendered open by default.
-- Mark read in the text pane recursed until the stack overflowed.
-- The Unread, Downloaded and Flagged filters answered `500` without a search term.
-- An OPML subscription always showed 0 unread.
-- Folder names kept doubled spaces where separators were stripped.
-- Sidebar rows had four different left edges.
-
-### Security
-
-- The web UI needs a token or a sign-in. The token is compared in constant time, and an empty
-  token refuses to serve.
-- Show notes are sanitised with `ammonia`.
-- A proxy's user header is honoured only from an address in `trusted_proxies`.
-- A feed URL must be http(s), so `file:///etc/passwd` is refused.
-- Download folders are sanitised per path segment, so `../../etc/Show` cannot climb out.
-
-## [0.1.0] - 2026-09-09
-
-### Added
-
-- `ipx`, a Rust rewrite of the iPodderX engine: TOML config, SQLite state, and `ipx list`, `add`,
-  `rm` and `fetch`.
-- RSS and Atom parsing with conditional GET, `<ttl>` and basic auth.
-- Streaming downloads with explicit, keyword and per-scan filters, deduplicated by enclosure URL.
-- Quota and age retention that never touches a starred file, and `ipx reap [--dry-run]`.
-- `ipx daemon` with a JSON-lines Unix socket. CLI commands proxy to a running daemon.
-- Torrent enclosures through librqbit, seeding to a ratio or a time, with a stall timeout.
-- `ipx import` and `ipx export` for OPML, and systemd units in `contrib/`.
-
-[unreleased]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/compare/v0.5.3...main
-[0.5.3]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/compare/v0.5.2...v0.5.3
-[0.5.2]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/compare/v0.5.1...v0.5.2
-[0.5.1]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/compare/v0.5.0...v0.5.1
-[0.5.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0
-[0.4.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0
-[0.3.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/compare/v0.2.0...v0.3.0
-[0.2.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/compare/v0.1.0...v0.2.0
-[0.1.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipodderx-rs/releases/tag/v0.1.0

CLAUDE.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Working on ipodderx-rs
+# Working on ipx
 
 Notes for whoever picks this up next. Read [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) for how the
 thing is built; this file is about working on it without repeating mistakes that have already been
@@ -6,41 +6,99 @@ made here.
 
 ## Where things are
 
-Production is the `iPodderX` container on Tower (192.168.1.130), the `ipodderx` service of the
-Arcane project `content`: `/mnt/fast/arcane/projects/content/compose.yaml`. That file is what runs;
-`docker-compose.yml` in this repo is a copy, and editing it changes nothing in production.
+Production is the `iPX` container on Tower (192.168.1.130), the `ipx` service of the
+Arcane project `ipx`: `/mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml`. That file is what runs, and
+the containers of the split (#207) join it there. `docker-compose.yml` in this repo is a sample for
+others, ipx alone on SQLite; editing it changes nothing in production. Until 2026-10-12 ipx was a
+service of the `content` project, beside audiobookshelf, immich and Plex (#208).
 
 | | Host | In the container |
 |---|---|---|
-| Image | `192.168.1.130:5000/ipodderx:latest` | |
-| Config | `/mnt/fast/appdata/ipodderx/config.toml` | `/config/config.toml` |
-| Database | `/mnt/user/ipodderx/state.db` | `/data/state.db` |
-| Downloads | `/mnt/user/ipodderx/downloads` | `/downloads` |
-| Web UI | `192.168.1.130:8099`, also `ipodderx.sdf1.net` via a Cloudflare tunnel | `0.0.0.0:8099` |
-| Sign-in via the tunnel | Cloudflare Access app `ipodderx`, with Authentik as its identity provider; see [docs/sso.md](docs/sso.md) | trusts `Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` from `192.168.16.1`, the `content_default` gateway |
+| Image | `192.168.1.130:5000/ipx:latest` | |
+| Config | `/mnt/fast/appdata/ipx/config.toml`: bind address, token, trusted proxies, torrent, paths. The feeds and server settings are in the database | `/config/config.toml` |
+| Database | Postgres 18, database `ipodderx`, login `ipodderx`, on the `postgres` container of the Arcane project `databases` (`192.168.1.130:5433`). The URL is in `ipx.env` beside the compose file (`/mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/ipx.env`, mode 600), passed to the container as `IPX_DATABASE_URL`. A relative `env_file`: Arcane runs compose in its own container, where `/mnt/fast/appdata` does not exist | |
+| Old database | `/mnt/user/ipx/state.db`, SQLite, used until the move to Postgres on 2026-09-18 and kept for rollback | `/data/state.db` |
+| Downloads | `/mnt/user/ipx/downloads` | `/downloads` |
+| Directory | `ipx-directory` in the same project, `192.168.1.130:8100`, public at `directory.ipxreader.app` through the tunnel with no Access in front: its pages are anyone's to browse, read only (#215), and its API (`/v1`) takes a token for everything. Until 2026-10-12 it was `ipx-dir.sdf1.net` (#214). Config `/mnt/fast/appdata/ipx-directory/directory.toml` (token hashes; Tower's own token in `tower.token` beside it, and entered in ipx's Admin, Directory, which keeps it in the database's `settings`), database `ipx_directory` on the same Postgres, URL in `directory.env` beside the compose file. See [docs/directory.md](docs/directory.md) | `/config/directory.toml` |
+| Home page | `ipxreader.app` (and `www`): a static page from `site/`, on the Cloudflare Pages project `ipxreader`, not on Tower. See below | |
+| Web UI | `ipx-web` (Caddy) in the same project, at `192.168.1.130:8099`, also `ipodderx.sdf1.net` via a Cloudflare tunnel. It serves the page and passes `/api` and `/media` to ipx, whose own port is published nowhere; its address on `ipx_default` is pinned to `192.168.64.10` (#203) | ipx `0.0.0.0:8099`, Caddy `:8080` |
+| Sign-in via the tunnel | Cloudflare Access app `ipodderx`, with Authentik as its identity provider; see [docs/sso.md](docs/sso.md) | Caddy passes `Cf-Access-*` only from `192.168.64.1`, the `ipx_default` gateway cloudflared arrives from (`TUNNEL_PEER`; the subnet is pinned in the compose file); ipx trusts them only from Caddy, `192.168.64.10`, and only with a valid `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` (`access_team`, `access_aud`) |
+
+Work to do lives in the Gitea issues at https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/issues, not in a
+`TODO.md`. `/src/tea` is logged in: `/src/tea issues list --login git.sdf1.net --repo rays/ipx`.
+
+**Every problem found gets an issue, before it is fixed.** A bug, a gap or a security hole turned
+up along the way (reading logs, a review, a test that fails for another reason) is filed as soon
+as it is found, even if it is fixed a minute later, so there is a record of what was wrong and
+when. Name the issue in the commit that fixes it (`(#40)` in the subject). Once the fix is on
+`main` and pushed, comment on the issue with what changed and the commit, then close it:
+
+```sh
+R="--login git.sdf1.net --repo rays/ipx"
+t() { timeout 30 /src/tea "$@" < /dev/null; }
+t issues create $R -t "Web token printed in the startup log" -L bug -d "What is wrong, where, how it was found."
+t comment $R 40 "Fixed in 3625cf4: the startup line says where the token is kept, not what it is. Deployed in 0.8.3."
+t issues close $R 40
+```
+
+**Give tea a closed stdin and a timeout**, as `t` does. Without a terminal, `tea comment` waits on
+stdin and never exits; a script closing seven issues sat hung for a day on the second (#39).
+
+Labels: `bug` for something wrong, `enhancement` for something missing. A problem found and left
+for later stays open, and that is how it gets picked up again.
 
 Deploying a change is: build and push the image, then pull it and recreate the container.
 
 ```sh
-docker buildx build --tag 192.168.1.130:5000/ipodderx:latest . --push
-docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/content/compose.yaml pull ipodderx
-docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/content/compose.yaml up -d ipodderx
-docker logs --tail 20 iPodderX
+docker buildx build --tag 192.168.1.130:5000/ipx:latest . --push
+docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml pull ipx
+docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml up -d ipx
+docker logs --tail 20 iPX
 ```
 
-**Name the service.** A bare `up -d` recreates every container in `content`, beets and immich
-included. Run `pull` before `up`, because `up` reuses whatever `latest` the host already has.
+The directory is the same, with its own image:
+
+```sh
+docker buildx build -f Dockerfile.directory --tag 192.168.1.130:5000/ipx-directory:latest . --push
+docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml pull ipx-directory
+docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml up -d ipx-directory
+```
+
+And the page, `ipx-web`, the same again; a change to `web/` alone needs only this one:
+
+```sh
+docker buildx build -f Dockerfile.web --tag 192.168.1.130:5000/ipx-web:latest . --push
+docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml pull ipx-web
+docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml up -d ipx-web
+```
+
+The home page (`site/`, #216) is not on Tower. `sh site/build.sh` puts it in `site/dist` with the
+typeface, logo and icon from `web/`, and it goes to the Cloudflare Pages project `ipxreader` by
+direct upload, since there is no wrangler login here: hash each file as wrangler does (BLAKE3 of
+its base64 contents plus its extension, the first 32 hex digits, with the `blake3-wasm` package),
+ask the project for an upload token (`GET .../pages/projects/ipxreader/upload-token`), send the
+files to `/pages/assets/upload` with that token, then create a deployment
+(`POST .../pages/projects/ipxreader/deployments`) with the manifest of paths and hashes and
+`_headers`. Its screenshots (`site/shots`) come from a scratch iPX on public feeds, never
+production's, which would show whose subscriptions are whose.
+
+Testing sign-in from Tower itself proves nothing about the tunnel: Tower's own requests reach the
+published port as `192.168.1.130`, and Caddy rightly strips their `Cf-Access-*`. Send them from a
+container on another network, as cloudflared's are (#209).
+
+**Name the service.** A bare `up -d` recreates every container in the project, which once the
+split lands means the frontend and directory too. Run `pull` before `up`, because `up` reuses whatever `latest` the host already has.
 
 **A build that fails with `429 Too Many Requests` on a base image** is Docker Hub rate-limiting
-this host. There is no Docker Hub login here, and the build asks about `debian:bookworm-slim` and
-`rust:1-slim-bookworm` every time unless they are already stored locally. Pull them from Google's
+this host. There is no Docker Hub login here, and the build asks about `debian:trixie-slim` and
+`rust:1-slim-trixie` every time unless they are already stored locally. Pull them from Google's
 mirror and tag them; the build then uses the local copies without asking Docker Hub:
 
 ```sh
-docker pull mirror.gcr.io/library/debian:bookworm-slim
-docker tag mirror.gcr.io/library/debian:bookworm-slim debian:bookworm-slim
-docker pull mirror.gcr.io/library/rust:1-slim-bookworm
-docker tag mirror.gcr.io/library/rust:1-slim-bookworm rust:1-slim-bookworm
+docker pull mirror.gcr.io/library/debian:trixie-slim
+docker tag mirror.gcr.io/library/debian:trixie-slim debian:trixie-slim
+docker pull mirror.gcr.io/library/rust:1-slim-trixie
+docker tag mirror.gcr.io/library/rust:1-slim-trixie rust:1-slim-trixie
 ```
 
 Run those again now and then, or the local copies go stale.
@@ -53,23 +111,51 @@ container restarts on its own after a reboot.
 
 Before the container, ipx ran by hand in code-server, with its files in `/config/.config/ipx/` and
 `/config/.local/share/ipx/`. Those are still there and the container does not read them. If you run
-a daemon by hand for testing, stop it with **`pkill -x ipx`, never `pkill -f ipx`**. `-f` matches
-the shell running the command and kills the session (exit 144). This has happened more than once.
+a daemon by hand for testing, **stop it by its own PID**: start it with `& echo $! > pid` and
+`kill $(cat pid)`. Never `pkill -x ipx`: Tower sees the container's processes, so it kills
+production's daemon as well (issue #38). Never `pkill -f ipx` either: `-f` matches the shell
+running the command and kills the session (exit 144), which has happened more than once.
 
 ## Before you touch the page
 
-`web/index.html` is `include_str!`d into the binary, so **every page change needs a rebuild** before
-it is visible. It is one file: markup, CSS and script.
+There are three pages: the app (`web/index.html`), the admin page (`web/admin.html`, sent to
+admins only) and sign-in (`web/login.html`). The app and admin pages share one stylesheet,
+`web/app.css`, and their script is TypeScript in `web/src/`; `web/build.mjs` lists which files
+make up each page's script. The page is its own image, **`ipx-web`** (#203): `web/build.mjs` uses
+swc to strip the types and minify each script (`app.js`, `admin.js`, `login.js`), minifies the
+pages, and puts them with the icons and typeface in `web/dist`, which Caddy serves
+(`web/Caddyfile`, `Dockerfile.web`), passing `/api` and `/media` to ipx on the same origin. ipx
+serves no page. The page loads its script as `/app.js?v=<hash of its contents>`, and `/app.css`
+and `/boot.js` the same way: the page is served `no-cache` and those `immutable`, so a browser
+keeps them until a deploy changes them and their names. So **every page change needs ipx-web
+rebuilt and deployed**, not ipx, and building needs node and `npm ci` run once.
+
+Caddy asks ipx before it serves a page (`forward_auth`): `/api/page-check` sends a browser that is
+not signed in to `/login` and anyone but an admin away from `/admin` (and refuses them
+`/admin.js`); `/api/login-check` sends someone Cloudflare Access vouches for past the form; a page
+asked for with `?token=` goes to `/api/signin`, which sets the cookie. The page is the same file
+for everyone, so what ipx used to write into it per person is the page's own job now:
+`web/boot.js`, in `<head>`, puts the theme from its cookie and an admin's link from the last visit
+on the page before the first frame, and `/api/me` brings the rest (version, the account's old
+theme).
+
+The files in `web/src` are not modules. They are one script split up, concatenated in the order
+`web/build.mjs` lists them, sharing one top-level scope as the single inline script did; a new
+file goes into that list. Top-level names are kept as they are, because markup calls some by
+name (`onclick="closeModal()"`) and the browser tests reach others through `page.evaluate`.
 
 After any edit to it:
 
 ```sh
+npx tsc -p .
 node tests/page-smoke.js
 ```
 
-That loads the script against a stub DOM and checks every selector it wires at load actually
-exists. It exists because a patch once anchored on a deleted function, `String.replace` silently
-matched nothing, and the whole UI died with a `ReferenceError` while every server-side test passed.
+The first type-checks `web/src` (loosely: `strict` is off, and `$` returns `any`). The second
+builds the page as shipped and runs its script against a stub DOM, checking every selector it
+wires at load actually exists. That check exists because a patch once anchored on a deleted
+function, `String.replace` silently matched nothing, and the whole UI died with a
+`ReferenceError` while every server-side test passed.
 
 Patching that file by guessing an anchor string has failed repeatedly. Read the exact block first
 (`sed -n 'START,ENDp'`), match it verbatim, and assert the replacement happened rather than hoping.
@@ -77,9 +163,13 @@ Patching that file by guessing an anchor string has failed repeatedly. Read the
 ## Tests
 
 ```sh
-cargo test                # ~51 tests: parsing, filters, retention, schedules, SQL, per-user state
+cargo test                # ~80 tests: parsing, filters, retention, schedules, SQL, per-user state
+npx tsc -p .              # type-checks web/src
 node tests/page-smoke.js
-npx playwright test       # 16 browser tests against a real daemon on fixture feeds
+node tests/native-bridge.js  # the page hands playback to a native shell
+node tests/contrast.js    # every theme's palette against WCAG AA
+npx playwright test       # 66 browser tests against a real daemon on fixture feeds
+node tests/load/run.js    # k6: many people at once against a scratch daemon with 1,500 feeds
 ```
 
 Things about the browser suite that have cost time:
@@ -96,6 +186,31 @@ Things about the browser suite that have cost time:
 * `webServer` starts **before** `globalSetup`, which is why the fixture config is written at
   config-load time instead.
 
+The load tests (`tests/load`, issue #133) are for what one browser cannot show: twenty-five people
+browsing at once, a hundred players saving positions while a scan writes, fifty listeners
+seeking through files, a flood of wrong passwords. Things about them:
+
+* They need **k6**, which `/src/install.sh` installs from k6's own signed apt repository, and they
+  build and run a **release** binary: Argon2 in a debug build takes about a second a sign-in,
+  which would measure the build.
+* `run.js` serves the feeds itself, generated, and starts **its own daemon** under
+  `/tmp/ipx-load`, wiped each run, on ports 8793 and 8794, so it can run beside the browser suite.
+  It stops that daemon by its PID. People sign in by the `X-Load-User` header, trusted from
+  127.0.0.1, as production trusts Cloudflare Access's; only the sign-in test uses a password.
+* Each threshold is a budget well above what the request takes now: it is there to catch a query
+  that has started asking once per feed, or writers queueing on a lock, not a slow minute.
+* `ipx status`, the Docker healthcheck, runs every second throughout, and a run fails if one takes
+  the healthcheck's 5s.
+* One at a time: `node tests/load/run.js signin`. All four take about six minutes.
+* The daemon is on **SQLite** unless `--postgres`, which puts it in `IPX_TEST_DATABASE_URL`, in
+  a schema of its own (`ipx_load`) dropped and made again each run. That URL, in `/src/.envrc`, is
+  `ipodderx_test` on the `databases` project's server, production's, as `ipodderx`, taken from
+  `ipx.env`; the harness refuses a database whose name does not end in `_test`. Postgres's
+  numbers are what production would see, and a run loads the server production's database is on,
+  so not while someone is using iPX in earnest. Each budget has a value for each database.
+* The Rust tests run on Postgres with the same URL: `. /src/.envrc && cargo test`. Each test
+  makes a schema `ipxt_<pid>_<n>`, and the next run drops those an earlier one left.
+
 Non-trivial logic leaves one runnable check behind. Pure functions (`merge_policy`, `pick`,
 `matches_keywords`, `parse_interval`) are the easiest place to put it.
 
@@ -105,10 +220,18 @@ Non-trivial logic leaves one runnable check behind. Pure functions (`merge_polic
   subscriber. Two feeds publishing the same URL means only the first one scanned shows it.
 * **Read state lives in `entry_state`, per user, and nowhere else.** `entries` had `read`, `flagged`
   and `position` columns from before accounts; two bugs came from queries still reading them
-  (retention, and the entry pruner), and `migrate()` now drops them.
-* **The catalogue is config.toml; the subscriptions are in the database.** A feed exists once;
+  (retention, and the entry pruner), and they were dropped in 0.5.
+* **The catalogue and the server settings are in the database, not config.toml** (issue #18):
+  tables `catalogue` (each feed's `config::Feed` as JSON) and `settings` (`general`:
+  `config::Stored`). ipx still runs from one in-memory `Config`, config.toml for where things are
+  and who gets in, the database for the rest (`assemble_config`); a change goes through
+  `Ctx::store_cfg`, never a write to the file. The first start on a database without them imports
+  config.toml's and trims the file, keeping `config.toml.pre-database`. A feed exists once;
   `subscriptions(user_id, feed_id)` says who wants it and with what settings. OPML children are
-  derived and never written to config.
+  derived and never in the catalogue.
+* **Postgres connections ask for no notices** (`client_min_messages=warning`, `db::url_for`).
+  Postgres sends one for every `CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS` on something existing, sqlx logs each,
+  and tracing-subscriber's per-layer filters then dropped the next line ipx logged.
 * **One fetch serves everyone**, so scan policy is a union of subscribers' wants (`merge_policy`).
   Anyone wanting an item is enough to fetch it.
 * **The UI hiding a control is not enforcement.** Admin-only actions check `user.is_admin` in the
@@ -117,13 +240,24 @@ Non-trivial logic leaves one runnable check behind. Pure functions (`merge_polic
   watch the shutdown channel itself; the daemon ignored SIGTERM for exactly this reason.
 * Only one daemon per socket. Removing the socket file defeats the guard and you get two daemons
   fighting over the database, with the stale one still holding the port.
+* **The Grafana dashboard reads the log's fields** (`grafana/dashboard.py`). Production logs JSON
+  (`IPX_LOG_FORMAT=json`); the access log's `method`, `path`, `route`, `status`, `duration_ms` and
+  the events' `ev`, `feed`, `new`, `bytes`, `msg` (`log_event` in ipc.rs) are what the panels query.
+  Rename one and its panels go blank without an error; regenerate the dashboard to match.
 * `/api/settings` answering `200` does **not** mean the daemon is well — the web server is a
   different task. `ipx status` checks the control socket and the database; to see the worker
   getting through its jobs, watch for `scan complete` in the log.
-* **Every `ipx` command runs `migrate()` when it opens the database**, the healthcheck's
-  `ipx status` included. A migration that rewrites a big table (`DROP COLUMN`) takes seconds on
-  production, and a command run meanwhile fails with `migrating schema`. It changes nothing; wait
-  for `daemon started` in the log. Copy `state.db` aside before deploying one.
+* **The database goes through SeaORM, and the entities in `crates/ipx/src/entity.rs` are the schema.**
+  `Db::open` creates any missing table or index from them (`create_missing`), on every `ipx`
+  command, the healthcheck's `ipx status` included, so it must never write when nothing is
+  missing: SeaORM's experimental schema sync dropped and remade an index on every open, the
+  write lock that took made `ipx status` time out behind a busy daemon, and it was removed for
+  it. A new column on an existing table needs its own `ALTER`; nothing adds one for you. Look for
+  the column first and alter only when it is missing, as `feeds.description` does.
+* **SQL written by hand in `db.rs` has to run on SQLite and Postgres both** (issue #18): `$1`
+  parameters, bound only if used; `ON CONFLICT`, not `INSERT OR IGNORE`; yes/no columns tested
+  as themselves (`NOT coalesce(s.read, false)`) and written as `true`/`false`, never compared to
+  1; no `rowid`, `GLOB` or `UPDATE OR IGNORE`. `Args` in `db.rs` builds the parameters.
 
 ## House style
 
@@ -131,23 +265,71 @@ Comments explain **why**, not what. If a line looks odd, the comment says what w
 it. No emoji, no exclamation marks, no "obviously". Prose in the UI and docs is plain English and
 addressed to the person using it.
 
-Every change gets one line under `## [Unreleased]` in [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md), in its
-[Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/) group: Added, Changed, Deprecated,
-Removed, Fixed or Security. Say it the way someone using ipx would notice it. When there is more to
-say, such as what was wrong before or what it cost to find out, write it up at the top of
-[docs/history.md](docs/history.md), dated. That record has been more useful than the git log more
-than once.
+Every change gets one line under `## [Unreleased]` in the changelog of the service it changes, in
+its [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/) group: Added, Changed, Deprecated,
+Removed, Fixed or Security. One changelog a service: [crates/ipx/CHANGELOG.md](crates/ipx/CHANGELOG.md)
+(the daemon and its API; until 0.12.0 everything), [web/CHANGELOG.md](web/CHANGELOG.md) (the page
+and ipx-web) and [crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md](crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md) (ipx-directory). A
+change to more than one gets a line in each, each saying what that service does differently. The
+monitoring (the Grafana dashboard, the prod-check skill) and the repository's own tooling are not
+a service anyone uses and get no line. Say it the way someone using ipx would notice it. When there is more to
+say, such as what was wrong before or what it cost to find out, it goes in the commit message's
+body, where `git log` and `git blame` find it beside the change. (There was a long-form
+`docs/history.md` until 0.7.0; it grew too large to be useful and was removed. It is in git.)
 
-Cutting a release: rename `[Unreleased]` to `## [X.Y.Z] - YYYY-MM-DD` and open a new empty
-`[Unreleased]` above it, bump `version` in `Cargo.toml`, tag the commit `vX.Y.Z`, and update the
-compare links at the bottom of the changelog.
+Each service has its own version and is released on its own, when its changelog has something to
+release:
+
+| service | version in | changelog | tag |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| ipx | `crates/ipx/Cargo.toml` | `crates/ipx/CHANGELOG.md` | `vX.Y.Z`, as every release before the split |
+| ipx-directory | `crates/directory/Cargo.toml` | `crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md` | `directory-vX.Y.Z` |
+| ipx-web, the page | `package.json` | `web/CHANGELOG.md` | `web-vX.Y.Z` |
+
+`crates/feed` is a library the two Rust services build in, not released (`0.0.0`); a change to it
+is a line in the changelog of each service it changes. The page shows ipx's version and its own in
+the logo's tooltip; the directory logs its own at start; each binary answers `--version`.
+
+Cutting a release of one: first read its `[Unreleased]` against its last release, not line by
+line, and rewrite it as what changed between the two. Lines go in as the work happens, so they
+record the way there: a feature added and then reworked in the same release is one line saying
+what it is now, under Added; something added and taken out again before the release, or a fix for
+a bug no release ever had, is not there at all; and "instead of" and "no longer" compare with the
+last release, not with last week. Issue numbers stay, all of them, on the line that survives. Then
+rename `[Unreleased]` to `## [X.Y.Z] - YYYY-MM-DD` and open a new empty `[Unreleased]` above it,
+set the service's version to `X.Y.Z` (dropping `-dev`), tag the commit with the service's tag, and
+update the compare links at the bottom of its changelog. Push the commit and the tag, build and
+deploy the service's image, then `sh scripts/release.sh ipx|directory|web` makes the Gitea
+release: that version's changelog section as its notes, and a tarball of what the image runs (the
+binary, or the page's files with the Caddyfile) attached, checked to be that version. Then, in the
+next commit, set its version
+to the next patch with `-dev` (after 0.9.0, `0.9.1-dev`), so a build between releases says so
+instead of claiming to be the last release. The release that follows can still be a minor or major
+one; `-dev` only says the work comes after `X.Y.Z`. A service never released is at `0.1.0-dev`,
+working towards its first release, `0.1.0`.
+
+**Traces first, logs second.** Anything that does work (a service, a handler, a job, a call to
+another service) gets spans, and passes `traceparent` on to whatever it calls, so one trace in
+Tempo follows a request or a job across ipx-web, ipx and the directory. A trace shows where the
+time went and what called what; a log line only that something happened. Log what a trace cannot
+carry: events worth counting on the dashboard, warnings and errors. A new service or route without
+traces is not finished.
 
 Deliberate simplifications get a `ponytail:` comment naming the ceiling and the upgrade path, e.g.
 `// ponytail: global connection mutex, move to a pool if feed count makes it contend`.
 
 ## Known gaps
 
-* Cloudflare's `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` is not verified — ipx trusts the hop plus `trusted_proxies`
-  (documented in [docs/sso.md](docs/sso.md)).
-* A feed's `<description>` subtitle is dropped whenever `content:encoded` exists, which loses
-  Substack-style subtitles.
+* They are the open issues in Gitea, not a list here: a limitation known and left in place is an
+  issue left open.
+
+<!-- rtk-instructions v2 -->
+# Command output
+
+Command output here is condensed to save tokens, keeping every signal and
+dropping costly noise. Treat it as the complete result: run commands
+normally, and batch related commands into one call to avoid extra turns.
+Truncated results state their recovery path in their own output. Re-run a
+command as `rtk proxy <cmd>` only when its result is unusable: empty when
+output was clearly expected, contradicting its exit code, or garbled.
+<!-- /rtk-instructions -->

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
-[package]
-name = "ipx"
-version = "0.5.3"
+[workspace]
+members = ["crates/ipx", "crates/feed", "crates/directory"]
+resolver = "3"
+
+# Each service has its own version, in its own Cargo.toml (ipx, ipx-directory) or package.json
+# (the page), released and tagged on its own; see CLAUDE.md.
+[workspace.package]
 edition = "2024"
 
-[dependencies]
+[workspace.dependencies]
+ipx-feed = { path = "crates/feed" }
+ipx-directory = { path = "crates/directory" }
 ammonia = "4.1.4"
 anyhow = "1.0.104"
 argon2 = "0.6.0"
@@ -12,19 +18,25 @@ axum = "0.8.9"
 chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["std", "clock"] }
 clap = { version = "4.6.6", features = ["derive"] }
 futures-util = { version = "0.3.34", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
+jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.1.0", default-features = false, features = ["aws_lc_rs"] }
 librqbit = { version = "9.0.1", default-features = false, features = ["rust-tls", "http-api-client"] }
+opentelemetry = { version = "0.33", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }
+opentelemetry-otlp = { version = "0.33", default-features = false, features = ["trace", "http-proto", "reqwest-blocking-client"] }
+opentelemetry_sdk = { version = "0.33", default-features = false, features = ["trace"] }
 opml = "1.1.6"
 percent-encoding = "2.3.2"
-quick-xml = "0.42.0"
+quick-xml = { version = "0.42.0", features = ["escape-html"] }
 reqwest = { version = "0.13.5", default-features = false, features = ["rustls", "http2", "gzip", "stream", "json", "charset", "system-proxy"] }
 rss = "2.1.1"
-rusqlite = { version = "0.40.2", features = ["bundled"] }
+sea-orm = { version = "2.0.3", default-features = false, features = ["sqlx-sqlite", "sqlx-postgres", "runtime-tokio-rustls", "macros", "with-json", "sqlite-use-returning-for-3_35"] }
 serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = "1.0.151"
-tokio = { version = "1.53.1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "fs", "io-util", "net", "sync", "time", "signal"] }
+sha2 = "0.10.9"
+tokio = { version = "1.53.1", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "fs", "io-util", "net", "sync", "time", "signal", "process"] }
 toml = "1.1.5"
 tower = { version = "0.5.3", features = ["util"] }
 tower-http = { version = "0.7.1", features = ["fs"] }
 tracing = "0.1.44"
-tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3.23", features = ["env-filter"] }
+tracing-opentelemetry = { version = "0.34", default-features = false }
+tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3.23", features = ["env-filter", "json"] }
 url = "2.5.8"

Dockerfile

@@ -1,25 +1,33 @@
 # Build. rusqlite is bundled (compiles SQLite from source) and librqbit needs a C
 # toolchain, so the builder needs cc. TLS is rustls throughout, so no OpenSSL headers.
-FROM rust:1-slim-bookworm AS build
+# The pages are ipx-web's (Dockerfile.web), so no node here (#203).
+FROM rust:1-slim-trixie AS build
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
         build-essential \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 WORKDIR /src
 
-# Dependencies first, so editing the source does not rebuild librqbit every time.
+# Dependencies first, so editing the source does not rebuild librqbit every time: each crate of
+# the workspace as an empty stub, its manifest real.
 COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
-RUN mkdir src && echo 'fn main(){}' > src/main.rs \
-    && cargo build --release --locked \
-    && rm -rf src
+COPY crates/ipx/Cargo.toml crates/ipx/
+COPY crates/feed/Cargo.toml crates/feed/
+COPY crates/directory/Cargo.toml crates/directory/
+RUN mkdir -p crates/ipx/src crates/feed/src crates/directory/src \
+    && echo 'fn main(){}' > crates/ipx/src/main.rs && touch crates/feed/src/lib.rs \
+    && echo 'fn main(){}' > crates/directory/src/main.rs && touch crates/directory/src/lib.rs \
+    && cargo build --release --locked -p ipx \
+    && rm -rf crates/ipx/src crates/feed/src crates/directory/src
 
-COPY src ./src
-COPY web ./web
+COPY crates ./crates
 # cargo skips a rebuild if mtimes look untouched; make sure it does not.
-RUN touch src/main.rs && cargo build --release --locked
+RUN touch crates/ipx/src/main.rs crates/feed/src/lib.rs && cargo build --release --locked -p ipx
 
-FROM debian:bookworm-slim
+FROM debian:trixie-slim
+# ffmpeg is DeadAir's (#171): it finds the silences and copies the frames kept. Debian's adds
+# about 480 MB, once: the layer stays cached until the base image changes.
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-        ca-certificates gosu \
+        ca-certificates gosu ffmpeg \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 COPY --from=build /src/target/release/ipx /usr/local/bin/ipx
 COPY docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/

Dockerfile.directory

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# ipx-directory (#204). Built from the repo's root: docker buildx build -f Dockerfile.directory .
+# No node here: only ipx's own build runs web/build.mjs.
+FROM rust:1-slim-trixie AS build
+# SQLite is compiled from source for sqlx, which needs a C toolchain.
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends build-essential \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+WORKDIR /src
+# Every member of the workspace, since cargo reads them all to build one.
+# ponytail: no dependency layer, so each build compiles sea-orm again; add the stub trick from
+# the main Dockerfile if builds get slow enough to matter.
+COPY Cargo.toml Cargo.lock ./
+COPY crates ./crates
+# The logo and icon the public pages serve (#215), compiled into the binary.
+COPY web/logo.svg web/logo-dark.svg web/favicon.png ./web/
+RUN cargo build --release --locked -p ipx-directory
+
+FROM debian:trixie-slim
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+COPY --from=build /src/target/release/ipx-directory /usr/local/bin/ipx-directory
+ENV DIRECTORY_CONFIG=/config/directory.toml
+# Unraid's nobody:users. It writes nothing to disk: the database is elsewhere.
+USER 99:100
+EXPOSE 8100
+CMD ["ipx-directory"]

Dockerfile.web

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# ipx-web (#203): the frontend, built from web/ and served by Caddy, which passes the API to ipx.
+# Built from the repo's root: docker buildx build -f Dockerfile.web .
+FROM node:22-slim AS build
+WORKDIR /src
+COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
+RUN npm ci --omit=dev
+COPY web ./web
+RUN node web/build.mjs /dist
+
+FROM caddy:2
+COPY web/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
+COPY --from=build /dist /srv
+EXPOSE 8080

README.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# ipodderx-rs
+# ipx
 
 A self-hosted podcatcher for a household. It checks your feeds, downloads the episodes, and serves
 a web UI modelled on the 2004 Mac app **iPodderX**, for any number of people sharing one copy of
@@ -9,19 +9,19 @@ behind iPodderX (2004-2008, Ray Slakinski & August Trometer).
 
 ## What it does
 
-- **The web UI.** It has a toolbar, and a feed list that opens with Directory, Popular and All
+- **The web UI.** It has a toolbar, and a feed list that opens with the Directory, Currently Listening and All
   Subscriptions. Items sit in a sortable table with a Files pane, and there is a player bar. It
   comes in Dark, Light and Classic themes, and works on a phone.
-- **Several people, one copy.** Each person has their own subscriptions and their own read, kept
+- **Several people, one copy.** Each person has their own subscriptions and their own read, pinned
   and playback state. There is one file on disk per episode, however many people want it. People
   sign in with a password or through a proxy (Cloudflare Zero Trust or Authentik), and admins
   manage accounts and settings.
 - **Scanning.** Feeds are checked on a schedule, globally or per feed, and a feed's own TTL is
-  honoured. Keyword, explicit-content and media-type filters decide what is downloaded, with a cap
-  on new downloads per scan.
+  honoured. Keyword, explicit-content and media-type filters decide what is downloaded, with a limit
+  on how many of a feed's newest episodes are downloaded.
 - **Downloads.** Files come over HTTP or BitTorrent and are filed into a folder per feed.
   Retention deletes the oldest files to stay under a disk quota or an age limit, and never touches
-  an item someone has kept.
+  an item someone has pinned.
 - **OPML.** You can import and export your own subscriptions. You can also subscribe to an OPML
   URL, which keeps a whole list in step as a folder.
 
@@ -30,12 +30,14 @@ behind iPodderX (2004-2008, Ray Slakinski & August Trometer).
 With Docker:
 
 ```sh
-docker build -t ipodderx .
+docker build -t ipx .
+docker build -f Dockerfile.web -t ipx-web .
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 
-`docker-compose.yml` is set up for the author's own server. Point its `image` and its three volumes
-(`/config`, `/data` and `/downloads`) at yours first. The UI is on port 8099. BitTorrent uses 6881
+`docker-compose.yml` is a sample: ipx, with its database in SQLite and its three volumes
+(`/config`, `/data` and `/downloads`) in folders beside the file, and ipx-web, the page, served by
+Caddy in front of it. Change them to suit. The UI is on port 8099. BitTorrent uses 6881
 over TCP and UDP. Files are written as `PUID`/`PGID`, 99:100 by default.
 
 From source:
@@ -62,8 +64,7 @@ The UI is plain HTTP, so put TLS in front of it if it is reachable from outside
 | [docs/users.md](docs/users.md) | Accounts, and what several people share |
 | [docs/sso.md](docs/sso.md) | Signing in through Cloudflare Zero Trust or Authentik |
 | [docs/architecture.md](docs/architecture.md) | How it works: modules, schema, control socket, HTTP API |
-| [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) | What changed, by release |
-| [docs/history.md](docs/history.md) | How it was built, with what was wrong and why |
+| [crates/ipx/CHANGELOG.md](crates/ipx/CHANGELOG.md), [web/CHANGELOG.md](web/CHANGELOG.md), [crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md](crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md) | What changed, by release, for ipx, the page and the directory |
 | [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md) | Notes for working on the code, including how production is deployed |
 
 ## Tests
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ The UI is plain HTTP, so put TLS in front of it if it is reachable from outside
 ```sh
 cargo test                # the engine: parsing, filters, retention, schedules, SQL, per-user state
 node tests/page-smoke.js  # the page script loads without throwing
+node tests/native-bridge.js  # the page hands playback to a native shell
 npx playwright test       # a real browser against a real daemon on fixture feeds
 ```
 

TODO.md

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-# To do
-
-## Errors in the log
-
-From the production log and the feeds' stored errors on 2026-09-13. The Docker log only reached back
-to 12:32 UTC, so the list comes from `feeds.last_error`: 57 of 1,059 feeds. None of it is ipx's
-User-Agent; a browser gets the same answers.
-
-- [x] **Stop scanning an OPML's feeds once nobody subscribes to it.** 55 of the 57 are feeds from
-  `davewiner` (lists.opml.org/davefeeds.xml). The list left `config.toml` about 14 hours before this
-  was written, but its 922 feeds are still in the database and still scanned every hour, with
-  auto-download on: `subscriptions()` adds every derived feed, and with no parent to copy from,
-  `auto_download` falls back to `true` (`src/main.rs:937`). `docs/users.md` says a feed stops being
-  scanned when its last subscriber leaves. Skip a derived feed whose parent is not in config, and
-  when the last subscriber leaves an OPML, treat its feeds the way `sync_group` treats ones the list
-  dropped: remove those with nothing downloaded, mark the rest orphaned. `remove_feed` and `ipx rm`
-  both leave them behind today. (`src/main.rs`, `src/web.rs`)
-- [x] **Read feeds with a bare `&`.** kcpw has `<link>https://kcpw.org/?post_type=post&p=125715</link>`,
-  and both feedland feeds have the same fault. Strict XML refuses them; browsers and other readers do
-  not. When `feed::parse` fails, try once more with every `&` that does not start an entity written
-  as `&amp;`. Nobody subscribes to these three now, but the next feed like them will fail the same
-  way. (`src/feed.rs`)
-- [x] **Say what came back when it is not a feed.** Thirteen errors read "not RSS (the input did not
-  begin with an rss tag) and not Atom (...)". Each one checked was a web page: the feed moved and its
-  old URL redirects to the site, or the domain lapsed. Say "got a web page, not a feed", and when the
-  page links a feed (`<link rel="alternate" type="application/rss+xml">`), name it. That link found
-  the new feed for om.co, ms.now, Letters of Note, the Daily Dot, Hell Gate, The Frame Lab and
-  Daily Kos. A `202` with an empty body (British Antarctic Survey) should read as "nothing yet", not
-  as a parse failure. (`src/feed.rs`)
-- [x] **Show a publisher's error in the UI.** Today a failing feed shows its raw error in red only
-  once you open it (`web/index.html:877`, `:960`); the OPML view marks a failing child "error"
-  (`:988`), and the sidebar shows nothing. Mark a failing feed in the sidebar too, and say whose
-  problem it is and what to do, in plain words: a 404 means the publisher took the feed down or moved
-  it, 401 and 403 that the site refuses ipx, 402 that the feed needs a paid plan, a name that no
-  longer resolves that the site is gone, and a web page instead of a feed that it moved (with the new
-  URL when the page links one). Offer Unsubscribe, or Use the new address. Keep timeouts, 5xx and
-  429 out of it, and flag a feed only once it has failed for a day: macmanx failed once and read
-  fine an hour later. That needs the time a feed started failing, kept beside `last_error` and
-  cleared when a check succeeds. (`web/index.html`, `src/db.rs`, `src/main.rs`)
-- [ ] **Westenberg.** The only failing feed anyone subscribes to. The Hacker News stars list still
-  gives `joanwestenberg.com/rss`, which is a 404; the feed is now `joanwestenberg.com/feed`.
-  Nothing for ipx to fix; subscribe to the new URL directly.
-
-## Other Fixes and Features
-
-- [ ] Remember which feed is selected and view (all, unread, flagged, etc) user as selected between visits. If unknown default to All Subscriptions
-- [x] When clicking any link it should open in a new tab
-- [ ] In mobile (iOS) sometimes the top line items like the hamburger menu are not clickable unless you do a hard refresh 
-- [x] video files play as audio files, they should play as video.
-- [ ] Move Light/Dark/Classic options to user settings. Include an Auto mode that uses system preferences for light/dark modes
-- [ ] Below Popular, have a currently listening section to show what podcasts have been started and not finnished
-- [x] Update subscribe/unsubscribe icons to be circle-minus (unsubscribe) and circle-check (subscribe)
-- [x] If I'm on the Unread tab, and I click to read an item the entry in the list will disappear. it should remain until I click to another item.
-
-## Directory Overhaul
-
-- [ ] Directory needs to be more functional, with categories and a more interesting layout. use /frontend-design to help

crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Changelog: ipx-directory
+
+The directory of public podcasts that ipx servers share (docs/directory.md). ipx's changelog is
+[crates/ipx/CHANGELOG.md](../ipx/CHANGELOG.md), the page's [web/CHANGELOG.md](../../web/CHANGELOG.md).
+
+Its version is in `crates/directory/Cargo.toml`, and a release is tagged `directory-vX.Y.Z`.
+
+The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
+and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-10-12
+
+### Added
+
+- Anyone can browse the directory in a web browser, read only: the most subscribed, categories, every feed A to Z, a search by name, and each feed's page with its latest items and its address to copy into any podcast app (#215).
+- `GET /v1/instances` lists the servers holding a snapshot, with their feeds and subscribers, for an admin token (#206).
+- `ipx-directory`, a directory of public podcasts that ipx servers share: each sends the public feeds its people subscribe to, and any server with a token browses them, each feed listed once it has been read. Tokens are in its config file, each read-only, read-write or admin, and revoked one at a time (#204, #205).
+- Traces: a span a request, joining the trace of the ipx server that called, and a trace a refresher round with a span a feed (#213).
+
+[unreleased]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/directory-v1.0.0...main
+[1.0.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/releases/tag/directory-v1.0.0

crates/directory/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+[package]
+name = "ipx-directory"
+version = "1.0.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "ipx-directory"
+path = "src/main.rs"
+
+[dependencies]
+ammonia.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+axum.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+ipx-feed.workspace = true
+opentelemetry.workspace = true
+opentelemetry-otlp.workspace = true
+opentelemetry_sdk.workspace = true
+percent-encoding.workspace = true
+reqwest.workspace = true
+sea-orm.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+tokio.workspace = true
+toml.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
+tracing-opentelemetry.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+url.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+tower.workspace = true

crates/directory/src/config.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+//! The directory's config file: where it listens, where its database is, and the tokens it
+//! accepts. Tokens are only ever changed here, never over the API, so whoever can edit this
+//! file decides who gets in (#204).
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use std::path::Path;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct Config {
+    #[serde(default = "default_bind")]
+    pub bind: String,
+    /// The environment variable holding the database URL, so the file holds no secret.
+    #[serde(default = "default_database_url_env")]
+    pub database_url_env: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub tokens: Vec<TokenCfg>,
+}
+
+fn default_bind() -> String {
+    "0.0.0.0:8100".into()
+}
+
+fn default_database_url_env() -> String {
+    "DIRECTORY_DATABASE_URL".into()
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct TokenCfg {
+    /// Who holds it: what its snapshot is filed under and what the log says, never the token.
+    pub name: String,
+    /// No default: a token whose access is missing or misspelled is refused when the file is
+    /// read, rather than given some access nobody chose.
+    pub access: Access,
+    /// The token's SHA-256, in hex: what `ipx-directory token new` prints. The file holds no
+    /// token, so adding or revoking one is an edit here and nothing else.
+    pub token_sha256: String,
+}
+
+/// What a token may do, each level including the one before.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Deserialize, serde::Serialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
+pub enum Access {
+    /// Browse.
+    Ro,
+    /// Browse and send snapshots.
+    Rw,
+    /// All that, and remove, block and refresh feeds and drop an instance's snapshot.
+    Rwa,
+}
+
+/// A token as the server checks it.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Token {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub access: Access,
+    /// SHA-256 of the token, lower-case hex.
+    pub sha256: String,
+}
+
+impl Config {
+    pub fn load(path: &Path) -> Result<Self> {
+        let text = std::fs::read_to_string(path).with_context(|| format!("reading {}", path.display()))?;
+        Self::parse(&text).with_context(|| format!("in {}", path.display()))
+    }
+
+    pub fn parse(text: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+        let cfg: Config = toml::from_str(text)?;
+        let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+        for t in &cfg.tokens {
+            if t.name.trim().is_empty() {
+                bail!("a token has an empty name");
+            }
+            // Snapshots are filed by name: two instances under one name would overwrite each other.
+            if !seen.insert(t.name.as_str()) {
+                bail!("two tokens are named {:?}", t.name);
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(cfg)
+    }
+
+    /// The tokens as the server checks them. A hash that is not 64 hex digits, or the same
+    /// hash under two names, is an error: which name a request is would be ambiguous.
+    pub fn tokens(&self) -> Result<Vec<Token>> {
+        let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+        self.tokens
+            .iter()
+            .map(|t| {
+                let sha256 = t.token_sha256.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
+                if sha256.len() != 64 || !sha256.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
+                    bail!("token {:?}: token_sha256 is not a SHA-256 in hex", t.name);
+                }
+                if !seen.insert(sha256.clone()) {
+                    bail!("token {:?} is the same token as another", t.name);
+                }
+                Ok(Token { name: t.name.clone(), access: t.access, sha256 })
+            })
+            .collect()
+    }
+}
+
+/// A token's SHA-256 in hex, as the config file holds it.
+pub fn hash(token: &str) -> String {
+    use sha2::Digest;
+    sha2::Sha256::digest(token.trim().as_bytes()).iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect()
+}
+
+/// Equal without saying, by how long it took, how much of the guess was right.
+pub fn same_secret(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
+    let (a, b) = (a.as_bytes(), b.as_bytes());
+    a.len() == b.len() && a.iter().zip(b).fold(0u8, |acc, (x, y)| acc | (x ^ y)) == 0
+}
+
+/// A new token: `ipxd_` and 256 random bits, the prefix so one found in a log says what it is.
+pub fn new_token() -> String {
+    use std::io::Read;
+    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
+    // Falling back to the clock would make a guessable token. Better to fail.
+    std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom")
+        .and_then(|mut f| f.read_exact(&mut bytes))
+        .expect("no source of randomness for a token");
+    format!("ipxd_{}", bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect::<String>())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    const GOOD: &str = r#"
+        [[tokens]]
+        name = "tower"
+        access = "rwa"
+        token_sha256 = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+
+        [[tokens]]
+        name = "friend"
+        access = "ro"
+        token_sha256 = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
+    "#;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn tokens_carry_their_access_and_take_their_value_from_the_environment() {
+        let cfg = Config::parse(GOOD).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(cfg.bind, "0.0.0.0:8100");
+        let t = cfg.tokens().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((t[0].name.as_str(), t[0].access, t[0].sha256.as_str()), ("tower", Access::Rwa, "a".repeat(64).as_str()));
+        assert_eq!(t[1].access, Access::Ro);
+        assert!(Access::Ro < Access::Rw && Access::Rw < Access::Rwa);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_missing_or_misspelled_access_a_reused_name_or_a_bad_hash_is_refused() {
+        let h = "a".repeat(64);
+        assert!(Config::parse(&format!("[[tokens]]\nname = \"a\"\ntoken_sha256 = \"{h}\"")).is_err());
+        assert!(Config::parse(&format!("[[tokens]]\nname = \"a\"\naccess = \"admin\"\ntoken_sha256 = \"{h}\"")).is_err());
+        assert!(Config::parse(&GOOD.replace("\"friend\"", "\"tower\"")).is_err());
+        assert!(Config::parse(&GOOD.replace(&"b".repeat(64), "xyz")).unwrap().tokens().is_err());
+        assert!(Config::parse(&GOOD.replace(&"b".repeat(64), &h)).unwrap().tokens().is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn secrets_compare_whole() {
+        assert!(same_secret("abc", "abc"));
+        assert!(!same_secret("abc", "abd"));
+        assert!(!same_secret("abc", "abcd"));
+        let t = new_token();
+        assert!(t.starts_with("ipxd_") && t.len() == 69 && t != new_token());
+        assert_eq!(hash("abc"), "ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad");
+    }
+}

crates/directory/src/lib.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,561 @@
+//! ipx's directory service (#204): a catalogue of public podcasts and blogs that ipx servers
+//! share. It holds metadata only, never a file: each server still fetches its own feeds. ipx
+//! servers send which public feeds their people subscribe to, the directory fetches each
+//! feed's title, artwork, description and latest items on a slow schedule, and any server
+//! holding a token can browse it.
+//!
+//! The types here are the wire format, shared with ipx, which asks the directory on its
+//! people's behalf.
+
+pub mod config;
+pub mod otel;
+mod site;
+pub mod store;
+
+use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+use axum::extract::{Path, Query, Request, State};
+use axum::http::{StatusCode, header};
+use axum::middleware::Next;
+use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
+use axum::routing::{delete, get, post};
+use axum::{Extension, Json, Router};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use config::{Access, Token};
+use store::{Refreshed, Store};
+
+/// A feed as the directory lists it.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Listing {
+    /// The first 64 bits of the SHA-256 of its normalised address (`store::feed_id`).
+    pub id: String,
+    pub url: String,
+    pub title: Option<String>,
+    pub image: Option<String>,
+    /// Apple's category and the subcategory within it, from the feed's own iTunes category.
+    pub category: Option<String>,
+    pub subcategory: Option<String>,
+    /// Any audio or video in its latest items.
+    pub podcast: bool,
+    /// Summed over every instance's latest snapshot.
+    pub subscribers: i64,
+}
+
+/// One feed's page: what it says it is, and its latest items.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct FeedPage {
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub listing: Listing,
+    /// The feed's own text, HTML as often as not, as it was sent: whoever shows it sanitizes it.
+    pub description: Option<String>,
+    /// Why its last check failed, in words, when it did.
+    pub failing: Option<String>,
+    pub items: Vec<Item>,
+}
+
+/// One of a feed's latest items: what it is, never its files.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Item {
+    pub guid: String,
+    pub title: Option<String>,
+    pub link: Option<String>,
+    pub published: Option<i64>,
+    pub duration: Option<i64>,
+    /// As the feed sent it, unsanitized.
+    pub description: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// One feed in a snapshot: its address, and how many people on the sending server subscribe.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SnapshotEntry {
+    pub url: String,
+    pub subscribers: i64,
+    /// The category the sending server's admin gave a feed that names none itself: used only
+    /// while the feed names none.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub category: Option<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct SnapshotResult {
+    pub accepted: usize,
+    /// Addresses that look like they carry a subscriber's own access.
+    pub refused_private: usize,
+    /// Feeds an admin removed from the directory.
+    pub refused_blocked: usize,
+    /// Not an http(s) address.
+    pub refused_invalid: usize,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Me {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub access: Access,
+}
+
+/// A token whose snapshot the directory holds: how many feeds it gave, and how many people.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Instance {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub feeds: i64,
+    pub subscribers: i64,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Blocked {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub url: Option<String>,
+    pub title: Option<String>,
+    pub at: i64,
+}
+
+/// The most a snapshot may list: far more than one server's subscriptions, few enough that one
+/// request cannot hold the database for long.
+pub const MAX_SNAPSHOT: usize = 20_000;
+
+/// How often each feed is fetched again. Metadata changes slowly, and every server subscribed
+/// to a feed fetches it itself anyway.
+pub const REFRESH_EVERY: i64 = 6 * 3600;
+
+pub struct Directory {
+    pub store: Store,
+    tokens: RwLock<Vec<Token>>,
+    client: reqwest::Client,
+    /// Wakes the refresher, so a feed a snapshot brings in is fetched now, not in a minute.
+    wake: tokio::sync::Notify,
+}
+
+pub type Shared = Arc<Directory>;
+
+impl Directory {
+    pub fn new(store: Store, tokens: Vec<Token>) -> Result<Shared, reqwest::Error> {
+        // No redirects: ipx_feed::fetch follows them itself, so it sees each hop.
+        let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none())
+            .user_agent(concat!("ipx-directory/", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")))
+            .build()?;
+        Ok(Arc::new(Self { store, tokens: RwLock::new(tokens), client, wake: tokio::sync::Notify::new() }))
+    }
+
+    /// Takes the tokens of a config file read again, and drops the snapshots of any that went.
+    pub async fn set_tokens(&self, tokens: Vec<Token>) -> anyhow::Result<u64> {
+        let names: Vec<String> = tokens.iter().map(|t| t.name.clone()).collect();
+        *self.tokens.write().unwrap() = tokens;
+        self.store.keep_instances(&names).await
+    }
+
+    fn caller(&self, presented: &str) -> Option<Me> {
+        let h = config::hash(presented);
+        // Every token compared, whether or not one matched, so timing says nothing either way.
+        self.tokens
+            .read()
+            .unwrap()
+            .iter()
+            .fold(None, |found, t| if config::same_secret(&t.sha256, &h) { Some(Me { name: t.name.clone(), access: t.access }) } else { found })
+    }
+
+    /// Fetches one feed and stores what it found.
+    pub async fn refresh(&self, due: &store::Due) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let got = match ipx_feed::fetch(&self.client, &due.url, None, due.etag.as_deref(), due.last_modified.as_deref()).await {
+            Ok((ipx_feed::Fetched::NotModified, _)) => Refreshed::NotModified,
+            Ok((ipx_feed::Fetched::Body { bytes, etag, last_modified }, _)) => {
+                if ipx_feed::is_opml(&bytes) {
+                    // ipx sends the feeds inside an OPML, never the OPML.
+                    Refreshed::Failed("an OPML list, not a feed".into())
+                } else {
+                    match ipx_feed::parse(&bytes) {
+                        Ok(parsed) => Refreshed::Feed { parsed, etag, last_modified },
+                        Err(e) => Refreshed::Failed(format!("{e:#}")),
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            Err(e) => Refreshed::Failed(format!("{e:#}")),
+        };
+        if let Refreshed::Failed(e) = &got {
+            tracing::info!(feed = %due.id, error = %e, "feed check failed");
+        }
+        // ponytail: a feed that moved for good is still asked for at its old address, which
+        // redirects; follow the move when a feed's id can change without losing its counts.
+        self.store.save(&due.id, got).await
+    }
+}
+
+/// Fetches whatever is due, a few at a time, forever.
+pub async fn refresher(dir: Shared) {
+    loop {
+        match dir.store.due(REFRESH_EVERY, 25).await {
+            Ok(due) => {
+                if !due.is_empty() {
+                    // A round is a trace, each feed's check a span in it (#213).
+                    let round = tracing::info_span!("refresh", feeds = due.len());
+                    tracing::Instrument::instrument(
+                        async {
+                            for d in &due {
+                                let check = tracing::info_span!("feed", feed = %d.id);
+                                if let Err(e) = tracing::Instrument::instrument(dir.refresh(d), check).await {
+                                    tracing::warn!(feed = %d.id, error = %format!("{e:#}"), "could not store a feed check");
+                                }
+                            }
+                            // One line a round, for the dashboard's refresher panel (#210); failures have their own.
+                            tracing::info!(checked = due.len(), "feeds checked");
+                        },
+                        round,
+                    )
+                    .await;
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+            Err(e) => tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "could not read which feeds are due"),
+        }
+        tokio::select! {
+            _ = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(60)) => {}
+            _ = dir.wake.notified() => {}
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reads the config file again whenever it changes, checked each minute. A file that fails to
+/// load leaves the tokens as they were, so a typo locks nobody out.
+pub async fn reloader(dir: Shared, path: std::path::PathBuf) {
+    let mtime = |p: &std::path::Path| std::fs::metadata(p).and_then(|m| m.modified()).ok();
+    let mut last = mtime(&path);
+    loop {
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(60)).await;
+        let now = mtime(&path);
+        if now == last {
+            continue;
+        }
+        last = now;
+        match config::Config::load(&path).and_then(|c| c.tokens()) {
+            Ok(tokens) => {
+                let n = tokens.len();
+                match dir.set_tokens(tokens).await {
+                    Ok(dropped) => tracing::info!(tokens = n, dropped, "config read again"),
+                    Err(e) => tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "config read again, but old snapshots could not be dropped"),
+                }
+            }
+            Err(e) => tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "config changed but does not load; keeping the tokens as they were"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn router(dir: Shared) -> Router {
+    let v1 = Router::new()
+        .route("/v1/me", get(me))
+        .route("/v1/feeds", get(list))
+        .route("/v1/popular", get(popular))
+        .route("/v1/feeds/{id}", get(feed).delete(remove))
+        .route("/v1/feeds/{id}/refresh", post(refresh))
+        .route("/v1/snapshot", post(snapshot))
+        .route("/v1/blocked", get(blocked))
+        .route("/v1/blocked/{id}", delete(unblock))
+        .route("/v1/instances", get(instances))
+        .route("/v1/instances/{name}", delete(drop_instance))
+        .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(dir.clone(), authenticate));
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/healthz", get(healthz))
+        .merge(v1)
+        // Anyone may browse, no token, read only (#215).
+        .merge(site::router())
+        .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(access_log))
+        .with_state(dir)
+}
+
+struct ApiError(StatusCode, String);
+
+impl IntoResponse for ApiError {
+    fn into_response(self) -> Response {
+        (self.0, Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": self.1 }))).into_response()
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<anyhow::Error> for ApiError {
+    fn from(e: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
+        tracing::error!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "request failed");
+        ApiError(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "something went wrong; the directory's log says what".into())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Who made the request, for the access log, set by `authenticate`.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+struct Who(String);
+
+/// One line a request, with the token's name and never the token: what the Grafana panels read.
+async fn access_log(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let (method, path) = (req.method().clone(), req.uri().path().to_owned());
+    let start = Instant::now();
+    // A span for each request but the healthcheck's, a child of the caller's when it sent a
+    // traceparent, as ipx does on its calls here (#213).
+    let span = if path == "/healthz" {
+        tracing::Span::none()
+    } else {
+        tracing::info_span!(
+            "http",
+            otel.name = %format!("{method} {path}"),
+            http.request.method = %method,
+            url.path = %path,
+            http.response.status_code = tracing::field::Empty,
+        )
+    };
+    if let Some(parent) = otel::remote_parent(req.headers(), None) {
+        use tracing_opentelemetry::OpenTelemetrySpanExt;
+        let _ = span.set_parent(parent);
+    }
+    let resp = tracing::Instrument::instrument(next.run(req), span.clone()).await;
+    span.record("http.response.status_code", resp.status().as_u16());
+    let _in = span.enter();
+    let who = resp.extensions().get::<Who>().map_or("", |w| w.0.as_str()).to_owned();
+    let status = resp.status().as_u16();
+    if path != "/healthz" {
+        tracing::info!(
+            target: "ipx_directory::http",
+            method = %method, path = %path, status, duration_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64, token = %who,
+            "{method} {path} -> {status}"
+        );
+    }
+    resp
+}
+
+async fn authenticate(State(dir): State<Shared>, mut req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let presented = req
+        .headers()
+        .get(header::AUTHORIZATION)
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .and_then(|v| v.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
+        .map(str::trim)
+        .filter(|t| !t.is_empty());
+    let Some(me) = presented.and_then(|t| dir.caller(t)) else {
+        return ApiError(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "a valid token is needed: Authorization: Bearer <token>".into()).into_response();
+    };
+    let who = Who(me.name.clone());
+    req.extensions_mut().insert(me);
+    let mut resp = next.run(req).await;
+    resp.extensions_mut().insert(who);
+    resp
+}
+
+fn need(me: &Me, access: Access) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
+    if me.access >= access {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        let what = match access {
+            Access::Ro => "browse",
+            Access::Rw => "send snapshots",
+            Access::Rwa => "administer the directory",
+        };
+        Err(ApiError(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, format!("this token may not {what}")))
+    }
+}
+
+async fn healthz(State(dir): State<Shared>) -> Result<&'static str, ApiError> {
+    dir.store.ping().await?;
+    Ok("ok")
+}
+
+async fn me(Extension(me): Extension<Me>) -> Json<Me> {
+    Json(me)
+}
+
+async fn list(State(dir): State<Shared>) -> Result<Json<Vec<Listing>>, ApiError> {
+    Ok(Json(dir.store.list().await?))
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+struct Limit {
+    limit: Option<u64>,
+}
+
+async fn popular(State(dir): State<Shared>, Query(q): Query<Limit>) -> Result<Json<Vec<Listing>>, ApiError> {
+    Ok(Json(dir.store.popular(q.limit.unwrap_or(10).clamp(1, 100)).await?))
+}
+
+async fn feed(State(dir): State<Shared>, Path(id): Path<String>) -> Result<Json<FeedPage>, ApiError> {
+    dir.store.feed(&id).await?.map(Json).ok_or_else(|| ApiError(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, format!("{id:?} is not in the directory")))
+}
+
+async fn snapshot(
+    State(dir): State<Shared>,
+    Extension(me): Extension<Me>,
+    Json(entries): Json<Vec<SnapshotEntry>>,
+) -> Result<Json<SnapshotResult>, ApiError> {
+    need(&me, Access::Rw)?;
+    if entries.len() > MAX_SNAPSHOT {
+        return Err(ApiError(StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE, format!("a snapshot lists at most {MAX_SNAPSHOT} feeds")));
+    }
+    let r = dir.store.snapshot(&me.name, &entries).await?;
+    dir.wake.notify_one();
+    tracing::info!(
+        instance = %me.name, accepted = r.accepted, refused_private = r.refused_private,
+        refused_blocked = r.refused_blocked, refused_invalid = r.refused_invalid, "snapshot"
+    );
+    Ok(Json(r))
+}
+
+async fn remove(State(dir): State<Shared>, Extension(me): Extension<Me>, Path(id): Path<String>) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    need(&me, Access::Rwa)?;
+    dir.store.block(&id).await?;
+    tracing::info!(feed = %id, by = %me.name, "feed removed and blocked");
+    Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
+}
+
+async fn blocked(State(dir): State<Shared>, Extension(me): Extension<Me>) -> Result<Json<Vec<Blocked>>, ApiError> {
+    need(&me, Access::Rwa)?;
+    Ok(Json(dir.store.blocked().await?))
+}
+
+async fn unblock(State(dir): State<Shared>, Extension(me): Extension<Me>, Path(id): Path<String>) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    need(&me, Access::Rwa)?;
+    if !dir.store.unblock(&id).await? {
+        return Err(ApiError(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, format!("{id:?} is not blocked")));
+    }
+    tracing::info!(feed = %id, by = %me.name, "feed unblocked");
+    Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
+}
+
+async fn instances(State(dir): State<Shared>, Extension(me): Extension<Me>) -> Result<Json<Vec<Instance>>, ApiError> {
+    need(&me, Access::Rwa)?;
+    Ok(Json(dir.store.instances().await?))
+}
+
+async fn drop_instance(State(dir): State<Shared>, Extension(me): Extension<Me>, Path(name): Path<String>) -> Result<StatusCode, ApiError> {
+    need(&me, Access::Rwa)?;
+    let n = dir.store.drop_instance(&name).await?;
+    tracing::info!(instance = %name, feeds = n, by = %me.name, "snapshot dropped");
+    Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
+}
+
+async fn refresh(State(dir): State<Shared>, Extension(me): Extension<Me>, Path(id): Path<String>) -> Result<Json<FeedPage>, ApiError> {
+    need(&me, Access::Rwa)?;
+    let due = dir.store.due_one(&id).await?.ok_or_else(|| ApiError(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, format!("{id:?} is not in the directory")))?;
+    dir.refresh(&due).await?;
+    feed(State(dir), Path(id)).await
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use axum::body::Body;
+    use tower::ServiceExt;
+
+    async fn app() -> (Router, Shared) {
+        let tokens = ["ro", "rw", "rwa"]
+            .iter()
+            .map(|n| Token {
+                name: format!("{n}-token"),
+                access: serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!(n)).unwrap(),
+                sha256: config::hash(&format!("secret-{n}")),
+            })
+            .collect();
+        let dir = Directory::new(Store::scratch().await, tokens).unwrap();
+        (router(dir.clone()), dir)
+    }
+
+    async fn call(app: &Router, method: &str, path: &str, token: Option<&str>, body: Option<serde_json::Value>) -> (u16, serde_json::Value) {
+        let mut req = axum::http::Request::builder().method(method).uri(path);
+        if let Some(t) = token {
+            req = req.header("authorization", format!("Bearer secret-{t}"));
+        }
+        let req = match body {
+            Some(b) => req.header("content-type", "application/json").body(Body::from(b.to_string())),
+            None => req.body(Body::empty()),
+        }
+        .unwrap();
+        let resp = app.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        let status = resp.status().as_u16();
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1 << 20).await.unwrap();
+        (status, serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null))
+    }
+
+    async fn get_page(app: &Router, path: &str) -> (u16, String, Option<String>) {
+        let req = axum::http::Request::builder().uri(path).body(Body::empty()).unwrap();
+        let resp = app.clone().oneshot(req).await.unwrap();
+        let status = resp.status().as_u16();
+        let csp = resp.headers().get("content-security-policy").map(|v| v.to_str().unwrap().to_owned());
+        let bytes = axum::body::to_bytes(resp.into_body(), 1 << 22).await.unwrap();
+        (status, String::from_utf8(bytes.to_vec()).unwrap(), csp)
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn anyone_browses_the_pages_and_the_api_still_needs_a_token() {
+        let (app, dir) = app().await;
+        let snap = serde_json::json!([{ "url": "https://x.test/a.xml", "subscribers": 3 }]);
+        call(&app, "POST", "/v1/snapshot", Some("rw"), Some(snap)).await;
+        store::tests::fetch_all(&dir.store).await;
+        let id = dir.store.list().await.unwrap()[0].id.clone();
+
+        let (s, home, csp) = get_page(&app, "/").await;
+        assert_eq!(s, 200);
+        assert!(csp.unwrap().contains("script-src 'self'"));
+        assert!(home.contains("Most subscribed") && home.contains(&format!("/feed/{id}")), "{home}");
+        assert!(get_page(&app, "/all").await.1.contains("3 people subscribe"));
+        let (s, page, _) = get_page(&app, &format!("/feed/{id}")).await;
+        assert_eq!(s, 200);
+        // Its address, to subscribe to anywhere.
+        assert!(page.contains("value=\"https://x.test/a.xml\""), "{page}");
+        assert!(!page.contains("<script>"), "the publisher's HTML is text here");
+        assert_eq!(get_page(&app, "/feed/nope").await.0, 404);
+        assert_eq!(get_page(&app, "/category/Nothing").await.0, 404);
+        assert_eq!(get_page(&app, "/search?q=").await.0, 303);
+        assert_eq!(get_page(&app, "/site.js").await.0, 200);
+        // Reading the pages takes no token; the API still does.
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds", None, None).await.0, 401);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "DELETE", &format!("/v1/feeds/{id}"), None, None).await.0, 401);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "DELETE", &format!("/feed/{id}"), None, None).await.0, 405);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn each_access_level_does_what_it_may_and_no_more() {
+        let (app, dir) = app().await;
+        let snap = serde_json::json!([{ "url": "https://x.test/a.xml", "subscribers": 2, "category": "Comedy" }]);
+
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds", None, None).await.0, 401);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds", Some("wrong"), None).await.0, 401);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/healthz", None, None).await.0, 200);
+
+        let (s, me) = call(&app, "GET", "/v1/me", Some("ro"), None).await;
+        assert_eq!((s, me["name"].as_str(), me["access"].as_str()), (200, Some("ro-token"), Some("ro")));
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "POST", "/v1/snapshot", Some("ro"), Some(snap.clone())).await.0, 403);
+
+        let (s, r) = call(&app, "POST", "/v1/snapshot", Some("rw"), Some(snap.clone())).await;
+        assert_eq!((s, r["accepted"].as_u64()), (200, Some(1)));
+        store::tests::fetch_all(&dir.store).await;
+        let (_, list) = call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds", Some("ro"), None).await;
+        let id = list[0]["id"].as_str().unwrap().to_owned();
+        assert_eq!(list[0]["subscribers"], 2);
+        assert_ne!(list[0]["category"], "Comedy", "the feed's own category wins over the sender's");
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", &format!("/v1/feeds/{id}"), Some("ro"), None).await.0, 200);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds/nope", Some("ro"), None).await.0, 404);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/popular?limit=5", Some("ro"), None).await.1[0]["id"], id.as_str());
+
+        for (m, p) in [("DELETE", format!("/v1/feeds/{id}")), ("GET", "/v1/blocked".into()), ("DELETE", "/v1/instances/rw-token".into())] {
+            assert_eq!(call(&app, m, &p, Some("rw"), None).await.0, 403, "{m} {p}");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "DELETE", &format!("/v1/feeds/{id}"), Some("rwa"), None).await.0, 204);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/blocked", Some("rwa"), None).await.1[0]["id"], id.as_str());
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "POST", "/v1/snapshot", Some("rw"), Some(snap.clone())).await.1["refused_blocked"], 1);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "DELETE", &format!("/v1/blocked/{id}"), Some("rwa"), None).await.0, 204);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "DELETE", &format!("/v1/blocked/{id}"), Some("rwa"), None).await.0, 404);
+        call(&app, "POST", "/v1/snapshot", Some("rw"), Some(snap)).await;
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "DELETE", "/v1/instances/rw-token", Some("rwa"), None).await.0, 204);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds", Some("ro"), None).await.1, serde_json::json!([]));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_revoked_token_loses_its_access_and_its_counts() {
+        let dir = Directory::new(Store::scratch().await, vec![]).unwrap();
+        let t = |n: &str| Token { name: n.into(), access: Access::Rw, sha256: config::hash(&format!("secret-{n}")) };
+        dir.set_tokens(vec![t("a"), t("b")]).await.unwrap();
+        let app = router(dir.clone());
+        let snap = serde_json::json!([{ "url": "https://x.test/a.xml", "subscribers": 1 }]);
+        call(&app, "POST", "/v1/snapshot", Some("a"), Some(snap.clone())).await;
+        call(&app, "POST", "/v1/snapshot", Some("b"), Some(snap)).await;
+        store::tests::fetch_all(&dir.store).await;
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds", Some("a"), None).await.1[0]["subscribers"], 2);
+
+        dir.set_tokens(vec![t("a")]).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds", Some("b"), None).await.0, 401);
+        assert_eq!(call(&app, "GET", "/v1/feeds", Some("a"), None).await.1[0]["subscribers"], 1);
+    }
+}

crates/directory/src/main.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+//! `ipx-directory`: serve the directory, make a token, or check that a running one answers.
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
+use ipx_directory::{Directory, config, store::Store};
+use tracing_subscriber::prelude::*;
+
+#[derive(Parser)]
+#[command(version, about = "ipx's directory of public podcasts")]
+struct Cli {
+    /// The config file: where to listen, the database, and the tokens it accepts. Otherwise
+    /// DIRECTORY_CONFIG, or else /config/directory.toml.
+    #[arg(long)]
+    config: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
+    #[command(subcommand)]
+    cmd: Option<Cmd>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Subcommand)]
+enum Cmd {
+    /// Serve the directory (the default).
+    Serve,
+    /// Make a token, and print it with the lines that let it in.
+    Token {
+        #[command(subcommand)]
+        cmd: TokenCmd,
+    },
+    /// Check that the directory on this machine answers and can read its database: the
+    /// container's healthcheck.
+    Health,
+}
+
+#[derive(Subcommand)]
+enum TokenCmd {
+    New {
+        /// Who it is for, as the log and their snapshot will name them.
+        name: String,
+        #[arg(long, value_parser = ["ro", "rw", "rwa"])]
+        access: String,
+    },
+}
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    let cli = Cli::parse();
+    let config_path = cli
+        .config
+        .or_else(|| std::env::var_os("DIRECTORY_CONFIG").map(Into::into))
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| "/config/directory.toml".into());
+    match cli.cmd.unwrap_or(Cmd::Serve) {
+        Cmd::Serve => serve(&config_path).await,
+        Cmd::Token { cmd: TokenCmd::New { name, access } } => {
+            let token = config::new_token();
+            println!("A token for {name}, to give them; it is not kept anywhere:\n\n    {token}\n");
+            println!("To let it in, add this to {}:\n", config_path.display());
+            println!("[[tokens]]\nname = {name:?}\naccess = {access:?}\ntoken_sha256 = {:?}", config::hash(&token));
+            println!("\nThe directory reads the file again within a minute. Delete the entry to revoke it.");
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        Cmd::Health => {
+            let cfg = config::Config::load(&config_path)?;
+            let port = cfg.bind.rsplit(':').next().unwrap_or("8100");
+            let resp = reqwest::Client::new()
+                .get(format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}/healthz"))
+                .timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(4))
+                .send()
+                .await
+                .context("the directory does not answer")?;
+            anyhow::ensure!(resp.status().is_success(), "the directory answers {}", resp.status());
+            Ok(())
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+async fn serve(path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<()> {
+    // One JSON object a line for Loki when DIRECTORY_LOG_FORMAT=json, as ipx does; text otherwise.
+    let json = std::env::var("DIRECTORY_LOG_FORMAT").is_ok_and(|f| f.eq_ignore_ascii_case("json"));
+    let filter = || tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_env("DIRECTORY_LOG").unwrap_or_else(|_| "ipx_directory=info".into());
+    // Traces to Tempo when OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT is set, joining ipx's (#213).
+    let otel = ipx_directory::otel::provider("ipx-directory")?;
+    tracing_subscriber::registry()
+        .with((!json).then(|| tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer().with_writer(std::io::stderr).with_filter(filter())))
+        .with(json.then(|| tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer().json().flatten_event(true).with_writer(std::io::stderr).with_filter(filter())))
+        .with(otel.as_ref().map(|p| {
+            use opentelemetry::trace::TracerProvider;
+            tracing_opentelemetry::layer().with_tracer(p.tracer("ipx-directory")).with_filter(tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::new("ipx_directory=info"))
+        }))
+        .init();
+
+    let cfg = config::Config::load(path)?;
+    let tokens = cfg.tokens()?;
+    let url = std::env::var(&cfg.database_url_env)
+        .ok()
+        .filter(|u| !u.trim().is_empty())
+        .with_context(|| format!("{} is not set: the directory needs a database URL", cfg.database_url_env))?;
+    let store = Store::open(&url).await.context("opening the database")?;
+    let dir = Directory::new(store, vec![])?;
+    let dropped = dir.set_tokens(tokens).await?;
+
+    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(&cfg.bind).await.with_context(|| format!("listening on {}", cfg.bind))?;
+    tracing::info!(version = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"), bind = %cfg.bind, tokens = cfg.tokens.len(), dropped, "directory started");
+    tokio::spawn(ipx_directory::refresher(dir.clone()));
+    tokio::spawn(ipx_directory::reloader(dir.clone(), path.to_owned()));
+    axum::serve(listener, ipx_directory::router(dir))
+        .with_graceful_shutdown(async {
+            let mut term = tokio::signal::unix::signal(tokio::signal::unix::SignalKind::terminate()).expect("SIGTERM handler");
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = term.recv() => {}
+                _ = tokio::signal::ctrl_c() => {}
+            }
+        })
+        .await?;
+    // The batch exporter holds the last few seconds of spans; without this they are lost.
+    if let Some(p) = otel {
+        let _ = p.shutdown();
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}

crates/directory/src/otel.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+//! Traces, for ipx and the directory both (#213): the exporter, and W3C `traceparent` in from a
+//! caller and out to a callee, so one trace follows a request from the browser through ipx-web
+//! and ipx into the directory.
+
+/// Traces over OTLP, to Tempo for one, when OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT names a collector
+/// (`http://host:4318`: the exporter speaks OTLP over HTTP and adds `/v1/traces`). The exporter
+/// reads that and the other `OTEL_` variables itself.
+pub fn provider(service: &'static str) -> anyhow::Result<Option<opentelemetry_sdk::trace::SdkTracerProvider>> {
+    if std::env::var("OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT").unwrap_or_default().is_empty() {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let exporter = opentelemetry_otlp::SpanExporter::builder().with_http().build()?;
+    let resource = opentelemetry_sdk::Resource::builder().with_service_name(service).build();
+    Ok(Some(
+        opentelemetry_sdk::trace::SdkTracerProvider::builder()
+            .with_batch_exporter(exporter)
+            .with_resource(resource)
+            .build(),
+    ))
+}
+
+/// The trace a request from the page belongs to, from its `traceparent` (#190), so the requests
+/// one action sets off are one trace. None for a missing or malformed one. In the query where no
+/// header can be set: a position saved by sendBeacon, and the playlist Safari's player fetches
+/// itself (#192).
+pub fn remote_parent(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap, query: Option<&str>) -> Option<opentelemetry::Context> {
+    use opentelemetry::trace::{SpanContext, SpanId, TraceContextExt, TraceFlags, TraceId, TraceState};
+    let v = match headers.get("traceparent") {
+        Some(h) => h.to_str().ok()?,
+        None => query?.split('&').find_map(|kv| kv.strip_prefix("traceparent="))?,
+    };
+    let mut parts = v.split('-');
+    let (version, trace, span) = (parts.next()?, parts.next()?, parts.next()?);
+    if version != "00" || trace.len() != 32 || span.len() != 16 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let sc = SpanContext::new(
+        TraceId::from_hex(trace).ok()?,
+        SpanId::from_hex(span).ok()?,
+        TraceFlags::SAMPLED,
+        true,
+        TraceState::default(),
+    );
+    sc.is_valid().then(|| opentelemetry::Context::new().with_remote_span_context(sc))
+}
+
+/// The current span as a `traceparent`, for a request to another service, so its spans join
+/// this trace. None outside a traced span.
+pub fn traceparent() -> Option<String> {
+    use opentelemetry::trace::TraceContextExt;
+    use tracing_opentelemetry::OpenTelemetrySpanExt;
+    let cx = tracing::Span::current().context();
+    let sc = cx.span().span_context().clone();
+    sc.is_valid().then(|| format!("00-{}-{}-{:02x}", sc.trace_id(), sc.span_id(), sc.trace_flags().to_u8()))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_requests_trace_is_the_pages_from_its_traceparent() {
+        use opentelemetry::trace::TraceContextExt;
+        let with = |v: &str| {
+            let mut h = axum::http::HeaderMap::new();
+            h.insert("traceparent", v.parse().unwrap());
+            remote_parent(&h, None)
+        };
+        let cx = with("00-4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736-00f067aa0ba902b7-01").expect("parsed");
+        assert_eq!(cx.span().span_context().trace_id().to_string(), "4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736");
+        assert!(cx.span().span_context().is_remote());
+        // Anything else from the browser starts a trace of its own.
+        for bad in ["", "00-xyz-00f067aa0ba902b7-01", "01-4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736-00f067aa0ba902b7-01",
+                    "00-00000000000000000000000000000000-00f067aa0ba902b7-01", "00-4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736"] {
+            assert!(with(bad).is_none(), "{bad}");
+        }
+        assert!(remote_parent(&axum::http::HeaderMap::new(), None).is_none());
+        // From the query, where a beacon or Safari's player cannot send a header (#192).
+        let q = remote_parent(&axum::http::HeaderMap::new(), Some("x=1&traceparent=00-4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736-00f067aa0ba902b7-01"));
+        assert_eq!(q.unwrap().span().span_context().trace_id().to_string(), "4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736");
+        assert!(remote_parent(&axum::http::HeaderMap::new(), Some("traceparent=nonsense")).is_none());
+    }
+}

crates/directory/src/site.css

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* The directory's pages (#215), in iPX's palette: the logo's navy, sky blue and needle orange,
+   dark or light as the system is. */
+:root{--bg:#eef5fb;--panel:#fff;--panel2:#e4eff9;--line:#c6d9ea;--fg:#10233a;--dim:#46596e;--faint:#56697e;--accent:#2f6aa0;--accent2:#c43e00;--ink:#fff}
+@media (prefers-color-scheme:dark){:root{--bg:#0a1726;--panel:#0f1f31;--panel2:#15283d;--line:#264060;--fg:#f3f7fb;--dim:#a3b6ca;--faint:#8a9fb5;--accent:#8fc2ea;--accent2:#ff6a1a;--ink:#0a1726}}
+*{box-sizing:border-box}
+html{-webkit-text-size-adjust:100%}
+body{margin:0;background:var(--bg);color:var(--fg);font:15px/1.5 system-ui,-apple-system,"Segoe UI",Roboto,sans-serif}
+a{color:var(--accent);text-decoration:none}
+a:hover{text-decoration:underline}
+a:focus-visible,button:focus-visible,input:focus-visible{outline:2px solid var(--accent);outline-offset:2px}
+header{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:16px;padding:12px 20px;background:var(--panel);border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);position:sticky;top:0;z-index:1}
+.brand{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:10px;color:var(--fg);font-weight:700;font-size:17px;white-space:nowrap}
+.brand img{border-radius:8px;display:block}
+header form{margin-left:auto;flex:0 1 320px}
+input{font:inherit;color:var(--fg);background:var(--bg);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:10px;padding:8px 12px;width:100%}
+main{max-width:1100px;margin:0 auto;padding:20px 20px 40px}
+footer{max-width:1100px;margin:0 auto;padding:16px 20px 32px;color:var(--faint);font-size:13px;border-top:1px solid var(--line)}
+h2{font-size:22px;margin:20px 0 12px}
+h3{font-size:17px;margin:28px 0 8px}
+.hint,.count{color:var(--dim)}
+.back{margin:0;color:var(--faint);font-size:14px}
+.more{font-weight:600}
+.art{position:relative;display:block;aspect-ratio:1;border-radius:10px;overflow:hidden;background:var(--panel2);flex:none}
+.art i{position:absolute;inset:0;display:grid;place-items:center;font-style:normal;font-weight:700;color:var(--accent);font-size:28px}
+.art img{position:absolute;inset:0;width:100%;height:100%;object-fit:cover}
+.art.sm{width:48px;border-radius:8px}.art.sm i{font-size:16px}
+.art.lg{width:180px;border-radius:14px}.art.lg i{font-size:48px}
+.chart{list-style:none;margin:0;padding:0;display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fill,minmax(min(320px,100%),1fr));gap:4px 24px}
+/* A grid item is as wide as its content unless told otherwise, and a long title then runs off the page. */
+.chart li,.tile{min-width:0}
+.chart a{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:12px;padding:8px;border-radius:10px;color:var(--fg)}
+.chart a:hover{background:var(--panel);text-decoration:none}
+.no{width:22px;text-align:right;color:var(--faint);font-variant-numeric:tabular-nums;flex:none}
+.txt{display:flex;flex-direction:column;min-width:0}
+.txt b,.tile b{overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;white-space:nowrap}
+small{color:var(--dim);font-size:13px}
+.cats{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fill,minmax(180px,1fr));gap:12px}
+.cat{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:2px;padding:14px 16px;border-radius:12px;background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);color:var(--fg)}
+.cat:hover{border-color:var(--accent);text-decoration:none}
+.tabs,.pills{display:flex;gap:6px;flex-wrap:wrap;margin:0 0 12px}
+.tabs a,.pills a{padding:6px 14px;border-radius:999px;background:var(--panel);border:1px solid var(--line);color:var(--fg);font-size:14px}
+.tabs a[aria-current],.pills a[aria-current]{background:var(--accent);border-color:var(--accent);color:var(--ink)}
+.pills a[aria-current] small{color:inherit}
+.tiles{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fill,minmax(150px,1fr));gap:18px 14px}
+.tile{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:4px;min-width:0;color:var(--fg)}
+.tile:hover{text-decoration:none}.tile:hover b{text-decoration:underline}
+.show{display:flex;gap:24px;align-items:flex-end;margin-top:8px}
+.meta{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:6px;min-width:0;flex:1}
+.meta h2{margin:0;font-size:28px;line-height:1.15;overflow-wrap:anywhere}
+.sub{margin:0;color:var(--dim)}
+.addr{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:4px;margin-top:8px;max-width:560px}
+.addr label{font-size:13px;color:var(--faint)}
+.addr .row{display:flex;gap:8px}
+.addr input{font-family:ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace;font-size:13px}
+button{font:inherit;font-weight:600;padding:8px 16px;border-radius:10px;border:0;background:var(--accent);color:var(--ink);cursor:pointer}
+.about{color:var(--dim);max-width:72ch;margin:20px 0 0}
+.failing{color:var(--accent2)}
+article{padding:12px 0;border-bottom:1px solid var(--line);max-width:80ch}
+article p{margin:4px 0;color:var(--dim)}
+@media (max-width:600px){
+  header{padding:10px 16px;gap:10px}
+  .brand span,.brand{font-size:15px}
+  main{padding:16px}
+  .show{flex-direction:column;align-items:flex-start;gap:14px}
+  .art.lg{width:140px}
+  .tiles{grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fill,minmax(104px,1fr));gap:14px 10px}
+}

crates/directory/src/site.js

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+// The one thing the directory's pages script (#215): Copy puts a feed's address on the clipboard.
+// Without it, the address is in a field of its own to select by hand.
+document.addEventListener('click', ev => {
+  const b = ev.target.closest('[data-copy]');
+  if (!b || !navigator.clipboard) return;
+  navigator.clipboard.writeText(b.dataset.copy).then(() => {
+    b.textContent = 'Copied';
+    setTimeout(() => { b.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);
+  });
+});

crates/directory/src/site.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+//! The directory in a web browser (#215): anyone may browse it, no token, read only. The most
+//! subscribed and the categories, every feed A to Z, a search by name, and a page per feed with
+//! its address to subscribe to in any podcast app. Rendered here from the store, as plain HTML:
+//! no build step, and nothing the API does not already hold.
+//!
+//! A feed's description and items are the publisher's HTML, unsanitized in the store; they are
+//! shown as text, tags stripped, and an item's link only when it is http(s).
+
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+use std::fmt::Write;
+
+use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
+use axum::http::{HeaderValue, StatusCode, header};
+use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
+use axum::routing::get;
+use axum::Router;
+
+use crate::{Listing, Shared};
+
+pub fn router() -> Router<Shared> {
+    Router::new()
+        .route("/", get(home))
+        .route("/all", get(all))
+        .route("/search", get(search))
+        .route("/category/{name}", get(category))
+        .route("/feed/{id}", get(feed))
+        .route("/site.css", get(|| asset("text/css; charset=utf-8", include_bytes!("site.css"))))
+        .route("/site.js", get(|| asset("text/javascript; charset=utf-8", include_bytes!("site.js"))))
+        .route("/logo.svg", get(|| asset("image/svg+xml", include_bytes!("../../../web/logo.svg"))))
+        .route("/logo-dark.svg", get(|| asset("image/svg+xml", include_bytes!("../../../web/logo-dark.svg"))))
+        .route("/favicon.png", get(|| asset("image/png", include_bytes!("../../../web/favicon.png"))))
+}
+
+/// Its own script and stylesheet only; covers come from their publishers.
+const CSP: &str = "default-src 'none'; img-src https: http: data:; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; \
+                   base-uri 'none'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'";
+
+async fn asset(kind: &'static str, body: &'static [u8]) -> Response {
+    ([(header::CONTENT_TYPE, kind), (header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=86400")], body).into_response()
+}
+
+#[derive(serde::Deserialize, Default)]
+struct Filter {
+    /// `podcasts` or `blogs`; anything else is both.
+    kind: Option<String>,
+    sub: Option<String>,
+    q: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl Filter {
+    fn keep(&self, l: &Listing) -> bool {
+        match self.kind.as_deref() {
+            Some("podcasts") => l.podcast,
+            Some("blogs") => !l.podcast,
+            _ => true,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+async fn home(State(dir): State<Shared>) -> Response {
+    let all = match dir.store.list().await {
+        Ok(a) => a,
+        Err(e) => return failed(e),
+    };
+    let mut top = all.clone();
+    top.sort_by(|a, b| b.subscribers.cmp(&a.subscribers).then_with(|| name(a).to_lowercase().cmp(&name(b).to_lowercase())));
+    top.truncate(10);
+    let mut cats: BTreeMap<&str, Vec<&Listing>> = BTreeMap::new();
+    for l in &all {
+        cats.entry(l.category.as_deref().unwrap_or("Other")).or_default().push(l);
+    }
+    let mut b = String::new();
+    if all.is_empty() {
+        b.push_str("<p class=hint>Nothing is listed yet. A feed appears once a server has shared it and the directory has read it.</p>");
+    } else {
+        b.push_str("<h2>Most subscribed</h2><ol class=chart>");
+        for (i, l) in top.iter().enumerate() {
+            let _ = write!(b, "<li><a href=\"/feed/{}\"><span class=no>{}</span>{}<span class=txt><b>{}</b><small>{}</small></span></a></li>",
+                esc(&l.id), i + 1, art(l, "art sm"), esc(name(l)), subscribers(l.subscribers));
+        }
+        b.push_str("</ol><h2>Categories</h2><div class=cats>");
+        for (c, ls) in &cats {
+            let _ = write!(b, "<a class=cat href=\"/category/{}\"><b>{}</b><small>{}</small></a>", seg(c), esc(c), ls.len());
+        }
+        let _ = write!(b, "</div><p><a class=more href=\"/all\">All {} feeds, A to Z</a></p>", all.len());
+    }
+    page("iPX Directory", None, &b)
+}
+
+async fn all(State(dir): State<Shared>, Query(f): Query<Filter>) -> Response {
+    listed(&dir, "All feeds", "/all", &f, |_| true).await
+}
+
+async fn search(State(dir): State<Shared>, Query(f): Query<Filter>) -> Response {
+    let q = f.q.clone().unwrap_or_default().trim().to_lowercase();
+    if q.is_empty() {
+        return redirect("/all");
+    }
+    let title = format!("Results for \u{201c}{}\u{201d}", f.q.as_deref().unwrap_or("").trim());
+    listed(&dir, &title, "/search", &f, move |l| name(l).to_lowercase().contains(&q)).await
+}
+
+async fn category(State(dir): State<Shared>, Path(c): Path<String>, Query(f): Query<Filter>) -> Response {
+    let here = format!("/category/{}", seg(&c));
+    let cat = c.clone();
+    listed(&dir, &c, &here, &f, move |l| l.category.as_deref().unwrap_or("Other") == cat).await
+}
+
+/// A page of tiles: those `pick` takes, of the kind and subcategory asked for, A to Z.
+async fn listed(dir: &Shared, title: &str, here: &str, f: &Filter, pick: impl Fn(&Listing) -> bool) -> Response {
+    let mut ls: Vec<Listing> = match dir.store.list().await {
+        Ok(a) => a.into_iter().filter(|l| pick(l)).collect(),
+        Err(e) => return failed(e),
+    };
+    if ls.is_empty() && here.starts_with("/category/") {
+        return not_found("That category has nothing in it.");
+    }
+    let subs: BTreeMap<String, usize> = ls.iter().filter_map(|l| l.subcategory.clone()).fold(BTreeMap::new(), |mut m, s| {
+        *m.entry(s).or_default() += 1;
+        m
+    });
+    ls.retain(|l| f.keep(l) && f.sub.as_ref().is_none_or(|s| l.subcategory.as_ref() == Some(s)));
+    ls.sort_by_key(|l| name(l).to_lowercase());
+
+    // The query a link keeps, with one of its keys changed.
+    let link = |kind: Option<&str>, sub: Option<&str>| {
+        let mut q = url::form_urlencoded::Serializer::new(String::new());
+        if let Some(v) = f.q.as_deref() {
+            q.append_pair("q", v);
+        }
+        if let Some(v) = kind {
+            q.append_pair("kind", v);
+        }
+        if let Some(v) = sub {
+            q.append_pair("sub", v);
+        }
+        let q = q.finish();
+        if q.is_empty() { here.to_owned() } else { format!("{here}?{q}") }
+    };
+    let mut b = String::new();
+    let _ = write!(b, "<p class=back><a href=\"/\">Directory</a></p><h2>{}</h2><nav class=tabs aria-label=Kind>", esc(title));
+    for (k, label) in [(None, "All"), (Some("podcasts"), "Podcasts"), (Some("blogs"), "Blogs")] {
+        let on = f.kind.as_deref() == k;
+        let _ = write!(b, "<a href=\"{}\"{}>{label}</a>", esc(&link(k, f.sub.as_deref())), if on { " aria-current=page" } else { "" });
+    }
+    b.push_str("</nav>");
+    if !subs.is_empty() {
+        b.push_str("<nav class=pills aria-label=Subcategory>");
+        let _ = write!(b, "<a href=\"{}\"{}>All</a>", esc(&link(f.kind.as_deref(), None)), if f.sub.is_none() { " aria-current=page" } else { "" });
+        for (s, n) in &subs {
+            let on = f.sub.as_deref() == Some(s.as_str());
+            let _ = write!(b, "<a href=\"{}\"{}>{} <small>{n}</small></a>", esc(&link(f.kind.as_deref(), Some(s))), if on { " aria-current=page" } else { "" }, esc(s));
+        }
+        b.push_str("</nav>");
+    }
+    if ls.is_empty() {
+        b.push_str("<p class=hint>Nothing here.</p>");
+    } else {
+        let _ = write!(b, "<p class=count>{}</p><div class=tiles>", plural(ls.len(), "feed"));
+        for l in &ls {
+            let _ = write!(b, "<a class=tile href=\"/feed/{}\">{}<b>{}</b><small>{}</small></a>", esc(&l.id), art(l, "art"), esc(name(l)), subscribers(l.subscribers));
+        }
+        b.push_str("</div>");
+    }
+    page(title, None, &b)
+}
+
+async fn feed(State(dir): State<Shared>, Path(id): Path<String>) -> Response {
+    let p = match dir.store.feed(&id).await {
+        Ok(Some(p)) => p,
+        Ok(None) => return not_found("That feed is not in the directory."),
+        Err(e) => return failed(e),
+    };
+    let l = &p.listing;
+    let mut b = String::new();
+    b.push_str("<p class=back><a href=\"/\">Directory</a>");
+    if let Some(c) = &l.category {
+        let _ = write!(b, " <span aria-hidden=true>/</span> <a href=\"/category/{}\">{}</a>", seg(c), esc(c));
+    }
+    let _ = write!(b, "</p><div class=show>{}<div class=meta><h2>{}</h2><p class=sub>{}{}</p>", art(l, "art lg"), esc(name(l)),
+        subscribers(l.subscribers), l.subcategory.as_deref().map(|s| format!(" &middot; {}", esc(s))).unwrap_or_default());
+    let _ = write!(b, "<div class=addr><label for=addr>Feed address</label><span class=row><input id=addr readonly value=\"{}\" spellcheck=false>\
+        <button type=button data-copy=\"{}\">Copy</button></span><small>Paste it into any podcast app or feed reader to subscribe.</small></div></div></div>",
+        esc(&l.url), esc(&l.url));
+    if let Some(d) = p.description.as_deref().map(text).filter(|d| !d.is_empty() && d != name(l)) {
+        let _ = write!(b, "<p class=about>{}</p>", esc(&d));
+    }
+    if let Some(why) = &p.failing {
+        let _ = write!(b, "<p class=failing>{}</p>", esc(why));
+    }
+    let _ = write!(b, "<h3>{}</h3>", if l.podcast { "Latest episodes" } else { "Latest posts" });
+    if p.items.is_empty() {
+        b.push_str("<p class=hint>Nothing read from it yet. The directory checks each feed every six hours.</p>");
+    }
+    for e in &p.items {
+        let title = e.title.as_deref().map(text).filter(|t| !t.is_empty()).unwrap_or_else(|| "Untitled".into());
+        let head = match e.link.as_deref().filter(|u| u.starts_with("https://") || u.starts_with("http://")) {
+            Some(u) => format!("<a href=\"{}\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">{}</a>", esc(u), esc(&title)),
+            None => esc(&title),
+        };
+        let blurb: String = e.description.as_deref().map(text).unwrap_or_default().chars().take(400).collect();
+        let when = [e.published.map(date), e.duration.filter(|d| *d > 0).map(clock)].into_iter().flatten().collect::<Vec<_>>().join(" &middot; ");
+        let _ = write!(b, "<article><b>{head}</b>{}{}</article>",
+            if blurb.is_empty() { String::new() } else { format!("<p>{}</p>", esc(&blurb)) },
+            if when.is_empty() { String::new() } else { format!("<small>{when}</small>") });
+    }
+    page(name(l), Some(&text(p.description.as_deref().unwrap_or(""))), &b)
+}
+
+fn page(title: &str, description: Option<&str>, body: &str) -> Response {
+    let full = if title == "iPX Directory" { title.to_owned() } else { format!("{title} | iPX Directory") };
+    let desc = description.filter(|d| !d.is_empty()).map(|d| d.chars().take(200).collect::<String>())
+        .unwrap_or_else(|| "Public podcasts and blogs that iPX servers share.".into());
+    let html = format!(
+        "<!doctype html><html lang=en><head><meta charset=utf-8><meta name=viewport content=\"width=device-width,initial-scale=1\">\
+         <title>{}</title><meta name=description content=\"{}\"><meta name=color-scheme content=\"light dark\">\
+         <link rel=icon href=/favicon.png><link rel=stylesheet href=/site.css><script src=/site.js defer></script></head>\
+         <body><header><a class=brand href=\"/\"><picture><source srcset=/logo-dark.svg media=\"(prefers-color-scheme: dark)\">\
+         <img src=/logo.svg alt=\"\" width=32 height=32></picture>iPX Directory</a>\
+         <form action=/search role=search><input type=search name=q placeholder=\"Find a feed\" aria-label=\"Find a feed by name\"></form></header>\
+         <main>{body}</main><footer>Public podcasts and blogs that iPX servers share, and how many people on them subscribe. \
+         Read only: to change what is here, an iPX server shares its public feeds.</footer></body></html>",
+        esc(&full),
+        esc(&desc),
+    );
+    let mut r = html.into_response();
+    let h = r.headers_mut();
+    h.insert(header::CONTENT_TYPE, HeaderValue::from_static("text/html; charset=utf-8"));
+    h.insert(header::CACHE_CONTROL, HeaderValue::from_static("public, max-age=300"));
+    h.insert(header::CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY, HeaderValue::from_static(CSP));
+    h.insert("x-content-type-options", HeaderValue::from_static("nosniff"));
+    h.insert("referrer-policy", HeaderValue::from_static("no-referrer"));
+    r
+}
+
+fn not_found(why: &str) -> Response {
+    let mut r = page("Not found", None, &format!("<p class=back><a href=\"/\">Directory</a></p><h2>Not found</h2><p class=hint>{}</p>", esc(why)));
+    *r.status_mut() = StatusCode::NOT_FOUND;
+    r
+}
+
+fn failed(e: anyhow::Error) -> Response {
+    tracing::error!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "a directory page failed");
+    let mut r = page("Unavailable", None, "<h2>Unavailable</h2><p class=hint>The directory could not read its list just now. Try again in a minute.</p>");
+    *r.status_mut() = StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE;
+    r
+}
+
+fn redirect(to: &'static str) -> Response {
+    (StatusCode::SEE_OTHER, [(header::LOCATION, to)]).into_response()
+}
+
+/// A cover from its publisher, over the feed's initials, which show where it has none or it fails.
+fn art(l: &Listing, class: &str) -> String {
+    // The first letter of each of the first two words that have one: `<antirez>` is A, not nothing.
+    let initials: String = name(l).split_whitespace().filter_map(|w| w.chars().find(|c| c.is_alphanumeric())).take(2).collect();
+    let img = l.image.as_deref().filter(|u| u.starts_with("https://") || u.starts_with("http://"))
+        .map(|u| format!("<img src=\"{}\" alt=\"\" loading=lazy referrerpolicy=no-referrer>", esc(u)))
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    format!("<span class=\"{class}\" aria-hidden=true><i>{}</i>{img}</span>", esc(&initials.to_uppercase()))
+}
+
+fn name(l: &Listing) -> &str {
+    l.title.as_deref().filter(|t| !t.trim().is_empty()).unwrap_or(&l.id)
+}
+
+fn subscribers(n: i64) -> String {
+    match n {
+        0 => "Listed, no subscribers yet".into(),
+        1 => "1 person subscribes".into(),
+        n => format!("{n} people subscribe"),
+    }
+}
+
+fn plural(n: usize, word: &str) -> String {
+    format!("{n} {word}{}", if n == 1 { "" } else { "s" })
+}
+
+/// `12 Oct 2026`, from a Unix time, with no date library: the civil-from-days algorithm.
+fn date(t: i64) -> String {
+    let z = t.div_euclid(86_400) + 719_468;
+    let era = z.div_euclid(146_097);
+    let doe = z - era * 146_097;
+    let yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36_524 - doe / 146_096) / 365;
+    let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100);
+    let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153;
+    let d = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1;
+    let m = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 };
+    let y = yoe + era * 400 + i64::from(m <= 2);
+    const MONTHS: [&str; 12] = ["Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun", "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"];
+    format!("{d} {} {y}", MONTHS[(m - 1) as usize])
+}
+
+fn clock(secs: i64) -> String {
+    let (h, m) = (secs / 3600, secs % 3600 / 60);
+    if h > 0 { format!("{h} h {m} min") } else { format!("{} min", m.max(1)) }
+}
+
+/// The publisher's HTML as plain text: tags gone, entities read, whitespace collapsed. Escaped
+/// again where it is shown.
+fn text(html: &str) -> String {
+    // A space where each tag was, or two paragraphs run together: "drives.For over".
+    let stripped = ammonia::Builder::empty().clean(&html.replace('<', " <")).to_string();
+    let decoded = stripped.replace("&lt;", "<").replace("&gt;", ">").replace("&quot;", "\"").replace("&#39;", "'").replace("&nbsp;", " ").replace("&amp;", "&");
+    decoded.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>().join(" ")
+}
+
+fn esc(s: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(s.len());
+    for c in s.chars() {
+        match c {
+            '&' => out.push_str("&amp;"),
+            '<' => out.push_str("&lt;"),
+            '>' => out.push_str("&gt;"),
+            '"' => out.push_str("&quot;"),
+            '\'' => out.push_str("&#39;"),
+            c => out.push(c),
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// A category as a path segment.
+fn seg(s: &str) -> String {
+    percent_encoding::utf8_percent_encode(s, percent_encoding::NON_ALPHANUMERIC).to_string()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_publishers_html_becomes_text_and_is_escaped_where_shown() {
+        assert_eq!(text("<p>Tom &amp; Jerry <script>alert(1)</script><b>live</b></p>"), "Tom & Jerry live");
+        assert_eq!(text("<p>One.</p><p>Two.</p>"), "One. Two.");
+        assert_eq!(esc(&text("a &lt;b&gt; c")), "a &lt;b&gt; c");
+        assert_eq!(esc("\"><img onerror=x>"), "&quot;&gt;&lt;img onerror=x&gt;");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn dates_and_lengths_read_as_people_write_them() {
+        assert_eq!(date(0), "1 Jan 1970");
+        assert_eq!(date(1_791_820_800), "12 Oct 2026");
+        assert_eq!(date(951_782_400), "29 Feb 2000");
+        assert_eq!(clock(59), "1 min");
+        assert_eq!(clock(3_725), "1 h 2 min");
+    }
+}

crates/directory/src/store.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+//! The directory's database: the feeds instances have sent, what each instance sent, and what
+//! an admin has blocked. SQL written by hand, as ipx's is, so it runs on SQLite (tests) and
+//! Postgres (production) both: `$1` parameters, `ON CONFLICT`, booleans as themselves.
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use sea_orm::{ConnectionTrait, DatabaseConnection, Statement, TransactionTrait, Value};
+
+use crate::{Blocked, FeedPage, Instance, Item, Listing, SnapshotEntry, SnapshotResult};
+
+/// A feed's items as its page shows them, and as many as ipx's own Directory page showed.
+pub const ITEMS: usize = 20;
+
+/// How long a feed's failure goes unexplained: a site down for an hour is not called gone (ipx#143).
+const FLAG_AFTER_SECS: i64 = 24 * 3600;
+
+pub struct Store {
+    db: DatabaseConnection,
+}
+
+/// What the refresher needs to ask for a feed again.
+pub struct Due {
+    pub id: String,
+    pub url: String,
+    pub etag: Option<String>,
+    pub last_modified: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// What a fetch found, to be stored.
+pub enum Refreshed {
+    NotModified,
+    Feed {
+        parsed: ipx_feed::ParsedFeed,
+        etag: Option<String>,
+        last_modified: Option<String>,
+    },
+    Failed(String),
+}
+
+pub fn now() -> i64 {
+    std::time::SystemTime::now().duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH).map_or(0, |d| d.as_secs() as i64)
+}
+
+/// The address as every instance would write it: scheme and host lower-cased, a default port
+/// and a fragment dropped. None for anything that is not http(s).
+pub fn normalise(url: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let mut u = url::Url::parse(url.trim()).ok()?;
+    if !matches!(u.scheme(), "http" | "https") || u.host_str().is_none() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    u.set_fragment(None);
+    Some(u.to_string())
+}
+
+/// A feed's id: the first 64 bits of its normalised address's SHA-256, so every instance, and
+/// anyone else, arrives at the same id for the same feed without asking.
+pub fn feed_id(normalised: &str) -> String {
+    use sha2::Digest;
+    sha2::Sha256::digest(normalised.as_bytes())[..8].iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect()
+}
+
+const SCHEMA: &[&str] = &[
+    "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS feeds (
+        id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        url TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+        title TEXT,
+        image TEXT,
+        category TEXT,
+        subcategory TEXT,
+        description TEXT,
+        podcast BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
+        items TEXT,
+        etag TEXT,
+        last_modified TEXT,
+        checked_at BIGINT,
+        last_error TEXT,
+        error_since BIGINT
+    )",
+    "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS snapshots (
+        instance TEXT NOT NULL,
+        feed_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+        subscribers BIGINT NOT NULL,
+        category TEXT,
+        subcategory TEXT,
+        PRIMARY KEY (instance, feed_id)
+    )",
+    "CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS snapshots_feed ON snapshots (feed_id)",
+    "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS blocked (
+        id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+        url TEXT,
+        title TEXT,
+        at BIGINT NOT NULL
+    )",
+];
+
+impl Store {
+    /// A database of its own for a test: a fresh schema on IPX_TEST_DATABASE_URL's Postgres when
+    /// that is set, as ipx's tests do, or else SQLite in memory.
+    #[cfg(test)]
+    pub async fn scratch() -> Self {
+        static N: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32 = std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(0);
+        let Some(url) = std::env::var("IPX_TEST_DATABASE_URL").ok().filter(|u| !u.is_empty()) else {
+            return Self::open("sqlite::memory:").await.unwrap();
+        };
+        let (pid, n) = (std::process::id(), N.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed));
+        // A bare connection: Store::open would make the tables in the public schema, and the
+        // tests running at once raced each other doing it.
+        let admin = Self { db: sea_orm::Database::connect(url.as_str()).await.unwrap() };
+        // Schemas an earlier run left behind: anything of ours not made by this process.
+        let old = admin
+            .rows(&format!(r"SELECT nspname FROM pg_namespace WHERE nspname LIKE 'ipxd\_%' AND nspname NOT LIKE 'ipxd\_{pid}\_%'"), vec![])
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        for r in old {
+            let name: String = r.try_get_by_index(0).unwrap();
+            admin.db.execute_unprepared(&format!("DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS {name} CASCADE")).await.unwrap();
+        }
+        let schema = format!("ipxd_{pid}_{n}");
+        admin.db.execute_unprepared(&format!("CREATE SCHEMA {schema}")).await.unwrap();
+        let sep = if url.contains('?') { '&' } else { '?' };
+        Self::open(&format!("{url}{sep}options=-c%20search_path%3D{schema}%20-c%20client_min_messages%3Dwarning")).await.unwrap()
+    }
+
+    pub async fn open(url: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut url = url.to_owned();
+        if url.starts_with("postgres") && !url.contains("options=") {
+            // Postgres sends a notice for every CREATE ... IF NOT EXISTS on something that exists;
+            // asking for none keeps them out of the log, as ipx's connections do.
+            let sep = if url.contains('?') { '&' } else { '?' };
+            url = format!("{url}{sep}options=-c%20client_min_messages%3Dwarning");
+        }
+        let mut opts = sea_orm::ConnectOptions::new(url.clone());
+        opts.sqlx_logging(false);
+        // An in-memory SQLite database is one per connection: a pool of them would be several.
+        if url.contains(":memory:") {
+            opts.max_connections(1);
+        }
+        let db = sea_orm::Database::connect(opts).await?;
+        for sql in SCHEMA {
+            db.execute_unprepared(sql).await?;
+        }
+        // Added after the first deploy: a database made before has the table without them.
+        if db.execute_unprepared("SELECT category FROM snapshots WHERE false").await.is_err() {
+            db.execute_unprepared("ALTER TABLE snapshots ADD COLUMN category TEXT").await?;
+            db.execute_unprepared("ALTER TABLE snapshots ADD COLUMN subcategory TEXT").await?;
+        }
+        Ok(Self { db })
+    }
+
+    fn stmt(&self, sql: &str, values: Vec<Value>) -> Statement {
+        Statement::from_sql_and_values(self.db.get_database_backend(), sql, values)
+    }
+
+    async fn exec(&self, sql: &str, values: Vec<Value>) -> Result<u64> {
+        Ok(self.db.execute_raw(self.stmt(sql, values)).await?.rows_affected())
+    }
+
+    async fn rows(&self, sql: &str, values: Vec<Value>) -> Result<Vec<sea_orm::QueryResult>> {
+        Ok(self.db.query_all_raw(self.stmt(sql, values)).await?)
+    }
+
+    pub async fn ping(&self) -> Result<()> {
+        self.rows("SELECT 1", vec![]).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Replaces everything `instance` sent before with `entries`. A private-looking address or a
+    /// blocked feed is left out and counted; the rest are added to the feeds, new ones to be
+    /// fetched by the refresher. Feeds no instance sends any more go.
+    pub async fn snapshot(&self, instance: &str, entries: &[SnapshotEntry]) -> Result<SnapshotResult> {
+        let blocked: std::collections::HashSet<String> =
+            self.rows("SELECT id FROM blocked", vec![]).await?.iter().map(|r| r.try_get("", "id")).collect::<Result<_, _>>()?;
+        let mut result = SnapshotResult::default();
+        let mut keep = std::collections::BTreeMap::new();
+        for e in entries {
+            let Some(url) = normalise(&e.url) else {
+                result.refused_invalid += 1;
+                continue;
+            };
+            // Checked here as well as by the sender: one instance's miss must not publish
+            // someone's paid feed to every other.
+            if ipx_feed::url_looks_private(&url) {
+                result.refused_private += 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            let id = feed_id(&url);
+            if blocked.contains(&id) {
+                result.refused_blocked += 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            // The same feed twice in one snapshot counts once, at its larger number.
+            let n = e.subscribers.max(0);
+            let path = e.category.as_deref().map(str::trim).filter(|c| !c.is_empty()).map(ipx_feed::category_path);
+            let slot = keep.entry(id).or_insert((url, n, path.clone()));
+            slot.1 = slot.1.max(n);
+            if slot.2.is_none() {
+                slot.2 = path;
+            }
+        }
+        result.accepted = keep.len();
+
+        let tx = self.db.begin().await?;
+        let backend = tx.get_database_backend();
+        let run = |sql: &str, values: Vec<Value>| Statement::from_sql_and_values(backend, sql, values);
+        tx.execute_raw(run("DELETE FROM snapshots WHERE instance = $1", vec![instance.into()])).await?;
+        for (id, (url, n, path)) in &keep {
+            tx.execute_raw(run(
+                "INSERT INTO feeds (id, url) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING",
+                vec![id.clone().into(), url.clone().into()],
+            ))
+            .await?;
+            tx.execute_raw(run(
+                "INSERT INTO snapshots (instance, feed_id, subscribers, category, subcategory) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)",
+                vec![
+                    instance.into(),
+                    id.clone().into(),
+                    (*n).into(),
+                    path.as_ref().map(|p| p.0.clone()).into(),
+                    path.as_ref().and_then(|p| p.1.clone()).into(),
+                ],
+            ))
+            .await?;
+        }
+        tx.execute_raw(run("DELETE FROM feeds WHERE id NOT IN (SELECT feed_id FROM snapshots)", vec![])).await?;
+        tx.commit().await?;
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+
+    /// Drops the snapshots of every instance not in `names`: a token taken out of the config
+    /// file takes its counts with it.
+    pub async fn keep_instances(&self, names: &[String]) -> Result<u64> {
+        let mut dropped = 0;
+        let present: Vec<String> = self
+            .rows("SELECT DISTINCT instance FROM snapshots", vec![])
+            .await?
+            .iter()
+            .map(|r| r.try_get("", "instance"))
+            .collect::<Result<_, _>>()?;
+        for name in present.iter().filter(|n| !names.contains(n)) {
+            dropped += self.drop_instance(name).await?;
+        }
+        Ok(dropped)
+    }
+
+    /// Drops what one instance sent; how many feeds it had.
+    pub async fn drop_instance(&self, name: &str) -> Result<u64> {
+        let n = self.exec("DELETE FROM snapshots WHERE instance = $1", vec![name.into()]).await?;
+        self.exec("DELETE FROM feeds WHERE id NOT IN (SELECT feed_id FROM snapshots)", vec![]).await?;
+        Ok(n)
+    }
+
+    // The feed's own category, or else one a sending server's admin gave it.
+    // Only feeds read as a feed at least once (`items` set): never an OPML a server sent before it
+    // knew it was one, nor an address that has never worked.
+    const LISTING: &str = "SELECT f.id, f.url, f.title, f.image,
+            CASE WHEN f.category IS NULL THEN max(s.category) ELSE f.category END AS category,
+            CASE WHEN f.category IS NULL THEN max(s.subcategory) ELSE f.subcategory END AS subcategory,
+            f.podcast, CAST(sum(s.subscribers) AS BIGINT) AS subscribers
+         FROM feeds f JOIN snapshots s ON s.feed_id = f.id WHERE f.items IS NOT NULL";
+
+    fn listing(r: &sea_orm::QueryResult) -> Result<Listing> {
+        Ok(Listing {
+            id: r.try_get("", "id")?,
+            url: r.try_get("", "url")?,
+            title: r.try_get("", "title")?,
+            image: r.try_get("", "image")?,
+            category: r.try_get("", "category")?,
+            subcategory: r.try_get("", "subcategory")?,
+            podcast: r.try_get("", "podcast")?,
+            subscribers: r.try_get("", "subscribers")?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Every feed, A to Z by title (one not fetched yet has none and sorts by its address).
+    ///
+    /// ponytail: the whole list in one answer, as ipx's own Directory was; page it when it
+    /// grows past a few thousand feeds.
+    pub async fn list(&self) -> Result<Vec<Listing>> {
+        let sql = format!("{} GROUP BY f.id ORDER BY lower(coalesce(f.title, f.url)), f.id", Self::LISTING);
+        self.rows(&sql, vec![]).await?.iter().map(Self::listing).collect()
+    }
+
+    /// The most subscribed, most first.
+    pub async fn popular(&self, limit: u64) -> Result<Vec<Listing>> {
+        let sql = format!(
+            "{} GROUP BY f.id ORDER BY sum(s.subscribers) DESC, lower(coalesce(f.title, f.url)), f.id LIMIT $1",
+            Self::LISTING
+        );
+        self.rows(&sql, vec![(limit as i64).into()]).await?.iter().map(Self::listing).collect()
+    }
+
+    /// One feed with its description and latest items.
+    pub async fn feed(&self, id: &str) -> Result<Option<FeedPage>> {
+        let sql = format!("{} AND f.id = $1 GROUP BY f.id", Self::LISTING);
+        let Some(r) = self.rows(&sql, vec![id.into()]).await?.into_iter().next() else { return Ok(None) };
+        let listing = Self::listing(&r)?;
+        let r = self
+            .rows("SELECT description, items, last_error, error_since FROM feeds WHERE id = $1", vec![id.into()])
+            .await?
+            .into_iter()
+            .next()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("feed {id} went while it was read"))?;
+        let items: Option<String> = r.try_get("", "items")?;
+        let last_error: Option<String> = r.try_get("", "last_error")?;
+        let error_since: Option<i64> = r.try_get("", "error_since")?;
+        Ok(Some(FeedPage {
+            listing,
+            description: r.try_get("", "description")?,
+            failing: last_error.map(|e| failure_words(&e, now() - error_since.unwrap_or_else(now))),
+            items: items.and_then(|i| serde_json::from_str(&i).ok()).unwrap_or_default(),
+        }))
+    }
+
+    /// Removes a feed and blocks it, so no snapshot brings it back. False when it was neither
+    /// listed nor blocked already.
+    pub async fn block(&self, id: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+        let r = self.rows("SELECT url, title FROM feeds WHERE id = $1", vec![id.into()]).await?.into_iter().next();
+        let (url, title): (Option<String>, Option<String>) = match &r {
+            Some(r) => (r.try_get("", "url")?, r.try_get("", "title")?),
+            None => (None, None),
+        };
+        let added = self
+            .exec(
+                "INSERT INTO blocked (id, url, title, at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING",
+                vec![id.into(), url.into(), title.into(), now().into()],
+            )
+            .await?;
+        self.exec("DELETE FROM snapshots WHERE feed_id = $1", vec![id.into()]).await?;
+        let removed = self.exec("DELETE FROM feeds WHERE id = $1", vec![id.into()]).await?;
+        Ok(added + removed > 0)
+    }
+
+    /// Unblocks a feed; it comes back with the next snapshot that has it.
+    pub async fn unblock(&self, id: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+        Ok(self.exec("DELETE FROM blocked WHERE id = $1", vec![id.into()]).await? > 0)
+    }
+
+    pub async fn instances(&self) -> Result<Vec<Instance>> {
+        // Postgres sums a BIGINT as NUMERIC, which does not read as an i64.
+        self.rows(
+            "SELECT instance, count(*) AS feeds, CAST(sum(subscribers) AS BIGINT) AS subscribers
+             FROM snapshots GROUP BY instance ORDER BY instance",
+            vec![],
+        )
+        .await?
+        .iter()
+        .map(|r| Ok(Instance { name: r.try_get("", "instance")?, feeds: r.try_get("", "feeds")?, subscribers: r.try_get("", "subscribers")? }))
+        .collect()
+    }
+
+    pub async fn blocked(&self) -> Result<Vec<Blocked>> {
+        self.rows("SELECT id, url, title, at FROM blocked ORDER BY at DESC, id", vec![])
+            .await?
+            .iter()
+            .map(|r| Ok(Blocked { id: r.try_get("", "id")?, url: r.try_get("", "url")?, title: r.try_get("", "title")?, at: r.try_get("", "at")? }))
+            .collect()
+    }
+
+    /// Feeds never fetched, then those fetched longest ago, older than `every` seconds.
+    pub async fn due(&self, every: i64, limit: u64) -> Result<Vec<Due>> {
+        self.rows(
+            "SELECT id, url, etag, last_modified FROM feeds
+             WHERE checked_at IS NULL OR checked_at < $1
+             ORDER BY coalesce(checked_at, 0), id LIMIT $2",
+            vec![(now() - every).into(), (limit as i64).into()],
+        )
+        .await?
+        .iter()
+        .map(|r| {
+            Ok(Due {
+                id: r.try_get("", "id")?,
+                url: r.try_get("", "url")?,
+                etag: r.try_get("", "etag")?,
+                last_modified: r.try_get("", "last_modified")?,
+            })
+        })
+        .collect()
+    }
+
+    pub async fn due_one(&self, id: &str) -> Result<Option<Due>> {
+        Ok(self
+            .rows("SELECT id, url, etag, last_modified FROM feeds WHERE id = $1", vec![id.into()])
+            .await?
+            .first()
+            .map(|r| -> Result<Due> {
+                Ok(Due {
+                    id: r.try_get("", "id")?,
+                    url: r.try_get("", "url")?,
+                    etag: r.try_get("", "etag")?,
+                    last_modified: r.try_get("", "last_modified")?,
+                })
+            })
+            .transpose()?)
+    }
+
+    pub async fn save(&self, id: &str, got: Refreshed) -> Result<()> {
+        let t = now();
+        match got {
+            Refreshed::NotModified => {
+                self.exec("UPDATE feeds SET checked_at = $1, last_error = NULL, error_since = NULL WHERE id = $2", vec![t.into(), id.into()]).await?;
+            }
+            Refreshed::Failed(err) => {
+                self.exec(
+                    "UPDATE feeds SET checked_at = $1, last_error = $2, error_since = coalesce(error_since, $1) WHERE id = $3",
+                    vec![t.into(), err.into(), id.into()],
+                )
+                .await?;
+            }
+            Refreshed::Feed { parsed, etag, last_modified } => {
+                let path = parsed.category.as_deref().map(ipx_feed::category_path);
+                let podcast = parsed.entries.iter().flat_map(|e| &e.enclosures).any(|e| {
+                    e.mime.as_deref().is_some_and(|m| m.starts_with("audio/") || m.starts_with("video/"))
+                });
+                let mut entries = parsed.entries;
+                entries.sort_by_key(|e| std::cmp::Reverse(e.published));
+                // What an item is, never its files: their addresses are where a key would be.
+                let items: Vec<Item> = entries
+                    .into_iter()
+                    .take(ITEMS)
+                    .map(|e| Item { guid: e.guid, title: e.title, link: e.link, published: e.published, duration: e.duration, description: e.description })
+                    .collect();
+                self.exec(
+                    "UPDATE feeds SET title = $1, image = $2, category = $3, subcategory = $4, description = $5,
+                        podcast = $6, items = $7, etag = $8, last_modified = $9, checked_at = $10,
+                        last_error = NULL, error_since = NULL
+                     WHERE id = $11",
+                    vec![
+                        parsed.title.into(),
+                        parsed.image.into(),
+                        path.as_ref().map(|p| p.0.clone()).into(),
+                        path.and_then(|p| p.1).into(),
+                        parsed.description.into(),
+                        podcast.into(),
+                        serde_json::to_string(&items)?.into(),
+                        etag.into(),
+                        last_modified.into(),
+                        t.into(),
+                        id.into(),
+                    ],
+                )
+                .await?;
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// A feed's last error as its page says it: explained once it has been failing a day, or else
+/// only that the check failed. Never the error itself, which is for the log.
+fn failure_words(err: &str, failing_for: i64) -> String {
+    Some(err)
+        .filter(|_| failing_for >= FLAG_AFTER_SECS)
+        .and_then(ipx_feed::explain_failure)
+        .map_or_else(|| "Its last check failed.".to_owned(), |f| f.reason.to_owned())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub(crate) mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    /// Reads the fixture feed as every feed waiting to be fetched, as the refresher would.
+    pub(crate) async fn fetch_all(s: &Store) {
+        for d in s.due(0, 100).await.unwrap() {
+            let parsed = ipx_feed::parse(include_bytes!("../../../tests/data/rss2.xml")).unwrap();
+            s.save(&d.id, Refreshed::Feed { parsed, etag: None, last_modified: None }).await.unwrap();
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn e(url: &str, n: i64) -> SnapshotEntry {
+        SnapshotEntry { url: url.into(), subscribers: n, category: None }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_failure_is_explained_after_a_day_and_never_names_its_address() {
+        let nothing = "the feed's address answered with nothing at all";
+        assert_eq!(failure_words(nothing, FLAG_AFTER_SECS), "This address answers with nothing; the site may be gone.");
+        // Not before it has been failing a day, as on the feed's own page in ipx (#143).
+        assert_eq!(failure_words(nothing, 3600), "Its last check failed.");
+        let raw = "error sending request for url (http://daily-quests.com/comic/?feed=atom): connection closed";
+        assert_eq!(failure_words(raw, FLAG_AFTER_SECS), "Its last check failed.");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn every_instance_writes_one_feed_the_same_way() {
+        let a = normalise("HTTPS://Example.COM:443/feed.xml#top").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(a, "https://example.com/feed.xml");
+        assert_eq!(feed_id(&a), feed_id(&normalise("https://example.com/feed.xml").unwrap()));
+        assert_eq!(feed_id(&a).len(), 16);
+        assert!(normalise("ftp://example.com/x").is_none());
+        assert!(normalise("not a url").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn snapshots_replace_what_an_instance_sent_and_add_up_across_instances() {
+        let s = Store::scratch().await;
+        let r = s
+            .snapshot("a", &[e("https://x.test/a.xml", 3), e("https://x.test/b.xml", 1), e("https://x.test/a.xml", 5)])
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(r.accepted, 2);
+        s.snapshot("b", &[e("https://x.test/a.xml", 2)]).await.unwrap();
+        // Nothing is listed until it has been read as a feed.
+        assert!(s.list().await.unwrap().is_empty());
+        fetch_all(&s).await;
+        let pop = s.popular(10).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((pop[0].url.as_str(), pop[0].subscribers), ("https://x.test/a.xml", 7));
+        assert_eq!(pop[1].subscribers, 1);
+
+        // a no longer has b.xml: nobody does, so it goes.
+        s.snapshot("a", &[e("https://x.test/a.xml", 1)]).await.unwrap();
+        let all = s.list().await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(all.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(all[0].subscribers, 3);
+
+        let i = s.instances().await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(i.iter().map(|i| (i.name.as_str(), i.feeds, i.subscribers)).collect::<Vec<_>>(), [("a", 1, 1), ("b", 1, 2)]);
+
+        // A token taken out of the config file takes its counts.
+        s.keep_instances(&["b".into()]).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(s.list().await.unwrap()[0].subscribers, 2);
+        s.drop_instance("b").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(s.list().await.unwrap().is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn private_looking_addresses_and_blocked_feeds_are_refused() {
+        let s = Store::scratch().await;
+        let r = s
+            .snapshot(
+                "a",
+                &[
+                    e("https://feeds.supercast.com/feeds/abc123", 1),
+                    e("https://x.test/feed?token=secret", 1),
+                    e("https://user:pass@x.test/feed", 1),
+                    e("https://www.patreon.com/rss/show?auth=k", 1),
+                    e("mailto:x@y", 1),
+                    e("https://x.test/public.xml", 1),
+                ],
+            )
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((r.accepted, r.refused_private, r.refused_invalid), (1, 4, 1));
+        fetch_all(&s).await;
+
+        let id = s.list().await.unwrap()[0].id.clone();
+        assert!(s.block(&id).await.unwrap());
+        assert!(s.list().await.unwrap().is_empty());
+        let r = s.snapshot("a", &[e("https://x.test/public.xml", 1)]).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((r.accepted, r.refused_blocked), (0, 1));
+        assert_eq!(s.blocked().await.unwrap()[0].url.as_deref(), Some("https://x.test/public.xml"));
+        assert!(s.unblock(&id).await.unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(s.snapshot("a", &[e("https://x.test/public.xml", 1)]).await.unwrap().accepted, 1);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_feed_naming_no_category_takes_the_one_a_server_gave_it() {
+        let s = Store::scratch().await;
+        let entry = |c: Option<&str>| SnapshotEntry { url: "https://x.test/blog.xml".into(), subscribers: 1, category: c.map(Into::into) };
+        s.snapshot("a", &[entry(Some("Visual Arts"))]).await.unwrap();
+        let d = s.due(0, 10).await.unwrap().remove(0);
+        let mut parsed = ipx_feed::parse(include_bytes!("../../../tests/data/rss2.xml")).unwrap();
+        parsed.category = None;
+        s.save(&d.id, Refreshed::Feed { parsed, etag: None, last_modified: None }).await.unwrap();
+        let l = s.list().await.unwrap().remove(0);
+        assert_eq!((l.category.as_deref(), l.subcategory.as_deref()), (Some("Arts"), Some("Visual Arts")));
+        s.snapshot("a", &[entry(None)]).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(s.list().await.unwrap()[0].category, None);
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_fetched_feed_shows_its_metadata_and_newest_items_but_no_files() {
+        let s = Store::scratch().await;
+        s.snapshot("a", &[e("https://x.test/feed.xml", 1)]).await.unwrap();
+        let due = s.due(3600, 10).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(due.len(), 1);
+        let parsed = ipx_feed::parse(include_bytes!("../../../tests/data/rss2.xml")).unwrap();
+        let title = parsed.title.clone();
+        s.save(&due[0].id, Refreshed::Feed { parsed, etag: Some("e".into()), last_modified: None }).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(s.due(3600, 10).await.unwrap().is_empty());
+        let page = s.feed(&due[0].id).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(page.listing.title, title);
+        assert!(page.listing.podcast);
+        assert!(!page.items.is_empty() && page.items.len() <= ITEMS);
+        assert!(page.items.windows(2).all(|w| w[0].published >= w[1].published));
+        assert!(page.failing.is_none());
+        let json = serde_json::to_string(&page).unwrap();
+        assert!(!json.contains(".mp3"), "an item's file must not be in its page: {json}");
+
+        s.save(&due[0].id, Refreshed::Failed("HTTP 404 Not Found".into())).await.unwrap();
+        let page = s.feed(&due[0].id).await.unwrap().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(page.failing.as_deref(), Some("Its last check failed."));
+        assert_eq!(page.listing.title, title, "a failure keeps what was found before");
+    }
+}

crates/feed/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[package]
+name = "ipx-feed"
+version = "0.0.0"
+publish = false
+edition.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+anyhow.workspace = true
+atom_syndication.workspace = true
+chrono.workspace = true
+opml.workspace = true
+quick-xml.workspace = true
+reqwest.workspace = true
+rss.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
+url.workspace = true
+
+[dev-dependencies]
+tokio.workspace = true

crates/ipx/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,831 @@
+# Changelog: ipx
+
+The daemon: the API, scans, downloads, DeadAir and the database. The page has its own changelog,
+[web/CHANGELOG.md](../../web/CHANGELOG.md), and the directory service its own,
+[crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md](../directory/CHANGELOG.md). Until 0.12.0 this was the changelog of
+all of ipx, the page included; they were split with the services (#207).
+
+Its version is in `crates/ipx/Cargo.toml`, and a release is tagged `vX.Y.Z`.
+
+The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
+and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
+
+## [Unreleased]
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-10-12
+
+### Added
+
+- With a directory token that may administer it, ipx's admins remove a feed from the directory (blocking it) or check it now, list and unblock what is blocked, and list and drop the servers sharing (#206).
+- ipx passes its trace on when it calls the directory, so a Directory page is one trace from the browser to the directory (#213).
+
+### Changed
+
+- The Directory comes from a directory service that iPX servers share, set up in Admin, Directory with its address and this server's token, instead of only this server's feeds. Sharing this server's public feeds with it is a setting, never a private one, and subscriber counts are every sharing server's. ipx sends the directory its feeds when they change, and every half hour (#205, #211).
+- A feed can be marked private, which keeps it out of the directory. A feed with a login, or whose address carries a key, is private already (#205).
+- ipx serves no page: the page is ipx-web's, which passes the API on to ipx, and ipx is built without node (#203).
+- `docker-compose.yml` is a sample to start from, ipx alone on SQLite with its folders beside the file, instead of a copy of the author's server (#208).
+- The source is a Cargo workspace: the daemon in `crates/ipx`, feed fetching and parsing in `crates/feed`. `cargo build --release` still makes `target/release/ipx` (#202).
+
+## [0.12.0] - 2026-10-11
+
+### Added
+
+- With `[web] metrics_bind` set, ipx serves Prometheus metrics on a port and thread of their own: the database pool, the worker's job and queue, jobs done and their time, scans, downloads and requests in progress, download speed, live-update listeners and missed updates, DeadAir's backlog, the artwork cache's fill, hit rate and evictions, memory, open files and the library's counts. (#194, #195, #198, #199).
+- The page reports its errors, the player's, how long play takes to start and how long it stalls to the server's log, and the requests one tap sets off share a trace, the playlist, audio and saved place of what it played included (#190, #192).
+- Saving an episode from a show with DeadAir on saves it without its dead air, at your breathing room (#186).
+- Choose the pause DeadAir leaves where it cuts a silence, from 0.2 to 0.5 seconds, for each show in its settings, as its breathing room, on a slider from brisk to relaxed. It is 0.3 seconds unless you change it, up from 0.2, which made speech sound rushed (#182, #183).
+
+### Changed
+
+- DeadAir no longer makes a shortened copy of each episode. It plays the original with its long silences left out, ready a few seconds after the download, with no gap where a silence was cut and no extra disk space; the copies already made are removed (#179, #181, #196).
+- DeadAir is in the same box as a show's download settings, below them, and stays there when automatic downloads are off (#185).
+- The container is built on Debian 13 (trixie) instead of 12, so DeadAir uses ffmpeg 7.1 instead of 5.1 (#177).
+- On Postgres, ipx keeps up to 20 connections to the database instead of 10, for the bursts of a page load asking for many covers at once (#200).
+- Traces of the disk sweep, episode lists and DeadAir's work on each file show each step, and the sweep's trace says what it removed (#187).
+
+### Fixed
+
+- All Subscriptions, and every item list, comes up faster, most of all the first time after a quiet spell: it took half a second to two (#188).
+- Checking for new episodes no longer waits up to 12 seconds each time on a clear-out of dead feeds from the Directory, which now runs once a day (#193).
+- A page left open no longer misses updates after a check for new episodes: the note that each feed not due was skipped, one per feed, filled the queue they share (#197).
+
+### Security
+
+- Cloudflare no longer keeps a copy of the audio you play, which it served to anyone it let in without checking they subscribe (#189).
+
+## [0.11.0] - 2026-10-09
+
+### Added
+
+- DeadAir: turn it on for a show in its settings, or with the button beside the speed while it plays, and its episodes play with long silences shortened, so podcasts finish sooner without sounding sped up. Your place carries over when you turn it on or off, each episode says how much shorter it is ("Cutting dead air…" until it is done), and Settings shows the time it has saved you. It is off for every show until you turn it on (#171, #172, #173, #174, #176).
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A downloaded file's play, save, share and delete buttons stay on one row in the Files pane, instead of delete wrapping underneath (#175).
+- Cover art up to 20 MB is shown, instead of nothing for anything over 5 MB, as for five of the Glass Cannon Network's feeds.
+- Seeking in an episode while many people listen answers in about 10 ms instead of 40, and files stream about four times as fast: each connection now sends what is ready without waiting for the browser to acknowledge the last part.
+- Artwork that could not be fetched is not fetched again for an hour, instead of on every page load, and the server's log says which image it was and why.
+
+## [0.10.3] - 2026-10-09
+
+### Changed
+
+- Swiping past the last item shows the theme's accent colour, without the words "No more items".
+- An empty list and the reader with nothing picked say nothing, instead of "Nothing here yet — try Scan now." and "Pick an item to read it."; a search that finds nothing still says so.
+- In Settings, the API tokens sit in a box of their own.
+- A feed's settings are redesigned: downloading on its own is a switch with what depends on it beneath, how many is Default, Newest or All shown on a strip of the show's own episodes, words to pick or hide are chips, the feed's address is at the top with a copy button, and Save is always in reach. Its folder and Directory category are no longer in it.
+- The feed list's traces show each of its database queries, so it can be told where its time goes.
+- Saving a feed's settings asks the database for your subscription once, not twice.
+- `ipx add` and Add feed in the page add a feed the same way, through one piece of code.
+- A pinned item or feed's pin button is filled with the theme's accent, in the reader, on the feed's page and in the toolbar, so pinned no longer looks like not pinned.
+- A feed's page in the Directory says how many people here subscribe only when someone does, without "Nobody here subscribes yet".
+
+### Fixed
+
+- The unread counts catch up when you come back to the page: an item read on another device, or while the phone app was in the background, no longer stays counted as unread until a reload.
+- A feed set to download 0 of its newest items downloads all of them, the whole back catalogue, as the server's 0 does; it downloaded nothing.
+- The feed list loads faster: it counts the items and files of your own feeds, not of every feed on the server, and asks for a group's title once, not once for every feed in it.
+- Downloading or deleting a file the server no longer has answers "not found" instead of a server error.
+- A feed's page in the Directory, and subscribing from it, no longer wait while the whole Directory is put together to check that the one feed is in it.
+- An episode that came as a torrent of several files plays its largest file, and can be deleted, by hand or to free space, instead of staying on disk for good.
+- Removing an account takes the feeds only that person read off the server, as unsubscribing does, instead of leaving them downloading every new episode for no one.
+- Freeing disk space counts only the people who subscribe to a feed: an episode is no longer taken as heard by everyone because someone who has since unsubscribed heard it, and their pins no longer keep files for good.
+- An episode whose file turns out to be a torrent shows as downloaded once it is, instead of being fetched again on every check of its feed, and no longer holds up the checking of other feeds while it downloads and seeds.
+- Downloading the latest 65 to 100 items of a feed queues them at once, instead of hanging until most had downloaded and holding up adding feeds and Refresh meanwhile.
+- Changes to the feed list made at the same moment, such as two people adding feeds, or a feed added while the server settings change, no longer undo one another.
+- A download that stops partway is given up after two minutes without data, instead of holding up every scan and download until a restart.
+- On a phone, the closed feed list no longer shades the left edge of the page with its shadow.
+- On an iPhone, the top bar's colour runs all the way up behind the status bar and the Dynamic Island, with no band of another colour above it. In Glass the bar is solid on a phone, in the colour its glass showed.
+- A feed's buttons stay on one row on a narrow phone, and the reader's buttons stay together instead of breaking across lines under a long feed name.
+- A moment's DNS failure no longer marks a feed as failing for a day or calls it gone: iPX tries it again in ten minutes. One failed lookup one morning left 205 podcasts unread, uncategorised and labelled gone until the next day. A name that does not resolve is said to be maybe gone, and only once it has been failing a day, on its Directory page as on its own.
+
+## [0.10.2] - 2026-10-05
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A publisher's correction to an item already in iPX, a retitled episode, mended text, new artwork or a fixed length, arrives on the next read. Since 0.9.1 an item kept what it first said: Ain't It Cool News's items each showed the text of the one before, long after the feed was fixed.
+- A feed's page in the Directory says when the feed is failing, and why, and no longer says nobody here subscribes to a feed someone does.
+
+## [0.10.1] - 2026-10-05
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A feed whose address answers with nothing, as a lapsed domain does behind a DNS filter's block page, shows as failing, with what to do about it, instead of as a show that has not posted yet.
+- The search box finds episodes in Currently Listening. It did nothing there.
+- `ipx add`, `ipx rm` and `ipx import`, run while the daemon runs, reach it at once. It kept its old list of feeds and wrote it back at its next change, undoing them.
+- On SQLite, several requests are answered at once instead of one at a time. With 25 people browsing, a page of a feed's items comes back in 10ms rather than 130.
+- On Postgres, a write no longer waits for the database server's disk. A scan read about one feed a second and now reads 1,500 in 20 seconds.
+- Checking every feed no longer makes every icon in the feed list flash while it runs: the list keeps the icons it has already drawn.
+
+### Security
+
+- A flood of sign-in attempts no longer stalls the site for everyone else. Passwords are checked a few at a time, away from the threads that answer every other request; forty wrong passwords at a time made everything else take four seconds.
+- A wrong password is refused in the same time whether or not the name is an account here, so how long it takes no longer tells anyone which names are.
+
+## [0.10.0] - 2026-10-05
+
+### Added
+
+- API tokens: in Settings, make a named token that lets a script or an agent use iPX as you, sent as `Authorization: Bearer`, and revoke it there. Each shows when it was last used.
+- In the Directory, a feed you do not subscribe to opens a page of its own: its cover, its category, how many people here subscribe, what the feed says it is, and its latest episodes or posts, with a button to subscribe. Before, only its subscribe button did anything.
+- Feeds that don't set a category, as most blogs don't, now get one automatically, so they show up under a category in the Directory. iPX picks the closest of Apple's podcast categories from the feed's title and latest headlines. This happens once per feed: the first time a new feed is read, or for a feed you already had, the next time you force a refresh. It needs `TYPESAFE_KEY` set. An admin can change the category in the feed's settings.
+- Artwork is kept on disk once shown and loads from iPX, not from each publisher's server: fast after the first time, and still there when the publisher's server is not. The admin page sets how much is kept (500 MB by default).
+- `ipx add --list --category News <url>` puts a feed in the Directory for anyone to subscribe to,
+  and it stays there when its last subscriber leaves. Run for a feed already in the catalogue,
+  it lists it or sets its category.
+- Feeds nobody subscribes to that are dead for a month or quiet for a year are removed, so the
+  Directory lists feeds worth taking.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The Directory is laid out as Apple's is. It opens on the ten most subscribed feeds, ranked, and the categories as tiles showing some of their shows' covers. A category opens a page of its own with its most subscribed feeds, its subcategories (Tech News under News, Video Games under Leisure) and its feeds; See all lists every one, A to Z, Z to A or by most subscribers. This replaces the grid of every feed under rows of category buttons, and Popular, which is gone from the feed list with its key, g p.
+- A pinned item in a list wears the same disc as a pinned feed, in the theme's accent, instead of a plain solid pin.
+- An item published without a title shows its opening words, in plain text rather than bold, instead of "(untitled)"; one with no text either shows its file's name, or its show and date. Opened, it starts with its text.
+- A feed that has moved for good (a permanent redirect) is followed to its new address, which iPX then reads from, and says so in the log as `feed_moved`. A temporary redirect changes nothing.
+- The daemon sleeps until the next feed is due, at most ten minutes, instead of looking every minute; refreshing or adding a feed still wakes it at once.
+- A pinned feed's pin sits on the corner of its artwork, as a failing feed's mark does, instead of before its name.
+- The Directory lists feeds nobody subscribes to yet; its most subscribed still lists what people subscribe to.
+  A feed nobody subscribes to is checked once a day, and at once when someone subscribes. A
+  listed feed downloads nothing until someone subscribes.
+- The Directory loads faster: it asked the database three questions per feed.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A database on SQLite, the default, no longer waits for the disk after nearly every write. On a slow disk a scan of 1,500 feeds took most of an hour and now takes half a minute. Postgres is unaffected.
+- The search box finds a feed in the Directory by name. It did nothing there.
+- Feeds that file themselves under Apple's Football or Soccer show under Sports, and those under the old Software How-To under Technology, instead of as categories of their own.
+- The download queue, in `ipx status`, `/api/status` and the dashboard, counts only what iPX will download on its own: older episodes beyond a show's limit, and files of feeds that do not download automatically, are listed but no longer counted as waiting.
+- Artwork published on http is stored on https when its host serves it there, so the page loads it directly; the rest still comes through iPX.
+- An iPhone adding the site to its home screen finds the icon at the first address it tries.
+- A feed whose server hangs no longer holds up every scan: a feed gets 30 seconds, and connecting anywhere 10.
+
+### Security
+
+- A feed's items and files reach only the people who subscribe to it. Anyone signed in could read any feed's items, a paid feed's included, with the addresses of its files, which can carry the subscriber's key, and could play, download or delete its files.
+
+## [0.9.1] - 2026-09-29
+
+### Added
+
+- `IPX_LOG_FORMAT=json` logs one JSON object a line, for Loki and the like: a request's method,
+  route, status and `duration_ms`, a scan's or download's details, a failure's kind in `error.type`
+  (and its HTTP status in `http.response.status_code`), and each line's `trace_id` and `span_id`.
+- With `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` set, the daemon sends traces of its scans, downloads and web
+  requests to a collector such as Tempo; a scan's shows the time each feed spends fetching, on its
+  artwork and in the database.
+- A feed with no artwork of its own, or whose artwork is missing, shows its website's icon, or the
+  site's `/favicon.ico`, and follows the site when it changes. It is asked for again only when the
+  artwork changes or you refresh the feed.
+- The refresh button turns while its feed is being checked, and the check-every-feed buttons
+  while any of yours is.
+- Adding a website's address, with or without `https://`, subscribes to the feed that site links.
+  An address is checked before it is added, and anything that is neither a feed nor a page linking
+  one is refused with the reason, instead of being added and failing on every check.
+- `/api/status` gives the number of feeds, items waiting to download and files downloaded, and
+  the version, for a dashboard such as Homepage.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The start-up line about the web UI being reachable off the machine says what guards it, and is a warning only when there is no Cloudflare Access in front of it.
+- The feed list updates just the feed that changed, as a scan checks it or you read an item, instead of reloading the whole list every minute.
+- A scan fetches several feeds at once, so a refresh no longer waits on every site in turn.
+- A feed that was failing when its last subscriber left is forgotten, rather than kept with its error for good. One that worked, or has files on disk, is kept as before.
+- A feed that keeps failing is checked less and less often, waiting as long as it has been failing, up to once a day; it goes back to its schedule as soon as it works. Refreshing it still checks it at once.
+- `ipx list` shows each feed's id on a line of its own, labelled, under its title.
+- Each browser keeps its own theme, so a phone and a desktop can differ. A browser that has not
+  chosen one yet starts from the theme your account had.
+- The Modern theme takes its colours from the new logo: its navy, the blue of its bars and the
+  orange of its needle.
+- The logo is in the top bar beside the add-feed button, in place of the name at the top of the
+  feed list, and left out on a phone, for the search box. It follows the page, dark in a dark theme
+  and light in a light one, as the browser tab's icon does, and hovering it shows iPX's version,
+  which says so between releases: 0.9.1-dev, not 0.9.0.
+- The logo's needle is a brighter, redder orange that stands apart from the blue bars.
+
+### Removed
+
+- `ipx copy-db`, the one-off move from SQLite to Postgres. Going back needs only the old `state.db`.
+- Starting up no longer looks for files downloaded twice before 0.6.0 read WordPress's player
+  links correctly; that clean-up has run.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A limit on new downloads per check means a show's newest episodes: with it set to 3, ipx no longer works back through the show's history three at a time. Set to 0, it still takes the whole back catalogue.
+- With no limit on new downloads per check (`max_new_per_check = 0`), downloads work on Postgres; they failed.
+- Checking a feed with a long history is much quicker: items already stored are no longer written again on every check.
+- The feed list loads several times faster: it was asking the database six questions per feed.
+- Artwork a feed offers only over plain http shows on the https site too.
+- A failing feed is easy to spot in any theme: a mark on its artwork, what is wrong in place of
+  its counts, and its artwork greyed out once it has failed for a day.
+- The log has no terminal colour codes when it is not going to a terminal, as in `docker logs`.
+- The read button shows whether an item is read, as the pin beside it shows whether it is
+  pinned: a tick when read, an envelope when not. It used to show the opposite.
+- In Directory and Popular, Subscribe is a plus again, not the tick that marks a feed you have.
+- A feed's refresh button looks like the buttons beside it, instead of standing out filled in.
+- Refreshing reads your feeds in full, instead of only asking each one whether it changed, so
+  a feed that has not changed is still read again.
+- Pulling the item list down to check for new items shows a spinner for a couple of seconds, and
+  a second pull meanwhile does nothing, instead of no sign at all that the check started.
+- Settings no longer lists the server's download folder, which only an admin can change, on
+  the admin page.
+- On the Unread tab, a swipe back (or k) goes to the item you just read, instead of past it or
+  back to the list. The items read on the way leave the Unread tab once you close the reader.
+
+## [0.9.0] - 2026-09-28
+
+### Added
+
+- A new logo, on every page, in the browser tab and on the home screen: the old radio's screen,
+  its tuning scale and orange needle, drawn flat to Apple's app icon guidelines, with a dark
+  version. The 2004 icon is still at /icon.png.
+- Words that hide items. Settings has a list for every feed you read, and each feed's settings a
+  list of its own; an item with one of those words or phrases in its title or text is hidden
+  from you and is not downloaded on your account. Other people's lists never hide anything from
+  you.
+- Share buttons for a feed, an item and a file. On a phone they open the system's share sheet;
+  elsewhere they copy the link. A link that looks like it carries your own access to a paid
+  feed asks before it goes anywhere.
+
+### Changed
+
+- iPodderX is now called iPX, on every page and in the tab. The repository is rays/ipx.
+- On a phone, iPodderX looks like an iOS app: filled round buttons and capsules instead of
+  outlined boxes, no rules between the bars and the page, the feed's name as a large title, a
+  segmented control for the tabs, taller rows with 17px text, and dialogs as sheets from the
+  bottom. Tapping a text box no longer zooms the page in. High contrast, and Increase Contrast,
+  keep their outlines.
+- The Glass theme's panels catch the light: a bright rim along the top and left edges, a fainter
+  one along the far edges, and a soft sheen from the top-left corner.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A new tab or home-screen icon shows up as soon as it is deployed, instead of a day later.
+- Opened from the home screen on an iPhone, the top bar, the reader's back button and the top
+  of the feed list keep clear of the Dynamic Island and the status bar instead of sitting under
+  them.
+- Swiping between items on a phone takes a quarter of the screen, so a diagonal scroll no longer
+  jumps ahead by accident, and no longer shows the item list through the reader: the next or
+  previous item sits beside the one you are reading and comes across with it, following your
+  finger, the end of the list says so, and swiping right from the first item draws the reader off
+  the list, dimmed until it is uncovered. A swipe from the screen's left edge stays with the page,
+  rather than Safari taking it as Back.
+
+## [0.8.4] - 2026-09-19
+
+### Added
+
+- A Glass theme, light and dark, with frosted see-through panels after Apple's Liquid Glass. It
+  goes solid when the system asks for less transparency or more contrast.
+- The page can hand playback to a native app. Opened inside an iOS or Android shell, an episode
+  plays through the host's own player instead of the page's, so it keeps going when the screen
+  locks and the car can control it; the player bar, the row buttons and the keyboard shortcuts
+  work as they always did. Video still plays in the page. In a browser nothing changes.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- On a phone, the bottom bar keeps clear of the home indicator, so the seek bar and the times are
+  no longer cut off when the page has the whole screen: in a native shell, or added to the iOS
+  home screen. In landscape the bars keep clear of the notch as well.
+
+## [0.8.3] - 2026-09-19
+
+### Security
+
+- The daemon no longer prints the web token when it starts, so it stays out of `docker logs`. It
+  says where the token is kept instead: `[web] token` in config.toml.
+- Signing in through Cloudflare Access can check the token Access signs: set `access_team` and
+  `access_aud` under `[web]`, and a request has to carry a valid `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` as well as
+  the email header. Without it, anything on the same Docker host as ipx could send the header. See
+  docs/sso.md.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A Substack post shows its subtitle above the post, as Substack does. Only posts that arrive from
+  now on have it.
+
+## [0.8.2] - 2026-09-19
+
+### Added
+
+- Four themes, each in light and dark: Catppuccin (Latte and Mocha), Gruvbox, Solarized, and High
+  contrast, black and white with every colour at 7:1 or more.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The themes in Settings are listed in alphabetical order.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Links in Classic, and hints and headings in Modern's dark half, are dark or light enough to
+  read comfortably. A failed-action message is easier to read in every theme.
+
+## [0.8.1] - 2026-09-19
+
+### Changed
+
+- A feed being checked shows a small spinner in place of its unread count (and its folder's),
+  instead of toasts: no more "Scanning…" or "1 new" pop-ups, and none at all for feeds you do not read. A
+  "Downloaded" toast is only for a file on your screen.
+- "Check every feed" checks every feed you subscribe to, not every feed on the server.
+- The Classic theme is listed in Settings as just "Classic".
+- Settings and the keyboard shortcuts close from an X in their top corner, not a button at the bottom.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Unread counts, the unread dot and the Gone and Error tags are readable in every theme: several
+  light themes (Flat Remix, Paper, Adwaita, Nordic, Modern) drew them below AA contrast.
+- The sign-in page follows the system's light or dark setting, and fits a phone's screen instead of
+  drawing at desktop width.
+- In Classic, a selected item's play and delete buttons are white on the blue, not grey.
+- In Nordic's dark half, button and toolbar borders show.
+- A zero unread count on the selected feed no longer disappears into the selection.
+
+## [0.8.0] - 2026-09-18
+
+### Added
+
+- ipx can keep its data in Postgres: set `IPX_DATABASE_URL` to a `postgres://` URL. Without it,
+  it is the SQLite `state.db` as before. `ipx copy-db <state.db>` moves an existing database
+  across, everything in one go.
+- The catalogue of feeds and the server settings the admin page edits are kept in the database
+  rather than config.toml, which keeps where things are, the torrent settings and who may sign
+  in. The first start takes them from config.toml and trims it, keeping the original as
+  `config.toml.pre-database`; feeds added to config.toml after that are ignored, with a warning.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The database is reached through SeaORM, which is what lets it be SQLite or Postgres; on SQLite
+  nothing you see changes. On Postgres, sorting by title or feed follows the language's order (an
+  accented letter beside the plain one) rather than raw bytes. A database from before 0.7 has to
+  be opened by a 0.7 release first, which brings its tables up to date.
+
+## [0.7.0] - 2026-09-18
+
+### Added
+
+- Six more themes in Settings: Dracula, Material, Adwaita, Flat Remix, Paper and Nordic, beside
+  Classic and Modern (the existing dark and light). Each that comes both ways has its own Light,
+  Dark or Auto setting; Classic and Paper come one way only, so that setting is hidden for them.
+  A theme chosen before this carries over.
+- Your theme is kept on your account rather than in the browser, so it follows you to another
+  browser or computer, and the page arrives in it with no flash of the default. The theme a
+  browser already had is saved to your account the first time you load the page.
+- Pin a feed to the top of the feed list with the pin on its page, a feed from inside an OPML or
+  Patreon folder included, which comes out of the folder while pinned. Pins are yours alone.
+- Touch gestures: pull the item list down from its top to check the feed for new items, and
+  swipe the item you are reading left for the next one and right for the one before, or back
+  to the list from the first.
+- A favicon: the logo, squared up, also at /favicon.ico for browsers that ask there on their own,
+  and on white for an iPhone's home screen.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The server's settings, the accounts and the log are on their own admin page, /admin, reached by
+  the wrench in the header. Only an admin is sent the page, its script, or the link to it.
+  Settings is now yours alone: your theme and your subscriptions.
+- A feed that fails to check gets a red exclamation mark in the feed list, in the margin where a
+  folder's triangle sits, and its page says why, in place of a pop-up per failure that everyone
+  saw during a scan of every feed. A folder holding a failing feed has its triangle turn red.
+- The theme is chosen in Settings only; the button beside the iPodderX name is gone.
+- Add a feed asks only for the feed; Popular and Directory in the sidebar are where you browse.
+- On a phone, an item's files, with play and delete, sit above its show notes rather than below
+  them, where long notes left them looking missing.
+- On a phone, an item with no files goes straight to its text, without a box saying "No files".
+- The page is served minified, about a quarter smaller, with its script in a file of its own,
+  `/app.js`, which your browser keeps between visits and fetches again only when an update changes
+  it. The script is TypeScript in `web/src`, type-checked and built with swc; building ipx needs
+  node.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Switching tabs straight after marking everything read no longer shows the previous tab's
+  items: of two lists asked for at once, only the later one is shown.
+- The file icon of an item not yet downloaded sits level with the rest of its row, instead of
+  higher than a downloaded one's.
+- Images in posts from sites that refuse images to other sites' pages, such as Jeff Geerling's,
+  now show: ipx asks for them without saying it is the page showing them.
+- While an episode plays, its play buttons in the files pane, its row and the toolbar show
+  pause, as the player bar's does, and pause it when pressed.
+- An item you open stays read. A list refresh that crossed with marking it read could put its
+  unread dot back until the next refresh.
+- On the Unread tab, the item you were reading leaves the list as soon as you move to the next
+  one, rather than a few read items lingering until a refresh cleared them.
+- An image or link in a post given relative to the post, such as The Observation Deck's, now
+  points at the post's site rather than at ipx, and shows.
+
+## [0.6.1] - 2026-09-15
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Time left, and when an episode counts as finished, go by the length your player measured
+  rather than the feed's, which can be minutes out: one episode said 0:08 left with 2:33 to play.
+- A player left open in another tab or on another device no longer saves its older place over
+  where you have got to since, which could drop an episode out of Currently Listening.
+
+## [0.6.0] - 2026-09-15
+
+### Added
+
+- Each episode in Currently Listening has a cross that takes it off the list. It forgets where you
+  got to, so playing it again starts from the beginning.
+- An admin can give a feed a Directory category in its settings (`category` in config.toml), for
+  the blogs and other feeds that name none of their own. A feed's own iTunes category still wins.
+- Keyboard shortcuts after Feedly's: j and k through items, Shift-J and Shift-K through feeds,
+  g and a letter to go to a place, o to play, s to pin, and more. Press ? for the whole list.
+- Directory can be filtered to Podcasts or Blogs, and by each show's own iTunes category as a row
+  of chips, the narrower one where a show gives two (Games, not Leisure). The two combine, and
+  both filter in place.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Currently Listening marks the episode in the player with the EQ bars, as the item list does,
+  and its progress and time left move as it plays. Each row says how much is left.
+- Directory shows each feed as its cover art in a grid, title and subscriber count underneath,
+  instead of a list. Popular and the Add a feed dialog keep their rows.
+- The pages are set in Inter, served by ipx itself. Classic keeps Lucida Grande.
+- Keeping an item is now pinning it: a thumbtack in place of the flag, and Pin, Pinned and Unpin
+  in place of Keep, Kept and Stop keeping. A pinned item is still never deleted.
+- Currently Listening is its own place in the feed list, below Popular, instead of a section at
+  the bottom of the Popular page.
+- The first scan after upgrading fetches every feed in full once, on its usual schedule, so each
+  picks up its category without waiting for the publisher to change something.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- An episode that fails to load, or is paused before it has, no longer forgets where you left off
+  in it, and so no longer drops out of Currently Listening.
+- Currently Listening lists the episodes you have started. It left out anything marked read, and
+  opening an episode marks it read, so it usually showed nothing. An episode now leaves the list
+  once 90% of it has played.
+- A WordPress post that embeds the file it encloses no longer lists, and downloads, that file
+  twice. Items that already had it twice are folded into one at startup, and the spare copy
+  deleted.
+- The pinned column's heading lines up with the pins under it, and every heading sits a pixel
+  further right, over its column.
+- The feeds left behind by an OPML subscription removed before ipx retired them are cleared at
+  startup: forgotten if nothing was downloaded, kept as orphaned if something was. Feeds from it
+  that have since been given their own settings stay as they are, with their items. Removing an
+  OPML or Patreon subscription no longer deletes the items of a feed inside it that has its own
+  settings.
+- Titles that arrive as HTML, such as The Verge's, no longer show their entities as text:
+  "Meta&#8217;s" reads "Meta’s". Titles already stored are corrected the next time their feed
+  changes.
+
+## [0.5.5] - 2026-09-14
+
+### Changed
+
+- A feed whose site sends a message instead of the feed, such as "Unable to establish a DB
+  connection", now shows that message and is flagged as the publisher's problem, instead of two
+  parser errors about reaching the end of input.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Add a feed opened over Directory or Popular now shows its Popular list instead of staying on
+  "Loading…", and no longer cuts the Directory behind it down to ten.
+
+## [0.5.4] - 2026-09-14
+
+### Added
+
+- Currently Listening, below Popular: episodes you started and have not finished, across every
+  feed you subscribe to. Tap one to pick up where you left off.
+- Theme has an Auto option, alongside Dark, Light and Classic, that follows your system's
+  light/dark setting. All four are now also in Settings, as a dropdown next to the header
+  button's one-click-at-a-time toggle -- the same setting either way.
+
+### Changed
+
+- The feed (or Directory/Popular/All Subscriptions) and the tab you had open are remembered
+  across a reload or a new visit. A feed you no longer subscribe to, or a first visit with
+  nothing remembered yet, lands on All Subscriptions instead of the first feed alphabetically.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- On iOS, the topbar (the hamburger menu included) could stop responding to taps until a hard
+  refresh. The page sized itself with `100vh`, which iOS Safari measures against the address
+  bar's collapsed state rather than what is actually visible; `100dvh` tracks the real viewport
+  as the bar shows and hides.
+
+## [0.5.3] - 2026-09-14
+
+### Added
+
+- A feed that has been failing for a day shows a plain-English reason in the sidebar and on its
+  own page, sorted from a 404, a 401/403, a 402, a name that no longer resolves, or a web page in
+  place of the feed -- with Unsubscribe or, when the page links its new feed, Use the new address.
+  A feed that fails once and reads fine again within a day is never flagged.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Unsubscribing from the last person's OPML or Patreon subscription now retires the feeds it
+  listed, the same as a feed the list itself drops: removed if nothing was downloaded, kept and
+  marked orphaned otherwise. Until now they stayed in the database and kept being scanned hourly
+  with auto-download on, which is how 922 defunct `davewiner` feeds outlived the OPML that listed
+  them.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A feed whose XML uses a bare `&` instead of `&amp;` (kcpw, both feedland feeds) is now read
+  instead of refused.
+- A feed URL that now serves a web page says so, and names the feed the page links to when it has
+  one, instead of a raw XML parser error.
+- A publisher answering with an empty body (British Antarctic Survey's 202) is read as nothing new
+  to report, not a parse failure.
+- A link in an item's show notes opens in a new tab instead of navigating away from ipx.
+- A video file plays as video, in a small floating pane above the player bar, instead of silently
+  as sound only.
+- On the Unread tab, opening an item no longer makes it disappear from the list -- it stays until
+  you open a different one, even if a scan finishes and refreshes the list while it is open.
+- Subscribe and Unsubscribe have their own icons (a circled check and a circled minus) instead of
+  sharing the generic plus and minus used for adding feeds, users and imports.
+- Settings no longer disappears for a non-admin account. It was hiding the whole Settings modal
+  along with the log and the users screen, but a non-admin has settings of their own in there --
+  their subscriptions' Export and Import, and the schedule and quota are worth seeing even without
+  a say in them. Only the log and the users screen, which the server also refuses them, are gone.
+
+## [0.5.2] - 2026-09-12
+
+### Added
+
+- Settings → Users and `ipx user list` show when each account was added and when it last signed
+  in, to the hour.
+- `ipx user rename <name> <new name>` renames an account and keeps its feeds, read state and admin
+  rights. An account made before the proxy was set up can take the name the proxy signs it in as.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Directory and Popular list the feeds inside an OPML one by one, and no longer the OPML itself,
+  so you can subscribe to just the shows you want.
+- The database no longer records when subscriptions and sign-in sessions were created. Nothing
+  ever read it, and an existing database drops the columns on its next start.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Show notes that the podcast's host cut off in the middle of a tag no longer open with a scrap of
+  HTML: the item's other copy of its notes is used instead, from the next time the feed changes.
+  Daily Meditation Podcast had 57.
+- Docker no longer shows ipodderx as starting, or calls it unhealthy, while it scans or downloads:
+  `ipx status` answers at once instead of waiting for the job in progress to finish.
+- Signing out after signing in through Cloudflare Access no longer lands on ipodderx's own password
+  page. With the new `sign_out_url` set, Sign out ends the Access session, and the password page
+  sends anyone the proxy signs in straight to their feeds.
+- The sign-in guide, `docs/sso.md`, describes the setup ipodderx.sdf1.net really runs: Authentik as
+  Cloudflare Access's identity provider, and how to find the address ipx has to trust. It had never
+  been checked against a real setup, and pointed at the wrong address.
+
+## [0.5.1] - 2026-09-12
+
+### Fixed
+
+- The triangle that opens an OPML or Patreon folder was cramped against the folder's art. It has
+  more room now, and a wider target to click.
+
+## [0.5.0] - 2026-09-12
+
+### Added
+
+- A Patreon token pasted into Add feed, or a creator's RSS link without `&show=`, becomes a folder
+  of that creator's shows, kept in step on every scan like a subscribed OPML. A creator with only
+  one show stays a plain feed. One already added as a single long feed is split into its shows on
+  its next scan, keeping its files and what you had read.
+- Add feed has an "Allow items marked explicit" box, so a new feed's first scan no longer skips
+  every explicit item.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Unread counts, unread dots and download progress are amber, the colour of the icon's EQ bars.
+  Blue is kept for the primary action and links, so a count no longer looks like a button.
+- What is playing is marked by small EQ bars, in its row and in the player. They move only while it
+  plays.
+- A folder in the sidebar shows its first four shows' art as a mosaic, and its shows sit under its
+  title. Only folders have a triangle, so every feed lines up with Directory and Popular above.
+- Feeds without art get initials in a colour of their own, instead of all the same grey.
+- The Flagged tab is called Kept, as the Keep button and Settings already said.
+- A feed's header is one short line; when it checks next is in its tooltip.
+- The item list takes more of the window, and the Files pane shows only when the item has files.
+- Column headings and tags are in sentence case, and fewer things are bold.
+- Unsubscribe is a round button beside the feed's other actions.
+- Export and Import in Settings say what they do.
+- The sign-in page shows the original icon large.
+- Nothing animates when your system asks for reduced motion.
+- The pages are about 90 KB smaller: the icon is served once instead of written into each.
+- A web token generated for a new install is 64 characters instead of 32.
+- The README is a short overview of what ipx does and how to run it, and points into `docs/` for
+  the rest. It still described the layout from before 0.4.0.
+
+### Removed
+
+- The systemd units in `contrib/`. Run ipx with Docker, or point a unit of your own at
+  `ipx daemon`.
+- Upgrading from before 0.3.0 directly: what was read, kept or part-played before accounts is no
+  longer carried over to the admin, and OPML feeds that old versions wrote into `config.toml` are
+  no longer moved out of it. Upgrade through 0.4.0 first.
+- `interval_mins` in `config.toml` is ignored; use `schedule`.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- The feed list works from the keyboard: Tab reaches every feed, Enter opens it, and Right and Left
+  open and close a folder. Every button shows where the focus is, including in the toolbar, which
+  used to clip the ring.
+- "1 items" reads "1 item".
+- A selected feed without art no longer loses its initials tile in Dark and Light.
+- The player shows the feed's initials when there is no art, not the episode's.
+- Turning on Allow explicit, or changing keywords or auto-download, brings back what those settings
+  had skipped on the feed's next scan. Before, an item was judged once, when first seen, and a
+  skipped one stayed skipped whatever you changed.
+- Feeds inside an OPML or a Patreon creator follow your settings on the folder unless you set their
+  own, as the folder's settings dialog said they did. Before, the folder's settings reached nothing
+  inside it.
+- A new feed no longer takes the name of one you removed earlier and shows that feed's old items.
+  Re-adding the same feed still gets its old name, and its history, back.
+
+## [0.4.0] - 2026-09-11
+
+### Added
+
+- A Classic theme after the 2004 Mac app, beside Dark and Light: brushed-metal toolbar, Aqua
+  blue selection, red unread badges, a striped table and Lucida Grande. The theme button steps
+  through all three and remembers the choice.
+- A toolbar across the top, after the original iPodderX: add, unsubscribe and scan; play, mark
+  read and keep for the selected item, showing its state; a search box for what is showing; and
+  Settings and Log.
+- Directory, Popular and All Subscriptions at the top of the feed list, opening in the main pane.
+  Directory lists every feed anyone here subscribes to, A to Z (`GET /api/directory`). All
+  Subscriptions lists every item from every feed you subscribe to (`GET /api/entries`).
+- Items show as a table (unread, kept, title, feed, file, size, published) with a Files pane beside
+  it, and a status bar with the totals. A file's type is an icon (audio, video, image, PDF, torrent,
+  other), green once it is downloaded and red when the download failed, with the details in its
+  tooltip; its size is in KB for small files instead of "0 MB".
+- Mark everything read from All Subscriptions, across every feed you subscribe to
+  (`POST /api/read-all`). It asks first. All Subscriptions can also check every feed from its header.
+- Click a column heading in the item table to sort by it (kept, title, feed, file type, size,
+  published); click again to reverse. The server sorts, so it covers the whole list, not just the
+  fifty shown, and the choice is remembered.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Popular shows the top 10, not 20, and counts everyone, you included. Your own feeds stay on it,
+  marked Subscribed, and clicking one opens it.
+- Adding a feed scans it straight away, and an OPML import that added feeds scans them, so their
+  items show without pressing Scan.
+- A file deleted to save space, or by hand, looks as if it was never downloaded: no "reaped"
+  label, just the Download button. The retention summary says "deleted", not "reaped".
+- Buttons are icons, with the words in their tooltips, one meaning per icon: minus unsubscribes,
+  x closes or cancels, plus adds or subscribes, a dialog's confirm button carries the icon of what
+  it does, Keep is a flag, as it was in the original, mark unread is an envelope, and Subscribed is
+  a green check. The icons are Font Awesome Free, embedded as SVG: only the ones used, no font to
+  download, and nothing fetched from anyone else. They replace words and font characters such as
+  ⟳ ⤓ ↗, which came out thin and tiny and differed from font to font, and the feed header's x for
+  unsubscribe, which read as closing the page.
+- An OPML subscription's page has the same header as a feed's, with its buttons in the same places.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Playing a file from the Files pane played it twice at once, in the pane and in the player bar.
+  The pane has a play button now, and the player bar is the only player.
+- The password box in Manage users was white in the dark theme.
+- An item with no date showed a stray dot in its details.
+- Escape did not close a dialog while the cursor was in one of its boxes, so Add feed, which opens
+  in its URL box, could not be closed with Escape.
+
+### Security
+
+- Feeds from paid-feed services (Patreon, Supercast, Supporting Cast, Glow, Memberful) are never
+  listed in Popular or the Directory. A Supercast feed, which keeps its key in the URL's path
+  rather than the query, was being listed.
+
+## [0.3.0] - 2026-09-11
+
+### Added
+
+- Add feed lists what other people on this server subscribe to, most subscribers first, and
+  subscribes you by id (`GET /api/popular`, `POST /api/popular/{id}`). Feeds from an OPML, and
+  feeds with a login or a key in their URL, are never listed.
+- Upload an OPML file to import, beside the paste box. The page checks it looks like OPML before
+  sending it and clears the picker afterwards.
+- Settings → Manage users: add and remove accounts, and choose who is an admin
+  (`GET`/`POST /api/users`, `PATCH`/`DELETE /api/users/{id}`).
+- Per-user subscriptions, and per-user read, starred and playback state. The existing library is
+  adopted by the admin on first start.
+- Subscribing to a feed someone else already has costs no second fetch and no second copy. Scanning
+  merges every subscriber's wants.
+- Delete on a shared feed reads **Delete for everyone**, and the server answers `409` while anyone
+  else has starred the item or not played it (`?force=true` overrides).
+- A shared feed's header says how many other people read it.
+- `docs/` for configuration, the CLI, users, SSO and architecture, and `CLAUDE.md` for anyone
+  working on the code.
+- Browser tests for OPML import and export by every route, user admin, unread ordering, and
+  `ipx import`/`ipx export`.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Feeds inside an OPML subscription list the ones with unread items first.
+- OPML import subscribes you to every feed in the file. `ipx import` subscribes the first admin.
+- OPML export lists only your own subscriptions.
+- Production runs as a Docker image pushed to `192.168.1.130:5000` and recreated with
+  `docker compose`.
+- This changelog follows Keep a Changelog. The long-form entries moved to `docs/history.md`.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- Importing something that is not OPML answered `500`. It is now `400` "that is not an OPML file",
+  refused before anything changes.
+
+### Security
+
+- The log is admin-only (`GET /api/logs` answers `403`, and the Log button is hidden). It names
+  every account, every feed and every failed sign-in.
+- OPML export no longer hands anyone signed in the whole catalogue, including other people's
+  private feed URLs.
+
+## [0.2.0] - 2026-09-10
+
+### Added
+
+- Web UI served by the daemon: plain HTML and JS compiled into the binary, with feeds, items,
+  filters, search, sanitised show notes and live progress over SSE. Opening an item marks it
+  read; playing it marks it read only at the end or past 90%.
+- Player bar with resume, speed, keyboard shortcuts and lock-screen controls.
+- Three-pane layout: feeds beside, items above, and the selected item's text and files below.
+- Phone layout.
+- Accounts and sign-in: Argon2id passwords, session cookies, `ipx user add|list|passwd|rm`, and a
+  trusted proxy header for Cloudflare Zero Trust or Authentik (`docs/sso.md`).
+- Subscribing to an OPML: it is re-read every scan and its feeds show as a folder. A feed dropped
+  from it is removed unless it has downloads.
+- Scheduling: a global interval with per-feed overrides (`every 30m`, `4h`, `1d`, `2w`), set by an
+  admin, as are the global settings.
+- `[general] media_types`, default audio and video, and `max_new_per_check`, default 3.
+- Every enclosure of an item, a View link for files that are not audio or video, and per-item
+  artwork.
+- In-app log view with Daemon I/O, Scans and HTTP tabs.
+- Mark all read on an OPML subscription.
+- Editable feed URL with a copy button.
+- Docker image whose healthcheck goes through the control socket.
+- The iPodderX name, icon, and a colour scheme taken from the icon.
+- `tests/page-smoke.js` and a Playwright browser suite.
+
+### Changed
+
+- Feeds from an OPML live in the database, not `config.toml`.
+- Torrents run detached, two at a time.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- The daemon ignored SIGTERM until the current download finished.
+- A torrent could freeze scanning for up to an hour.
+- Image enclosures were downloaded as episodes.
+- A feed whose entries had been deleted stayed empty, because the server kept answering `304`.
+- An item with several enclosures kept only the last.
+
+### Security
+
+- The web UI needs a token or a sign-in. The token is compared in constant time, and an empty
+  token refuses to serve.
+- Show notes are sanitised with `ammonia`.
+- A proxy's user header is honoured only from an address in `trusted_proxies`.
+- A feed URL must be http(s), so `file:///etc/passwd` is refused.
+- Download folders are sanitised per path segment, so `../../etc/Show` cannot climb out.
+
+## [0.1.0] - 2026-09-09
+
+### Added
+
+- `ipx`, a Rust rewrite of the iPodderX engine: TOML config, SQLite state, and `ipx list`, `add`,
+  `rm` and `fetch`.
+- RSS and Atom parsing with conditional GET, `<ttl>` and basic auth.
+- Streaming downloads with explicit, keyword and per-scan filters, deduplicated by enclosure URL.
+- Quota and age retention that never touches a starred file, and `ipx reap [--dry-run]`.
+- `ipx daemon` with a JSON-lines Unix socket. CLI commands proxy to a running daemon.
+- Torrent enclosures through librqbit, seeding to a ratio or a time, with a stall timeout.
+- `ipx import` and `ipx export` for OPML, and systemd units in `contrib/`.
+
+[unreleased]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v1.0.0...main
+[1.0.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.12.0...v1.0.0
+[0.12.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.11.0...v0.12.0
+[0.11.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.10.3...v0.11.0
+[0.10.3]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.10.2...v0.10.3
+[0.10.2]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.10.1...v0.10.2
+[0.10.1]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.10.0...v0.10.1
+[0.10.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.9.1...v0.10.0
+[0.9.1]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.9.0...v0.9.1
+[0.9.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.8.4...v0.9.0
+[0.8.4]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.8.3...v0.8.4
+[0.8.3]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.8.2...v0.8.3
+[0.8.2]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.8.1...v0.8.2
+[0.8.1]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.8.0...v0.8.1
+[0.8.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.7.0...v0.8.0
+[0.7.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.6.1...v0.7.0
+[0.6.1]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.6.0...v0.6.1
+[0.6.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.5.5...v0.6.0
+[0.5.5]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.5.4...v0.5.5
+[0.5.4]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.5.3...v0.5.4
+[0.5.3]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.5.2...v0.5.3
+[0.5.2]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.5.1...v0.5.2
+[0.5.1]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.5.0...v0.5.1
+[0.5.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.4.0...v0.5.0
+[0.4.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0
+[0.3.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.2.0...v0.3.0
+[0.2.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/compare/v0.1.0...v0.2.0
+[0.1.0]: https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx/releases/tag/v0.1.0

crates/ipx/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+[package]
+name = "ipx"
+version = "1.0.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+ipx-feed.workspace = true
+ipx-directory.workspace = true
+ammonia.workspace = true
+anyhow.workspace = true
+argon2.workspace = true
+atom_syndication.workspace = true
+axum.workspace = true
+chrono.workspace = true
+clap.workspace = true
+futures-util.workspace = true
+jsonwebtoken.workspace = true
+librqbit.workspace = true
+opentelemetry.workspace = true
+opml.workspace = true
+percent-encoding.workspace = true
+quick-xml.workspace = true
+reqwest.workspace = true
+rss.workspace = true
+sea-orm.workspace = true
+serde.workspace = true
+serde_json.workspace = true
+sha2.workspace = true
+tokio.workspace = true
+toml.workspace = true
+tower.workspace = true
+tower-http.workspace = true
+tracing.workspace = true
+tracing-opentelemetry.workspace = true
+tracing-subscriber.workspace = true
+url.workspace = true

crates/ipx/src/access.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+//! Cloudflare Access's signed assertion, `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`. Without it, the proxy
+//! sign-in trusts a plain header from any address in `trusted_proxies`, and on Tower that
+//! address is the Docker gateway: any container there could send the header and be anyone.
+//! Access signs the same identity with keys only Cloudflare holds, so checking that signature
+//! takes the network out of the question.
+
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::future::Future;
+use std::sync::Mutex;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result};
+use jsonwebtoken::jwk::JwkSet;
+use jsonwebtoken::{Algorithm, DecodingKey, Validation, decode, decode_header};
+
+/// Cloudflare rotates its keys every six weeks or so, publishing the new one before using it.
+/// A token naming a key not seen yet refetches, but no more often than this, so a stream of
+/// made-up key ids cannot turn every request into a request to Cloudflare.
+const REFETCH_EVERY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct Keys {
+    cache: Mutex<Cache>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct Cache {
+    keys: HashMap<String, DecodingKey>,
+    fetched: Option<Instant>,
+}
+
+#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
+struct Claims {
+    email: Option<String>,
+}
+
+impl Keys {
+    /// The name the token vouches for, or None: a bad signature, the wrong audience or issuer, an
+    /// expired token, a key that cannot be had, or no email in it (a service token has none).
+    pub async fn verify(&self, client: &reqwest::Client, team: &str, aud: &str, token: &str) -> Option<String> {
+        self.verify_with(team, aud, token, || fetch(client, team)).await
+    }
+
+    /// Fill the cache before the first request needs it. A failure is only logged: the next
+    /// request tries again, and until one succeeds the proxy sign-in refuses everyone.
+    pub async fn prefetch(&self, client: &reqwest::Client, team: &str) {
+        match fetch(client, team).await {
+            Ok(set) => self.store(set),
+            Err(e) => tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "could not fetch Cloudflare Access's signing keys"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn verify_with<F, Fut>(&self, team: &str, aud: &str, token: &str, fetch: F) -> Option<String>
+    where
+        F: FnOnce() -> Fut,
+        Fut: Future<Output = Result<JwkSet>>,
+    {
+        let kid = decode_header(token).ok()?.kid?;
+        let key = match self.key(&kid) {
+            Some(k) => k,
+            None => {
+                if !self.may_refetch() {
+                    return None;
+                }
+                match fetch().await {
+                    Ok(set) => self.store(set),
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "could not fetch Cloudflare Access's signing keys");
+                        return None;
+                    }
+                }
+                self.key(&kid)?
+            }
+        };
+        // RS256 only: a token that names HS256 or none is refused here, before its signature
+        // is looked at, rather than checked with the public key as if it were a secret.
+        let mut v = Validation::new(Algorithm::RS256);
+        v.set_audience(&[aud]);
+        v.set_issuer(&[format!("https://{team}")]);
+        v.validate_nbf = true;
+        match decode::<Claims>(token, &key, &v) {
+            Ok(data) => crate::auth::name_from_header(&data.claims.email?),
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "refused a Cloudflare Access token");
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn key(&self, kid: &str) -> Option<DecodingKey> {
+        self.cache.lock().unwrap().keys.get(kid).cloned()
+    }
+
+    /// Takes the slot as it answers, so two requests at once do not both fetch.
+    fn may_refetch(&self) -> bool {
+        let mut c = self.cache.lock().unwrap();
+        if c.fetched.is_some_and(|t| t.elapsed() < REFETCH_EVERY) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        c.fetched = Some(Instant::now());
+        true
+    }
+
+    /// Replaces the whole set, so a key Cloudflare has retired stops being accepted.
+    fn store(&self, set: JwkSet) {
+        let keys = set
+            .keys
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|k| Some((k.common.key_id.clone()?, DecodingKey::from_jwk(k).ok()?)))
+            .collect();
+        let mut c = self.cache.lock().unwrap();
+        c.keys = keys;
+        c.fetched = Some(Instant::now());
+    }
+}
+
+async fn fetch(client: &reqwest::Client, team: &str) -> Result<JwkSet> {
+    let url = format!("https://{team}/cdn-cgi/access/certs");
+    client
+        .get(&url)
+        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("fetching {url}"))?
+        .error_for_status()?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .context("reading the signing keys")
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use jsonwebtoken::{EncodingKey, Header, encode, get_current_timestamp};
+
+    const TEAM: &str = "team.cloudflareaccess.com";
+    const AUD: &str = "aud-tag";
+
+    fn jwks() -> JwkSet {
+        serde_json::from_str(include_str!("../../../tests/data/access-test.jwks.json")).unwrap()
+    }
+
+    fn token(key: &[u8], alg: Algorithm, claims: serde_json::Value) -> String {
+        let mut h = Header::new(alg);
+        h.kid = Some("k1".into());
+        let k = if alg == Algorithm::RS256 { EncodingKey::from_rsa_der(key) } else { EncodingKey::from_secret(key) };
+        encode(&h, &claims, &k).unwrap()
+    }
+
+    fn claims(aud: &str, exp_in: i64) -> serde_json::Value {
+        let now = get_current_timestamp() as i64;
+        serde_json::json!({
+            "aud": [aud], "iss": format!("https://{TEAM}"), "email": "Rays@SDF1.net",
+            "iat": now, "nbf": now, "exp": now + exp_in, "type": "app",
+        })
+    }
+
+    const SIGNER: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../tests/data/access-test.der");
+    const FORGER: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../../../tests/data/access-forger.der");
+
+    async fn check(keys: &Keys, t: &str) -> Option<String> {
+        keys.verify_with(TEAM, AUD, t, || async { Ok(jwks()) }).await
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn only_a_token_cloudflare_signed_for_this_app_signs_anyone_in() {
+        let keys = Keys::default();
+        keys.store(jwks());
+        let ok = token(SIGNER, Algorithm::RS256, claims(AUD, 300));
+        assert_eq!(check(&keys, &ok).await.as_deref(), Some("rays@sdf1.net"), "lower-cased like the header");
+
+        let other_app = token(SIGNER, Algorithm::RS256, claims("another-app", 300));
+        assert_eq!(check(&keys, &other_app).await, None, "an Access token for another application");
+
+        let expired = token(SIGNER, Algorithm::RS256, claims(AUD, -3600));
+        assert_eq!(check(&keys, &expired).await, None, "expired");
+
+        let forged = token(FORGER, Algorithm::RS256, claims(AUD, 300));
+        assert_eq!(check(&keys, &forged).await, None, "signed by a key that is not Cloudflare's");
+
+        // HMAC and none, the classic ways to get a token past a verifier that trusts its header.
+        let hs = token(b"any secret at all", Algorithm::HS256, claims(AUD, 300));
+        assert_eq!(check(&keys, &hs).await, None, "HS256");
+        let none = format!("{}.{}.", "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwia2lkIjoiazEifQ",
+            ok.split('.').nth(1).unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(check(&keys, &none).await, None, "alg none");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn an_unknown_key_refetches_once_a_minute_at_most() {
+        let keys = Keys::default();
+        let ok = token(SIGNER, Algorithm::RS256, claims(AUD, 300));
+        let fetches = std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0);
+        let count = || { fetches.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst); async { Ok(jwks()) } };
+        assert_eq!(keys.verify_with(TEAM, AUD, &ok, count).await.as_deref(), Some("rays@sdf1.net"),
+            "a key not cached yet is fetched");
+        assert_eq!(fetches.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 1);
+
+        // A made-up key id straight after: not fetched again.
+        let mut h = Header::new(Algorithm::RS256);
+        h.kid = Some("nobody".into());
+        let stray = encode(&h, &claims(AUD, 300), &EncodingKey::from_rsa_der(SIGNER)).unwrap();
+        let count = || { fetches.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst); async { Ok(jwks()) } };
+        assert_eq!(keys.verify_with(TEAM, AUD, &stray, count).await, None);
+        assert_eq!(fetches.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst), 1, "rate-limited");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn keys_that_cannot_be_fetched_refuse_rather_than_wave_through() {
+        let keys = Keys::default();
+        let ok = token(SIGNER, Algorithm::RS256, claims(AUD, 300));
+        let got = keys.verify_with(TEAM, AUD, &ok, || async { Err(anyhow::anyhow!("offline")) }).await;
+        assert_eq!(got, None);
+    }
+}

crates/ipx/src/art.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+//! Artwork kept on disk, so the page loads it from iPX: fast after the first time, nothing asked
+//! of each publisher's server for every visit, and still there when a publisher is not.
+
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::sync::{LazyLock, Mutex};
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+pub fn dir() -> PathBuf {
+    crate::config::data_dir().join("art")
+}
+
+/// Where an image's bytes are kept; its content type is beside it, in `<name>.type`.
+// ponytail: std's hasher, 64 bits, keyed by the URL. Its algorithm may change with Rust, which
+// only makes the cache miss once and refill; a collision among a few thousand images is about
+// one in 10^12. Move to a SHA if either ever matters.
+pub fn path(url: &str) -> PathBuf {
+    use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
+    let mut h = std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher::new();
+    url.hash(&mut h);
+    dir().join(format!("{:016x}", h.finish()))
+}
+
+/// A kept image and its type, marked as just used, which is what keeps it from being trimmed.
+pub fn read(file: &Path) -> Option<(String, Vec<u8>)> {
+    let kind = std::fs::read_to_string(file.with_extension("type")).ok()?;
+    let body = std::fs::read(file).ok()?;
+    if let Ok(f) = std::fs::File::options().write(true).open(file) {
+        let _ = f.set_modified(std::time::SystemTime::now());
+    }
+    Some((kind, body))
+}
+
+/// Keeps an image, written aside and renamed into place, so a page asking for it meanwhile
+/// never reads half of one.
+pub fn write(file: &Path, kind: &str, body: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(file.parent().unwrap_or(Path::new(".")))?;
+    let tmp = file.with_extension("part");
+    std::fs::write(&tmp, body)?;
+    std::fs::write(file.with_extension("type"), kind)?;
+    std::fs::rename(&tmp, file)
+}
+
+/// How long an address that could not be fetched is answered from memory before it is tried again.
+const RETRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 60);
+
+/// Addresses that could not be fetched lately, and why. Without it a page shown again fetched
+/// them again: five covers too big to keep were downloaded from Patreon on every load (#169).
+// ponytail: in memory, and an entry goes only when it is asked for after RETRY. It holds at most
+// one per artwork address a feed or item names; move it to disk or prune it on trim if that grows.
+static FAILED: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, (Instant, String)>>> = LazyLock::new(Default::default);
+
+/// Why `url` could not be fetched, if it failed less than an hour ago.
+pub fn failed(url: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    failed_as_of(url, Instant::now())
+}
+
+fn failed_as_of(url: &str, now: Instant) -> Option<String> {
+    let mut map = FAILED.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
+    match map.get(url) {
+        Some((at, why)) if now.duration_since(*at) < RETRY => Some(why.clone()),
+        Some(_) => {
+            map.remove(url);
+            None
+        }
+        None => None,
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn fail(url: &str, why: &str) {
+    FAILED.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()).insert(url.to_owned(), (Instant::now(), why.to_owned()));
+}
+
+/// Removes the least recently used images until what is kept fits in `limit` bytes; 0 empties it.
+/// Returns how many went.
+pub fn trim(dir: &Path, limit: u64) -> usize {
+    let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(dir) else { return 0 };
+    let mut kept: Vec<(std::time::SystemTime, u64, PathBuf)> = entries
+        .flatten()
+        .map(|e| e.path())
+        .filter(|p| p.extension().is_none())
+        .filter_map(|p| {
+            let m = p.metadata().ok()?;
+            Some((m.modified().ok()?, m.len(), p))
+        })
+        .collect();
+    let mut total: u64 = kept.iter().map(|(_, n, _)| n).sum();
+    kept.sort();
+    let mut gone = 0;
+    for (_, n, p) in kept {
+        if total <= limit {
+            break;
+        }
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(p.with_extension("type"));
+        if std::fs::remove_file(&p).is_ok() {
+            total -= n;
+            gone += 1;
+        }
+    }
+    crate::metrics::STATS.art_cache_bytes.store(total, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+    crate::metrics::STATS.art_evicted.fetch_add(gone as u64, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+    gone
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_least_recently_used_go_first_until_it_fits() {
+        let d = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("ipx-art-test-{}", std::process::id()));
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&d);
+        for (name, age) in [("old", 300), ("mid", 200), ("new", 100)] {
+            let f = d.join(name);
+            write(&f, "image/png", &[0; 1000]).unwrap();
+            let t = std::time::SystemTime::now() - std::time::Duration::from_secs(age);
+            std::fs::File::options().write(true).open(&f).unwrap().set_modified(t).unwrap();
+        }
+        // Shown just now: no longer the oldest.
+        assert_eq!(read(&d.join("old")).unwrap().0, "image/png");
+        assert_eq!(trim(&d, 2000), 1);
+        assert!(!d.join("mid").exists() && !d.join("mid.type").exists());
+        assert!(d.join("old").exists() && d.join("new").exists());
+        assert_eq!(trim(&d, 0), 2);
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&d);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_failure_is_remembered_for_an_hour() {
+        let u = "https://example.com/a-failure-is-remembered.png";
+        assert_eq!(failed(u), None);
+        fail(u, "larger than 5 MB");
+        assert_eq!(failed(u).as_deref(), Some("larger than 5 MB"));
+        assert_eq!(failed_as_of(u, Instant::now() + RETRY), None);
+        // Asked for after the hour, it is forgotten, not just ignored.
+        assert_eq!(failed(u), None);
+    }
+}

crates/ipx/src/auth.rs

@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ pub fn verify_password(password: &str, stored: &str) -> bool {
         .is_ok()
 }
 
+/// How many password checks run at once: each is tens of milliseconds of CPU, and forty wrong
+/// passwords at a time, run on the async workers, made every other request wait 4s (#137).
+/// Half the cores, so a flood of sign-ins waits on itself and the rest of the server has the rest.
+static CHECKS: std::sync::LazyLock<tokio::sync::Semaphore> = std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
+    tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(std::thread::available_parallelism().map_or(1, |n| (n.get() / 2).max(1)))
+});
+
+/// What a name that is not an account is checked against, so that refusing it takes as long as
+/// refusing a wrong password does. Refused without a check, it came back 31ms sooner, and the
+/// time told anyone which names are accounts here (#138).
+static DECOY: std::sync::LazyLock<String> =
+    std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| hash_password("no account here has this password").expect("hashing a fixed password"));
+
+/// A sign-in's password against the account's hash, or against `DECOY` when there is no account
+/// or it has no password: false either way, in the same time. Off the async workers, and a few at
+/// a time; see `CHECKS`.
+pub async fn check_password(password: String, stored: Option<String>) -> bool {
+    let Ok(_turn) = CHECKS.acquire().await else { return false };
+    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || match stored {
+        Some(h) => verify_password(&password, &h),
+        None => {
+            verify_password(&password, &DECOY);
+            false
+        }
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
 /// A session id: 256 bits of urandom, hex. Long enough that guessing is not a strategy.
 pub fn new_session_token() -> String {
     let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
@@ -40,6 +69,19 @@ pub fn new_session_token() -> String {
     bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect()
 }
 
+/// A new API token: `ipx_` and a session's 256 random bits, the prefix so one found in a log
+/// or a file says what it opens (#123).
+pub fn new_api_token() -> String {
+    format!("ipx_{}", new_session_token())
+}
+
+/// What is kept of an API token. A fast hash is enough: the token is 256 random bits, not a
+/// password, so there is nothing to guess from a stolen hash.
+pub fn api_token_hash(token: &str) -> String {
+    use sha2::Digest;
+    sha2::Sha256::digest(token.as_bytes()).iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect()
+}
+
 fn getrandom(buf: &mut [u8]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
     use std::io::Read;
     std::fs::File::open("/dev/urandom")?.read_exact(buf)
@@ -63,6 +105,16 @@ pub fn name_from_header(raw: &str) -> Option<String> {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_sign_in_without_an_account_is_checked_all_the_same() {
+        let h = hash_password("correct horse battery").unwrap();
+        assert!(check_password("correct horse battery".into(), Some(h.clone())).await);
+        assert!(!check_password("wrong".into(), Some(h)).await);
+        assert!(!check_password("correct horse battery".into(), None).await);
+        // A decoy that does not parse is refused before any hashing, and the time says so (#138).
+        assert!(PasswordHash::new(&DECOY).is_ok());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn a_password_verifies_only_against_itself() {
         let h = hash_password("correct horse battery").unwrap();
@@ -74,6 +126,21 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(hash_password("short").is_err());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn api_tokens_are_prefixed_and_hash_to_hex() {
+        let t = new_api_token();
+        assert!(t.starts_with("ipx_") && t.len() == 68);
+        let h = api_token_hash(&t);
+        assert_eq!(h.len(), 64);
+        assert_eq!(h, api_token_hash(&t), "the same token, the same hash");
+        assert_ne!(h, api_token_hash(&new_api_token()));
+        assert_eq!(
+            api_token_hash("abc"),
+            "ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad",
+            "SHA-256"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn session_tokens_are_long_and_distinct() {
         let a = new_session_token();

crates/ipx/src/config.rs

@@ -39,6 +39,17 @@ pub struct General {
     /// image in an <enclosure>, so taking everything filled the disk with artwork and
     /// counted it as episodes. Empty means take anything.
     pub media_types: Vec<String>,
+    /// How much artwork iPX keeps on disk, in MB, so the page loads it from iPX rather than from
+    /// every publisher; the least recently shown goes first. 0 keeps none.
+    pub art_cache_mb: u64,
+    /// The directory service the Directory shows (#205), as `https://directory.ipxreader.app`. Empty
+    /// for none: then the Directory says so, and feeds are added by their address.
+    pub directory_url: String,
+    /// The token the directory gave this server. Never sent to the page: it says only whether
+    /// one is set.
+    pub directory_token: String,
+    /// Send the directory the public feeds people here subscribe to, and how many of them do.
+    pub directory_share: bool,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -78,6 +89,14 @@ pub struct Web {
     /// hop that set it, so an empty list means nobody: on a LAN-bound port anyone could
     /// otherwise claim to be anyone. Loopback covers a tunnel running beside the daemon.
     pub trusted_proxies: Vec<String>,
+    /// Cloudflare Access's team domain, `<team>.cloudflareaccess.com`. With `access_aud`, the
+    /// proxy sign-in also needs the `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` Access signs, and takes the name
+    /// from it: a header from a trusted address is otherwise all it asks for, and on a Docker
+    /// host any container can send one from the gateway's address.
+    pub access_team: String,
+    /// The Access application's Application Audience (AUD) tag. Empty, with `access_team`,
+    /// leaves the signature unchecked.
+    pub access_aud: String,
     /// Create an account the first time the proxy vouches for a name it has not seen.
     pub auto_create_users: bool,
     /// Where Sign out sends someone the proxy signed in. Signing out of ipx alone cannot stick
@@ -86,6 +105,9 @@ pub struct Web {
     pub sign_out_url: String,
     /// Sign a session out after this long without a request.
     pub session_days: i64,
+    /// Where to serve /metrics for Prometheus (#194), on a thread of its own, without sign-in:
+    /// `0.0.0.0:9187`. Empty serves none.
+    pub metrics_bind: String,
 }
 
 impl Default for Web {
@@ -96,9 +118,12 @@ impl Default for Web {
             token: String::new(),
             trusted_header: String::new(),
             trusted_proxies: vec!["127.0.0.1".into(), "::1".into()],
+            access_team: String::new(),
+            access_aud: String::new(),
             auto_create_users: true,
             sign_out_url: String::new(),
             session_days: 30,
+            metrics_bind: String::new(),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -107,6 +132,12 @@ impl Web {
     pub fn binds_publicly(&self) -> bool {
         !self.bind.starts_with("127.") && !self.bind.starts_with("localhost")
     }
+
+    /// Both halves of the Access check, or None while either is unset.
+    pub fn access(&self) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
+        (!self.access_team.is_empty() && !self.access_aud.is_empty())
+            .then_some((self.access_team.as_str(), self.access_aud.as_str()))
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -115,6 +146,10 @@ pub struct Feed {
     /// Download folder name; defaults to the sanitized feed title.
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub folder: Option<String>,
+    /// The Directory's category for a feed that names none of its own, as most blogs do not.
+    /// The feed's own iTunes category wins where there is one.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub category: Option<String>,
     /// Every whitespace-separated word of a keyword must appear in the
     /// url/title/description/categories for an enclosure to be taken.
     #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
@@ -143,6 +178,14 @@ pub struct Feed {
     /// Preferred over `password`: name of an env var holding the password.
     #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub password_env: Option<String>,
+    /// Put in the Directory by an admin (`ipx add --list`): listed with no subscribers, and kept
+    /// in the catalogue when the last one leaves, where anyone else's feed is dropped.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
+    pub listed: bool,
+    /// Never sent to the directory (#205), whatever its address looks like: someone's own
+    /// access to a paid show that `feed::url_looks_private` does not recognise.
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
+    pub private: bool,
 }
 
 fn yes() -> bool {
@@ -160,6 +203,10 @@ impl Default for General {
             max_age_days: 0,
             max_new_per_check: 3,
             media_types: vec!["audio".into(), "video".into()],
+            art_cache_mb: 500,
+            directory_url: String::new(),
+            directory_token: String::new(),
+            directory_share: false,
         }
     }
 }
@@ -241,6 +288,11 @@ impl Feed {
         }
         self.password.clone()
     }
+
+    /// What `feed::fetch` sends the feed's host: a username, and its password if there is one.
+    pub fn auth(&self) -> Option<(&str, Option<String>)> {
+        self.username.as_deref().map(|u| (u, self.password()))
+    }
 }
 
 impl Config {
@@ -257,21 +309,117 @@ impl Config {
         Ok(cfg)
     }
 
-    pub fn save(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
-        if let Some(dir) = path.parent() {
-            std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)
-                .with_context(|| format!("creating {}", dir.display()))?;
+}
+
+/// What the database keeps of the configuration (issue #18): the server settings the admin page
+/// edits, and, beside them in `Db::stored_config`, the catalogue of feeds. The rest -- where
+/// things are, who may sign in, the torrent session -- is needed before the database is reached,
+/// or decides who gets in, and stays in config.toml.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize)]
+pub struct Stored {
+    pub schedule: String,
+    pub max_total_gb: f64,
+    pub max_age_days: u64,
+    pub max_new_per_check: usize,
+    pub media_types: Vec<String>,
+    /// Settings saved before it existed have none: they get the default.
+    #[serde(default = "art_cache_mb")]
+    pub art_cache_mb: u64,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub directory_url: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub directory_token: String,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub directory_share: bool,
+}
+
+fn art_cache_mb() -> u64 {
+    General::default().art_cache_mb
+}
+
+/// `[general]` keys that live in the database once it holds the configuration.
+const STORED_KEYS: [&str; 9] = [
+    "schedule",
+    "max_total_gb",
+    "max_age_days",
+    "max_new_per_check",
+    "media_types",
+    "art_cache_mb",
+    "directory_url",
+    "directory_token",
+    "directory_share",
+];
+
+impl Stored {
+    pub fn of(cfg: &Config) -> Self {
+        let g = &cfg.general;
+        Self {
+            schedule: g.schedule.clone(),
+            max_total_gb: g.max_total_gb,
+            max_age_days: g.max_age_days,
+            max_new_per_check: g.max_new_per_check,
+            media_types: g.media_types.clone(),
+            art_cache_mb: g.art_cache_mb,
+            directory_url: g.directory_url.clone(),
+            directory_token: g.directory_token.clone(),
+            directory_share: g.directory_share,
         }
-        let text = toml::to_string_pretty(self)?;
-        std::fs::write(path, text).with_context(|| format!("writing {}", path.display()))?;
-        // Passwords may live in here.
-        #[cfg(unix)]
-        {
-            use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
-            std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
-        }
-        Ok(())
     }
+
+    pub fn apply(self, cfg: &mut Config) {
+        let g = &mut cfg.general;
+        g.schedule = self.schedule;
+        g.max_total_gb = self.max_total_gb;
+        g.max_age_days = self.max_age_days;
+        g.max_new_per_check = self.max_new_per_check;
+        g.media_types = self.media_types;
+        g.art_cache_mb = self.art_cache_mb;
+        g.directory_url = self.directory_url;
+        g.directory_token = self.directory_token;
+        g.directory_share = self.directory_share;
+    }
+}
+
+impl Config {
+    /// config.toml as it is kept once the database holds the feeds and server settings: the same
+    /// file without `[feeds]` or the `[general]` keys in `Stored`.
+    pub fn save_bootstrap(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut v = toml::Value::try_from(self)?;
+        if let Some(t) = v.as_table_mut() {
+            t.remove("feeds");
+            if let Some(g) = t.get_mut("general").and_then(|g| g.as_table_mut()) {
+                for k in STORED_KEYS {
+                    g.remove(k);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        write_private(path, &toml::to_string_pretty(&v)?)
+    }
+
+    /// Whether config.toml still lists feeds or server settings, which the database now holds:
+    /// an edit there would otherwise go unnoticed.
+    pub fn file_holds_stored(path: &Path) -> bool {
+        let Ok(text) = std::fs::read_to_string(path) else { return false };
+        let Ok(v) = text.parse::<toml::Table>() else { return false };
+        v.get("feeds").and_then(|f| f.as_table()).is_some_and(|f| !f.is_empty())
+            || v.get("general")
+                .and_then(|g| g.as_table())
+                .is_some_and(|g| STORED_KEYS.iter().any(|k| g.contains_key(*k)))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Writes a config file readable by its owner alone: feed passwords have lived in it.
+fn write_private(path: &Path, text: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    if let Some(dir) = path.parent() {
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(dir).with_context(|| format!("creating {}", dir.display()))?;
+    }
+    std::fs::write(path, text).with_context(|| format!("writing {}", path.display()))?;
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 /// `$IPX_CONFIG`, else `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ipx/config.toml`.
@@ -366,6 +514,36 @@ fn expand_tilde(p: &Path) -> PathBuf {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn the_file_kept_beside_the_database_has_no_feeds_or_server_settings() {
+        let cfg: Config = toml::from_str(
+            r#"
+            [general]
+            download_dir = "/downloads"
+            schedule = "every 2h"
+            max_new_per_check = 7
+            media_types = ["audio"]
+            [web]
+            bind = "0.0.0.0:8099"
+            token = "t"
+            [feeds.show]
+            url = "http://x/show.xml"
+            "#,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("ipx-bootstrap-{}.toml", std::process::id()));
+        std::fs::write(&path, toml::to_string(&cfg).unwrap()).unwrap();
+        assert!(Config::file_holds_stored(&path), "a whole config.toml holds them");
+        cfg.save_bootstrap(&path).unwrap();
+        let text = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).unwrap();
+        assert!(!Config::file_holds_stored(&path), "{text}");
+        let back: Config = toml::from_str(&text).unwrap();
+        assert!(back.feeds.is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(back.web.token, "t", "who may sign in stays in the file");
+        assert_eq!(back.general.download_dir, PathBuf::from("/downloads"), "where things are, too");
+        std::fs::remove_file(&path).unwrap();
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn parses_a_config_and_applies_defaults() {
         let cfg: Config = toml::from_str(
@@ -456,6 +634,12 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(wanted_media(Some("image/jpeg"), &["image/jpeg".to_string()]));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn settings_saved_before_the_art_cache_keep_the_default() {
+        let old = r#"{"schedule":"every 1h","max_total_gb":0.0,"max_age_days":0,"max_new_per_check":3,"media_types":["audio"]}"#;
+        assert_eq!(serde_json::from_str::<Stored>(old).unwrap().art_cache_mb, 500);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn slugs_are_readable_and_unique() {
         assert_eq!(slug("Accidental Tech Podcast"), "accidental-tech-podcast");
@@ -469,7 +653,7 @@ mod tests {
         taken.insert("the-daily".to_string(), Feed {
             url: "u".into(), folder: None, group: None, media_types: None, schedule: None, keywords: vec![], allow_explicit: false,
             auto_download: true, max_new_per_check: None, username: None,
-            password: None, password_env: None,
+            password: None, password_env: None, category: None, listed: false, private: false,
         });
         assert_eq!(unique_slug("The Daily", &taken), "the-daily-2");
     }
@@ -489,6 +673,9 @@ mod tests {
             username: Some("ray".into()),
             password: Some("literal".into()),
             password_env: None,
+            category: None,
+            listed: false,
+            private: false,
         };
         assert_eq!(f.password().as_deref(), Some("literal"));
 

crates/ipx/src/deadair.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+//! DeadAir (issue #171): podcasts play with their long silences shortened, so they finish
+//! sooner without sounding sped up.
+//!
+//! Nothing is copied (#181). DeadAir finds a file's silences once, in the background, and keeps a
+//! `Plan` for each pause length a person can choose (#182): the frames kept, as byte ranges of
+//! the original. The player gets an HLS playlist of those ranges (`playlist`), which Safari plays
+//! itself and other browsers through hls.js, with no gap at the cuts. Seeking past each silence
+//! instead left about 1.3 s of nothing at every one (#178); a copy made with ffmpeg cost as much
+//! disk again as the original and could only have one pause length.
+//!
+//! Positions stay in the original's time. What a plan leaves out is stored as `Cut`s of the
+//! original's time, and the server converts both ways (`to_copy`, `to_original`): the iOS and
+//! Android apps save positions themselves, from their own player, so converting in the page
+//! would miss them.
+
+use std::collections::{BTreeMap, HashMap};
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use tracing::Instrument;
+
+use crate::db::step;
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+use crate::Ctx;
+
+/// Quieter than this for longer than `MIN_SILENCE` is a silence: what the measurements on the
+/// issue used. A podcast's room tone sits well below it and speech well above.
+const THRESHOLD: &str = "-38dB";
+const MIN_SILENCE: f64 = 0.35;
+/// The pauses a person can have DeadAir leave where it cuts a silence, in ms (#182). Half of it
+/// is kept at each end of the silence, so the frames on both sides of a cut are silent. Decoding
+/// blends a frame with the one before it, and an MP3 frame can begin in the bytes of the frame
+/// before (the bit reservoir): the first frame after a cut decodes against the wrong neighbour,
+/// which nobody hears between two silent frames and everyone hears at the start of a word.
+pub const PAUSES: [i64; 4] = [200, 300, 400, 500];
+/// 0.2 s, the first DeadAir's, made speech sound rushed.
+pub const DEFAULT_PAUSE: i64 = 300;
+/// The longest piece of a playlist, in seconds: about what HLS players expect, so a long stretch
+/// of talk is not one request for megabytes.
+const MAX_PIECE: f64 = 10.0;
+/// How long the maker waits when there is nothing to do: a download or a feed turned on is
+/// picked up this long after, at most.
+const IDLE: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(120);
+
+/// A span of the original, in milliseconds, that DeadAir leaves out.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Cut(pub i64, pub i64);
+
+/// What one pause length leaves of a file: what it cuts, and what it keeps as pieces of the
+/// original, (byte offset, bytes, seconds).
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct Plan {
+    pub cuts: Vec<Cut>,
+    pub pieces: Vec<(u64, u64, f64)>,
+}
+
+impl Plan {
+    pub fn saved_ms(&self) -> i64 {
+        saved(&self.cuts)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The length of the ID3v2 tag a file starts with, 0 if it has none.
+pub fn id3_len(head: &[u8]) -> u64 {
+    if head.len() < 10 || &head[..3] != b"ID3" {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    // Seven bits a byte, so no byte of the size looks like the start of a frame.
+    let size = head[6..10].iter().fold(0u64, |n, b| n << 7 | u64::from(b & 0x7f));
+    let footer = if head[5] & 0x10 != 0 { 10 } else { 0 };
+    10 + size + footer
+}
+
+/// A file as `plan` plays it, to save (#186): its ID3 tag, so the title and artwork come too, then
+/// the pieces one after another. MP3 and ADTS frames each stand alone, so that is a file any
+/// player plays. Read as it is sent and never stored, as the playlist is: (its length, its bytes).
+pub async fn kept(
+    path: &Path,
+    plan: &Plan,
+) -> std::io::Result<(u64, impl futures_util::Stream<Item = std::io::Result<axum::body::Bytes>> + use<>)> {
+    use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncSeekExt};
+    let mut file = tokio::fs::File::open(path).await?;
+    let mut head = [0u8; 10];
+    let n = file.read(&mut head).await?;
+    // Only up to the first frame kept: past the tag can be the Xing frame, which gives the
+    // original's length.
+    let first = plan.pieces.first().map_or(0, |p| p.0);
+    let tag = id3_len(&head[..n]).min(first);
+    let ranges: std::collections::VecDeque<(u64, u64)> =
+        std::iter::once((0, tag)).chain(plan.pieces.iter().map(|&(o, n, _)| (o, n))).filter(|r| r.1 > 0).collect();
+    let len = ranges.iter().map(|r| r.1).sum();
+    let body = futures_util::stream::try_unfold((file, ranges), |(mut f, mut left)| async move {
+        let Some((off, n)) = left.pop_front() else { return Ok(None) };
+        let mut buf = vec![0; n.min(1 << 16) as usize];
+        f.seek(std::io::SeekFrom::Start(off)).await?;
+        f.read_exact(&mut buf).await?;
+        let got = buf.len() as u64;
+        if got < n {
+            left.push_front((off + got, n - got));
+        }
+        Ok(Some((axum::body::Bytes::from(buf), (f, left))))
+    });
+    Ok((len, body))
+}
+
+/// The silences silencedetect reported, as (start, end) seconds. One still open at the end of
+/// the file has no end and is left alone.
+pub fn parse_silences(log: &str) -> Vec<(f64, f64)> {
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    let mut start = None;
+    for line in log.lines() {
+        if let Some(v) = after(line, "silence_start: ") {
+            start = Some(v);
+        } else if let Some(v) = after(line, "silence_end: ")
+            && let Some(s) = start.take()
+        {
+            out.push((s, v));
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+fn after(line: &str, key: &str) -> Option<f64> {
+    let rest = &line[line.find(key)? + key.len()..];
+    rest.split_whitespace().next()?.parse().ok()
+}
+
+/// Which frames to drop for these silences, as inclusive ranges of frame numbers, and the same
+/// as `Cut`s. Frame `n` plays from `first + n * frame` seconds. Only frames wholly inside a
+/// silence, `keep` seconds in from each end, go.
+pub fn plan(silences: &[(f64, f64)], first: f64, frame: f64, keep: f64) -> (Vec<(u64, u64)>, Vec<Cut>) {
+    let spans: Vec<(u64, u64)> = silences
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|(s, e)| e - s >= MIN_SILENCE)
+        .filter_map(|&(s, e)| {
+            let a = ((s + keep - first) / frame).ceil().max(0.0) as u64;
+            let b = ((e - keep - first) / frame).floor() as i64 - 1;
+            (b >= a as i64).then_some((a, b as u64))
+        })
+        .collect();
+    let ms = |n: u64| ((first + n as f64 * frame) * 1000.0).round() as i64;
+    let cuts = spans.iter().map(|&(a, b)| Cut(ms(a), ms(b + 1))).collect();
+    (spans, cuts)
+}
+
+/// The frames kept, as pieces of the file: runs of frames lying end to end in it, none past
+/// `MAX_PIECE`. `frames` is each frame's (byte offset, bytes); `drop` is from `plan`.
+pub fn pieces(frames: &[(u64, u64)], drop: &[(u64, u64)], frame: f64) -> Vec<(u64, u64, f64)> {
+    let most = ((MAX_PIECE / frame).floor() as usize).max(1);
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    let push = |out: &mut Vec<(u64, u64, f64)>, (first, n): (usize, usize)| {
+        let (start, (pos, size)) = (frames[first].0, frames[first + n - 1]);
+        out.push((start, pos + size - start, n as f64 * frame));
+    };
+    let mut drops = drop.iter().peekable();
+    let mut run: Option<(usize, usize)> = None;
+    for (n, &(pos, _)) in frames.iter().enumerate() {
+        while drops.peek().is_some_and(|&&(_, b)| (b as usize) < n) {
+            drops.next();
+        }
+        let dropped = drops.peek().is_some_and(|&&(a, _)| a as usize <= n);
+        // Something between two frames (an ID3 tag partway through) ends a piece too.
+        let joins = !dropped
+            && run.is_some_and(|(f, c)| c < most && frames[f + c - 1].0 + frames[f + c - 1].1 == pos);
+        if !joins && let Some(r) = run.take() {
+            push(&mut out, r);
+        }
+        if !dropped {
+            run = Some(run.map_or((n, 1), |(f, c)| (f, c + 1)));
+        }
+    }
+    if let Some(r) = run {
+        push(&mut out, r);
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// The HLS playlist for a plan: each piece a byte range of `uri`, the original.
+pub fn playlist(plan: &Plan, uri: &str) -> String {
+    let longest = plan.pieces.iter().map(|p| p.2).fold(0.0, f64::max);
+    let mut s = format!(
+        "#EXTM3U\n#EXT-X-VERSION:4\n#EXT-X-TARGETDURATION:{}\n#EXT-X-PLAYLIST-TYPE:VOD\n#EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE:0\n",
+        longest.ceil() as u64
+    );
+    for &(off, len, secs) in &plan.pieces {
+        let _ = write!(s, "#EXTINF:{secs:.6},\n#EXT-X-BYTERANGE:{len}@{off}\n{uri}\n");
+    }
+    s + "#EXT-X-ENDLIST\n"
+}
+
+/// A time in the original, in ms, as the same moment in the shortened version. A time inside a
+/// cut is where the cut was made.
+pub fn to_copy(cuts: &[Cut], ms: i64) -> i64 {
+    let mut out = ms;
+    for &Cut(s, e) in cuts {
+        if ms >= e {
+            out -= e - s;
+        } else {
+            if ms > s {
+                out -= ms - s;
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// A time in the shortened version, in ms, as the same moment in the original.
+pub fn to_original(cuts: &[Cut], ms: i64) -> i64 {
+    let mut out = ms;
+    for &Cut(s, e) in cuts {
+        if out >= s {
+            out += e - s;
+        } else {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+pub fn saved(cuts: &[Cut]) -> i64 {
+    cuts.iter().map(|Cut(s, e)| e - s).sum()
+}
+
+/// Whether someone with these settings plays a feed shortened. Off for every feed until they
+/// turn it on for that one, or for the group it came in (an OPML or a Patreon creator), which a
+/// feed of the group can still say otherwise to.
+pub fn wants(prefs: &HashMap<String, bool>, feed: &str, group: Option<&str>) -> bool {
+    prefs.get(feed).or_else(|| group.and_then(|g| prefs.get(g))).copied().unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
+/// The settings of each person with DeadAir on for something, and each managed feed's group,
+/// which is what `wants` and `pause` need.
+pub struct Wanting {
+    pub people: HashMap<i64, HashMap<String, bool>>,
+    pub pauses: HashMap<(i64, String), i64>,
+    pub groups: HashMap<String, String>,
+}
+
+impl Wanting {
+    pub async fn load(ctx: &Ctx, only: Option<i64>) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut people: HashMap<i64, HashMap<String, bool>> = HashMap::new();
+        let mut pauses = HashMap::new();
+        for (user, feed, wanted, pause) in ctx.db.deadair_prefs(only).await? {
+            if let Some(p) = pause {
+                pauses.insert((user, feed.clone()), p);
+            }
+            people.entry(user).or_default().insert(feed, wanted);
+        }
+        people.retain(|_, p| p.values().any(|&w| w));
+        let groups = if people.is_empty() {
+            HashMap::new()
+        } else {
+            ctx.db.managed_feeds().await?.into_iter().map(|m| (m.id, m.group_id)).collect()
+        };
+        Ok(Self { people, pauses, groups })
+    }
+
+    pub fn wants(&self, user: i64, feed: &str) -> bool {
+        self.people
+            .get(&user)
+            .is_some_and(|p| wants(p, feed, self.groups.get(feed).map(String::as_str)))
+    }
+
+    /// The pause this person has DeadAir leave in a feed: the feed's, else its group's.
+    pub fn pause(&self, user: i64, feed: &str) -> i64 {
+        let group = self.groups.get(feed);
+        self.pauses
+            .get(&(user, feed.to_owned()))
+            .or_else(|| group.and_then(|g| self.pauses.get(&(user, g.clone()))))
+            .copied()
+            .unwrap_or(DEFAULT_PAUSE)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The plan someone plays a file with: their pause's, for a file in a feed they have DeadAir on
+/// for, once its silences are found. None if it cuts nothing.
+fn chosen(wanting: &Wanting, user: i64, feed: &str, plans: &BTreeMap<i64, Plan>) -> Option<Plan> {
+    if !wanting.wants(user, feed) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    plans.get(&wanting.pause(user, feed)).filter(|p| !p.cuts.is_empty()).cloned()
+}
+
+/// What each person is playing shortened, by (person, feed, guid): set when they are handed the
+/// playlist and cleared when `/media` serves them the original, so a saved position is converted
+/// from the clock it was measured in, whether the page saved it or a native app did.
+// shortcut: in memory, so a restart forgets it. A position saved before the player next asks
+// for the playlist is then taken as the original's, which resumes a little early, never late.
+pub type Playing = Arc<std::sync::Mutex<HashMap<(i64, String, String), Arc<Plan>>>>;
+
+/// The plan for one file as this person would play it, for the playlist route.
+pub async fn plan_for(ctx: &Ctx, user: i64, feed: &str, enclosure: i64) -> Result<Option<Plan>> {
+    let wanting = Wanting::load(ctx, Some(user)).await?;
+    let plans = ctx.db.plans(&[enclosure]).await?;
+    Ok(plans.get(&enclosure).and_then(|p| chosen(&wanting, user, feed, p)))
+}
+
+/// Puts a page of entries in the clock of what this person will play: for each file they play
+/// shortened, `deadair` is the seconds it saves, and the entry's position and length are the
+/// shortened version's. The page plays `/media/{id}/deadair.m3u8` for a file that has it.
+pub async fn for_reader(ctx: &Ctx, user: i64, rows: &mut [crate::db::EntryRow]) -> Result<()> {
+    let wanting = Wanting::load(ctx, Some(user)).await?;
+    if wanting.people.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let ids: Vec<i64> = rows
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|r| wanting.wants(user, &r.feed_id))
+        .flat_map(|r| r.enclosures.iter().filter(|e| e.path.is_some()).map(|e| e.id))
+        .collect();
+    let plans = ctx.db.plans(&ids).await?;
+    for r in rows.iter_mut() {
+        // Heard through already: the maker passes it over, so nothing is coming.
+        let finished = r.duration.is_some_and(|d| d > 0 && r.position * 10 >= d * 9);
+        let mut converted = false;
+        for e in &mut r.enclosures {
+            e.deadair_pending = ids.contains(&e.id) && e.state == "done" && !plans.contains_key(&e.id) && !finished;
+            let Some(p) = plans.get(&e.id).and_then(|p| chosen(&wanting, user, &r.feed_id, p)) else { continue };
+            e.deadair = Some(p.saved_ms() / 1000);
+            // One position an item, however many files: the first played shortened sets the clock.
+            if !std::mem::replace(&mut converted, true) {
+                r.position = to_copy(&p.cuts, r.position * 1000) / 1000;
+                r.duration = r.duration.map(|d| to_copy(&p.cuts, d * 1000) / 1000);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// A position and length a player saved, in the clock of what it was playing, as the
+/// original's. Past 75% of the shortened version, the episode also counts towards the time
+/// DeadAir has saved this person.
+pub async fn on_save(
+    ctx: &Ctx,
+    playing: &Playing,
+    user: i64,
+    feed: &str,
+    guid: &str,
+    secs: i64,
+    duration: Option<i64>,
+) -> Result<(i64, Option<i64>)> {
+    let plan = playing.lock().unwrap().get(&(user, feed.to_owned(), guid.to_owned())).cloned();
+    let Some(p) = plan else { return Ok((secs, duration)) };
+    let original = |s: i64| to_original(&p.cuts, s * 1000) / 1000;
+    let (secs, duration) = (original(secs), duration.map(original));
+    let len = match duration {
+        Some(d) => Some(d),
+        None => ctx.db.entry_duration(user, feed, guid).await?,
+    };
+    if let Some(len) = len
+        && len > 0
+        && secs * 4 >= len * 3
+    {
+        ctx.db.count_deadair(user, feed, guid, p.saved_ms()).await?;
+    }
+    Ok((secs, duration))
+}
+
+/// Finds silences until stopped: in the next file anyone wants shortened, or a wait of `IDLE`
+/// when there is none.
+pub async fn run(ctx: Arc<Ctx>, mut stop: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>) {
+    if !have_ffmpeg().await {
+        tracing::warn!("ffmpeg is not installed, so DeadAir shortens nothing");
+        return;
+    }
+    // Files ffmpeg failed on, passed over until the next start. Not stored: a failure recorded
+    // as the file having nothing to cut was never tried again, even once a fix was deployed (#174).
+    let mut failed = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+    loop {
+        // Dropping the pass on a signal kills the ffmpeg it is running (`kill_on_drop`).
+        let done = tokio::select! {
+            _ = stop.changed() => return,
+            done = next(&ctx, &mut failed) => done,
+        };
+        match done {
+            Ok(true) => continue,
+            Ok(false) => {}
+            Err(e) => tracing::warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "DeadAir could not read a file"),
+        }
+        tokio::select! {
+            _ = stop.changed() => return,
+            _ = ctx.deadair.notified() => {}
+            _ = tokio::time::sleep(IDLE) => {}
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+async fn have_ffmpeg() -> bool {
+    tokio::process::Command::new("ffmpeg")
+        .arg("-version")
+        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .status()
+        .await
+        .is_ok_and(|s| s.success())
+}
+
+/// Plans one file someone wants shortened, if there is one. A file everyone who would play it
+/// shortened has already heard through gets none: finished episodes are rarely played again.
+// shortcut: those stay on the list and are looked at again each pass, one query each; record
+// them as passed over if a large library makes the pass slow.
+async fn next(ctx: &Ctx, failed: &mut std::collections::HashSet<i64>) -> Result<bool> {
+    // Nobody with DeadAir on for anything, which is most passes: nothing more to ask the database.
+    use std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed;
+    let st = &crate::metrics::STATS;
+    let wanting = Wanting::load(ctx, None).await?;
+    if wanting.people.is_empty() {
+        st.deadair_backlog.store(0, Relaxed);
+        return Ok(false);
+    }
+    let todo = ctx.db.deadair_todo().await?;
+    // For /metrics (#195): files of feeds someone has DeadAir on, from memory, without the
+    // per-file subscription and finished checks below.
+    let wanted = |t: &crate::db::DeadAirTodo| !failed.contains(&t.id) && wanting.people.keys().any(|&u| wanting.wants(u, &t.feed_id));
+    st.deadair_backlog.store(todo.iter().filter(|t| wanted(t)).count() as i64, Relaxed);
+    for t in todo {
+        if failed.contains(&t.id) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let users: Vec<i64> =
+            wanting.people.keys().copied().filter(|&u| wanting.wants(u, &t.feed_id)).collect();
+        if users.is_empty() || !ctx.db.subscribed_any(&users, &t.feed_id).await? {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let finished = ctx.db.finished(&t.feed_id, &t.guid).await?;
+        if users.iter().all(|u| finished.contains(u)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let src = crate::download::playable(Path::new(&t.path));
+        let started = std::time::Instant::now();
+        // A trace of its own for each file looked at, not for the passes that find nothing to do,
+        // which are most of them.
+        let span = tracing::info_span!("deadair", feed = t.feed_id, enclosure = t.id, cuts = tracing::field::Empty);
+        st.deadair_busy_since.store(crate::db::now(), Relaxed);
+        let analysed = analyse(&src).instrument(span.clone()).await;
+        st.deadair_busy_since.store(0, Relaxed);
+        let plans = match analysed {
+            Ok(p) => p.unwrap_or_default(),
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::warn!(path = %src.display(), error = %format!("{e:#}"), "DeadAir could not read a file");
+                failed.insert(t.id);
+                return Ok(true);
+            }
+        };
+        ctx.db.store_plans(t.id, &serde_json::to_string(&plans)?).instrument(span.in_scope(|| step("store_plans"))).await?;
+        let usual = plans.get(&DEFAULT_PAUSE);
+        span.record("cuts", usual.map_or(0, |p| p.cuts.len()));
+        let saved_ms = usual.map_or(0, Plan::saved_ms);
+        ctx.out.emit(crate::ipc::Event::DeadairDone { feed: t.feed_id.clone(), enclosure: t.id, saved_s: saved_ms / 1000 });
+        // The event says it too (ev="deadair_done"); this line has how long it took and how many cuts.
+        tracing::info!(
+            feed = t.feed_id,
+            path = %src.display(),
+            cuts = usual.map_or(0, |p| p.cuts.len()),
+            saved_s = saved_ms / 1000,
+            took_ms = started.elapsed().as_millis() as u64,
+            "DeadAir found the silences"
+        );
+        return Ok(true);
+    }
+    Ok(false)
+}
+
+/// A plan for each of `PAUSES`, for one file. None for a file DeadAir does not apply to: video,
+/// anything but MP3 or AAC on its own (ADTS; AAC in MP4 has no byte ranges a playlist can
+/// use), or one with no silence long enough to cut.
+pub async fn analyse(src: &Path) -> Result<Option<BTreeMap<i64, Plan>>> {
+    let Some((first, frame)) = probe(src).instrument(step("probe")).await? else { return Ok(None) };
+    let path = src.display().to_string();
+    let log = ffmpeg(&[
+        "-hide_banner", "-nostats", "-i", &path, "-map", "0:a:0",
+        "-af", &format!("silencedetect=n={THRESHOLD}:d={MIN_SILENCE}"), "-f", "null", "-",
+    ])
+    .instrument(step("silencedetect"))
+    .await
+    .context("finding the silences")?;
+    let silences = parse_silences(&log);
+    let frames = frame_bytes(&path).instrument(step("frame_bytes")).await?;
+    let plans: BTreeMap<i64, Plan> = PAUSES
+        .iter()
+        .map(|&pause| {
+            let (drop, cuts) = plan(&silences, first, frame, pause as f64 / 2000.0);
+            (pause, Plan { cuts, pieces: pieces(&frames, &drop, frame) })
+        })
+        .collect();
+    Ok(plans.values().any(|p| !p.cuts.is_empty()).then_some(plans))
+}
+
+/// Where each audio frame is in the file, as (byte offset, bytes), in order.
+async fn frame_bytes(path: &str) -> Result<Vec<(u64, u64)>> {
+    let out = run_out("ffprobe", &[
+        "-v", "error", "-select_streams", "a:0", "-show_entries", "packet=pos,size", "-of", "compact=p=0", path,
+    ])
+    .await?;
+    // ffprobe writes the fields in its own order, not the order asked for: by name, then.
+    out.lines()
+        .map(|l| {
+            let field = |k: &str| {
+                l.split('|').find_map(|f| f.strip_prefix(k)?.strip_prefix('=')?.parse::<u64>().ok())
+            };
+            field("pos").zip(field("size")).with_context(|| format!("reading ffprobe's frame: {l}"))
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// When the first audio frame starts and how long each lasts, in seconds, for a file DeadAir
+/// can shorten; None for one it cannot. A cover picture in an MP3 is not video.
+async fn probe(src: &Path) -> Result<Option<(f64, f64)>> {
+    let path = src.display().to_string();
+    let out = run_out("ffprobe", &[
+        "-v", "error", "-show_entries",
+        "format=format_name:stream=codec_type,codec_name:stream_disposition=attached_pic", "-of", "json", &path,
+    ])
+    .await?;
+    let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&out).context("reading ffprobe")?;
+    let streams = v["streams"].as_array().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
+    let video = streams
+        .iter()
+        .any(|s| s["codec_type"] == "video" && s["disposition"]["attached_pic"] != 1);
+    let audio = streams.iter().find(|s| s["codec_type"] == "audio");
+    let format = v["format"]["format_name"].as_str().unwrap_or("");
+    let plain = |codec: &str| format == codec && audio.is_some_and(|a| a["codec_name"] == codec);
+    if video || !(plain("mp3") || plain("aac")) {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let out = run_out("ffprobe", &[
+        "-v", "error", "-select_streams", "a:0", "-show_entries", "packet=pts_time,duration_time",
+        "-read_intervals", "%+#1", "-of", "csv=p=0", &path,
+    ])
+    .await?;
+    let mut f = out.trim().split(',').map(|x| x.trim().parse::<f64>());
+    match (f.next(), f.next()) {
+        (Some(Ok(first)), Some(Ok(frame))) if frame > 0.0 => Ok(Some((first, frame))),
+        _ => bail!("no audio frame in {path}"),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Runs ffmpeg and gives back what it wrote to stderr, where silencedetect reports.
+async fn ffmpeg(args: &[&str]) -> Result<String> {
+    let out = command("ffmpeg").args(["-nostdin", "-threads", "1"]).args(args).output().await?;
+    let log = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).into_owned();
+    if !out.status.success() {
+        bail!("ffmpeg failed: {}", log.lines().rev().take(3).collect::<Vec<_>>().join(" / "));
+    }
+    Ok(log)
+}
+
+async fn run_out(prog: &str, args: &[&str]) -> Result<String> {
+    let out = command(prog).args(args).output().await.with_context(|| format!("running {prog}"))?;
+    if !out.status.success() {
+        bail!("{prog} failed: {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr).trim());
+    }
+    Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned())
+}
+
+fn command(prog: &str) -> tokio::process::Command {
+    let mut c = tokio::process::Command::new(prog);
+    c.kill_on_drop(true).stdin(std::process::Stdio::null());
+    c
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn silences_are_read_from_the_log_and_an_open_one_is_left() {
+        let log = "[silencedetect @ 0x1] silence_start: 1\n\
+                   [silencedetect @ 0x1] silence_end: 3.00002 | silence_duration: 2.00002\n\
+                   [silencedetect @ 0x1] silence_start: 10.5\n";
+        assert_eq!(parse_silences(log), vec![(1.0, 3.00002)]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cuts_leave_silent_frames_either_side_and_skip_short_silences() {
+        // MP3 frames, 26.122 ms; one silence of 2 s, one too short to touch; a 0.3 s pause.
+        let frame = 1152.0 / 44100.0;
+        let (frames, cuts) = plan(&[(1.0, 3.0), (5.0, 5.3)], 0.0, frame, 0.15);
+        assert_eq!(frames, vec![(45, 108)]);
+        let Cut(s, e) = cuts[0];
+        assert!(s >= 1150 && e <= 2850, "{cuts:?}");
+        assert!(s - 1150 < 27 && 2850 - e < 27, "no more than a frame kept beyond half the pause: {cuts:?}");
+        // AAC starts a frame early, for the encoder's priming.
+        let (frames, _) = plan(&[(1.0, 3.0)], -0.02322, 1024.0 / 44100.0, 0.15);
+        assert_eq!(frames, vec![(51, 122)]);
+        // A silence the margins use up entirely is left alone.
+        assert!(plan(&[(1.0, 1.35)], 0.0, frame, 0.15).0.is_empty());
+        // A longer pause cuts less of the same silence.
+        assert!(saved(&plan(&[(1.0, 3.0)], 0.0, frame, 0.25).1) < saved(&cuts));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn pieces_are_the_frames_kept_end_to_end_and_never_too_long() {
+        // 1000 frames of 100 bytes after a 50-byte tag, an ID3 tag of 7 bytes before frame 600.
+        let frames: Vec<(u64, u64)> =
+            (0..1000u64).map(|n| (50 + n * 100 + if n >= 600 { 7 } else { 0 }, 100)).collect();
+        let frame = 0.026;
+        let p = pieces(&frames, &[(100, 199), (900, 999)], frame);
+        let at: Vec<u64> = p.iter().map(|x| x.0).collect();
+        // 0-99; 200-583 and 584-599, split at 384 frames (10 s); 600-899 after the tag.
+        assert_eq!(at, [50, 20_050, 58_450, 60_057]);
+        assert_eq!(p[0], (50, 10_000, 100.0 * frame));
+        assert_eq!(p[2].1, 1600, "frames 584-599");
+        assert!(p.iter().all(|x| x.2 <= MAX_PIECE));
+        let kept: u64 = p.iter().map(|x| x.1).sum();
+        assert_eq!(kept, 800 * 100, "every kept frame once, the tag in none");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_playlist_lists_each_piece_as_a_range_of_the_original() {
+        let plan = Plan { cuts: vec![Cut(1000, 2000)], pieces: vec![(50, 400, 1.0), (500, 4000, 9.5)] };
+        assert_eq!(
+            playlist(&plan, "deadair.mp3"),
+            "#EXTM3U\n#EXT-X-VERSION:4\n#EXT-X-TARGETDURATION:10\n#EXT-X-PLAYLIST-TYPE:VOD\n#EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE:0\n\
+             #EXTINF:1.000000,\n#EXT-X-BYTERANGE:400@50\ndeadair.mp3\n\
+             #EXTINF:9.500000,\n#EXT-X-BYTERANGE:4000@500\ndeadair.mp3\n#EXT-X-ENDLIST\n"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn positions_convert_both_ways() {
+        let cuts = [Cut(10_000, 20_000), Cut(30_000, 35_000)];
+        assert_eq!(to_copy(&cuts, 5_000), 5_000);
+        assert_eq!(to_copy(&cuts, 15_000), 10_000, "inside a cut is where it was made");
+        assert_eq!(to_copy(&cuts, 25_000), 15_000);
+        assert_eq!(to_copy(&cuts, 40_000), 25_000);
+        for t in [0, 5_000, 10_000, 15_000, 19_999, 20_000, 25_000, 40_000] {
+            let back = to_original(&cuts, to_copy(&cuts, t));
+            // A time inside a cut comes back as the cut's end: the shortened version has nothing between.
+            let expect = if (10_000..20_000).contains(&t) { 20_000 } else { t };
+            assert_eq!(back, expect, "{t}");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(saved(&cuts), 15_000);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn off_for_every_feed_until_turned_on_for_it_or_its_group() {
+        let p = |v: &[(&str, bool)]| v.iter().map(|(k, w)| (k.to_string(), *w)).collect::<HashMap<_, _>>();
+        assert!(!wants(&p(&[]), "a", None), "off until turned on for the feed");
+        assert!(!wants(&p(&[("b", true)]), "a", None), "another feed's says nothing of this one");
+        assert!(wants(&p(&[("a", true)]), "a", None));
+        assert!(wants(&p(&[("g", true)]), "a", Some("g")), "on for its group");
+        assert!(!wants(&p(&[("g", true), ("a", false)]), "a", Some("g")), "kept out of its group's");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_pause_is_the_feeds_then_its_groups_then_the_default() {
+        let w = Wanting {
+            people: HashMap::new(),
+            pauses: [((1, "a".to_string()), 500), ((1, "g".to_string()), 400)].into(),
+            groups: [("b".to_string(), "g".to_string())].into(),
+        };
+        assert_eq!(w.pause(1, "a"), 500);
+        assert_eq!(w.pause(1, "b"), 400, "its group's");
+        assert_eq!(w.pause(1, "c"), DEFAULT_PAUSE);
+        assert_eq!(w.pause(2, "a"), DEFAULT_PAUSE, "someone else's says nothing of yours");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn id3_len_reads_the_tags_size() {
+        assert_eq!(id3_len(b"ID3\x04\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x01xx"), 10 + 257);
+        assert_eq!(id3_len(b"ID3\x04\x00\x10\x00\x00\x02\x01"), 10 + 257 + 10, "with a footer");
+        assert_eq!(id3_len(b"\xff\xfb\x90\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"), 0);
+        assert_eq!(id3_len(b"ID3"), 0);
+    }
+
+    /// The whole of it, on a clip ffmpeg makes: a second of tone, two of silence, and so on,
+    /// played back through its playlist by ffmpeg's own HLS reader. Skipped where ffmpeg is not
+    /// installed.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn the_playlist_of_a_file_is_shorter_by_what_was_cut_and_plays() {
+        if !have_ffmpeg().await {
+            eprintln!("no ffmpeg; skipped");
+            return;
+        }
+        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("ipx-deadair-{}", std::process::id()));
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+        for (ext, codec) in [("mp3", "libmp3lame"), ("aac", "aac"), ("m4a", "aac")] {
+            let src = dir.join(format!("t.{ext}"));
+            ffmpeg(&[
+                "-v", "error", "-y", "-f", "lavfi", "-i",
+                "aevalsrc='if(lt(mod(t,3),1),0.5*sin(2*PI*440*t),0)':d=12:s=44100",
+                "-c:a", codec, &src.display().to_string(),
+            ])
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+            let plans = analyse(&src).await.unwrap();
+            if ext == "m4a" {
+                assert!(plans.is_none(), "AAC in MP4 has no byte ranges to play");
+                continue;
+            }
+            let plans = plans.expect("plans");
+            assert_eq!(plans.keys().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>(), PAUSES);
+            let p = &plans[&DEFAULT_PAUSE];
+            assert_eq!(p.cuts.len(), 4, "{ext}: {:?}", p.cuts);
+            // About 1.7 s from each of the four 2 s silences, and less for a longer pause.
+            let cut = p.saved_ms();
+            assert!((6_500..6_900).contains(&cut), "{ext}: {cut}");
+            assert!(plans[&500].saved_ms() < cut && cut < plans[&200].saved_ms());
+            let list = dir.join(format!("{ext}.m3u8"));
+            std::fs::write(&list, playlist(p, &format!("t.{ext}"))).unwrap();
+            // Its frames added up: a raw AAC file's duration is only guessed from its bitrate.
+            let len = |p: &Path| {
+                let p = p.display().to_string();
+                async move {
+                    run_out("ffprobe", &["-v", "error", "-select_streams", "a:0", "-show_entries", "packet=duration_time", "-of", "csv=p=0", &p])
+                        .await
+                        .unwrap()
+                        .lines()
+                        .filter_map(|l| l.trim().trim_end_matches(',').parse::<f64>().ok())
+                        .sum::<f64>()
+                }
+            };
+            let short = len(&src).await - len(&list).await;
+            assert!((short * 1000.0 - cut as f64).abs() < 100.0, "{ext}: {short} s shorter, {cut} ms cut");
+            // Decodes without a complaint.
+            assert!(ffmpeg(&["-v", "error", "-i", &list.display().to_string(), "-f", "null", "-"]).await.unwrap().is_empty());
+            // Saved as a file of its own (#186): as long as the playlist, and it plays.
+            let (n, body) = kept(&src, p).await.unwrap();
+            let parts: Vec<_> = futures_util::TryStreamExt::try_collect(body).await.unwrap();
+            let bytes = parts.concat();
+            assert_eq!(bytes.len() as u64, n);
+            if ext == "mp3" {
+                assert!(bytes.starts_with(b"ID3"), "the original's tag comes too");
+            }
+            let saved = dir.join(format!("saved.{ext}"));
+            std::fs::write(&saved, &bytes).unwrap();
+            assert!((len(&saved).await - len(&list).await).abs() < 0.05, "{ext}");
+            assert!(ffmpeg(&["-v", "error", "-i", &saved.display().to_string(), "-f", "null", "-"]).await.unwrap().is_empty());
+        }
+        std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
+    }
+}
+
+/// A real episode, for trying the cut on something other than a test tone:
+/// `IPX_DEADAIR_FILE=/path/ep.mp3 cargo test real_file -- --ignored --nocapture`. Each pause's
+/// playlist is left beside it, `ep.mp3.300.m3u8`, to listen to.
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[tokio::test]
+#[ignore]
+async fn real_file() {
+    let src = std::path::PathBuf::from(std::env::var("IPX_DEADAIR_FILE").expect("IPX_DEADAIR_FILE"));
+    let t = std::time::Instant::now();
+    let plans = analyse(&src).await.unwrap().expect("plans");
+    eprintln!("analysed in {:.1?}", t.elapsed());
+    let name = src.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy().into_owned();
+    for (pause, p) in &plans {
+        std::fs::write(src.with_file_name(format!("{name}.{pause}.m3u8")), playlist(p, &name)).unwrap();
+        eprintln!("{pause} ms: {} cuts, {:.1} min saved, {} pieces", p.cuts.len(), p.saved_ms() as f64 / 60_000.0, p.pieces.len());
+    }
+}

crates/ipx/src/directory.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+//! The Directory, from the directory service (#205): ipx asks it on its people's behalf, so the
+//! page never talks to it and never sees its token, and sends it the public feeds people here
+//! subscribe to when an admin has turned sharing on.
+
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
+
+use ipx_directory::{FeedPage, Listing, Me, SnapshotEntry, SnapshotResult};
+use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
+
+use crate::{Ctx, Sub, config, feed};
+
+/// How often the snapshot goes when nothing has woken the sender sooner.
+const SHARE_EVERY: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(30 * 60);
+
+/// What went wrong asking the directory, in words for an admin.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum DirError {
+    /// No address, or no token, in the settings.
+    NotConfigured,
+    /// It answered, refusing: 401 is a token it does not know, 403 one without the access asked for.
+    Refused(u16, String),
+    /// It did not answer, or not with what was asked for.
+    Unreachable(String),
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for DirError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            DirError::NotConfigured => write!(f, "No directory is set up on this server. An admin sets one in Admin, Directory."),
+            DirError::Refused(401, _) => write!(f, "The directory does not accept this server's token. It may have been revoked."),
+            DirError::Refused(403, msg) => write!(f, "The directory refused: {msg}."),
+            DirError::Refused(404, _) => write!(f, "That is not in the directory."),
+            DirError::Refused(code, msg) => write!(f, "The directory answered {code}: {msg}"),
+            DirError::Unreachable(e) => write!(f, "The directory could not be reached: {e}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// When the snapshot last went, and what came of it, for the admin page.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
+pub struct Shared {
+    pub at: i64,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    pub result: Option<SnapshotResult>,
+    pub error: Option<String>,
+}
+
+fn target(cfg: &config::Config) -> Option<(String, String)> {
+    let url = cfg.general.directory_url.trim().trim_end_matches('/');
+    let token = cfg.general.directory_token.trim();
+    (!url.is_empty() && !token.is_empty()).then(|| (url.to_owned(), token.to_owned()))
+}
+
+pub fn configured(cfg: &config::Config) -> bool {
+    target(cfg).is_some()
+}
+
+async fn call<T: DeserializeOwned>(ctx: &Ctx, method: reqwest::Method, path: &str, body: Option<&[SnapshotEntry]>) -> Result<T, DirError> {
+    let (base, token) = target(&ctx.cfg()).ok_or(DirError::NotConfigured)?;
+    let mut req = ctx.client.request(method, format!("{base}{path}")).bearer_auth(token).timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(20));
+    // The directory's spans join this request's trace (#213).
+    if let Some(tp) = ipx_directory::otel::traceparent() {
+        req = req.header("traceparent", tp);
+    }
+    if let Some(b) = body {
+        req = req.json(b);
+    }
+    let resp = req.send().await.map_err(|e| DirError::Unreachable(format!("{e:#}")))?;
+    let status = resp.status();
+    if !status.is_success() {
+        let msg = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await.ok().and_then(|v| v["error"].as_str().map(str::to_owned)).unwrap_or_default();
+        return Err(DirError::Refused(status.as_u16(), msg));
+    }
+    // A removal or an unblock answers 204, with nothing to read: that reads as null, which is ().
+    let body = resp.bytes().await.map_err(|e| DirError::Unreachable(format!("{e:#}")))?;
+    serde_json::from_slice(if body.is_empty() { b"null" } else { &body }).map_err(|e| DirError::Unreachable(format!("its answer did not read: {e:#}")))
+}
+
+fn seg(s: &str) -> percent_encoding::PercentEncode<'_> {
+    percent_encoding::utf8_percent_encode(s, percent_encoding::NON_ALPHANUMERIC)
+}
+
+pub async fn me(ctx: &Ctx) -> Result<Me, DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::GET, "/v1/me", None).await
+}
+
+pub async fn feeds(ctx: &Ctx) -> Result<Vec<Listing>, DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::GET, "/v1/feeds", None).await
+}
+
+pub async fn popular(ctx: &Ctx) -> Result<Vec<Listing>, DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::GET, "/v1/popular?limit=10", None).await
+}
+
+pub async fn page(ctx: &Ctx, id: &str) -> Result<FeedPage, DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::GET, &format!("/v1/feeds/{}", seg(id)), None).await
+}
+
+// Administering the directory (#206): each needs an rwa token, which the directory checks.
+
+/// Removes a feed and blocks it, so no snapshot brings it back.
+pub async fn remove(ctx: &Ctx, id: &str) -> Result<(), DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::DELETE, &format!("/v1/feeds/{}", seg(id)), None).await
+}
+
+pub async fn refresh(ctx: &Ctx, id: &str) -> Result<serde::de::IgnoredAny, DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::POST, &format!("/v1/feeds/{}/refresh", seg(id)), None).await
+}
+
+pub async fn blocked(ctx: &Ctx) -> Result<Vec<ipx_directory::Blocked>, DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::GET, "/v1/blocked", None).await
+}
+
+pub async fn unblock(ctx: &Ctx, id: &str) -> Result<(), DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::DELETE, &format!("/v1/blocked/{}", seg(id)), None).await
+}
+
+pub async fn instances(ctx: &Ctx) -> Result<Vec<ipx_directory::Instance>, DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::GET, "/v1/instances", None).await
+}
+
+/// Drops one server's snapshot, and its counts with it. It comes back with that server's next
+/// one: to keep a server out, revoke its token.
+pub async fn drop_instance(ctx: &Ctx, name: &str) -> Result<(), DirError> {
+    call(ctx, reqwest::Method::DELETE, &format!("/v1/instances/{}", seg(name)), None).await
+}
+
+/// Has the snapshot sent again now, changed or not.
+pub fn resend_now(ctx: &Ctx) {
+    ctx.directory_resend.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+    ctx.directory_wake.notify_one();
+}
+
+/// Whether this server's token may administer the directory.
+pub async fn can_admin(ctx: &Ctx) -> bool {
+    me(ctx).await.is_ok_and(|m| m.access == ipx_directory::config::Access::Rwa)
+}
+
+/// Whether a feed is someone's own: marked private, given a username or password, or at an
+/// address that carries a key (`feed::url_looks_private`).
+pub fn looks_private(feed: &config::Feed) -> bool {
+    feed.private
+        || feed.username.is_some()
+        || feed.password.is_some()
+        || feed.password_env.is_some()
+        || feed::url_looks_private(&feed.url)
+}
+
+/// What the snapshot lists: every feed in the catalogue, with how many people here subscribe,
+/// except an OPML or a Patreon creator itself, which is sent as the feeds in it, and anything
+/// private, a feed inside a private OPML included. An OPML not read yet is not known to be one
+/// and goes too; the directory lists only what it has read as a feed.
+pub fn snapshot_entries(catalogue: &[Sub], counts: &HashMap<String, i64>) -> Vec<SnapshotEntry> {
+    let by_id: HashMap<&str, &config::Feed> = catalogue.iter().map(|s| (s.id.as_str(), &s.cfg)).collect();
+    let is_group: HashSet<&str> = catalogue.iter().filter_map(|s| s.cfg.group.as_deref()).collect();
+    catalogue
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|s| {
+            !is_group.contains(s.id.as_str())
+                && !feed::is_patreon_creator(&s.cfg.url)
+                && !looks_private(&s.cfg)
+                && !s.cfg.group.as_deref().and_then(|g| by_id.get(g)).is_some_and(|f| looks_private(f))
+        })
+        .map(|s| SnapshotEntry {
+            url: s.cfg.url.clone(),
+            subscribers: counts.get(&s.id).copied().unwrap_or(0),
+            category: s.cfg.category.clone(),
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// Sends the snapshot now.
+async fn snapshot(ctx: &Ctx) -> Result<Vec<SnapshotEntry>, DirError> {
+    let catalogue = crate::subscriptions(ctx).await.map_err(|e| DirError::Unreachable(format!("{e:#}")))?;
+    let counts = ctx.db.subscriber_counts().await.map_err(|e| DirError::Unreachable(format!("{e:#}")))?;
+    Ok(snapshot_entries(&catalogue, &counts))
+}
+
+pub async fn share(ctx: &Ctx, entries: &[SnapshotEntry]) -> Result<SnapshotResult, DirError> {
+    let r: SnapshotResult = call(ctx, reqwest::Method::POST, "/v1/snapshot", Some(entries)).await?;
+    if r.refused_private > 0 {
+        // The directory caught what this side should have: worth knowing which check differs.
+        tracing::warn!(refused = r.refused_private, "the directory refused feeds as private that ipx sent");
+    }
+    Ok(r)
+}
+
+/// Sends the snapshot every half hour while sharing is on, and at once when the settings change.
+pub async fn run(ctx: std::sync::Arc<Ctx>, mut stop: tokio::sync::watch::Receiver<bool>) {
+    // What went last, where, and when: a scan wakes this every half minute or so, and the same
+    // 1,500 feeds went each time, the directory rewriting its rows for nothing (#211).
+    let mut last: Option<(Vec<u8>, std::time::Instant)> = None;
+    loop {
+        let cfg = ctx.cfg();
+        if cfg.general.directory_share && configured(&cfg) {
+            let got = match snapshot(&ctx).await {
+                Ok(entries) => {
+                    let key = serde_json::to_vec(&(target(&cfg), &entries)).unwrap_or_default();
+                    let forced = ctx.directory_resend.swap(false, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+                    if forced || resend(last.as_ref(), &key) {
+                        let span = tracing::info_span!(target: "ipx::directory", "directory_share", feeds = entries.len());
+                        let got = tracing::Instrument::instrument(share(&ctx, &entries), span).await;
+                        if got.is_ok() {
+                            last = Some((key, std::time::Instant::now()));
+                        }
+                        Some(got)
+                    } else {
+                        None
+                    }
+                }
+                Err(e) => Some(Err(e)),
+            };
+            if let Some(got) = got {
+                match &got {
+                    Ok(r) => tracing::info!(accepted = r.accepted, refused_private = r.refused_private, refused_blocked = r.refused_blocked, "shared with the directory"),
+                    Err(e) => tracing::warn!(error = %e, "could not share with the directory"),
+                }
+                let (result, error) = match got {
+                    Ok(r) => (Some(r), None),
+                    Err(e) => (None, Some(e.to_string())),
+                };
+                *ctx.directory_shared.lock().unwrap() = Some(Shared { at: crate::db::now(), result, error });
+            }
+        }
+        tokio::select! {
+            _ = tokio::time::sleep(SHARE_EVERY) => {}
+            _ = ctx.directory_wake.notified() => {}
+            _ = stop.changed() => return,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Whether to send the snapshot `key` stands for: one that changed, or went to another directory
+/// or with another token, goes now; the same again only once SHARE_EVERY has passed, so a
+/// directory that lost it, or dropped this server's counts, has it back within the half hour.
+fn resend(last: Option<&(Vec<u8>, std::time::Instant)>, key: &[u8]) -> bool {
+    last.is_none_or(|(k, at)| k != key || at.elapsed() >= SHARE_EVERY)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn sub(id: &str, url: &str, edit: impl FnOnce(&mut config::Feed)) -> Sub {
+        let mut cfg: config::Feed = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({ "url": url })).unwrap();
+        edit(&mut cfg);
+        Sub { id: id.into(), cfg, managed: false }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_snapshot_holds_public_feeds_and_never_a_private_one() {
+        let catalogue = vec![
+            sub("public", "https://example.com/feed.xml", |_| {}),
+            sub("marked", "https://example.com/mine.xml", |f| f.private = true),
+            sub("password", "https://example.com/locked.xml", |f| f.username = Some("me".into())),
+            sub("paid", "https://feeds.supercast.com/feeds/abc", |_| {}),
+            sub("keyed", "https://example.com/feed?key=k", |_| {}),
+            // An OPML: sent as the feeds in it, never itself.
+            sub("list", "https://example.com/list.opml", |_| {}),
+            sub("in-list", "https://example.com/a.xml", |f| f.group = Some("list".into())),
+            // Inside a private OPML: as private as the OPML.
+            sub("secret-list", "https://example.com/l.opml?token=t", |_| {}),
+            sub("in-secret", "https://example.com/b.xml", |f| f.group = Some("secret-list".into())),
+        ];
+        let counts = HashMap::from([("public".to_string(), 3), ("marked".to_string(), 1)]);
+        let got = snapshot_entries(&catalogue, &counts);
+        let urls: Vec<(&str, i64)> = got.iter().map(|e| (e.url.as_str(), e.subscribers)).collect();
+        assert_eq!(urls, [("https://example.com/feed.xml", 3), ("https://example.com/a.xml", 0)]);
+        let patreon = vec![sub("creator", "https://www.patreon.com/c/someone", |_| {})];
+        assert!(snapshot_entries(&patreon, &counts).is_empty(), "a Patreon creator goes as its shows");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn nothing_is_asked_without_an_address_and_a_token() {
+        let mut cfg = config::Config::default();
+        assert!(!configured(&cfg));
+        cfg.general.directory_url = "https://ipx-dir.example/".into();
+        assert!(!configured(&cfg));
+        cfg.general.directory_token = "t".into();
+        assert_eq!(target(&cfg), Some(("https://ipx-dir.example".into(), "t".into())));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_same_snapshot_is_not_sent_again_within_the_half_hour() {
+        let now = std::time::Instant::now();
+        assert!(resend(None, b"a"));
+        assert!(!resend(Some(&(b"a".to_vec(), now)), b"a"));
+        assert!(resend(Some(&(b"a".to_vec(), now)), b"b"));
+        if let Some(long_ago) = now.checked_sub(SHARE_EVERY) {
+            assert!(resend(Some(&(b"a".to_vec(), long_ago)), b"a"));
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/ipx/src/download.rs

@@ -172,10 +172,12 @@ pub async fn download(
         .with_context(|| format!("creating {}", tmp.display()))?;
     let mut done: u64 = 0;
     let mut stream = resp.bytes_stream();
+    let _active = crate::metrics::busy(&crate::metrics::STATS.downloads_active);
     while let Some(chunk) = stream.next().await {
         let chunk = chunk.context("reading body")?;
         file.write_all(&chunk).await?;
         done += chunk.len() as u64;
+        crate::metrics::STATS.download_bytes.fetch_add(chunk.len() as u64, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
         on_progress(done, total);
     }
     file.flush().await?;
@@ -207,6 +209,36 @@ pub async fn place(d: &Downloaded, dir: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
     Ok(dest)
 }
 
+/// Deletes what an enclosure's path names: a file, or the folder a torrent of several files came
+/// down as. `remove_file` refused the folder, so the reaper warned on every pass and freed nothing,
+/// and Delete failed (#158).
+pub fn remove(path: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    if path.is_dir() {
+        return std::fs::remove_dir_all(path);
+    }
+    std::fs::remove_file(path)
+}
+
+/// The file to play for an enclosure's path: the path itself, or for a torrent of several files,
+/// the largest file in its folder, which is the episode (#158).
+pub fn playable(path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
+    fn largest(dir: &Path, best: &mut Option<(u64, PathBuf)>) {
+        let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(dir) else { return };
+        for e in entries.flatten() {
+            match e.metadata() {
+                Ok(m) if m.is_dir() => largest(&e.path(), best),
+                Ok(m) if best.as_ref().is_none_or(|(n, _)| m.len() > *n) => *best = Some((m.len(), e.path())),
+                _ => {}
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    let mut best = None;
+    if path.is_dir() {
+        largest(path, &mut best);
+    }
+    best.map_or_else(|| path.to_owned(), |(_, p)| p)
+}
+
 /// Advertised as a torrent, before spending any bandwidth on it.
 pub fn looks_like_torrent(url: &str, mime: Option<&str>) -> bool {
     mime.is_some_and(|m| m.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("torrent"))
@@ -305,6 +337,25 @@ pub fn matches_keywords(keywords: &[String], haystacks: &[&str]) -> bool {
     })
 }
 
+/// Whether any of these words or phrases appears, as whole words, in the haystacks. Whole words,
+/// unlike `matches_keywords`, because a block hides things: "ai" should not hide everything that
+/// "said" something. Case and punctuation are ignored, so "A.I." is not caught by "ai", but
+/// "Trump's" is by "trump".
+pub fn blocked(words: &[String], haystacks: &[&str]) -> bool {
+    // Letters and digits only, each run of anything else one space, padded so a phrase matches
+    // at either end: " new york " is in " the new york times ", " york " is not in " yorkshire ".
+    let norm = |s: &str| {
+        let mut out = String::from(" ");
+        for w in s.split(|c: char| !c.is_alphanumeric()).filter(|w| !w.is_empty()) {
+            out.push_str(&w.to_lowercase());
+            out.push(' ');
+        }
+        out
+    };
+    let hay = norm(&haystacks.join(" "));
+    words.iter().map(|w| norm(w)).any(|w| w.len() > 1 && hay.contains(&w))
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -387,7 +438,7 @@ mod tests {
         let mut f = crate::config::Feed {
             url: "u".into(), folder: Some("Subscriptions/Some | Show".into()), group: None, media_types: None,
             schedule: None, keywords: vec![], allow_explicit: false, auto_download: true,
-            max_new_per_check: None, username: None, password: None, password_env: None,
+            max_new_per_check: None, username: None, password: None, password_env: None, category: None, listed: false, private: false,
         };
         assert_eq!(folder_for(&cfg, "id", &f, None), "Subscriptions/Some - Show");
 
@@ -396,6 +447,20 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(folder_for(&cfg, "id", &f, None), "etc/Show");
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn a_torrent_folder_plays_its_largest_file_and_deletes_whole() {
+        let d = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("ipx-torrent-test-{}", std::process::id()));
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&d);
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(d.join("show/extras")).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(d.join("show/cover.jpg"), [0; 10]).unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(d.join("show/extras/episode.mp3"), [0; 100]).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(playable(&d.join("show")), d.join("show/extras/episode.mp3"));
+        assert_eq!(playable(&d.join("show/cover.jpg")), d.join("show/cover.jpg"), "a file is itself");
+        remove(&d.join("show")).unwrap();
+        assert!(!d.join("show").exists());
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&d);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn keyword_matching_is_or_across_keywords_and_and_within_one() {
         let kws = vec!["deep dive".to_string(), "interview".to_string()];
@@ -404,4 +469,16 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!matches_keywords(&kws, &["Just a dive"]), "half a keyword is not a match");
         assert!(matches_keywords(&[], &["anything"]), "no keywords means take everything");
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocking_matches_whole_words_and_phrases() {
+        let words = vec!["AI".to_string(), "new york".to_string()];
+        assert!(blocked(&words, &["What AI means now"]));
+        assert!(blocked(&words, &["<p>ai, again</p>"]), "markup and punctuation are not words");
+        assert!(!blocked(&words, &["He said so", "Portrait"]), "not inside another word");
+        assert!(blocked(&words, &["Live from", "New  York."]), "a phrase spans runs of space");
+        assert!(!blocked(&words, &["New Yorkshire"]));
+        assert!(!blocked(&["  ".to_string()], &["anything"]), "a blank word blocks nothing");
+        assert!(!blocked(&[], &["anything"]));
+    }
 }

crates/ipx/src/entity.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+//! The database's tables as SeaORM entities: the one description of the schema, from which
+//! `Db::open` creates what a database is missing, on SQLite or Postgres alike (see
+//! `db::create_missing`). Times are Unix seconds.
+
+pub mod feeds {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "feeds")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub id: String,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub url: String,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub title: Option<String>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub image: Option<String>,
+        /// The channel's first <itunes:category>, for the Directory.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub category: Option<String>,
+        /// What the feed says it is, as it says it, for its page in the Directory. Added after
+        /// the table was, so `create_missing` adds it to a database without it.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub description: Option<String>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub etag: Option<String>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub last_modified: Option<String>,
+        pub last_checked: Option<i64>,
+        pub ttl_mins: Option<i64>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub last_error: Option<String>,
+        /// When the current run of failures began; NULL while the feed is healthy. Kept through
+        /// repeated failures so the UI can tell a blip (macmanx: failed once, fine an hour
+        /// later) from a feed that has been down for a day.
+        pub error_since: Option<i64>,
+        /// Came from a subscribed OPML that no longer lists it, but has downloads, so kept.
+        #[sea_orm(default_value = false)]
+        pub orphaned: bool,
+        /// The OPML subscription this feed came from.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub group_id: Option<String>,
+        /// Derived from an OPML and not written to config.toml. Writing 80-odd generated entries
+        /// into a hand-edited file made it unreadable; the OPML is the source of truth, so they
+        /// are re-derived instead. Customising one promotes it to config.
+        #[sea_orm(default_value = false)]
+        pub managed: bool,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, EnumIter, DeriveRelation)]
+    pub enum Relation {}
+
+    impl ActiveModelBehavior for ActiveModel {}
+}
+
+pub mod entries {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "entries")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub feed_id: String,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub guid: String,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub title: Option<String>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub link: Option<String>,
+        pub published: Option<i64>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub description: Option<String>,
+        pub first_seen: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub image: Option<String>,
+        pub duration: Option<i64>,
+        pub episode: Option<i64>,
+        pub season: Option<i64>,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, EnumIter, DeriveRelation)]
+    pub enum Relation {}
+
+    impl ActiveModelBehavior for ActiveModel {}
+}
+
+pub mod enclosures {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "enclosures")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key)]
+        pub id: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub feed_id: String,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub guid: String,
+        /// The dedupe key, and the reason one file serves every subscriber. A reaped file keeps
+        /// its row with path NULL and state 'reaped', so a purged episode is never fetched again.
+        #[sea_orm(unique, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub url: String,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub mime: Option<String>,
+        pub length: Option<i64>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub path: Option<String>,
+        /// 'pending' is queued: a scan downloads it on its own. 'held' is listed but outside the
+        /// feed's newest max_new_per_check, or its feed downloads nothing automatically; it can
+        /// be downloaded by hand (`Db::hold_back`). 'skipped' is filtered out ('last_error' says
+        /// why), then 'downloading', 'done', 'error', 'reaped'.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub state: String,
+        #[sea_orm(default_value = 0)]
+        pub bytes_done: i64,
+        pub downloaded_at: Option<i64>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub last_error: Option<String>,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, EnumIter, DeriveRelation)]
+    pub enum Relation {}
+
+    impl ActiveModelBehavior for ActiveModel {}
+}
+
+pub mod users {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "users")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key)]
+        pub id: i64,
+        /// Unique without regard to case: `db::create_missing` adds the index on lower(name), which
+        /// works the same on both databases where SQLite's COLLATE NOCASE does not.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub name: String,
+        /// NULL for someone who only ever arrives through the proxy: there is no password to
+        /// check, and leaving it empty is not the same as leaving it unset.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub pass_hash: Option<String>,
+        #[sea_orm(default_value = false)]
+        pub is_admin: bool,
+        /// For whoever maintains the server. NULL where it is not known.
+        pub created: Option<i64>,
+        pub last_login: Option<i64>,
+        /// The theme chosen in Settings, and light, dark or auto. NULL until one is chosen.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub theme: Option<String>,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub theme_mode: Option<String>,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, EnumIter, DeriveRelation)]
+    pub enum Relation {}
+
+    impl ActiveModelBehavior for ActiveModel {}
+}
+
+/// A table of one person's rows, gone when they are.
+macro_rules! owned_by_user {
+    () => {
+        #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, EnumIter, DeriveRelation)]
+        pub enum Relation {
+            #[sea_orm(
+                belongs_to = "super::users::Entity",
+                from = "Column::UserId",
+                to = "super::users::Column::Id",
+                on_delete = "Cascade"
+            )]
+            User,
+        }
+
+        impl Related<super::users::Entity> for Entity {
+            fn to() -> RelationDef {
+                Relation::User.def()
+            }
+        }
+
+        impl ActiveModelBehavior for ActiveModel {}
+    };
+}
+
+/// What one person wants from a feed. The feed, its items and its files are shared; this is the
+/// part that is not. NULL in a column means: follow the feed's own setting.
+pub mod subscriptions {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "subscriptions")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false)]
+        pub user_id: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub feed_id: String,
+        /// JSON array of strings; NULL follows the feed.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text", nullable)]
+        pub keywords: Option<String>,
+        pub auto_download: Option<bool>,
+        pub allow_explicit: Option<bool>,
+        pub max_new_per_check: Option<i64>,
+        /// Pinned to the top of this person's feed list, a feed inside a folder included.
+        #[sea_orm(default_value = false)]
+        pub pinned: bool,
+    }
+
+    owned_by_user!();
+}
+
+/// Read, kept and how far in. One row per person per item, created on first touch; an item
+/// nobody has touched has no row at all, which is what unread means.
+pub mod entry_state {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "entry_state")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false)]
+        pub user_id: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub feed_id: String,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub guid: String,
+        #[sea_orm(default_value = false)]
+        pub read: bool,
+        #[sea_orm(default_value = false)]
+        pub flagged: bool,
+        #[sea_orm(default_value = 0)]
+        pub position: i64,
+        /// The length this person's player measured, beside the position it is measured against.
+        pub duration: Option<i64>,
+    }
+
+    owned_by_user!();
+}
+
+/// Words someone never wants to see: an item whose title or text has one is hidden from them and
+/// not downloaded on their account (issue #47). `feed_id` is empty for the list that applies to
+/// every feed they read.
+pub mod blocklists {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "blocklists")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false)]
+        pub user_id: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub feed_id: String,
+        /// JSON array of strings.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub words: String,
+    }
+
+    owned_by_user!();
+}
+
+/// The items someone's block lists hide from them, worked out whenever a list or the feed
+/// changes (`Db::rehide`), since SQL on both databases cannot match whole words itself.
+pub mod hidden {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "hidden")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false)]
+        pub user_id: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub feed_id: String,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub guid: String,
+    }
+
+    owned_by_user!();
+}
+
+pub mod sessions {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "sessions")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub token: String,
+        pub user_id: i64,
+        pub seen: i64,
+    }
+
+    owned_by_user!();
+}
+
+/// A token a script or agent sends as `Authorization: Bearer`, acting as the person who made
+/// it (#123). Kept as its SHA-256, so the table is no use to anyone who reads it.
+pub mod api_tokens {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "api_tokens")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key)]
+        pub id: i64,
+        pub user_id: i64,
+        /// What its owner called it, to tell one from another when revoking.
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub name: String,
+        #[sea_orm(unique, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub hash: String,
+        pub created: i64,
+        pub last_used: Option<i64>,
+    }
+
+    owned_by_user!();
+}
+
+/// The catalogue: every feed configured, with its shared settings as `config::Feed` in JSON, so a
+/// new setting on a feed needs no new column. It was config.toml's `[feeds]` (issue #18).
+pub mod catalogue {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "catalogue")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub id: String,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub spec: String,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, EnumIter, DeriveRelation)]
+    pub enum Relation {}
+
+    impl ActiveModelBehavior for ActiveModel {}
+}
+
+/// The server's settings, by name, each a JSON value. `general` is `config::Stored`: what was in
+/// config.toml's `[general]` and the admin page edits. Its row being there is what says the
+/// configuration has moved in (issue #18).
+pub mod settings {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "settings")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub name: String,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub value: String,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, EnumIter, DeriveRelation)]
+    pub enum Relation {}
+
+    impl ActiveModelBehavior for ActiveModel {}
+}
+
+/// What DeadAir found in an enclosure (#181): `plans` is a `deadair::Plan` for each pause length,
+/// as JSON keyed by the pause in ms, and `{}` for a file it does not apply to (video, not MP3 or
+/// AAC, nothing to cut), so that one is looked at once and not every pass.
+pub mod deadair_plans {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "deadair_plans")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false)]
+        pub enclosure_id: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(column_type = "Text")]
+        pub plans: String,
+        /// Against the enclosure's `downloaded_at`: a file downloaded again is looked at again.
+        pub made_at: i64,
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, EnumIter, DeriveRelation)]
+    pub enum Relation {}
+
+    impl ActiveModelBehavior for ActiveModel {}
+}
+
+/// Who has DeadAir on, for which feeds: it is off for every feed until someone turns it on for
+/// that one or its group, and `wanted` false keeps one feed of a group out of the group's.
+pub mod deadair_prefs {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "deadair_prefs")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false)]
+        pub user_id: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub feed_id: String,
+        pub wanted: bool,
+        /// The pause DeadAir leaves where it cuts a silence, in ms (#182); NULL for the usual.
+        pub pause_ms: Option<i64>,
+    }
+
+    owned_by_user!();
+}
+
+/// The time DeadAir has saved someone: one row per episode they got 75% through on a copy, so
+/// replaying it never counts twice. Their total is the sum.
+pub mod deadair_saved {
+    use sea_orm::entity::prelude::*;
+
+    #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, DeriveEntityModel)]
+    #[sea_orm(table_name = "deadair_saved")]
+    pub struct Model {
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false)]
+        pub user_id: i64,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub feed_id: String,
+        #[sea_orm(primary_key, auto_increment = false, column_type = "Text")]
+        pub guid: String,
+        pub saved_ms: i64,
+        pub at: i64,
+    }
+
+    owned_by_user!();
+}

crates/ipx/src/ipc.rs

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ pub enum Event {
     FeedSkip { feed: String, reason: String },
     FeedDone { feed: String, new: usize, downloaded: usize, failed: usize, torrents: usize },
     FeedError { feed: String, msg: String },
+    /// The feed answered from a new address after redirects that all said it moved for good,
+    /// and the catalogue now has that address (#115).
+    FeedMoved { feed: String, from: String, to: String },
     Progress {
         feed: String,
         /// Which enclosure this is about. Without it a UI cannot tell one download's
@@ -29,6 +32,8 @@ pub enum Event {
     DownloadDone { feed: String, enclosure: i64, url: String, path: String, bytes: u64 },
     DownloadError { feed: String, enclosure: i64, url: String, msg: String },
     TorrentDeferred { feed: String, url: String },
+    /// DeadAir finished a file's copy (#171), so a page showing it as in progress can stop.
+    DeadairDone { feed: String, enclosure: i64, saved_s: i64 },
     Reaped { path: String, bytes: u64 },
     /// Terminal: a client that asked for work stops reading here.
     ScanDone { feeds: usize },
@@ -50,6 +55,7 @@ impl Event {
                 "{feed}: {new} new entries, {downloaded} downloaded, {failed} failed, {torrents} torrents deferred"
             ),
             Event::FeedError { feed, msg } => format!("{feed}: error: {msg}"),
+            Event::FeedMoved { feed, from, to } => format!("{feed}: moved for good from {from} to {to}; following it"),
             Event::Progress { file, done, total, .. } => match total {
                 Some(t) if *t > 0 => format!(
                     "    {file}: {:.1}% ({:.1}/{:.1} MB)",
@@ -69,12 +75,13 @@ impl Event {
                 *bytes as f64 / 1_048_576.0
             ),
             Event::Status { feeds, pending, downloaded } => {
-                format!("{feeds} feeds, {pending} pending, {downloaded} downloaded")
+                format!("{feeds} feeds, {pending} queued to download, {downloaded} downloaded")
             }
             Event::Error { msg } => format!("error: {msg}"),
             // Noise in a terminal; a UI still gets them on the socket.
             Event::FeedStart { feed } => format!("{feed}: checking"),
             Event::TorrentDeferred { feed, .. } => format!("{feed}: torrent deferred"),
+            Event::DeadairDone { feed, saved_s, .. } => format!("{feed}: DeadAir found the silences, {saved_s} s shorter"),
             Event::ScanDone { feeds } => format!("scan complete, {feeds} feed(s)"),
         })
     }
@@ -88,6 +95,11 @@ pub enum Command {
         feed: Option<String>,
         #[serde(default)]
         force: bool,
+        /// Only these feeds, and the feeds inside any of them that is an OPML: "check every feed"
+        /// from the web UI is every feed of the person asking, not of everyone (issue #37).
+        /// Empty is every feed, as the schedule and the CLI mean it.
+        #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+        feeds: Vec<String>,
     },
     Reap {
         #[serde(default)]
@@ -100,6 +112,11 @@ pub enum Command {
         enclosure: i64,
     },
     Status,
+    /// Read the catalogue and server settings again from the database, which `ipx add`, `rm`
+    /// and `import` change in a process of their own. A daemon keeps them in memory, and with
+    /// its old copy wrote a removed feed back, and dropped an added one, at its next change of
+    /// its own (#120). Answered, as status is, with the counts after it.
+    Reload,
 }
 
 /// Where events go: the socket, the terminal, or both.
@@ -126,38 +143,13 @@ impl Emitter {
         // Level by how much it matters. With 80-odd feeds in an OPML subscription, one
         // line per feed per tick for "not due yet" would push everything worth reading
         // out of the buffer within a few minutes.
-        let routine = match &e {
-            Event::Progress { .. } | Event::FeedSkip { .. } | Event::FeedStart { .. } => true,
-            Event::FeedDone { new, downloaded, failed, torrents, .. } => {
-                *new == 0 && *downloaded == 0 && *failed == 0 && *torrents == 0
-            }
-            _ => false,
-        };
-        let bad = matches!(
-            &e,
-            Event::FeedError { .. } | Event::DownloadError { .. } | Event::Error { .. }
-        );
-        if let Some(line) = e.human() {
-            let line = line.trim();
-            if bad {
-                tracing::warn!(target: "ipx::scan", "{line}");
-            } else if routine {
-                tracing::debug!(target: "ipx::scan", "{line}");
-            } else {
-                tracing::info!(target: "ipx::scan", "{line}");
-            }
-        }
-
-        if let Some(tx) = &self.tx {
-            // The outbound half of the protocol, as it goes on the wire. Progress is the
-            // high-volume one, so it sits at debug.
-            if let Ok(json) = serde_json::to_string(&e) {
-                if matches!(e, Event::Progress { .. }) {
-                    tracing::debug!(target: "ipx::io", "<- {json}");
-                } else {
-                    tracing::info!(target: "ipx::io", "<- {json}");
-                }
-            }
+        log_event(&e, self.tx.is_some());
+        // A feed not due changes nothing a listener shows, and a scan has one for nearly every
+        // feed: 1,500 at once overflowed the channel's 1,024 for a page slow to read (#197).
+        let routine = matches!(&e, Event::FeedSkip { reason, .. } if reason.starts_with("not due"));
+        if let Some(tx) = &self.tx
+            && !routine
+        {
             // An error here only means nobody is listening yet.
             let _ = tx.send(e.clone());
         }
@@ -167,16 +159,77 @@ impl Emitter {
     }
 }
 
+/// An event, logged once (#91): its words as the message, and `ev`, `feed`, `new` and the rest as
+/// fields, so Loki reads them without parsing the message. A failure also gets `error.type` and,
+/// from an HTTP error, `http.response.status_code`, so failures group by kind without a regex.
+/// Level by how much it matters: with 80-odd feeds in an OPML subscription, a line per feed per
+/// tick for "not due yet" would push everything worth reading out of the log view in minutes,
+/// and Progress fires on every whole percent. `wire` also logs the event as it goes on the
+/// socket, at debug: the admin page's Daemon I/O tab shows it, production's log leaves it out.
+fn log_event(e: &Event, wire: bool) {
+    let json = serde_json::to_string(e).unwrap_or_default();
+    let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap_or_default();
+    let s = |k: &str| v.get(k).and_then(|x| x.as_str());
+    let n = |k: &str| v.get(k).and_then(|x| x.as_u64());
+    let (kind, code) = match e {
+        Event::FeedError { msg, .. } | Event::DownloadError { msg, .. } | Event::Error { msg } => {
+            let (k, c) = crate::feed::failure_kind(msg);
+            (Some(k), c)
+        }
+        _ => (None, None),
+    };
+    let routine = match e {
+        Event::Progress { .. } | Event::FeedSkip { .. } | Event::FeedStart { .. } => true,
+        Event::FeedDone { new, downloaded, failed, torrents, .. } => {
+            *new == 0 && *downloaded == 0 && *failed == 0 && *torrents == 0
+        }
+        _ => false,
+    };
+    macro_rules! line {
+        ($level:ident, $target:literal, $text:expr) => {
+            tracing::$level!(
+                target: $target,
+                ev = s("ev"), feed = s("feed"), msg = s("msg"), url = s("url"), reason = s("reason"), from = s("from"), to = s("to"),
+                new = n("new"), downloaded = n("downloaded"), failed = n("failed"),
+                torrents = n("torrents"), bytes = n("bytes"), feeds = n("feeds"),
+                pending = n("pending"), enclosure = n("enclosure"), files = n("files"),
+                "error.type" = kind, "http.response.status_code" = code,
+                "{}", $text
+            )
+        };
+    }
+    // The healthcheck's answer, every 30s: a reply on the socket rather than work done, so it
+    // stays with the rest of the conversation, and the Scans tab stays about scans.
+    if matches!(e, Event::Status { .. }) {
+        return line!(info, "ipx::io", format!("<- {json}"));
+    }
+    if wire {
+        tracing::debug!(target: "ipx::io", "<- {json}");
+    }
+    let text = e.human().map(|l| l.trim().to_owned()).unwrap_or_else(|| json.clone());
+    if kind.is_some() {
+        line!(warn, "ipx::scan", text)
+    } else if routine {
+        line!(debug, "ipx::scan", text)
+    } else {
+        line!(info, "ipx::scan", text)
+    }
+}
+
 /// True when something is already listening -- i.e. a daemon owns this socket.
 pub async fn daemon_is_live(path: &Path) -> bool {
     UnixStream::connect(path).await.is_ok()
 }
 
-/// Answers `status` for the socket, without the worker. The worker runs one job at a time, and a
-/// healthcheck left waiting behind a scan or a long download timed out and called a busy daemon
-/// dead. The answer goes to the client that asked and no one else: broadcast, it ended any
-/// `ipx fetch` that was watching a scan, since `status` is a terminal event.
-pub type StatusFn = std::sync::Arc<dyn Fn() -> Event + Send + Sync>;
+/// Answers `status` and `reload` for the socket, without the worker. The worker runs one job at a
+/// time, and a healthcheck left waiting behind a scan or a long download timed out and called a
+/// busy daemon dead; a reload left waiting would let the web UI write the old catalogue back in
+/// the meantime. The answer goes to the client that asked and no one else: broadcast, it ended
+/// any `ipx fetch` that was watching a scan, since `status` is a terminal event.
+/// A future, since reading the counts is a database query.
+pub type StatusFn = std::sync::Arc<
+    dyn Fn(Command) -> std::pin::Pin<Box<dyn std::future::Future<Output = Event> + Send>> + Send + Sync,
+>;
 
 /// Accepts connections, feeding commands to `cmds` and events from `events` back out.
 pub async fn serve(
@@ -247,12 +300,10 @@ async fn handle(
         }
         match serde_json::from_str::<Command>(line) {
             // Answered here, not queued behind whatever the worker is on: see StatusFn.
-            Ok(Command::Status) => {
+            Ok(cmd @ (Command::Status | Command::Reload)) => {
                 tracing::info!(target: "ipx::io", "-> {line}");
-                let ev = status();
-                if let Ok(json) = serde_json::to_string(&ev) {
-                    tracing::info!(target: "ipx::io", "<- {json}");
-                }
+                let ev = status(cmd).await;
+                log_event(&ev, true);
                 let _ = reply.send(ev).await;
             }
             Ok(cmd) => {
@@ -267,6 +318,26 @@ async fn handle(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Tells a running daemon to read the catalogue again (see Command::Reload), and waits for it.
+pub async fn reload(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
+    let stream = UnixStream::connect(path).await?;
+    let (read, mut write) = stream.into_split();
+    write.write_all(b"{\"cmd\":\"reload\"}\n").await?;
+    let mut lines = BufReader::new(read).lines();
+    let answer = async {
+        // Other clients' events come here too; the answer is the status, or an error.
+        while let Some(line) = lines.next_line().await? {
+            match serde_json::from_str::<Event>(&line) {
+                Ok(Event::Status { .. }) => return Ok(()),
+                Ok(Event::Error { msg }) => anyhow::bail!("{msg}"),
+                _ => continue,
+            }
+        }
+        anyhow::bail!("the daemon closed the connection without answering")
+    };
+    tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10), answer).await.context("the daemon did not answer in 10s")?
+}
+
 /// Sends one command to a running daemon and prints the events it produces.
 pub async fn proxy(path: &Path, cmd: &Command) -> Result<()> {
     let stream = UnixStream::connect(path).await?;
@@ -296,13 +367,32 @@ pub async fn proxy(path: &Path, cmd: &Command) -> Result<()> {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[test]
+    fn a_feed_not_due_stays_off_the_live_updates() {
+        let (tx, mut rx) = broadcast::channel(4);
+        let out = Emitter::socket(tx, false);
+        for i in 0..10 {
+            out.emit(Event::FeedSkip { feed: format!("f{i}"), reason: "not due for 5m".into() });
+        }
+        out.emit(Event::FeedSkip { feed: "g".into(), reason: "not modified".into() });
+        assert!(matches!(rx.try_recv(), Ok(Event::FeedSkip { feed, .. }) if feed == "g"), "nothing missed");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_feed_that_moved_says_so_on_the_wire_and_in_words() {
+        let e = Event::FeedMoved { feed: "x".into(), from: "http://a/f".into(), to: "https://a/f".into() };
+        let wire = serde_json::to_value(&e).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!((wire["ev"].as_str(), wire["from"].as_str(), wire["to"].as_str()), (Some("feed_moved"), Some("http://a/f"), Some("https://a/f")));
+        assert_eq!(e.human().unwrap(), "x: moved for good from http://a/f to https://a/f; following it");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn commands_parse_from_the_wire_form() {
         let got: Command = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"cmd":"fetch"}"#).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(got, Command::Fetch { feed: None, force: false }));
+        assert!(matches!(got, Command::Fetch { feed: None, force: false, .. }));
 
         let got: Command = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"cmd":"fetch","feed":"atp","force":true}"#).unwrap();
-        assert!(matches!(got, Command::Fetch { feed: Some(f), force: true } if f == "atp"));
+        assert!(matches!(got, Command::Fetch { feed: Some(f), force: true, .. } if f == "atp"));
 
         let got: Command = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"cmd":"reap","dry_run":true}"#).unwrap();
         assert!(matches!(got, Command::Reap { dry_run: true }));
@@ -366,7 +456,8 @@ mod tests {
         // Another client, watching a scan: it must not be handed someone else's answer, which
         // would end its session.
         let mut watcher = events.subscribe();
-        let status: StatusFn = std::sync::Arc::new(|| Event::Status { feeds: 1, pending: 2, downloaded: 3 });
+        let status: StatusFn =
+            std::sync::Arc::new(|_| Box::pin(async { Event::Status { feeds: 1, pending: 2, downloaded: 3 } }));
         let (client, server) = UnixStream::pair().unwrap();
         tokio::spawn(handle(server, events.subscribe(), cmds, status));
 

crates/ipx/src/metrics.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+//! Prometheus metrics for what logs and traces cannot show: the daemon's own state between
+//! requests, such as how many database connections are in use (#194). Served on a port and a
+//! thread of their own, with a runtime of their own, and made only of what is already in memory:
+//! a scrape neither waits for the web server's threads or the database, whose pool running dry
+//! is one of the things it is there to show, nor holds anything up itself. No sign-in, as
+//! Prometheus exporters have none: checking a token is a database lookup. Written out by hand:
+//! the text format is a few lines, and a client library would be a dependency for them.
+
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI64, AtomicU64, Ordering::Relaxed};
+
+/// What the daemon counts as it works, for /metrics to read without asking anything (#195).
+/// Global: the web layer, the worker, downloads, artwork and DeadAir each add to it, and a handle
+/// threaded through all of them was more code than the counts.
+pub static STATS: Stats = Stats::new();
+
+pub struct Stats {
+    pub http_in_flight: AtomicI64,
+    /// Live updates dropped for a page or socket client that fell behind the broadcast.
+    pub events_missed: AtomicU64,
+    pub downloads_active: AtomicI64,
+    pub download_bytes: AtomicU64,
+    /// Feeds a scan is fetching at this moment, up to its AHEAD.
+    pub feeds_fetching: AtomicI64,
+    /// When a scan last finished, Unix seconds; 0 for not since starting.
+    pub last_scan_done: AtomicI64,
+    /// Files someone wants shortened that DeadAir has not looked at, as of its last pass.
+    pub deadair_backlog: AtomicI64,
+    /// When DeadAir started on the file it is on, Unix seconds; 0 when it is on none.
+    pub deadair_busy_since: AtomicI64,
+    pub art_cache_bytes: AtomicU64,
+    /// Images the sweep threw out to keep under the limit: kept bytes sit at the limit by design,
+    /// so this is what says whether the limit is too small.
+    pub art_evicted: AtomicU64,
+    /// Artwork served from disk, and fetched from the publisher because it was not there.
+    pub art_hits: AtomicU64,
+    pub art_misses: AtomicU64,
+    /// The library as the healthcheck last counted it, every 30 s; -1 until it has.
+    pub feeds: AtomicI64,
+    pub pending: AtomicI64,
+    pub downloaded: AtomicI64,
+    /// The worker's job now, and since when.
+    job: std::sync::Mutex<Option<(&'static str, std::time::Instant)>>,
+    /// Jobs finished, by kind: how many, and their seconds all told.
+    jobs: std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::BTreeMap<&'static str, (u64, f64)>>,
+}
+
+impl Stats {
+    pub const fn new() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            http_in_flight: AtomicI64::new(0),
+            events_missed: AtomicU64::new(0),
+            downloads_active: AtomicI64::new(0),
+            download_bytes: AtomicU64::new(0),
+            feeds_fetching: AtomicI64::new(0),
+            last_scan_done: AtomicI64::new(0),
+            deadair_backlog: AtomicI64::new(0),
+            deadair_busy_since: AtomicI64::new(0),
+            art_cache_bytes: AtomicU64::new(0),
+            art_evicted: AtomicU64::new(0),
+            art_hits: AtomicU64::new(0),
+            art_misses: AtomicU64::new(0),
+            feeds: AtomicI64::new(-1),
+            pending: AtomicI64::new(-1),
+            downloaded: AtomicI64::new(-1),
+            job: std::sync::Mutex::new(None),
+            jobs: std::sync::Mutex::new(std::collections::BTreeMap::new()),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Marks the worker as on a job of `kind` until what it returns is dropped, however the job
+    /// ends: finished, failed or stopped.
+    pub fn job(&'static self, kind: &'static str) -> Job {
+        *self.job.lock().unwrap() = Some((kind, std::time::Instant::now()));
+        Job(self)
+    }
+}
+
+pub struct Job(&'static Stats);
+
+impl Drop for Job {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        if let Some((kind, since)) = self.0.job.lock().unwrap().take() {
+            let mut jobs = self.0.jobs.lock().unwrap();
+            let e = jobs.entry(kind).or_default();
+            e.0 += 1;
+            e.1 += since.elapsed().as_secs_f64();
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Counts one more of something in progress until dropped, however it ends.
+pub struct Busy(&'static AtomicI64);
+
+pub fn busy(gauge: &'static AtomicI64) -> Busy {
+    gauge.fetch_add(1, Relaxed);
+    Busy(gauge)
+}
+
+impl Drop for Busy {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        self.0.fetch_sub(1, Relaxed);
+    }
+}
+
+/// What the metrics are read from.
+pub struct Sources {
+    pub ctx: Arc<crate::Ctx>,
+    pub cmds: tokio::sync::mpsc::Sender<crate::ipc::Command>,
+    pub events: tokio::sync::broadcast::Sender<crate::ipc::Event>,
+    pub playing: crate::deadair::Playing,
+    /// The daemon's runtime, not the metrics thread's own.
+    pub runtime: tokio::runtime::Handle,
+    pub started: std::time::Instant,
+}
+
+/// Starts serving /metrics on `bind`, on a thread of its own, and says where.
+pub fn spawn(bind: &str, s: Sources) -> anyhow::Result<std::net::SocketAddr> {
+    use anyhow::Context as _;
+    // Bound here, so a port already taken is the daemon's error at start, not a thread's later.
+    let listener = std::net::TcpListener::bind(bind).with_context(|| format!("binding metrics to {bind}"))?;
+    listener.set_nonblocking(true)?;
+    let addr = listener.local_addr()?;
+    let s = Arc::new(s);
+    std::thread::Builder::new().name("metrics".into()).spawn(move || {
+        let rt = match tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread().enable_all().build() {
+            Ok(rt) => rt,
+            Err(e) => return tracing::error!(error = %e, "metrics could not start"),
+        };
+        rt.block_on(async move {
+            let app = axum::Router::new().route(
+                "/metrics",
+                axum::routing::get(move || {
+                    let s = s.clone();
+                    async move { ([(axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE, "text/plain; version=0.0.4")], render(&s)) }
+                }),
+            );
+            match tokio::net::TcpListener::from_std(listener) {
+                Ok(l) => {
+                    if let Err(e) = axum::serve(l, app).await {
+                        tracing::error!(error = %e, "metrics stopped");
+                    }
+                }
+                Err(e) => tracing::error!(error = %e, "metrics could not listen"),
+            }
+        });
+    })?;
+    Ok(addr)
+}
+
+/// Every metric, from memory alone.
+pub fn render(s: &Sources) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::new();
+    let (open, idle, max) = s.ctx.db.pool();
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_db_connections", "Database connections open, in use or idle.",
+        &[("state=\"in_use\"", open as f64 - idle as f64), ("state=\"idle\"", idle as f64)]);
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_db_connections_max", "The most database connections the pool opens.", &[("", max as f64)]);
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_worker_queue", "Commands waiting for the worker: scans, downloads and the like.",
+        &[("", (s.cmds.max_capacity() - s.cmds.capacity()) as f64)]);
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_event_listeners", "Open pages and socket clients listening for live updates.",
+        &[("", s.events.receiver_count() as f64)]);
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_torrent_slots_free", "Torrents that could start now.",
+        &[("", s.ctx.torrent_slots.available_permits() as f64)]);
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_deadair_playing", "Episodes someone is playing through DeadAir's playlist.",
+        &[("", s.playing.lock().map_or(0, |p| p.len()) as f64)]);
+    work(&mut out, &STATS, s.events.len(), s.ctx.retry.lock().map_or(0, |r| r.len()), s.ctx.cfg().general.art_cache_mb * 1_048_576);
+    let rt = s.runtime.metrics();
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_runtime_workers", "The async runtime's worker threads.", &[("", rt.num_workers() as f64)]);
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_runtime_tasks", "Tasks alive in the async runtime.", &[("", rt.num_alive_tasks() as f64)]);
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_runtime_queue", "Tasks waiting in the runtime's global queue.", &[("", rt.global_queue_depth() as f64)]);
+    let (rss, fds) = process();
+    if let Some(v) = rss {
+        gauge(&mut out, "ipx_process_resident_bytes", "Memory the process holds.", &[("", v)]);
+    }
+    if let Some(v) = fds {
+        gauge(&mut out, "ipx_process_open_fds", "Files and sockets the process has open.", &[("", v)]);
+    }
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_uptime_seconds", "Seconds since the daemon started.", &[("", s.started.elapsed().as_secs() as f64)]);
+    let version = format!("version=\"{}\"", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"));
+    gauge(&mut out, "ipx_build_info", "The version running, as a label.", &[(&version, 1.0)]);
+    out
+}
+
+/// The work in progress and done, from `STATS`: jobs, queues and what is in flight (#195).
+fn work(out: &mut String, st: &Stats, event_queue: usize, retries: usize, art_limit: u64) {
+    let now = crate::db::now();
+    let job = *st.job.lock().unwrap();
+    gauge(out, "ipx_worker_busy", "1 while the worker is on a job.", &[("", job.is_some() as u8 as f64)]);
+    if let Some((kind, since)) = job {
+        let label = format!("kind=\"{kind}\"");
+        gauge(out, "ipx_worker_job_seconds", "How long the worker has been on its job, by the job's kind.",
+            &[(&label, since.elapsed().as_secs_f64())]);
+    }
+    let jobs = st.jobs.lock().unwrap().clone();
+    let labels: Vec<String> = jobs.keys().map(|k| format!("kind=\"{k}\"")).collect();
+    let pairs = |f: fn(&(u64, f64)) -> f64| labels.iter().zip(jobs.values()).map(|(l, v)| (l.as_str(), f(v))).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    counter(out, "ipx_jobs_total", "Jobs the worker has finished, by kind.", &pairs(|v| v.0 as f64));
+    counter(out, "ipx_job_seconds_total", "Seconds the worker has spent on jobs, by kind.", &pairs(|v| v.1));
+    let last = st.last_scan_done.load(Relaxed);
+    if last > 0 {
+        gauge(out, "ipx_last_scan_age_seconds", "Seconds since a scan last finished.", &[("", (now - last) as f64)]);
+    }
+    gauge(out, "ipx_http_requests_in_flight", "Web requests being answered.", &[("", st.http_in_flight.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    gauge(out, "ipx_scan_feeds_fetching", "Feeds a scan is fetching at once.", &[("", st.feeds_fetching.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    gauge(out, "ipx_downloads_active", "Files downloading now.", &[("", st.downloads_active.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    counter(out, "ipx_download_bytes_total", "Bytes downloaded since the daemon started.", &[("", st.download_bytes.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    gauge(out, "ipx_event_queue", "Live updates sent and not yet read by every listener.", &[("", event_queue as f64)]);
+    counter(out, "ipx_events_missed_total", "Live updates dropped for a listener that fell behind.", &[("", st.events_missed.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    gauge(out, "ipx_deadair_backlog", "Files of shows someone has DeadAir on that it has not looked at, those already heard through included.", &[("", st.deadair_backlog.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    let since = st.deadair_busy_since.load(Relaxed);
+    gauge(out, "ipx_deadair_busy_seconds", "How long DeadAir has been on its file; 0 when on none.",
+        &[("", if since > 0 { (now - since) as f64 } else { 0.0 })]);
+    gauge(out, "ipx_feed_retries", "Feeds waiting to try a failed name lookup again.", &[("", retries as f64)]);
+    gauge(out, "ipx_art_cache_bytes", "Artwork kept on disk, as of the last sweep.", &[("", st.art_cache_bytes.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    gauge(out, "ipx_art_cache_limit_bytes", "The most artwork kept.", &[("", art_limit as f64)]);
+    counter(out, "ipx_art_evicted_total", "Images thrown out to keep the artwork under its limit.", &[("", st.art_evicted.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    counter(out, "ipx_art_requests_total", "Artwork asked for: served from disk, or fetched from the publisher.",
+        &[("result=\"hit\"", st.art_hits.load(Relaxed) as f64), ("result=\"miss\"", st.art_misses.load(Relaxed) as f64)]);
+    for (name, help, v) in [
+        ("ipx_feeds", "Feeds in the catalogue, as the healthcheck last counted.", &st.feeds),
+        ("ipx_downloads_pending", "Files a scan will download on its own, as the healthcheck last counted.", &st.pending),
+        ("ipx_files_downloaded", "Files on disk, as the healthcheck last counted.", &st.downloaded),
+    ] {
+        let v = v.load(Relaxed);
+        if v >= 0 {
+            gauge(out, name, help, &[("", v as f64)]);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// A counter, which only goes up while the daemon runs, in Prometheus's text format.
+pub fn counter(out: &mut String, name: &str, help: &str, samples: &[(&str, f64)]) {
+    write(out, "counter", name, help, samples);
+}
+
+/// One gauge in Prometheus's text format: its help, its type, and a line for each set of labels
+/// (`state="idle"`, or "" for none).
+pub fn gauge(out: &mut String, name: &str, help: &str, samples: &[(&str, f64)]) {
+    write(out, "gauge", name, help, samples);
+}
+
+fn write(out: &mut String, kind: &str, name: &str, help: &str, samples: &[(&str, f64)]) {
+    let _ = writeln!(out, "# HELP {name} {help}\n# TYPE {name} {kind}");
+    for (labels, value) in samples {
+        let labels = if labels.is_empty() { String::new() } else { format!("{{{labels}}}") };
+        let _ = writeln!(out, "{name}{labels} {value}");
+    }
+}
+
+/// The process's resident memory in bytes and its open files, from /proc; None elsewhere.
+pub fn process() -> (Option<f64>, Option<f64>) {
+    let rss = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/status").ok().and_then(|s| {
+        let kb = s.lines().find_map(|l| l.strip_prefix("VmRSS:"))?.trim().strip_suffix("kB")?.trim().parse::<f64>().ok()?;
+        Some(kb * 1024.0)
+    });
+    let fds = std::fs::read_dir("/proc/self/fd").ok().map(|d| d.count() as f64);
+    (rss, fds)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn gauges_are_written_as_prometheus_reads_them() {
+        let mut out = String::new();
+        gauge(&mut out, "ipx_db_connections", "Connections.", &[("state=\"idle\"", 3.0), ("state=\"in_use\"", 1.0)]);
+        gauge(&mut out, "ipx_feeds", "Feeds.", &[("", 1535.0)]);
+        assert_eq!(
+            out,
+            "# HELP ipx_db_connections Connections.\n# TYPE ipx_db_connections gauge\n\
+             ipx_db_connections{state=\"idle\"} 3\nipx_db_connections{state=\"in_use\"} 1\n\
+             # HELP ipx_feeds Feeds.\n# TYPE ipx_feeds gauge\nipx_feeds 1535\n"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn jobs_and_work_in_progress_are_counted_however_they_end() {
+        static T: Stats = Stats::new();
+        {
+            let _j = T.job("scan");
+            let _b = busy(&T.downloads_active);
+            assert_eq!(T.downloads_active.load(Relaxed), 1);
+            let mut out = String::new();
+            work(&mut out, &T, 0, 0, 0);
+            assert!(out.contains("ipx_worker_busy 1\n") && out.contains("ipx_worker_job_seconds{kind=\"scan\"}"), "{out}");
+        }
+        // Dropped, as an error or a stop drops them: nothing left in progress, one scan done.
+        assert_eq!(T.downloads_active.load(Relaxed), 0);
+        let mut out = String::new();
+        work(&mut out, &T, 3, 1, 10);
+        assert!(out.contains("ipx_worker_busy 0\n") && !out.contains("ipx_worker_job_seconds"), "{out}");
+        assert!(out.contains("ipx_jobs_total{kind=\"scan\"} 1\n") && out.contains("# TYPE ipx_jobs_total counter"), "{out}");
+        assert!(out.contains("ipx_event_queue 3\n") && out.contains("ipx_feed_retries 1\n"));
+        // The library's counts are left out until the healthcheck has counted it.
+        assert!(!out.contains("ipx_feeds "));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_process_reads_its_memory_and_files_on_linux() {
+        let (rss, fds) = process();
+        assert!(rss.unwrap() > 0.0 && fds.unwrap() > 0.0);
+    }
+}

crates/ipx/src/retention.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
 //! Disk quota and age sweeps. Replaces iPXQuotaManager.py ("SmartSpace").
 
 use anyhow::Result;
+use tracing::Instrument;
 
 use crate::config::Config;
-use crate::db::{Candidate, Db, now};
+use crate::db::{Candidate, Db, now, step};
 
 /// Headroom kept below the quota, as getToQuota()'s `1048576 * 50` did.
 pub const PAD_BYTES: u64 = 50 * 1024 * 1024;
@@ -45,28 +46,33 @@ pub fn aged(candidates: &[Candidate], cutoff: i64) -> Vec<Candidate> {
         .collect()
 }
 
-pub fn run(cfg: &Config, db: &Db, dry_run: bool) -> Result<Report> {
+pub async fn run(cfg: &Config, db: &Db, dry_run: bool) -> Result<Report> {
     let mut report = Report::default();
 
     // Someone may have deleted a file by hand; the row must stop claiming it exists.
-    for (id, path) in db.missing_files()? {
+    // Each step is a span of the reap's trace, so a slow one says which part was slow.
+    for (id, path) in db.missing_files().instrument(step("missing_files")).await? {
         if !dry_run {
-            db.mark_reaped(id)?;
+            db.mark_reaped(id).await?;
         }
         tracing::debug!(path, "file gone, row reaped");
         report.reconciled += 1;
     }
 
-    let candidates = db.reap_candidates()?;
+    for id in db.prune_abandoned_failures().instrument(step("prune_abandoned_failures")).await? {
+        tracing::info!(feed = id, "forgot a failing feed nobody subscribes to");
+    }
+
+    let candidates = db.reap_candidates().instrument(step("reap_candidates")).await?;
 
     if cfg.general.max_age_days > 0 {
         let cutoff = now() - (cfg.general.max_age_days * 86_400) as i64;
         report.aged_out = aged(&candidates, cutoff);
         for c in &report.aged_out {
-            report.bytes_freed += remove(db, c, dry_run)?;
+            report.bytes_freed += remove(db, c, dry_run).instrument(step("remove_aged")).await?;
         }
         if !dry_run {
-            report.entries_pruned = db.prune_entries(cutoff)?;
+            report.entries_pruned = db.prune_entries(cutoff).instrument(step("prune_entries")).await?;
         }
     }
 
@@ -81,26 +87,30 @@ pub fn run(cfg: &Config, db: &Db, dry_run: bool) -> Result<Report> {
         let total: u64 = remaining.iter().map(|c| c.bytes.max(0) as u64).sum();
         report.over_quota = pick(&remaining, total, limit);
         for c in &report.over_quota {
-            report.bytes_freed += remove(db, c, dry_run)?;
+            report.bytes_freed += remove(db, c, dry_run).instrument(step("remove_over_quota")).await?;
         }
     }
 
     Ok(report)
 }
 
-fn remove(db: &Db, c: &Candidate, dry_run: bool) -> Result<u64> {
+async fn remove(db: &Db, c: &Candidate, dry_run: bool) -> Result<u64> {
     if dry_run {
         return Ok(c.bytes.max(0) as u64);
     }
-    let size = std::fs::metadata(&c.path).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(c.bytes.max(0) as u64);
+    // A torrent's folder measures as a directory entry, not what is in it: the recorded size then.
+    let size = std::fs::metadata(&c.path)
+        .ok()
+        .filter(|m| m.is_file())
+        .map_or(c.bytes.max(0) as u64, |m| m.len());
     // Missing is fine: the point is that it is gone.
-    if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_file(&c.path)
+    if let Err(e) = crate::download::remove(std::path::Path::new(&c.path))
         && e.kind() != std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound
     {
         tracing::warn!(path = c.path, error = %e, "could not delete");
         return Ok(0);
     }
-    db.mark_reaped(c.id)?;
+    db.mark_reaped(c.id).await?;
     Ok(size)
 }
 
@@ -149,12 +159,12 @@ mod tests {
         // age_key 0 means "never recorded" -- not the same as "infinitely old".
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn query_never_offers_a_file_anyone_starred_and_prefers_ones_everyone_read() {
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn query_never_offers_a_file_anyone_starred_and_prefers_ones_everyone_read() {
         // One file serves both subscribers, so it takes both of them to release it.
-        let db = Db::memory().unwrap();
+        let db = Db::memory().await.unwrap();
         db.exec_for_test(
-            "INSERT INTO users (id, name, is_admin) VALUES (1,'ray',1),(2,'sam',0);
+            "INSERT INTO users (id, name, is_admin) VALUES (1,'ray',true),(2,'sam',false);
              INSERT INTO subscriptions (user_id, feed_id) VALUES (1,'f'),(2,'f');
              INSERT INTO entries (feed_id, guid, first_seen) VALUES
                 ('f', 'keep',   0),
@@ -163,20 +173,20 @@ mod tests {
                 ('f', 'read',   0);
              -- Starred by one of the two, so it stays whatever the other thinks.
              INSERT INTO entry_state (user_id, feed_id, guid, read, flagged) VALUES
-                (1, 'f', 'keep',   1, 1),
-                (2, 'f', 'keep',   1, 0),
-                (1, 'f', 'half',   1, 0),
-                (1, 'f', 'read',   1, 0),
-                (2, 'f', 'read',   1, 0);
+                (1, 'f', 'keep',   true, true),
+                (2, 'f', 'keep',   true, false),
+                (1, 'f', 'half',   true, false),
+                (1, 'f', 'read',   true, false),
+                (2, 'f', 'read',   true, false);
              INSERT INTO enclosures (id, feed_id, guid, url, path, bytes_done, state, downloaded_at) VALUES
                 (1, 'f', 'keep',   'u1', '/tmp/keep',   10, 'done', 10),
                 (2, 'f', 'half',   'u2', '/tmp/half',   10, 'done', 20),
                 (3, 'f', 'unread', 'u3', '/tmp/unread', 10, 'done', 30),
                 (4, 'f', 'read',   'u4', '/tmp/read',   10, 'done', 40);",
-        )
+        ).await
         .unwrap();
 
-        let got: Vec<i64> = db.reap_candidates().unwrap().iter().map(|c| c.id).collect();
+        let got: Vec<i64> = db.reap_candidates().await.unwrap().iter().map(|c| c.id).collect();
         assert_eq!(
             got,
             vec![4, 2, 3],
@@ -185,12 +195,37 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn prune_keeps_entries_that_still_have_a_file() {
-        let db = Db::memory().unwrap();
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn the_marks_of_someone_who_left_count_for_nothing() {
+        // ray and sam subscribe; left read one episode and pinned the others before unsubscribing.
+        let db = Db::memory().await.unwrap();
         db.exec_for_test(
-            "INSERT INTO users (id, name, is_admin) VALUES (1,'ray',1);
-             INSERT INTO entry_state (user_id, feed_id, guid, flagged) VALUES (1,'f','flagged',1);
+            "INSERT INTO users (id, name, is_admin) VALUES (1,'ray',true),(2,'sam',false),(3,'left',false);
+             INSERT INTO subscriptions (user_id, feed_id) VALUES (1,'f'),(2,'f');
+             INSERT INTO entries (feed_id, guid, first_seen) VALUES
+                ('f', 'heard', 0), ('f', 'pinned', 0), ('f', 'old', 0);
+             INSERT INTO entry_state (user_id, feed_id, guid, read, flagged) VALUES
+                (3, 'f', 'heard', true, false),
+                (1, 'f', 'heard', true, false),
+                (3, 'f', 'pinned', false, true),
+                (3, 'f', 'old', false, true);
+             INSERT INTO enclosures (id, feed_id, guid, url, path, bytes_done, state, downloaded_at) VALUES
+                (1, 'f', 'heard',  'u1', '/tmp/heard',  10, 'done', 10),
+                (2, 'f', 'pinned', 'u2', '/tmp/pinned', 10, 'done', 20);",
+        ).await
+        .unwrap();
+        let got: Vec<(i64, bool)> = db.reap_candidates().await.unwrap().iter().map(|c| (c.id, c.read)).collect();
+        assert_eq!(got, vec![(1, false), (2, false)], "sam has not heard it, and nobody here pinned it (#156)");
+        assert_eq!(db.prune_entries(500).await.unwrap(), 1, "the old item goes, a leaver's pin or not");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn prune_keeps_entries_that_still_have_a_file() {
+        let db = Db::memory().await.unwrap();
+        db.exec_for_test(
+            "INSERT INTO users (id, name, is_admin) VALUES (1,'ray',true);
+             INSERT INTO subscriptions (user_id, feed_id) VALUES (1,'f');
+             INSERT INTO entry_state (user_id, feed_id, guid, flagged) VALUES (1,'f','flagged',true);
              INSERT INTO entries (feed_id, guid, first_seen) VALUES
                 ('f', 'has-file', 100),
                 ('f', 'no-file',  100),
@@ -198,9 +233,9 @@ mod tests {
                 ('f', 'recent',   900);
              INSERT INTO enclosures (id, feed_id, guid, url, path, state) VALUES
                 (1, 'f', 'has-file', 'u1', '/tmp/x', 'done');",
-        )
+        ).await
         .unwrap();
 
-        assert_eq!(db.prune_entries(500).unwrap(), 1, "only the old, fileless, unflagged one");
+        assert_eq!(db.prune_entries(500).await.unwrap(), 1, "only the old, fileless, unflagged one");
     }
 }

docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,24 +1,54 @@
+# A sample: ipx with its database in SQLite, and ipx-web, the page, in front of it. Build both
+# images first (`docker build -t ipx .` and `docker build -f Dockerfile.web -t ipx-web .`), then
+# `docker compose up -d`, and sign in at http://<host>:8099 as admin / ipodderx.
+# docs/configuration.md has the rest, Postgres included.
 services:
-  ipodderx:
-    image: 192.168.1.130:5000/ipodderx:latest
-    container_name: iPodderX
+  ipx:
+    image: ipx
+    container_name: ipx
     restart: unless-stopped
     environment:
+      # Who owns the files it writes. 99:100 is Unraid's nobody:users.
       PUID: "99"
       PGID: "100"
-      TZ: "America/Toronto"
-      IPX_LOG: "ipx=info"
+      TZ: "UTC"
+      # For Postgres instead of SQLite:
+      # IPX_DATABASE_URL: "postgres://ipx:password@db-host:5432/ipx"
+    # No web port of its own: ipx-web is the way in, and passes the API on to it.
     ports:
-      - "8099:8099"          # web UI
       - "6881:6881/tcp"      # BitTorrent peers
       - "6881:6881/udp"      # DHT
     volumes:
-      - /mnt/fast/appdata/ipodderx:/config     # config.toml, and the web token
-      - /mnt/user/ipodderx/:/data         # state.db
-      - /mnt/user/ipodderx/downloads:/downloads
+      - ./config:/config         # config.toml, written on first start
+      - ./data:/data             # state.db
+      - ./downloads:/downloads
     healthcheck:
       test: ["CMD", "ipx", "status"]
       interval: 30s
       timeout: 5s
       retries: 3
       start_period: 10s
+
+  ipx-web:
+    image: ipx-web
+    container_name: ipx-web
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      IPX_UPSTREAM: "ipx:8099"
+      # Behind Cloudflare Access only: where cloudflared's requests come from, the one address
+      # whose Cf-Access-* headers are passed on. docs/sso.md says how to find it.
+      # TUNNEL_PEER: "192.168.64.1"
+      # Traces to an OpenTelemetry collector, a span for each request, continued into ipx:
+      # WEB_TRACING: "on"
+      # OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: "http://collector:4318"
+      # OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL: "http/protobuf"
+      # OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: "ipx-web"
+    ports:
+      - "8099:8080"          # the web UI
+    depends_on:
+      - ipx
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "wget", "-q", "--spider", "http://127.0.0.1:8080/favicon.png"]
+      interval: 30s
+      timeout: 5s
+      retries: 3

docs/architecture.md

@@ -1,27 +1,61 @@
 # How it works
 
-One binary, `ipx`. `ipx daemon` runs three things in one process: a scheduler, a Unix-socket
-control server, and the web UI. Everything else is a CLI that either does the work itself or hands
-it to a running daemon.
+Three services, each a container of its own with its own version and changelog (#207):
+
+| Service | What it is | Source | Image |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| ipx-web | Caddy: serves the page, a static site built from `web/`, and passes `/api` and `/media` to ipx on the same address. It asks ipx before it serves the app or the admin page (`/api/page-check`) | `web/`, `web/Caddyfile` | `Dockerfile.web` |
+| ipx | The daemon and CLI, one binary. `ipx daemon` runs a scheduler, a Unix-socket control server and the HTTP API in one process; everything else is a CLI that either does the work itself or hands it to a running daemon | `crates/ipx` | `Dockerfile` |
+| ipx-directory | The directory of public podcasts that ipx servers share. ipx asks it on its people's behalf; the page never talks to it ([directory.md](directory.md)) | `crates/directory` | `Dockerfile.directory` |
+
+The Rust source is a Cargo workspace (#202); `crates/feed` (`ipx-feed`) fetches and parses feeds
+for both Rust services. Versions: ipx's in `crates/ipx/Cargo.toml`, the directory's in
+`crates/directory/Cargo.toml`, the page's in `package.json`; CLAUDE.md has the release steps.
+
+## Traces and logs
+
+A request is one trace (#213). The page starts one for each tap and sends `traceparent` with its
+requests (#190); Caddy's span continues it and passes it on to ipx; ipx's request span, its steps
+and its calls to the directory follow, and the directory's request span joins it. Scans,
+downloads, DeadAir's work, shares with the directory and the directory's refresher rounds are
+traces of their own. All three log one JSON object a line, for Loki; ipx's lines carry their trace
+id, and Caddy's request lines theirs. ipx also serves Prometheus metrics (`[web] metrics_bind`,
+#194). The exporter and the `traceparent` handling both Rust services use are in
+`crates/directory/src/otel.rs`.
 
 ## Modules
 
 | File | Responsibility | What it replaced in the Python |
 |---|---|---|
-| `src/main.rs` | CLI, dispatch, scan loop, download policy | `iPXAgent.py` |
-| `src/config.rs` | TOML load/save, `General`/`Feed`/`Web`, intervals, slugs | `iPXSettings.py`, `feeds.plist` |
-| `src/db.rs` | SQLite schema, migrations, every query | `.ipxd` plists, `history.dat`, `qmcache.dat` |
-| `src/feed.rs` | Conditional GET, RSS/Atom/OPML parsing | `FeedData.__getFeed/__getEntries` |
-| `src/download.rs` | Streaming download, naming, type sniffing, placement | `iPXDownloader.getFile` |
-| `src/torrent.rs` | librqbit session, seeding limits, stall abort | vendored BitTorrent 4.2.1 |
-| `src/retention.rs` | Quota and age sweeps | `iPXQuotaManager.py` |
-| `src/ipc.rs` | Event and command types, the socket server | `printMSG` on stdout |
-| `src/auth.rs` | Argon2id hashing, session tokens, header names | — |
-| `src/web.rs` | axum: HTTP API, auth, SSE, media streaming | — |
-| `src/logbuf.rs` | Ring buffer behind the UI's Log view | — |
-| `web/index.html` | The whole front end, `include_str!`d into the binary | — |
+| `crates/ipx/src/main.rs` | CLI, dispatch, scan loop, download policy | `iPXAgent.py` |
+| `crates/ipx/src/config.rs` | TOML load/save, `General`/`Feed`/`Web`, intervals, slugs | `iPXSettings.py`, `feeds.plist` |
+| `crates/ipx/src/db.rs` | Every query, through SeaORM; creates missing tables | `.ipxd` plists, `history.dat`, `qmcache.dat` |
+| `crates/ipx/src/entity.rs` | The tables, as SeaORM entities: the schema | — |
+| `crates/feed/src/lib.rs` | Conditional GET, RSS/Atom/OPML parsing, `url_looks_private` | `FeedData.__getFeed/__getEntries` |
+| `crates/ipx/src/download.rs` | Streaming download, naming, type sniffing, placement | `iPXDownloader.getFile` |
+| `crates/ipx/src/torrent.rs` | librqbit session, seeding limits, stall abort | vendored BitTorrent 4.2.1 |
+| `crates/ipx/src/retention.rs` | Quota and age sweeps | `iPXQuotaManager.py` |
+| `crates/ipx/src/ipc.rs` | Event and command types, the socket server | `printMSG` on stdout |
+| `crates/ipx/src/auth.rs` | Argon2id hashing, session tokens, header names | — |
+| `crates/ipx/src/web.rs` | axum: HTTP API, auth, SSE, media streaming | — |
+| `crates/ipx/src/logbuf.rs` | Ring buffer behind the UI's Log view | — |
+| `crates/ipx/src/directory.rs` | Asking the directory service, and sharing this server's public feeds with it | — |
+| `crates/ipx/src/metrics.rs` | `/metrics` for Prometheus | — |
+| `crates/directory/src/lib.rs` | The directory's HTTP API, its token check, the refresher | — |
+| `crates/directory/src/store.rs` | The directory's database: feeds, snapshots, blocked | — |
+| `crates/directory/src/config.rs` | The directory's config file: its tokens and their access | — |
+| `crates/directory/src/otel.rs` | Traces for both Rust services: the exporter, `traceparent` in and out | — |
+| `web/index.html` | The app's markup | — |
+| `web/admin.html` | The admin page's markup: server settings, accounts, the log. Sent to admins only | — |
+| `web/app.css` | The stylesheet both pages share | — |
+| `web/src/*.ts` | The page's script, one scope split across files, type-checked by `npx tsc` | — |
+| `web/build.mjs` | swc: strips the types into `app.js`/`admin.js`/`login.js`, named in the page by a hash of their contents, minifies, and writes the static site to `web/dist` | — |
+| `web/boot.js` | In `<head>`: the theme from its cookie, and an admin's link, before the first frame | — |
+| `web/Caddyfile` | `ipx-web`: serves `web/dist`, asks ipx before serving a page, passes `/api` and `/media` to ipx | — |
 
-The page is compiled in, so **editing `web/index.html` needs a rebuild**.
+The page is a separate image, `ipx-web` (`Dockerfile.web`, #203), so **editing `web/` needs
+ipx-web rebuilt**, not ipx, and building it needs node and `npm ci` run once. ipx serves the API
+and the files, and no page.
 
 ## A scan
 
@@ -31,7 +65,9 @@ The page is compiled in, so **editing `web/index.html` needs a rebuild**.
    re-derived into the database each scan, never written to config.toml. A Patreon creator link
    (a token, no `show=`) with more than one show is treated the same way, before any fetch: its
    shows come from Patreon's web API and each becomes a derived feed.
-4. Record entries. A changed title or description flips the item back to unread.
+4. Record entries: the new ones, and those the feed now gives a different title, text, artwork,
+   length or number, compared with what is stored for the items it lists (#141). A corrected item
+   keeps its read state.
 5. Record enclosures. `enclosures.url` is `UNIQUE`, which is the dedupe key and subsumes the
    original's `history.dat` pickle: a reaped file keeps its row so it is never fetched twice.
 6. Apply the merged policy (see [users.md](users.md)) and mark anything rejected as `skipped` with
@@ -44,8 +80,8 @@ The page is compiled in, so **editing `web/index.html` needs a rebuild**.
 ## Data model
 
 ```
-feeds       id, url, title, image, etag, last_modified, last_checked, ttl_mins,
-            last_error, orphaned, group_id, managed
+feeds       id, url, title, image, category, description, etag, last_modified,
+            last_checked, ttl_mins, last_error, orphaned, group_id, managed
 entries     feed_id, guid, title, link, published, description, first_seen,
             image, duration, episode, season            PK (feed_id, guid)
 enclosures  id, feed_id, guid, url UNIQUE, mime, length, path, state,
@@ -59,14 +95,15 @@ entry_state    user_id, feed_id, guid, read, flagged, position
 ```
 
 Read state is `entry_state` alone. `entries` had `read`, `flagged` and `position` columns from
-before accounts; two bugs came from queries still reading them, and `migrate()` drops them from an
-older database.
+before accounts; two bugs came from queries still reading them, and they were dropped in 0.5.
 
-Schema changes: add the table or column to `SCHEMA`. `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS` leaves a table
-that already exists alone, so a new column on one also goes in `migrate()`'s `wanted` list, and a
-retired one in its `retired` list; both are checked with `PRAGMA table_info`. Columns from before
-0.3.0, the oldest version an upgrade may start from, need no entry. `Db::memory()` runs the same
-path as `Db::open`, so a migration cannot pass the tests while missing in production.
+Schema changes: the tables are the entities in `crates/ipx/src/entity.rs`, and `Db::open` creates whatever
+table or index a database is missing from them (`db::create_missing`), with `IF NOT EXISTS`. It
+never alters a table that exists, so a new column on one needs its own `ALTER` in
+`create_missing`, looked for first and run only when it is missing, as `feeds.description`'s is,
+or `sea-orm-migration` once there are several. `Db::memory()` builds its
+database the same way, so the tests run on the schema production gets. A database from before
+0.7 takes its last columns from the old `migrate()`, so it upgrades through a 0.7 release first.
 
 ## Control socket
 
@@ -82,13 +119,15 @@ printf '{"cmd":"fetch","force":true}\n' | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/
 ```
 
 **Commands** — `fetch` (optional `feed`, `force`), `reap` (optional `dry_run`), `download`
-(`enclosure`), `status`.
+(`enclosure`), `status`, `reload` (read the catalogue and settings again from the database, which
+`ipx add`, `rm` and `import` send after changing them in a process of their own; answered with
+`status`).
 
 **Events** — `feed_start`, `feed_skip`, `feed_done`, `feed_error`, `progress`, `download_done`,
 `download_error`, `torrent_deferred`, `reaped`, `reap_done`, `scan_done`, `status`, `error`.
 `scan_done`, `reap_done` and `status` are terminal: a client that asked for work stops reading
-there. Commands run one at a time, in the order they arrive, except `status`: the socket answers it
-straight away, so the Docker healthcheck is never left waiting behind a scan or a download, and
+there. Commands run one at a time, in the order they arrive, except `status` and `reload`: the
+socket answers them straight away, so the Docker healthcheck is never left waiting behind a scan or a download, and
 answers only the client that asked, since `status` would end any other client's session.
 
 Progress carries the enclosure id, without which a UI cannot tell one download from another and
@@ -103,12 +142,13 @@ so a long download had to be able to notice the signal itself.
 ## HTTP API
 
 Everything below `/api` needs a signed-in user; the browser gets a redirect to `/login`, anything
-else a `401`.
+else a `401`. A feed's items and files (its entries, `download-latest`, `/api/enclosures/{id}` and
+`/media/{id}`) answer only someone who subscribes to the feed; anyone else gets a `404`.
 
 | Route | |
 |---|---|
-| `GET /` | the app |
-| `GET /login`, `POST /api/login`, `POST /api/logout`, `GET /api/me` | sign-in |
+| `GET /api/page-check`, `GET /api/login-check`, `GET /api/signin` | for Caddy (#203): whether the visitor may have the page in `X-Forwarded-Uri` (`204`), or where to send them; signing in with `?token=` |
+| `POST /api/login`, `POST /api/logout`, `GET /api/me` | sign-in; `/api/me` also gives the version and the account's theme from before |
 | `GET /api/feeds`, `POST /api/feeds` | your subscriptions; subscribe |
 | `PATCH /api/feeds/{id}`, `DELETE /api/feeds/{id}` | your settings or (admin) the feed's; unsubscribe |
 | `GET /api/feeds/{id}/entries` | paged, filtered, searchable, sortable (`sort` = kept, title, feed, type, size or published; `dir` = asc or desc) |
@@ -119,8 +159,12 @@ else a `401`.
 | `POST /api/enclosures/{id}/download`, `DELETE /api/enclosures/{id}` | `?force=true` overrides the shared-file warning |
 | `POST /api/fetch` | |
 | `GET /api/opml`, `POST /api/opml` | export your subscriptions; subscribe to every feed in an OPML |
-| `GET /api/popular`, `GET /api/directory`, `POST /api/popular/{id}` | the ten most subscribed feeds, and every listable feed A to Z, with an OPML's feeds in place of the OPML and everyone counted (id, title, art, count, whether it is yours; never a URL, never a private feed); subscribe by id |
-| `GET /api/settings`, `PATCH /api/settings` | admin-only to write |
+| `GET /api/directory/{id}` | a feed's page from the directory service (#205), by the directory's id: its description and latest twenty items, sanitized here, and why its last check failed, in words; never a file or its address |
+| `GET /api/popular`, `GET /api/directory`, `POST /api/popular/{id}` | the directory service's ten most subscribed and every feed it lists, A to Z, asked by ipx with its token (directory id, title, art, subscribers across every sharing server, whether it is yours and its id here, category, whether it carries audio or video; never a URL); subscribe by the directory's id, which takes the feed's address from the directory. `503` with no directory set up |
+| `DELETE /api/directory/{id}`, `POST /api/directory/{id}/refresh` | admin-only, and the directory refuses unless this server's token is `rwa` (#206): remove and block a feed; check it now. `GET /api/directory/{id}` says `can_admin` when both hold |
+| `GET /api/directory-admin`, `DELETE /api/directory-blocked/{id}`, `DELETE /api/directory-instances/{name}` | admin-only, `rwa` (#206): the servers sharing (name, feeds, subscribers) and the blocked feeds (id, title, when; never the address, often why it was blocked); unblock; drop a server's snapshot. Unblocking or dropping sends this server's snapshot again at once |
+| `GET /api/directory-status` | admin-only: the name and access the directory gives this server's token, or why it refused, and how the last snapshot went |
+| `GET /api/settings`, `PATCH /api/settings` | admin-only to write. The directory's token is written, never read back: `directory_token_set` says whether there is one |
 | `GET /api/users`, `POST /api/users`, `PATCH /api/users/{id}`, `DELETE /api/users/{id}` | admin-only; the only admin cannot be demoted or removed |
 | `GET /api/events` | SSE, the same broadcast the socket carries |
 | `GET /api/logs` | admin-only; the ring buffer, with a sequence cursor |
@@ -134,7 +178,9 @@ before they reach the page.
 ```sh
 cargo test                # parsing, filters, retention, schedules, SQL, per-user isolation
 node tests/page-smoke.js  # the page script loads and every selector it wires at load exists
+node tests/native-bridge.js  # the page hands playback to a native shell
 npx playwright test       # a real browser against a real daemon on fixture feeds
+node tests/load/run.js    # k6: many people at once against a daemon with 1,500 generated feeds
 ```
 
 The Rust tests cannot see a wrong selector, a handler that runs and does nothing, or a page that

docs/cli.md

@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@ processes must never download the same thing. `--local` forces the work to happe
 | `ipx list` | Subscriptions and their state |
 | `ipx status` | Counts: feeds, pending, downloaded |
 | `ipx fetch [FEED] [--force]` | Scan everything, or one feed. `--force` ignores the TTL |
-| `ipx add <url> [--folder X] [--keywords a,b]` | Subscribe; the id comes from the feed title |
+| `ipx add <url> [--folder X] [--keywords a,b] [--list] [--category C]` | Subscribe; the id comes from the feed title. `--list` subscribes no one but keeps it in the catalogue, and so in what this server shares with the directory, when its last subscriber leaves; `--category` is the category the directory files it under when the feed names none. Run for a feed already in the catalogue, these list it or set its category |
 | `ipx rm <feed>` | Unsubscribe; downloads and history are kept |
 | `ipx import <file.opml>` / `ipx export <file.opml>` | Move subscriptions in or out. Import subscribes the first admin, as the shared web token does; in the web UI it subscribes whoever is signed in |
 | `ipx reap [--dry-run]` | Run retention now |
 | `ipx user <add\|list\|passwd\|rm>` | Accounts for the web UI |
-| `ipx daemon [--web ADDR]` | Scheduler, control socket and web UI |
+| `ipx daemon [--web ADDR]` | Scheduler, control socket and the HTTP API (the page is ipx-web's) |
+
+`add`, `rm` and `import` change the catalogue in a process of their own. With a daemon running they
+then tell it to read the catalogue again; without that it kept its own copy and wrote it back at
+its next change, undoing them. If it does not answer they say so: restart it.
 
 ## Accounts
 
@@ -67,7 +71,7 @@ stops the next scan fetching it again.
 ## The daemon
 
 ```sh
-ipx daemon                     # scheduler + socket + web UI
+ipx daemon                     # scheduler + socket + HTTP API
 ipx daemon --web 0.0.0.0:8099  # override the configured bind for one run
 ```
 
@@ -80,7 +84,9 @@ To kill it, match the binary exactly:
 pkill -x ipx
 ```
 
-`pkill -f ipx` matches the shell running the command too, and kills your own session.
+`pkill -f ipx` matches the shell running the command too, and kills your own session. On a machine
+that also runs ipx in a container, `pkill -x ipx` stops that one as well, since the host sees a
+container's processes: stop the one you started by its PID instead (`kill <pid>`).
 
 ## Talking to it directly
 

docs/configuration.md

@@ -1,7 +1,19 @@
 # Configuration
 
-One TOML file, read at startup and re-read whenever the web UI writes to it — most changes take
-effect without a restart. Default location `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ipx/config.toml`
+Two places. **config.toml** holds what ipx needs before it reaches its database, and what decides
+who gets in: where things are (`download_dir`, `socket`, `organize`), `[torrent]` and `[web]`.
+**The database** holds the catalogue of feeds (`[feeds.<id>]` below) and the server settings the
+admin page edits (`schedule`, `max_total_gb`, `max_age_days`, `max_new_per_check`,
+`media_types`, `art_cache_mb`). Change those in the web UI, or with `ipx add`, `ipx rm` and `ipx import`; they
+take effect without a restart.
+
+The first time ipx meets a database that holds no catalogue, it takes the feeds and those
+settings from config.toml, then rewrites config.toml without them, keeping the original beside it
+as `config.toml.pre-database`. After that, feeds or those settings written into config.toml are
+ignored, with a warning in the log saying so. The sections below describe them as they were
+written in config.toml, which is still how a fresh install begins.
+
+config.toml's default location is `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ipx/config.toml`
 (`~/.config/ipx/config.toml`), overridden with `--config` or `$IPX_CONFIG`.
 
 | What | Where | Override |
@@ -11,8 +23,15 @@ effect without a restart. Default location `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ipx/config.toml`
 | Control socket | `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/ipx.sock` | `[general] socket` |
 | Downloads | `[general] download_dir` | — |
 
-`~` is expanded in paths. The database is SQLite in WAL mode; back it up by copying `state.db`
-while the daemon is stopped, or with `sqlite3 state.db .backup`.
+`~` is expanded in paths. The database is SQLite in WAL mode unless `IPX_DATABASE_URL` names a
+Postgres database instead. Back SQLite up by copying `state.db` while the daemon is stopped, or
+with `sqlite3 state.db .backup`; back Postgres up with `pg_dump`.
+
+ipx does not wait for the disk to confirm each write: SQLite syncs at checkpoints
+(`synchronous=NORMAL`), and ipx's own Postgres sessions set `synchronous_commit=off`, which leaves
+other databases on the server as they are. Waiting made a scan take most of a second a feed. A
+crash of ipx loses nothing; a power cut, or a crash of the Postgres server, can lose the last moment
+of changes, a read mark or a saved position, and never corrupts the database.
 
 ## `[general]`
 
@@ -26,18 +45,31 @@ max_total_gb      = 50              # 0 = unlimited
 max_age_days      = 30              # 0 = keep forever
 max_new_per_check = 3               # per feed, per scan. 0 = unlimited
 media_types       = ["audio", "video"]
+art_cache_mb      = 500             # artwork kept on disk. 0 = none
 ```
 
+`schedule`, `max_total_gb`, `max_age_days`, `max_new_per_check`, `media_types` and `art_cache_mb` move into the
+database as described above; `download_dir`, `socket` and `organize` stay in config.toml.
+
 * **`schedule`** — how often feeds are re-checked. A feed's own `<ttl>` still wins when it asks to
-  be polled *less* often, and a per-feed `schedule` overrides both. Admin-only from the UI.
+  be polled *less* often, and a per-feed `schedule` overrides both. A feed that keeps failing
+  waits as long as it has been failing before the next try, up to a day, and is back on schedule
+  after its first success. A moment's failure to look its host up does not count: the network, not
+  the feed, failed, and it is tried again in ten minutes. Admin-only from the UI.
 * **`organize`** — `feed` files downloads under the feed's folder; `date` under `YYYY-MM-DD`.
 * **`max_total_gb`** — the reaper deletes to get back under this, oldest first, keeping a 50 MB
   pad. Kept items are never deleted, and a file only counts as read once every subscriber has
   read it. `0` disables it entirely.
 * **`max_age_days`** — items older than this with no file on disk are pruned from the database.
   Kept ones stay. `0` disables it.
-* **`max_new_per_check`** — the cap that stops a new subscription pulling a whole back catalogue.
-  `0` means unlimited, which is rarely what you want: subscribing to an OPML of 80 feeds with no cap
+* **`art_cache_mb`** — how much show and episode artwork iPX keeps on disk, in `art/` beside the
+  database, so the page loads it from iPX rather than from every publisher's server. Over this,
+  what has gone longest unshown goes first. `0` keeps none: artwork still comes through iPX, fetched
+  each time. 500 by default.
+* **`max_new_per_check`** — how many of a feed's newest episodes are downloaded; older ones stay
+  listed to download by hand. It stops a new subscription pulling a whole back catalogue.
+  `0` means every episode, for an archive; set it on the feeds you want archived, since on the
+  global default it applies to every feed: subscribing to an OPML of 80 feeds with no limit
   fetched 216 files and 22 GB in one scan.
 * **`media_types`** — top-level MIME types taken automatically. Anything else is still listed and
   can be fetched by hand; blog feeds put each article's header image in an `<enclosure>`, and
@@ -66,9 +98,12 @@ bind              = "0.0.0.0:8099"        # 127.0.0.1:8080 by default
 token             = ""                    # generated and saved on first run
 trusted_header    = ""                    # e.g. "Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email"
 trusted_proxies   = ["127.0.0.1", "::1"]
+access_team       = ""                    # e.g. "<team>.cloudflareaccess.com"
+access_aud        = ""                    # the Access application's AUD tag
 auto_create_users = true
 sign_out_url      = ""                    # e.g. "/cdn-cgi/access/logout"
 session_days      = 30
+metrics_bind      = ""                    # e.g. "0.0.0.0:9187"; empty serves no metrics
 ```
 
 * **`token`** — the shared secret, which signs in as the **admin**. `?token=…` sets a cookie, so
@@ -77,19 +112,26 @@ session_days      = 30
   disables that path. See [sso.md](sso.md).
 * **`trusted_proxies`** — addresses allowed to assert that header, and the entire security boundary
   for it. Name the proxy, never a subnet.
+* **`access_team`**, **`access_aud`** — with both set, a request through the proxy also has to
+  carry the `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` Cloudflare Access signed for this application, and the name
+  comes from that token instead of the header. See [sso.md](sso.md#verifying-cloudflares-token).
 * **`auto_create_users`** — create an account the first time the proxy vouches for a new name.
 * **`sign_out_url`** — where Sign out sends someone the proxy signed in: the proxy's own sign-out,
   `/cdn-cgi/access/logout` behind Cloudflare Access. Empty sends them to the sign-in page, where
   the proxy signs them straight back in.
 * **`session_days`** — sign a session out after this long without a request.
+* **`metrics_bind`** — where to serve `/metrics` for Prometheus: database connections in use, the
+  worker's queue, the runtime's tasks, memory and open files. It has a thread and a port of its own
+  and no sign-in, so publish it to the LAN only. Empty, the default, serves none.
 
 It is plain HTTP. On a LAN bind everything crosses the network in the clear — and a feed URL can
 itself carry a credential. Put TLS in front of it if that matters.
 
 ## `[feeds.<id>]`
 
-The table key is the feed id: stable, human-readable, and used in paths and the API. `ipx add`
-derives it from the feed title.
+Kept in the database once ipx has moved them in: a feed's settings are changed in the web UI, and
+feeds come and go with `ipx add`, `ipx rm` and `ipx import`. The table key is the feed id: stable,
+human-readable, and used in paths and the API. `ipx add` derives it from the feed title.
 
 ```toml
 [feeds.atp]
@@ -97,6 +139,8 @@ url                = "https://atp.fm/rss"
 folder             = "Accidental Tech Podcast"   # default: the feed title
 schedule           = "every 6h"                  # overrides [general] for this feed
 media_types        = ["audio"]                   # overrides [general] for this feed
+category           = "Technology"                # the Directory's, if the feed names none
+listed             = true                        # shared with the directory with no subscribers
 username           = "ray"                       # HTTP basic auth
 password_env       = "IPX_ATP_PASS"              # preferred over a literal `password`
 ```
@@ -106,8 +150,19 @@ With more than one account, **`keywords`, `auto_download`, `allow_explicit` and
 config.toml are the fallback for a feed nobody has claimed. The keys above describe the feed itself
 and are the same for everyone. See [users.md](users.md).
 
-Feeds derived from a subscribed OPML are **not** written here: the OPML is the source of truth and
-they are re-derived on every scan. Editing one in the UI promotes it to a real config entry.
+**The Directory** is the directory service's ([directory.md](directory.md)), which an admin sets
+up in Admin, Directory: its address, this server's token and whether to share. They are server
+settings, kept in the database (`directory_url`, `directory_token`, `directory_share`), not here.
+With sharing on, this server sends it every feed in the catalogue that is not private, with how
+many people here subscribe, and the `category` above for a feed that names none. To offer one with
+nobody subscribed, `ipx add --list --category News <url>`: it subscribes no one, and a listed feed
+stays in the catalogue, and so in what is shared, when its last subscriber leaves, where another
+is dropped. A feed nobody
+subscribes to is checked once a day. One that is dead (failing for 30 days) or quiet (nothing
+new in a year), with nobody subscribed and no file on disk, is removed from the catalogue.
+
+Feeds derived from a subscribed OPML are **not** in the catalogue: the OPML is the source of truth
+and they are re-derived on every scan. Editing one in the UI promotes it to a catalogue entry.
 
 ## Environment
 
@@ -115,6 +170,24 @@ they are re-derived on every scan. Editing one in the UI promotes it to a real c
 |---|---|
 | `IPX_CONFIG` | Config file path |
 | `IPX_DATA_DIR` | Directory holding `state.db` |
+| `IPX_DATABASE_URL` | A `postgres://user:password@host:port/database` URL: use that database instead of `state.db` |
+| `IPX_TEST_DATABASE_URL` | For `cargo test`: run the database tests on this Postgres database too, each in a schema of its own |
 | `IPX_LOG` | What reaches stderr (`ipx=debug`, `ipx::scan=debug`, …) |
+| `IPX_LOG_FORMAT` | `json` for one JSON object a line, with each request's and event's fields as its own (for Loki and the like); text otherwise |
 | `IPX_UI_LOG` | What the in-process log buffer captures for the UI's Log view |
+| `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` | An OTLP/HTTP collector, such as Tempo at `http://host:4318`: the daemon sends it traces of scans, downloads and web requests. The other `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_*` variables apply too |
 | `http_proxy` / `https_proxy` | Honoured for feed and enclosure fetches |
+
+## ipx-web
+
+The page's container reads only its environment (`web/Caddyfile`):
+
+| Variable | Effect |
+|---|---|
+| `IPX_UPSTREAM` | Where ipx is, `host:port`; `ipx:8099` by default |
+| `WEB_BIND` | Where to listen; `:8080` by default |
+| `WEB_ROOT` | The built page; `/srv` in the image |
+| `TUNNEL_PEER` | The one address whose `Cf-Access-*` headers are passed on to ipx: where cloudflared's requests come from. Unset passes none. See [sso.md](sso.md) |
+| `WEB_TRACING` | `on` sends a span for each request to the collector the `OTEL_*` variables name (`OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT`, `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL=http/protobuf`, `OTEL_SERVICE_NAME`), continuing the page's trace into ipx. Off by default |
+
+ipx-directory's settings are in [directory.md](directory.md).

docs/directory.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# The directory
+
+`ipx-directory` is a catalogue of public podcasts and blogs that ipx servers share (#204). An ipx
+server sends it the public feeds its people subscribe to, and how many of them do. The directory
+fetches each feed's title, artwork, category, description and latest twenty items every six hours,
+and any server holding a token can browse it. It never downloads a file, and it never stores
+one's address: every ipx server still fetches its own feeds.
+
+This server's is at `https://directory.ipxreader.app` (until 2026-10-12 `ipx-dir.sdf1.net`, #214), the `ipx-directory` service of the Arcane project
+`ipx`, with its database `ipx_directory` on the `databases` project's Postgres.
+
+## In ipx
+
+An admin sets it up in **Admin, Directory**: the directory's address, the token its operator gave
+this server, and whether to share. ipx asks the directory on its people's behalf, so the page never
+talks to it and never sees the token or a feed's address. With no directory set up, the Directory
+says so and feeds are added by their address.
+
+ipx keeps the address and token with its other server settings, in its database (`settings`,
+`directory_url` and `directory_token`), not in config.toml. The token is written, never shown
+again: the tab says it is set and offers to clear it. To replace one, make a new token on the
+directory, paste it over the old, then delete the old token's entry from the directory's config.
+
+With sharing on, ipx sends its snapshot when what it would send has changed (checked after every
+scan, and whenever the catalogue or these settings change), and every half hour regardless (#211): each feed checked at least once, with how many people here subscribe,
+and the category an admin gave a feed that names none. It never sends an OPML or a Patreon creator
+itself (their feeds go instead), or a private feed. A feed's settings have a **Private** switch for
+a paid feed iPX does not recognise by its address; anyone subscribed may turn it on, and only an
+admin off.
+
+When this server's token is `rwa`, its admins administer the directory from iPX (#206). A feed's
+page in the Directory has **Check now** and **Remove from the directory**, which blocks it so no
+server's snapshot brings it back. Admin, Directory lists the **Servers** sharing, by token name,
+with how many feeds and subscribers each gave, and **Blocked**, by title, with Unblock. Dropping a
+server's snapshot takes its feeds and counts out until it next shares; to keep a server out,
+revoke its token. An admin's own subscriptions open as their feeds, not as Directory pages, so
+removing one of those is done by marking it private, or from another admin's account.
+
+## In a web browser
+
+Anyone may browse it at its address, no token and no sign-in (#215): the most subscribed, the
+categories, every feed A to Z, a search by name, and a page for each feed with its description,
+its latest items and its address, with a Copy button, to subscribe to in any podcast app or feed
+reader. The pages only read: nothing in them changes the directory. They are rendered by the
+directory itself from what the API serves, with the publisher's HTML shown as text, an item's link
+only when it is http(s), and a Content-Security-Policy that allows the site's own script and
+stylesheet and the covers, which load from their publishers. `/v1` is the API and still needs a
+token for everything.
+
+## Tokens
+
+Everything but `/healthz` needs a token, sent as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. Each one has a
+name and one of three levels of access:
+
+| | browse | send snapshots | remove, block, refresh feeds; drop a server's snapshot |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `ro` | yes | | |
+| `rw` | yes | yes | |
+| `rwa` | yes | yes | yes |
+
+Tokens are in the config file and nowhere else, and no level of access can make or revoke one
+over the API. To make one:
+
+```sh
+docker exec ipx-directory ipx-directory token new <name> --access ro|rw|rwa
+```
+
+It prints the token, to give to whoever it is for, and the lines to add to the config file. The file
+holds the token's SHA-256, never the token. The directory reads the file again within a minute of
+a change, so adding a token and revoking one (deleting its entry) need no restart. A revoked token
+also takes the counts its server sent. A file that does not load (a misspelled `access`, two tokens
+with one name) leaves the tokens as they were, and the log says why.
+
+## The config file
+
+`/config/directory.toml` in the container (`DIRECTORY_CONFIG`, or `--config`), on Tower
+`/mnt/fast/appdata/ipx-directory/directory.toml`:
+
+```toml
+bind = "0.0.0.0:8100"
+# The environment variable holding the database URL: postgres://... or sqlite://...
+database_url_env = "DIRECTORY_DATABASE_URL"
+
+[[tokens]]
+name = "tower"
+access = "rwa"
+token_sha256 = "…"
+```
+
+`DIRECTORY_LOG_FORMAT=json` logs one JSON object a line, for Loki, as ipx's `IPX_LOG_FORMAT` does.
+Each request is a line with its `method`, `path`, `status`, `duration_ms` and the `token`'s name.
+
+With `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` set (`http://host:4318`, OTLP over HTTP), it sends traces: a
+span a request, a child of the caller's when the request carries a `traceparent`, as ipx's do, and
+a trace a refresher round with a span a feed (#213). `OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES` tags them, as
+production does with `deployment.environment.name=production`. Its version is in
+`crates/directory/Cargo.toml`, logged at start and answered by `ipx-directory --version`; its
+changelog is `crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md`.
+
+## Running one
+
+```yaml
+services:
+  ipx-directory:
+    image: ipx-directory          # docker build -f Dockerfile.directory -t ipx-directory .
+    restart: unless-stopped
+    environment:
+      DIRECTORY_DATABASE_URL: "postgres://ipx_directory:password@db-host:5432/ipx_directory"
+    ports:
+      - "8100:8100"
+    volumes:
+      - ./directory:/config:ro    # directory.toml
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "ipx-directory", "health"]
+```
+
+## What it will not hold
+
+A private feed is never meant to reach it. ipx leaves out a feed marked private, one with a
+username or password, and one whose address `ipx_feed::url_looks_private` catches: a paid-feed
+host, or a key in the query. The directory checks every address it is sent with the same function
+and refuses what it catches, so one server's miss does not publish someone's paid feed to every
+other. What both miss, an `rwa` token can remove: `DELETE /v1/feeds/{id}` removes the feed and
+blocks it, so no snapshot brings it back.
+
+## API
+
+| Route | Access | |
+|---|---|---|
+| `GET /healthz` | none | `ok` when it can read its database |
+| `GET /v1/me` | ro | the token's `name` and `access` |
+| `GET /v1/feeds` | ro | every feed A to Z: `id`, `url`, `title`, `image`, `category`, `subcategory`, `podcast`, `subscribers` |
+| `GET /v1/popular?limit=10` | ro | the most subscribed, at most 100 |
+| `GET /v1/feeds/{id}` | ro | one feed, with `description`, `failing` (why its last check failed, in words) and its latest twenty `items` (`guid`, `title`, `link`, `published`, `duration`, `description`), never their files |
+| `POST /v1/snapshot` | rw | `[{"url", "subscribers"}]`, at most 20,000: replaces everything this token sent before; answers what it `accepted` and how many it refused as private, blocked or invalid |
+| `DELETE /v1/feeds/{id}` | rwa | remove and block |
+| `GET /v1/blocked`, `DELETE /v1/blocked/{id}` | rwa | what is blocked; unblock |
+| `GET /v1/instances` | rwa | each token holding a snapshot: its `name`, `feeds` and `subscribers` |
+| `DELETE /v1/instances/{name}` | rwa | drop one token's snapshot, its counts with it |
+| `POST /v1/feeds/{id}/refresh` | rwa | fetch the feed now, answering with its page |
+
+A feed's `id` is the first 64 bits of the SHA-256 of its address, normalised (scheme and host in
+lower case, no default port or fragment), so every server arrives at the same id. `subscribers`
+is the sum over every token's latest snapshot. A feed is listed once the directory has read it as
+a feed, so an OPML or an address that never worked is not, and goes when no snapshot has it any more. Descriptions
+are the feed's own HTML, unsanitized: whoever shows them sanitizes them, as ipx does.

docs/sso.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ real setup and pointed at the wrong address.
 ```
 browser ─► Cloudflare Access, app "ipodderx" ─── sign in ───► Authentik (OpenID Connect)
         ─► tunnel "rays-unraid" (the cloudflared container on Tower)
-        ─► http://192.168.1.130:8099 ─► ipx
+        ─► http://192.168.1.130:8099, ipx-web (Caddy) ─► ipx
 ```
 
 Authentik is not in the request path. It is the identity provider Cloudflare Access asks. Access
@@ -31,21 +31,27 @@ request it forwards through the tunnel, and ipx signs that person in.
 | Access application | Zero Trust → Access → Applications → `ipodderx` | Domain `ipodderx.sdf1.net`; identity providers: Authentik only, with instant auth; session 730h; policy *Require Login* allows a list of email addresses |
 | Tunnel route | Zero Trust → Networks → Tunnels → `rays-unraid` → Public hostnames | `ipodderx.sdf1.net` → HTTP `192.168.1.130:8099` |
 | DNS | `sdf1.net` | `ipodderx` CNAME to the tunnel, proxied |
-| ipx | `/mnt/fast/appdata/ipodderx/config.toml`, `[web]` | below |
+| ipx | `/mnt/fast/appdata/ipx/config.toml`, `[web]` | below |
 
 ```toml
 [web]
 enabled = true
 bind = "0.0.0.0:8099"
 trusted_header = "Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email"
-trusted_proxies = ["127.0.0.1", "::1", "192.168.16.1"]
+trusted_proxies = ["127.0.0.1", "::1", "192.168.64.10"]   # ipx-web; see "Behind ipx-web"
+access_team = "rays-sdf1.cloudflareaccess.com"
+access_aud = "8bfe73dfbc8c548d1cb5dc11c6db6887bcaf4f5144840396f83a620a140e1c4f"
 auto_create_users = true
 sign_out_url = "/cdn-cgi/access/logout"
 session_days = 30
 ```
 
-Restart ipx after editing it: `docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/content/compose.yaml
-restart ipodderx`.
+The last two turn on the token check described under [Verifying Cloudflare's token](#verifying-cloudflares-token),
+on since 2026-09-19. Both can be read without the dashboard: a request to the site while signed
+out is sent to `https://<team domain>/cdn-cgi/access/login/ipodderx.sdf1.net?kid=<AUD tag>&...`.
+
+Restart ipx after editing it: `docker compose -f /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/ipx/compose.yaml
+restart ipx`.
 
 ### What was missing
 
@@ -59,22 +65,34 @@ Cloudflare and Authentik were already right. Three things on the ipx side were n
    `rays@sdf1.net`. With `auto_create_users` on, the first visit would have made a second, empty
    account. `ipx user rename rays rays@sdf1.net` fixed that without losing anything.
 
-### The address to trust, and why it is 192.168.16.1
+### The address to trust, and why it is 192.168.64.1
 
-`cloudflared` runs in its own container and reaches ipx through the host's published port. Docker
+`cloudflared` runs in its own container and reaches ipx-web (before #203, ipx) through the host's published port. Docker
 (iptables firewall backend) masquerades traffic between its bridge networks, so the tunnel's
-requests arrive from the **gateway of ipx's own network**, `content_default`:
+requests arrive from the **gateway of ipx's own network**, `ipx_default`:
 
 ```sh
-docker network inspect content_default -f '{{range .IPAM.Config}}{{.Gateway}}{{end}}'
+docker network inspect ipx_default -f '{{range .IPAM.Config}}{{.Gateway}}{{end}}'
 ```
 
 That was measured, not assumed. ipx does not log where a request came from, so the addresses were
 read from the kernel's connection table inside the container while the site was open. (`/proc/net/tcp`
 lists them in hex.)
 
-If the `content` project's network is ever recreated, its gateway can change. Check it again, and
-update `trusted_proxies` to match.
+The `ipx` project's compose file pins that network's subnet to `192.168.64.0/20`, so its gateway
+stays `192.168.64.1` when the network is recreated. It was `192.168.16.1`, `content_default`'s, while
+ipx was part of the `content` project. If the subnet is ever changed, update `TUNNEL_PEER` in the
+compose file to match (before #203, `trusted_proxies`).
+
+### Behind ipx-web (#203)
+
+With the page served by `ipx-web` (Caddy), cloudflared reaches Caddy instead, still through the
+host's port 8099, so its requests still arrive from `192.168.64.1`, at Caddy now. Caddy passes the
+`Cf-Access-*` headers on only from that address (`TUNNEL_PEER`) and strips them from everyone else,
+the boundary `trusted_proxies` drew before. ipx then sees every request come from Caddy, so
+`trusted_proxies` names Caddy's address on `ipx_default`, pinned in the compose file
+(`192.168.64.10`), instead of the gateway. The token check is unchanged: a header Caddy passes on
+still needs a valid `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`.
 
 ### Names
 
@@ -87,7 +105,7 @@ ordinary user with no feeds. An account made before the proxy can be given the n
 send:
 
 ```sh
-docker exec iPodderX ipx user rename <old name> <email address>
+docker exec iPX ipx user rename <old name> <email address>
 ```
 
 ### Signing out
@@ -103,11 +121,15 @@ feeds.
 
 ### The tile in Authentik's library
 
-Authentik's library lists Authentik's own applications, and ipodderx signs in through the one
-called `Cloudflare Access`, so ipodderx needs a bookmark of its own to show up there. It is
-Applications → Applications → `ipodderx`: no provider, launch URL `https://ipodderx.sdf1.net`, and
-the iPodderX icon. Like Outline's, it has no policy bindings, so everyone in Authentik sees the
-tile. Who actually gets in is still up to the Access policy.
+Authentik's library lists Authentik's own applications, and ipx signs in through the one
+called `Cloudflare Access`, so ipx needs a bookmark of its own to show up there. It is
+Applications → Applications → `iPX` (slug `ipodderx`): no provider, launch URL
+`https://ipodderx.sdf1.net`, and web/logo.svg at 512px as its icon, uploaded again when the logo
+changes. The library keeps each person's list of tiles in a cache that an edit to the application
+does not clear, so after one, clear it (System → Policies → Clear cache, or
+`POST /api/v3/policies/all/cache_clear/`) or the old name and icon stay up. It has no policy
+bindings, so everyone in Authentik sees the tile. Who actually gets in is still up to the Access
+policy.
 
 ### Check it
 
@@ -163,18 +185,44 @@ itself, with a **Proxy Provider** and an **outpost** that adds `X-authentik-user
 
 ## How this is secured
 
-**The header is only believed from `trusted_proxies`.** Every other source is ignored, and the
-request falls through to a session cookie or the shared token. That is the whole security boundary.
+**The header is only passed on from `TUNNEL_PEER`, and only believed from `trusted_proxies`.**
+Caddy strips `Cf-Access-*` from every request that does not come from `TUNNEL_PEER`, and ipx
+ignores the header from anyone but Caddy, its one trusted proxy; such a request falls through to a
+session cookie or the shared token. That is the whole security boundary.
 
-With the tunnel reaching ipx through the host's port, `192.168.16.1` means **any container on Tower
+With the tunnel reaching ipx-web through the host's port, `192.168.64.1` means **any container on Tower
 that connects to `192.168.1.130:8099`**, not only `cloudflared`. Machines on the LAN, and Tower
 itself, arrive under their own addresses and cannot set the header; the checks above show both
 sides. Never list a LAN address or range: anyone there could then send
 `Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email: rays@sdf1.net` and be you.
 
-**What ipx does not do:** it does not verify Cloudflare's signed `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion`. It
-trusts the hop. Verifying the signature would make the containers on Tower irrelevant to the
-boundary, and is the upgrade if that ever matters.
+**Unless the token is checked.** With `access_team` and `access_aud` set (next section), the
+header is not enough on its own: the request has to carry the token Cloudflare Access signed, and
+a container on Tower cannot make one.
+
+### Verifying Cloudflare's token
+
+Access adds `Cf-Access-Jwt-Assertion` to every request it forwards: a JWT naming the person,
+signed with keys only Cloudflare holds. With these two settings ipx checks it on every proxied
+request, and takes the name from its `email` claim.
+
+```toml
+[web]
+access_team = "<team>.cloudflareaccess.com" # Zero Trust → Settings: the team domain
+access_aud  = "…"                           # Access → Applications → ipodderx → Overview: Application Audience (AUD) Tag
+```
+
+ipx fetches the public keys from `https://<access_team>/cdn-cgi/access/certs` when it starts, and
+again when a token names a key it has not seen (Cloudflare rotates them every six weeks or so), at
+most once a minute. It checks the signature (RS256 only), that the audience is this application's
+tag, the issuer, and the expiry. Anything else is refused, and so is every proxied request while
+the keys cannot be fetched; password and token sign-in still work then.
+
+`trusted_header` and `trusted_proxies` still apply: the check is added to them, not put in their
+place.
+
+Check it: the busybox request under [Check it](#check-it), which sends the email header without a
+token from the Docker bridge, now gets `sign in`, and the site still signs you in through Authentik.
 
 **Turning it off:** clear `trusted_header` and restart. Proxy-made accounts stay, but nobody can sign
 in with them until they are given a password (`ipx user passwd <name>`).
@@ -192,12 +240,26 @@ echo -n 'newsecret' | ipx user passwd sam      # change a password
 ipx user rm sam                                # remove the account
 ```
 
-In the container, put `docker exec iPodderX` in front, and `docker exec -i iPodderX` for the ones
+In the container, put `docker exec iPX` in front, and `docker exec -i iPX` for the ones
 that read a password.
 
 Set `auto_create_users = false` once everyone who should have an account has one. After that the
 proxy vouching for an unknown name is logged and refused. Make people ahead of time instead, with
 the exact name the header will carry.
 
+## API tokens for scripts and agents
+
+Anyone can make API tokens for their own account in Settings. A token is sent as
+`Authorization: Bearer ipx_...` and acts as the person who made it, admin only if they are. Only
+its SHA-256 is kept; it is shown once, when made, and revoked there too.
+
+Through the tunnel, Cloudflare Access turns a request with no Access sign-in towards Authentik
+before ipx sees it, so a token alone does not get in that way. On the LAN, `http://192.168.1.130:8099`
+takes it directly. From outside, make an Access service token, add a Service Auth policy for it to
+the `ipodderx` application, and send `CF-Access-Client-Id` and `CF-Access-Client-Secret` beside the
+`Authorization` header: Access lets the request through, vouches for no name, and ipx takes the
+API token as who is asking. Do not bypass Access for `/api/*` instead; the token would then be the
+only thing between the internet and the API.
+
 See also [users.md](users.md) for what several people share, [configuration.md](configuration.md)
 for every `[web]` key, and [cli.md](cli.md) for the `ipx user` commands.

docs/users.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ fetch, one parse and one file.
 
 | Yours alone | The same for everyone |
 |---|---|
-| Read, kept, playback position | The feed's URL |
+| Read, pinned, playback position | The feed's URL |
 | Which feeds you see at all | Its download folder |
 | Keywords, auto-download, explicit, per-scan cap | When it is scanned |
 | | The file on disk |
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ is shared.
 
 Deleting a file deletes everyone's copy. A feed with other subscribers labels the button **Delete
 for everyone** and names them in the confirmation, and the server has the last word: if anyone else
-has kept the item or not played it yet, `DELETE /api/enclosures/{id}` answers `409` with the
+has pinned the item or not played it yet, `DELETE /api/enclosures/{id}` answers `409` with the
 reason, and only `?force=true` goes through.
 
-Retention follows the same rule: an item anyone kept keeps its file, and it counts as read only once
+Retention follows the same rule: an item anyone pinned keeps its file, and it counts as read only once
 every subscriber has read it.
 
 ## Signing in
@@ -70,17 +70,29 @@ list with their own read state. Unsubscribing removes it from their list alone;
 subscriber leaves does the feed stop being scanned, and even then its files and history stay, so
 re-subscribing does not pull the back catalogue again.
 
-**Popular** and **Directory** sit at the top of the feed list, above your own feeds. Popular, also
-shown in the Add feed dialog, lists the ten feeds with the most subscribers on this server, you
-included. Directory lists every one of them A to Z. Your own feeds are marked Subscribed.
+**Directory** sits at the top of the feed list, above your own feeds. It shows the directory
+service an admin has set up ([directory.md](directory.md)), which iPX servers share, and says so
+when there is none. It opens on the ten feeds with the most subscribers on every server sharing
+with it, you included, ranked, then the categories, each a tile
+showing a few of its shows' covers. A category has a page of its own: its most subscribed feeds,
+then all of them as a grid of cover art, with its subcategories along the top (Tech News under
+News, Video Games under Leisure) and a choice of order. See all lists every feed, and the search
+box finds one by name. A feed you do not subscribe to opens a page of its own, with what it says it
+is and its latest episodes or posts, so you can see what it is first. Every page can be narrowed to Podcasts (anything with audio or video) or
+Blogs (the rest). A show's category is the one it gives itself in iTunes, or for one that names
+none, one an admin or iPX picked for it. Your own feeds are marked Subscribed.
 It shows a title, artwork and a count, never a URL or who reads it. An OPML subscription is listed
 as the feeds inside it, one by one, and never the OPML itself, so you can take just the shows you
-want. Anything that looks private is left out: a login configured for the feed, credentials in its URL,
+want. Anything private is left out: a feed someone marked Private in its settings, a login configured for the feed, credentials in its URL,
 or a key such as `auth=` or `token=` in the query, or a feed from a paid-feed service such as
 Patreon or Supercast, which put the key in the path, and any feed inside an OPML that looks private
 itself. Those are someone's paid subscriptions, and listing them would let anyone here read what
 they pay for.
 
+**Currently Listening**, under the Directory, is every episode you started and have not finished,
+across all your feeds, with how much is left. A click picks one up where you left off. The search
+box looks through it, as it does a feed's items, and through the Directory by name.
+
 An admin can do the same from **Settings → Manage users…**: add someone (with a password, or none
 for someone the proxy signs in), tick or untick Admin, or remove an account. Removing one takes its
 subscriptions and read state with it; downloaded files stay. The only admin cannot be demoted or
@@ -89,7 +101,7 @@ removed there, so there is always someone who can manage the rest.
 ## Admin
 
 The first account is an admin. An admin can change global settings (scanning interval, quota,
-retention, media types, download folder), a feed's URL, folder and schedule, and who has an account
+retention, media types, download folder, the directory), a feed's URL, folder and schedule, and who has an account
 and who else is an admin, and read the log, which names everyone's feeds and sign-ins. Everyone else
 gets the Settings and Log buttons hidden and a `403` if they ask anyway.
 

grafana/dashboard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+"""The iPX dashboard in Grafana: the three containers of the Arcane project ipx (ipx, ipx-web,
+ipx-directory) and Tower under them, from Prometheus, Loki (their logs, shipped by Alloy) and Tempo.
+
+    python3 grafana/dashboard.py > /mnt/fast/arcane/projects/monitoring/grafana-provisioning/dashboards/ipx.json
+
+Grafana reads that file on its own within a minute; edits made in Grafana are refused. Rows go
+top-down as a request does: an overview, Tower, then each container (ipx-web, ipx's API, its
+worker and its process, the directory), then traces and logs. Prometheus scrapes ipx's /metrics
+(job ipx, #194) and Tower's node exporter (job node); nothing scrapes the containers themselves,
+so ipx-web and the directory are read from their logs. The log panels read fields: ipx's
+(web.rs access_log, ipc.rs log_event), the directory's and Caddy's; renaming one has to be
+matched here. `dashboard.py queries` prints each Loki query, to try against Loki.
+"""
+import json, sys
+
+LOKI = {"type": "loki", "uid": "${loki}"}
+TEMPO = {"type": "tempo", "uid": "${tempo}"}
+PROM = {"type": "prometheus", "uid": "${prometheus}"}
+SEL = '{container="iPX"}'
+# ipx logs one JSON object a line (IPX_LOG_FORMAT=json). Each scan and download event carries its
+# fields (ev, feed, new, bytes, msg, error.type, ...); each request its method, path, route, status
+# and duration_ms. Events are logged under ipx::scan, the healthcheck's status under ipx::io, so
+# the filter is on the ev field, not the target.
+EV = SEL + ' |= "\\"ev\\":\\"" | json | __error__="" | ev != ""'
+HTTP = SEL + ' |= "\\"target\\":\\"ipx::http\\"" | json | __error__="" | path != "/api/events"'
+BAD = SEL + ' | json | __error__="" | level =~ "WARN|ERROR"'
+TEXT = ' | line_format "{{.level}} {{.target}}: {{.message}}"'
+# Every production span: ipx-web's, ipx's and the directory's, one trace from the page to the
+# directory where a request goes that far (#213). A daemon run by hand has no such tag.
+TRACES = '{resource.deployment.environment.name="production"'
+# The directory's JSON log (#204): a line a request (method, path, status, duration_ms, token), a
+# line a snapshot (instance, accepted, refused_*), a line a refresher round (checked) and one a
+# failed feed check (feed, error).
+DIR = '{container="ipx-directory"} | json | __error__=""'
+DIR_HTTP = '{container="ipx-directory"} |= "ipx_directory::http" | json | __error__=""'
+# ipx-web's Caddy access log (#203, #210): request.uri, status, duration in seconds. The page and
+# its files only: /api and /media are ipx's, and in its own log already.
+WEB = ('{container="ipx-web"} |= "http.log.access" | json | __error__=""'
+       ' | request_uri !~ "/(api|media)/.*" | request_remote_ip != "127.0.0.1"')  # not its healthcheck
+# Less what Caddy says at every start, by design: no admin endpoint, and no HTTPS or HTTP/3
+# behind the tunnel; and its goodbye on a restart.
+OTHERS_BAD = ('{container=~"ipx-web|ipx-directory"} | json | __error__="" | level =~ "(?i)warn|error"'
+              ' | msg !~ "admin endpoint disabled|automatic HTTPS is completely disabled|HTTP/[23] skipped.*|exiting; byeee.*"')
+
+
+QUERIES = {}
+panels, y = [], 0
+pid = 0
+
+
+def panel(kind, title, w, h, x, targets, **extra):
+    global pid
+    pid += 1
+    p = {"id": pid, "type": kind, "title": title, "gridPos": {"x": x, "y": y, "w": w, "h": h},
+         "datasource": targets[0].get("datasource", LOKI), "targets": targets}
+    p.update(extra)
+    panels.append(p)
+    return p
+
+
+def loki(expr, ref="A", legend=None, instant=False, kind=None):
+    QUERIES[expr] = instant
+    t = {"refId": ref, "datasource": LOKI, "expr": expr, "queryType": "instant" if instant else "range"}
+    if legend:
+        t["legendFormat"] = legend
+    return t
+
+
+def prom(expr, ref="A", legend=None):
+    # ipx's /metrics (#194), scraped by Prometheus as job ipx.
+    t = {"refId": ref, "datasource": PROM, "expr": expr}
+    if legend:
+        t["legendFormat"] = legend
+    return t
+
+
+def row(title):
+    global y, pid
+    pid += 1
+    panels.append({"id": pid, "type": "row", "title": title, "collapsed": False,
+                   "gridPos": {"x": 0, "y": y, "w": 24, "h": 1}, "panels": []})
+    y += 1
+
+
+def stat(title, target, x, unit="short", color="blue", thresholds=None, desc=None):
+    """target: loki(..., instant=True) or prom(...)."""
+    steps = thresholds or [{"color": color, "value": None}]
+    return panel("stat", title, 4, 4, x, [target], description=desc or "",
+                 fieldConfig={"defaults": {"unit": unit, "color": {"mode": "thresholds"},
+                                           "thresholds": {"mode": "absolute", "steps": steps}}, "overrides": []},
+                 options={"reduceOptions": {"calcs": ["lastNotNull"], "fields": "", "values": False},
+                          "colorMode": "value", "graphMode": "none", "textMode": "value"})
+
+
+def ts(title, targets, x, w=12, h=8, unit="short", bars=False, stack=False, desc=""):
+    custom = {"drawStyle": "bars" if bars else "line", "fillOpacity": 60 if bars else 10,
+              "lineWidth": 1, "showPoints": "never", "stacking": {"mode": "normal" if stack else "none"}}
+    return panel("timeseries", title, w, h, x, targets, description=desc,
+                 fieldConfig={"defaults": {"unit": unit, "custom": custom}, "overrides": []},
+                 options={"legend": {"displayMode": "list", "placement": "bottom"},
+                          "tooltip": {"mode": "multi", "sort": "desc"}})
+
+
+def table(title, targets, x, w=12, h=8, rename=None, sort=None, desc=""):
+    return panel("table", title, w, h, x, targets, description=desc,
+                 transformations=[{"id": "labelsToFields", "options": {"mode": "columns"}},
+                                  {"id": "organize", "options": {
+                                      "excludeByName": {"Time": True, "container": True, "compose_project": True,
+                                                        "service_name": True},
+                                      "renameByName": rename or {}}}],
+                 options={"showHeader": True, "sortBy": sort or []},
+                 fieldConfig={"defaults": {}, "overrides": []})
+
+
+GOOD_BAD = [{"color": "green", "value": None}, {"color": "orange", "value": 1}]
+# Caddy's line for each request, what kind it is by its address.
+WEB_ALL = ('{container="ipx-web"} |= "http.log.access" | json | __error__="" | request_remote_ip != "127.0.0.1"'
+           ' | label_format kind=`{{ if hasPrefix "/api/" .request_uri }}API{{ else if hasPrefix "/media/" .request_uri }}'
+           'media{{ else }}page and files{{ end }}`')
+LOG_OPTS = {"showTime": True, "wrapLogMessage": True, "sortOrder": "Descending", "enableLogDetails": True}
+
+
+def bar_overrides(*names):
+    return [{"matcher": {"id": "byName", "options": n},
+             "properties": [{"id": "unit", "value": "short"}, {"id": "custom.axisPlacement", "value": "right"},
+                            {"id": "custom.drawStyle", "value": "bars"}, {"id": "custom.fillOpacity", "value": 60}]}
+            for n in names]
+
+
+# ---- Overview: is each part up, and is anything wrong
+row("Overview")
+stat("ipx", prom('max(up{job="ipx"})'), 0, thresholds=[{"color": "red", "value": None}, {"color": "green", "value": 1}],
+     desc="Prometheus reaching ipx's /metrics: 1 is up. Its healthcheck asks the daemon and the database too.")["fieldConfig"]["defaults"]["mappings"] = [
+    {"type": "value", "options": {"0": {"text": "down"}, "1": {"text": "up"}}}]
+stat("Feeds", prom('max(ipx_feeds{job="ipx"})'), 4)
+stat("Waiting to download", prom('max(ipx_downloads_pending{job="ipx"})'), 8)
+stat("Since the last scan", prom('max(ipx_last_scan_age_seconds{job="ipx"})'), 12, unit="s",
+     thresholds=[{"color": "green", "value": None}, {"color": "orange", "value": 600}, {"color": "red", "value": 1800}],
+     desc="Over ten minutes means the worker may be stuck; the healthcheck still passes.")
+stat("Page and API errors", loki(f'sum(count_over_time({WEB_ALL} | status >= 500 [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 16,
+     thresholds=GOOD_BAD, desc="Answers of 500 and up from ipx-web, for the page or passed on from ipx: 502 is ipx not answering.")
+stat("Warnings and errors", loki(f'sum(count_over_time({BAD} [$__range])) + sum(count_over_time({OTHERS_BAD} [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 20,
+     thresholds=[{"color": "green", "value": None}, {"color": "orange", "value": 1}, {"color": "red", "value": 50}],
+     desc="All three containers, in the time range.")
+y += 4
+stat("Feed failures", loki(f'sum(count_over_time({EV} | ev="feed_error" [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 0,
+     thresholds=GOOD_BAD, desc="Failed feed checks in the time range.")
+stat("Download failures", loki(f'sum(count_over_time({EV} | ev="download_error" [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 4,
+     thresholds=GOOD_BAD)
+stat("Downloaded", prom('max(ipx_files_downloaded{job="ipx"})'), 8, color="green")
+stat("ipx running for", prom('max(ipx_uptime_seconds{job="ipx"})'), 12, unit="s")
+stat("Directory: feeds shared", loki('sum(max by (instance) (max_over_time(' + DIR + ' | message="snapshot" | unwrap accepted [6h])))', instant=True), 16,
+     desc="The feeds each server's latest snapshot gave, added up.")
+stat("Directory: refused as private", loki(f'sum(sum_over_time({DIR} | message="snapshot" | unwrap refused_private [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 20,
+     thresholds=[{"color": "green", "value": None}, {"color": "red", "value": 1}],
+     desc="Feeds a server sent that the directory caught as private. Not 0 means a server's own check missed one.")
+y += 4
+
+# ---- Tower: the host all three run on, from the node exporter
+row("Tower")
+ts("Load", [prom('node_load1{job="node"}', legend="1 minute"), prom('node_load15{job="node"}', ref="B", legend="15 minutes")],
+   0, w=8, desc="Twelve threads. Load far above that with little CPU used is processes waiting on a disk or the user shares (shfs).")
+ts("CPU", [prom('sum by (mode) (rate(node_cpu_seconds_total{job="node", mode=~"user|system|iowait"}[$__rate_interval]))', legend="{{mode}}")],
+   8, w=8, stack=True, desc="Cores busy, by kind. Much system time with little user time is the kernel, often FUSE (shfs).")
+ts("Memory available", [prom('node_memory_MemAvailable_bytes{job="node"}', legend="available")], 16, w=8, unit="bytes")
+y += 8
+ts("Disk busy", [prom('rate(node_disk_io_time_seconds_total{job="node", device=~"nvme.*|md.*"}[$__rate_interval])', legend="{{device}}")],
+   0, w=12, unit="percentunit", desc="nvme1n1 is /mnt/fast (appdata, Postgres's data); md* are the array's disks behind /mnt/user (downloads).")
+ts("Network", [prom('sum(rate(node_network_receive_bytes_total{job="node", device!~"lo|veth.*|docker.*|br-.*"}[$__rate_interval]))', legend="in"),
+               prom('sum(rate(node_network_transmit_bytes_total{job="node", device!~"lo|veth.*|docker.*|br-.*"}[$__rate_interval]))', ref="B", legend="out")],
+   12, w=12, unit="Bps")
+y += 8
+
+# ---- ipx-web: Caddy, the way in. Serves the page itself, passes /api and /media to ipx
+row("ipx-web")
+ts("Requests by kind", [loki(f'sum by (kind) (count_over_time({WEB_ALL} [$__interval]))', legend="{{kind}}")],
+   0, w=8, bars=True, stack=True, desc="Everything through Caddy, from the LAN and the tunnel. The API and media go on to ipx.")
+ts("Page and files by status", [loki(f'sum by (status) (count_over_time({WEB} [$__interval]))', legend="{{status}}")],
+   8, w=8, bars=True, stack=True, desc="What Caddy served itself. A page answered 401 or 403 is ipx refusing it in /api/page-check.")
+ts("Page response time", [loki(f'quantile_over_time(0.95, {WEB} | unwrap duration [$__interval]) by ()', legend="95th percentile"),
+                          loki(f'max_over_time({WEB} | unwrap duration [$__interval]) by ()', ref="B", legend="slowest")],
+   16, w=8, unit="s", desc="A page waits on ipx's /api/page-check before it is sent.")
+y += 8
+
+# ---- ipx: the API it answers behind ipx-web
+row("ipx: API")
+ts("Requests by status", [loki(f'sum by (status) (count_over_time({HTTP} [$__interval]))', legend="{{status}}")],
+   0, bars=True, stack=True, desc="The event stream the page keeps open is left out.")
+ts("Response time", [loki(f'quantile_over_time(0.5, {HTTP} | unwrap duration_ms [$__interval]) by ()', legend="median"),
+                     loki(f'quantile_over_time(0.95, {HTTP} | unwrap duration_ms [$__interval]) by ()', ref="B", legend="95th percentile"),
+                     loki(f'max_over_time({HTTP} | unwrap duration_ms [$__interval]) by ()', ref="C", legend="slowest")],
+   12, unit="ms")
+y += 8
+table("Slowest routes", [loki(f'topk(15, avg_over_time({HTTP} | route != "" | unwrap duration_ms [$__range]) by (method, route))', instant=True)],
+      0, w=8, rename={"method": "Method", "route": "Route", "Value": "Average ms"}, sort=[{"displayName": "Average ms", "desc": True}])
+table("Busiest routes", [loki(f'topk(15, sum by (method, route) (count_over_time({HTTP} | route != "" [$__range])))', instant=True)],
+      8, w=8, rename={"method": "Method", "route": "Route", "Value": "Requests"}, sort=[{"displayName": "Requests", "desc": True}])
+ts("Open connections", [prom('max(ipx_http_requests_in_flight{job="ipx"})', legend="requests in flight"),
+                        prom('max(ipx_event_listeners{job="ipx"})', ref="B", legend="live-update listeners"),
+                        prom('max(ipx_event_queue{job="ipx"})', ref="C", legend="live updates unread"),
+                        prom('sum(increase(ipx_events_missed_total{job="ipx"}[$__rate_interval]))', ref="D", legend="live updates missed")],
+   16, w=8, desc="Each open page holds one live-update listener. Missed updates mean a page fell behind and reloads its lists.")
+y += 8
+
+# ---- ipx: the worker, one job at a time: scans, downloads, DeadAir
+row("ipx: worker")
+ts("Worker", [prom('max by (kind) (ipx_worker_job_seconds{job="ipx"})', legend="on a {{kind}} for"),
+              prom('max(ipx_last_scan_age_seconds{job="ipx"})', ref="B", legend="since the last scan finished")],
+   0, w=8, unit="s", desc="A job's time that only climbs, or no scan for over 10 minutes, means the worker is stuck; the healthcheck still passes.")
+ts("Jobs done", [prom('sum by (kind) (increase(ipx_jobs_total{job="ipx"}[$__rate_interval]))', legend="{{kind}}")],
+   8, w=8, bars=True, stack=True)
+ts("Time on jobs", [prom('sum by (kind) (increase(ipx_job_seconds_total{job="ipx"}[$__rate_interval]))', legend="{{kind}}")],
+   16, w=8, unit="s", bars=True, stack=True, desc="Seconds the worker spent on each kind of job in each interval.")
+y += 8
+ts("Waiting", [prom('ipx_worker_queue{job="ipx"}', legend="commands for the worker"),
+               prom('ipx_downloads_pending{job="ipx"}', ref="B", legend="downloads"),
+               prom('max(ipx_feed_retries{job="ipx"})', ref="C", legend="feeds to retry a lookup"),
+               prom('max(ipx_deadair_backlog{job="ipx"})', ref="D", legend="files for DeadAir")],
+   0, w=8, desc="A queue that only grows means the worker is stuck or behind.")
+ts("Feeds checked and new items", [loki(f'sum(sum_over_time({EV} | ev="scan_done" | unwrap feeds [$__interval]))', legend="feeds checked"),
+                                   loki(f'sum(sum_over_time({EV} | ev="feed_done" | unwrap new [$__interval]))', ref="B", legend="new items")],
+   8, w=8, bars=True, desc="Feeds that were due and fetched; the rest were skipped as not due.")
+ts("Downloads", [loki(f'sum(count_over_time({EV} | ev="download_done" [$__interval]))', legend="saved"),
+                 loki(f'sum(count_over_time({EV} | ev="download_error" [$__interval]))', ref="B", legend="failed"),
+                 prom('max(ipx_downloads_active{job="ipx"})', ref="C", legend="at once"),
+                 prom('2 - max(ipx_torrent_slots_free{job="ipx"})', ref="D", legend="torrents")],
+   16, w=8, bars=True)
+y += 8
+ts("Download speed", [prom('sum(rate(ipx_download_bytes_total{job="ipx"}[$__rate_interval]))', legend="downloading")],
+   0, w=8, unit="Bps")
+ts("Feeds fetching at once", [prom('max(ipx_scan_feeds_fetching{job="ipx"})', legend="fetching")], 8, w=8)
+ts("DeadAir on a file", [prom('max(ipx_deadair_busy_seconds{job="ipx"})', legend="for"),
+                         prom('max(ipx_deadair_playing{job="ipx"})', ref="B", legend="playing through DeadAir")],
+   16, w=8, unit="s", desc="How long DeadAir has been on the file it is analysing; a few seconds each.")["fieldConfig"]["overrides"] = [
+    {"matcher": {"id": "byName", "options": "playing through DeadAir"},
+     "properties": [{"id": "unit", "value": "short"}, {"id": "custom.axisPlacement", "value": "right"}]}]
+y += 8
+table("Failing feeds", [loki(f'sum by (feed, msg) (count_over_time({EV} | ev="feed_error" [$__range]))', instant=True)],
+      0, rename={"feed": "Feed", "msg": "Error", "Value": "Failures"}, sort=[{"displayName": "Failures", "desc": True}])
+table("Failed downloads", [loki(f'sum by (feed, msg) (count_over_time({EV} | ev="download_error" [$__range]))', instant=True)],
+      12, rename={"feed": "Feed", "msg": "Error", "Value": "Failures"}, sort=[{"displayName": "Failures", "desc": True}])
+y += 8
+
+# ---- ipx: the process, what it holds between requests and jobs (#194)
+row("ipx: process")
+# Open connections stay open, idle, for ten minutes after a burst, so open at the max is not
+# pressure; drawn as a line of its own it read as the pool maxing out (#199).
+ts("Database connections", [prom('max(max_over_time(ipx_db_connections{job="ipx", state="in_use"}[$__interval]))', legend="in use"),
+                            prom('sum(ipx_db_connections{job="ipx"})', ref="B", legend="open"),
+                            prom('max(ipx_db_connections_max{job="ipx"})', ref="C", legend="most the pool opens")],
+   0, w=8, desc="In use reaching the most the pool opens means requests and scans are waiting for a connection. "
+                "Open connections stay open, idle, for ten minutes after a burst.")["fieldConfig"]["overrides"] = [
+    {"matcher": {"id": "byName", "options": "open"},
+     "properties": [{"id": "custom.lineStyle", "value": {"fill": "dash", "dash": [4, 4]}},
+                    {"id": "custom.fillOpacity", "value": 0}, {"id": "color", "value": {"mode": "fixed", "fixedColor": "#8e8e8e"}}]}]
+ts("Memory", [prom('ipx_process_resident_bytes{job="ipx"}', legend="resident")], 8, w=8, unit="bytes")
+ts("Open files and sockets", [prom('ipx_process_open_fds{job="ipx"}', legend="open")], 16, w=8)
+y += 8
+ts("Runtime", [prom('ipx_runtime_tasks{job="ipx"}', legend="tasks"),
+               prom('ipx_runtime_queue{job="ipx"}', ref="B", legend="tasks waiting for a thread"),
+               prom('ipx_runtime_workers{job="ipx"}', ref="C", legend="threads")],
+   0, w=12, desc="Tasks waiting for a thread for long means something is blocking the runtime.")
+ts("Artwork", [prom('max(ipx_art_cache_bytes{job="ipx"}) / max(ipx_art_cache_limit_bytes{job="ipx"})', legend="full"),
+               prom('sum(increase(ipx_art_requests_total{job="ipx", result="hit"}[$__rate_interval])) / '
+                    'sum(increase(ipx_art_requests_total{job="ipx"}[$__rate_interval]))', ref="B", legend="hit rate"),
+               prom('sum(increase(ipx_art_evicted_total{job="ipx"}[$__rate_interval]))', ref="C", legend="images evicted")],
+   12, w=12, unit="percentunit",
+   desc="Full sits near 100% once the cache has filled, since each sweep trims it to fit. Hit rate is the share served from disk: "
+        "the rest was fetched from the publisher. Evicted, on the right, is images each sweep threw out to stay under the "
+        "limit: many at every sweep, with a falling hit rate, means the limit is too small.")["fieldConfig"]["overrides"] = bar_overrides("images evicted")
+y += 8
+
+# ---- ipx-directory: public at directory.ipxreader.app, shared by ipx servers (#204)
+row("ipx-directory")
+stat("Snapshots", loki(f'sum(count_over_time({DIR} | message="snapshot" [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 0,
+     desc="ipx sends one when what it shares changes, and every half hour (#211).")
+stat("Feed checks", loki(f'sum(sum_over_time({DIR} | message="feeds checked" | unwrap checked [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 4,
+     desc="Each feed every six hours, 25 at a time.")
+stat("Failed feed checks", loki(f'sum(count_over_time({DIR} | message="feed check failed" [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 8,
+     thresholds=GOOD_BAD, desc="Mostly the publishers': a feed gone or moved.")
+stat("Requests", loki(f'sum(count_over_time({DIR_HTTP} [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 12)
+stat("Requests refused", loki(f'sum(count_over_time({DIR_HTTP} | status =~ "401|403" [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 16,
+     thresholds=[{"color": "green", "value": None}, {"color": "orange", "value": 100}],
+     desc="Without a token, or with one that has not the access asked for. Now and then is someone trying a public address.")
+stat("Slowest request", loki(f'max(max_over_time({DIR_HTTP} | unwrap duration_ms [$__range])) or vector(0)', instant=True), 20, unit="ms")
+y += 4
+ts("Requests by token", [loki(f'sum by (status, token) (count_over_time({DIR_HTTP} [$__interval]))', legend="{{status}} {{token}}")],
+   0, bars=True, stack=True)
+ts("Feed checks over time", [loki(f'sum(sum_over_time({DIR} | message="feeds checked" | unwrap checked [$__interval]))', legend="checked"),
+                             loki(f'sum(count_over_time({DIR} | message="feed check failed" [$__interval]))', ref="B", legend="failed")],
+   12, bars=True, desc="A burst follows a snapshot with new feeds.")
+y += 8
+table("Failing feeds in the directory", [loki(f'sum by (feed, error) (count_over_time({DIR} | message="feed check failed" [$__range]))', instant=True)],
+      0, rename={"feed": "Feed id", "error": "Error", "Value": "Failures"}, sort=[{"displayName": "Failures", "desc": True}])
+table("Snapshots by server", [loki(f'sum by (instance) (count_over_time({DIR} | message="snapshot" [$__range]))', instant=True)],
+      12, rename={"instance": "Token", "Value": "Snapshots"}, sort=[{"displayName": "Snapshots", "desc": True}])
+y += 8
+
+# ---- Traces: all three send them to Tempo (#213)
+row("Traces")
+for x, title, q in [(0, "Recent", TRACES + "}"),
+                    (8, "Slow (over 2s)", TRACES + " && duration > 2s}"),
+                    (16, "Failed", TRACES + " && status = error}")]:
+    panel("table", title, 8, 10, x,
+          [{"refId": "A", "datasource": TEMPO, "queryType": "traceql", "query": q, "limit": 50,
+            "tableType": "traces"}],
+          fieldConfig={"defaults": {}, "overrides": []})
+y += 10
+
+# ---- Logs
+row("Logs")
+panel("logs", "ipx: warnings and errors", 12, 10, 0, [loki(BAD + TEXT)], options=LOG_OPTS)
+panel("logs", "ipx-web and ipx-directory: warnings and errors", 12, 10, 12,
+      [loki(OTHERS_BAD + ' | line_format "{{.container}} {{.level}}: {{.message}}{{.msg}}"')], options=LOG_OPTS)
+y += 10
+panel("logs", "ipx log", 24, 12, 0,
+      [loki(SEL + ' | json | __error__="" | path != "/api/events" | ev != "feed_skip" | ev != "status"'
+            ' | message != "-> {\\"cmd\\":\\"status\\"}"' + TEXT)],
+      description="Without the event stream's requests, not-due skips and healthcheck status calls.", options=LOG_OPTS)
+y += 12
+
+dash = {
+    "uid": "ipx", "title": "iPX", "tags": ["ipx"], "timezone": "browser", "schemaVersion": 39,
+    "time": {"from": "now-24h", "to": "now"}, "refresh": "1m", "editable": True,
+    "templating": {"list": [
+        {"name": "loki", "label": "Logs", "type": "datasource", "query": "loki", "current": {}, "hide": 0},
+        {"name": "tempo", "label": "Traces", "type": "datasource", "query": "tempo", "current": {}, "hide": 0},
+        {"name": "prometheus", "label": "Metrics", "type": "datasource", "query": "prometheus", "current": {}, "hide": 0},
+    ]},
+    "links": [{"title": "iPX", "type": "link", "url": "https://ipodderx.sdf1.net", "targetBlank": True}],
+    "panels": panels,
+}
+
+if sys.argv[1:] == ["queries"]:
+    for q, instant in QUERIES.items():
+        print(json.dumps([q, instant]))
+else:
+    print(json.dumps(dash, indent=2))

package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,18 @@
 {
-  "name": "ipx-ui-tests",
+  "name": "ipx-web",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
-      "name": "ipx-ui-tests",
+      "name": "ipx-web",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "@swc/core": "^1.16.2",
+        "@swc/html": "^1.16.2",
+        "hls.js": "1.6.19"
+      },
       "devDependencies": {
-        "@playwright/test": "^1.56.0"
+        "@playwright/test": "^1.56.0",
+        "typescript": "^7.0.2"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@playwright/test": {
@@ -25,6 +31,853 @@
         "node": ">=20"
       }
     },
+    "node_modules/@swc/core": {
+      "version": "1.16.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@swc/core/-/core-1.16.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-95I4kiSMeveI/Mhi+tE4fiWcWLUMfzfKrk0jtr8LRMqHgOgq+xHS+zExkDqoO4b5OeeuXHMWVdD5MeP3X6sULw==",
+      "hasInstallScript": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "dependencies": {
+        "@swc/counter": "^0.1.3",
+        "@swc/types": "^0.1.28"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=10"
+      },
+      "funding": {
+        "type": "opencollective",
+        "url": "https://opencollective.com/swc"
+      },
+      "optionalDependencies": {
+        "@swc/core-darwin-arm64": "1.16.2",
+        "@swc/core-darwin-x64": "1.16.2",
+        "@swc/core-linux-arm-gnueabihf": "1.16.2",
+        "@swc/core-linux-arm64-gnu": "1.16.2",
+        "@swc/core-linux-arm64-musl": "1.16.2",
+        "@swc/core-linux-ppc64-gnu": "1.16.2",
+        "@swc/core-linux-s390x-gnu": "1.16.2",
+        "@swc/core-linux-x64-gnu": "1.16.2",
+        "@swc/core-linux-x64-musl": "1.16.2",
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+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
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+    "node_modules/@typescript/typescript-linux-riscv64": {
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+        "riscv64"
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+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "linux"
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+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
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+    },
+    "node_modules/@typescript/typescript-linux-s390x": {
+      "version": "7.0.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript/typescript-linux-s390x/-/typescript-linux-s390x-7.0.2.tgz",
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+      "cpu": [
+        "s390x"
+      ],
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "linux"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
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+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
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+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "netbsd"
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+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
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+        "x64"
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+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
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+        "netbsd"
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+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
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+    "node_modules/@typescript/typescript-openbsd-arm64": {
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+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript/typescript-openbsd-arm64/-/typescript-openbsd-arm64-7.0.2.tgz",
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+      "cpu": [
+        "arm64"
+      ],
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "openbsd"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/@typescript/typescript-openbsd-x64": {
+      "version": "7.0.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript/typescript-openbsd-x64/-/typescript-openbsd-x64-7.0.2.tgz",
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+      "cpu": [
+        "x64"
+      ],
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "openbsd"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/@typescript/typescript-sunos-x64": {
+      "version": "7.0.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript/typescript-sunos-x64/-/typescript-sunos-x64-7.0.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-dLJDGaLZ1D4HPQn62u1n8mBDkJREwMsAkCdkwd4Ieqw+x3TUyTsqY0YiBCtE6H6OzzgGk3iuZ3vFWRS+E8/d1g==",
+      "cpu": [
+        "x64"
+      ],
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "sunos"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/@typescript/typescript-win32-arm64": {
+      "version": "7.0.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript/typescript-win32-arm64/-/typescript-win32-arm64-7.0.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-Gyl1Vy6OsWesLzmq+EP0Fb7b4Nid5232AvcA2SFcdYreldpNtYFFofPjnt62y9hQy7VTaZp65ICJjuAQRaVcIQ==",
+      "cpu": [
+        "arm64"
+      ],
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "win32"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/@typescript/typescript-win32-x64": {
+      "version": "7.0.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@typescript/typescript-win32-x64/-/typescript-win32-x64-7.0.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-0BQ3HkAHHlKLSp1qRvf3SUhGpGsDuhB/jgFw75guyqbxJqEaS0Cw/VFO8i2nHglJUzQCRtMMR/IBAKE3ETMC4g==",
+      "cpu": [
+        "x64"
+      ],
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "optional": true,
+      "os": [
+        "win32"
+      ],
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
+      }
+    },
+    "node_modules/hls.js": {
+      "version": "1.6.19",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/hls.js/-/hls.js-1.6.19.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-A//aZeaAgM5rgUCbTURD4gkfyw5Uag2/4Jky7CfDOukL/DN+P5DjbgK2BYteyP3/KnCkPfkGVkbLxQG2T0AbUQ==",
+      "license": "Apache-2.0"
+    },
     "node_modules/playwright": {
       "version": "1.63.0",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/playwright/-/playwright-1.63.0.tgz",
@@ -53,6 +906,41 @@
       "engines": {
         "node": ">=20"
       }
+    },
+    "node_modules/typescript": {
+      "version": "7.0.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/typescript/-/typescript-7.0.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-8FYau96o3NKOhbjKi/qNvG/W5jhzxkbdm5sj9AbZ/5T5sWqn3hJgLfGx27sRKZWTvyzCP8dLRBTf5tBTSRVUNA==",
+      "dev": true,
+      "license": "Apache-2.0",
+      "bin": {
+        "tsc": "bin/tsc"
+      },
+      "engines": {
+        "node": ">=16.20.0"
+      },
+      "optionalDependencies": {
+        "@typescript/typescript-aix-ppc64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-darwin-arm64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-darwin-x64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-freebsd-arm64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-freebsd-x64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-linux-arm": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-linux-arm64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-linux-loong64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-linux-mips64el": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-linux-ppc64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-linux-riscv64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-linux-s390x": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-linux-x64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-netbsd-arm64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-netbsd-x64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-openbsd-arm64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-openbsd-x64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-sunos-x64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-win32-arm64": "7.0.2",
+        "@typescript/typescript-win32-x64": "7.0.2"
+      }
     }
   }
 }

package.json

@@ -1,13 +1,23 @@
 {
-  "name": "ipx-ui-tests",
+  "name": "ipx-web",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
   "private": true,
-  "description": "Browser tests for the ipx web UI. The Rust tests cover the server; these cover the page.",
+  "description": "Builds the ipx web pages from web/src (web/build.mjs, run by build.rs) and tests them. The Rust tests cover the server.",
   "scripts": {
+    "build": "node web/build.mjs",
+    "typecheck": "tsc -p .",
+    "smoke": "node tests/page-smoke.js",
     "test": "playwright test",
     "test:headed": "playwright test --headed",
-    "smoke": "node tests/page-smoke.js"
+    "load": "node tests/load/run.js"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@playwright/test": "^1.56.0"
+    "@playwright/test": "^1.56.0",
+    "typescript": "^7.0.2"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@swc/core": "^1.16.2",
+    "@swc/html": "^1.16.2",
+    "hls.js": "1.6.19"
   }
 }

playwright.config.js

@@ -26,10 +26,29 @@ module.exports = defineConfig({
       reuseExistingServer: false,
       stdout: 'ignore',
     },
+    {
+      // The directory the Directory shows (#205), on SQLite in the scratch directory.
+      command: `cargo build -q -p ipx-directory && exec ./target/debug/ipx-directory --config ${setup.root}/directory.toml`,
+      url: `${setup.DIRECTORY}/healthz`,
+      reuseExistingServer: false,
+      timeout: 180_000,
+      stdout: 'ignore',
+      env: { DIRECTORY_DATABASE_URL: `sqlite://${setup.root}/directory.db?mode=rwc` },
+    },
+    {
+      // The frontend as production serves it (#203): built from web/, served by Caddy on the
+      // suite's port, the API passed to the daemon behind it.
+      command: `node web/build.mjs ${setup.root}/web && exec caddy run --config web/Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile`,
+      url: 'http://127.0.0.1:8791/favicon.png',
+      reuseExistingServer: false,
+      timeout: 60_000,
+      stdout: 'ignore',
+      env: { WEB_BIND: '127.0.0.1:8791', WEB_ROOT: `${setup.root}/web`, IPX_UPSTREAM: '127.0.0.1:8796', HOME: setup.root, XDG_DATA_HOME: setup.root, XDG_CONFIG_HOME: setup.root },
+    },
     {
       // Build first so the tests always run against current source.
       command: 'cargo build -q && exec ./target/debug/ipx daemon',
-      port: 8791,
+      port: 8796,
       reuseExistingServer: false,
       timeout: 180_000,
       stdout: 'pipe',
@@ -37,6 +56,10 @@ module.exports = defineConfig({
         IPX_CONFIG: `${setup.root}/config/config.toml`,
         IPX_DATA_DIR: `${setup.root}/data`,
         IPX_LOG: 'ipx=info',
+        // Blank, whatever the shell running the suite has: the test daemon sends no traces to
+        // production's Tempo and never opens production's database.
+        OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: '',
+        IPX_DATABASE_URL: '',
       },
     },
   ],

scripts/release.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Publish a Gitea release for one service's tag, with a tarball taken from the image that was
+# deployed, so what is attached is what runs on Tower. Run after the release commit is tagged,
+# pushed and its image built and pushed:  sh scripts/release.sh ipx|directory|web
+set -eu
+cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
+
+case "${1:-}" in
+ipx)       name=ipx;           ver=$(sed -n 's/^version = "\(.*\)"/\1/p' crates/ipx/Cargo.toml | head -1)
+           tag=v$ver;          log=crates/ipx/CHANGELOG.md;       from=/usr/local/bin/ipx ;;
+directory) name=ipx-directory; ver=$(sed -n 's/^version = "\(.*\)"/\1/p' crates/directory/Cargo.toml | head -1)
+           tag=directory-v$ver; log=crates/directory/CHANGELOG.md; from=/usr/local/bin/ipx-directory ;;
+web)       name=ipx-web;       ver=$(node -p 'require("./package.json").version')
+           tag=web-v$ver;      log=web/CHANGELOG.md;              from=/srv ;;
+*) echo "usage: $0 ipx|directory|web" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+esac
+
+case "$ver" in *-dev) echo "$name is at $ver: release it first" >&2; exit 1 ;; esac
+git fetch -q --tags origin
+git merge-base --is-ancestor "$tag" origin/main || { echo "$tag is not on origin/main" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+out=$(mktemp -d); trap 'rm -rf "$out"' EXIT
+dir=$out/$name-$ver; mkdir "$dir"
+image=192.168.1.130:5000/$name:latest
+c=$(docker create "$image"); trap 'docker rm -f "$c" >/dev/null; rm -rf "$out"' EXIT
+if [ "$name" = ipx-web ]; then
+	docker cp -q "$c:$from/." "$dir/"
+	cp web/Caddyfile "$dir/"
+	# latest may be a later build than the tag: the page carries its version, so check it.
+	grep -qF "$ver" "$dir"/app.js || { echo "$image is not ipx-web $ver" >&2; exit 1; }
+	arch=any
+else
+	docker cp -q "$c:$from" "$dir/"
+	"$dir/$name" --version | grep -qF " $ver" || { echo "$image is not $name $ver" >&2; exit 1; }
+	arch=linux-$(uname -m)
+fi
+cp LICENSE README.md "$dir/"; cp "$log" "$dir/CHANGELOG.md"
+tarball=$out/$name-$ver-$arch.tar.gz
+tar -C "$out" -czf "$tarball" "$name-$ver"
+
+# The notes are this version's section of the changelog, without its heading.
+awk -v h="## [$ver]" 'index($0, h) == 1 {p = 1; next} p && /^## \[/ {exit} p' "$log" > "$out/notes.md"
+[ -s "$out/notes.md" ] || { echo "no [$ver] section in $log" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+timeout 120 /src/tea releases create --login git.sdf1.net --repo rays/ipx --tag "$tag" \
+	--title "$name $ver" --note-file "$out/notes.md" --asset "$tarball" < /dev/null

site/_headers

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Cloudflare Web Analytics, which Pages adds to the page, is the one script it runs (#216).
+/*
+  Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; img-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; script-src https://static.cloudflareinsights.com; connect-src 'self' https://cloudflareinsights.com; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'
+  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
+  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
+/fonts/*
+  Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable

site/build.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# ipxreader.app: the page and its stylesheet, and the typeface, logo and icon from web/, into
+# site/dist, which Cloudflare Pages serves.
+set -e
+here=$(dirname "$0")
+rm -rf "$here/dist"
+mkdir -p "$here/dist/fonts"
+cp "$here/index.html" "$here/site.css" "$here/wave.svg" "$here/gitea.svg" "$here/_headers" "$here/dist/"
+# The reader's own typeface, the same file ipx-web serves.
+cp "$here/../web/InterVariable.woff2" "$here/dist/fonts/inter.woff2"
+cp "$here/../web/logo.svg" "$here/../web/favicon.png" "$here/dist/"
+cp -r "$here/shots" "$here/dist/"

site/gitea.svg

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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site/index.html

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
+<title>iPX</title>
+<meta name="description" content="iPX checks your podcasts, downloads new episodes and gives everyone at home an account of their own, on your own server. The successor to iPodderX, free and open source.">
+<meta name="color-scheme" content="light">
+<link rel="icon" href="/favicon.png">
+<link rel="preload" href="/fonts/inter.woff2" as="font" type="font/woff2" crossorigin>
+<link rel="stylesheet" href="/site.css">
+</head>
+<body>
+<header class="bar">
+  <a class="home" href="/"><img src="/logo.svg" alt="" width="36" height="36">iPX</a>
+  <nav aria-label="Elsewhere">
+    <a href="https://directory.ipxreader.app">Directory</a>
+    <a class="src" href="https://git.sdf1.net/rays/ipx" title="Source code on git.sdf1.net"><img src="/gitea.svg" alt="Source code" width="28" height="28"></a>
+  </nav>
+</header>
+
+<main>
+  <section class="hero">
+    <h1>iPX</h1>
+    <p class="intro">iPX checks your podcasts, downloads new episodes, and gives everyone at home their own account to listen from in the browser. It runs on your own server.</p>
+    <p class="acts">
+      <a class="btn primary" href="https://directory.ipxreader.app">Browse the directory</a>
+    </p>
+  </section>
+
+  <!-- The iPodderX logo is a radio's tuning scale and needle. Here the scale is full size and its
+       stations are shows from the directory; the needle sweeps once and settles. -->
+  <figure class="dial" aria-label="A radio dial tuned across shows in the iPX directory">
+    <div class="scale"><div class="track">
+      <ol class="freq" aria-hidden="true">
+        <li>88</li><li>92</li><li>96</li><li>100</li><li>104</li><li>108</li>
+      </ol>
+      <ul class="stations">
+        <li>99% Invisible</li>
+        <li>Hackaday</li>
+        <li>Clarkesworld</li>
+        <li>Accidental Tech Podcast</li>
+        <li>Daring Fireball</li>
+        <li class="tuned">Ologies</li>
+        <li>Oxide and Friends</li>
+        <li>xkcd</li>
+        <li>The Sporkful</li>
+        <li>Acquired</li>
+        <li>Construction Physics</li>
+        <li>Dwarkesh Podcast</li>
+      </ul>
+      <span class="needle" aria-hidden="true"></span>
+    </div></div>
+  </figure>
+
+  <!-- Each feature beside the part of the app that shows it, cut from a scratch iPX on public
+       podcasts, in a navy frame like the dial's. -->
+  <section class="does" aria-labelledby="does">
+    <h2 id="does">What it does</h2>
+
+    <div class="feature">
+      <div class="say">
+        <h3>An account for everyone at home</h3>
+        <p>Each person has their own shows, sees what they have and have not heard, and picks up where they left off.</p>
+      </div>
+      <figure class="frame"><img src="/shots/feeds.webp" width="290" height="276" loading="lazy"
+        alt="The feed list: Directory, Currently Listening and All Subscriptions, then each show with its cover and how many of its episodes are unread."></figure>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="feature">
+      <div class="say">
+        <h3>New episodes, ready to play</h3>
+        <p>iPX checks your podcasts through the day and downloads new episodes as they come out. Skip the ones you don't want by keyword, or leave out explicit ones. Old episodes are cleared to stay within the space you give it, but never one someone has pinned.</p>
+      </div>
+      <figure class="frame"><img class="cut" src="/shots/episodes.webp" width="904" height="283" loading="lazy"
+        alt="99% Invisible's episodes in a table with each one's size and date, and the downloaded one's file beside it, ready to play, save, share or delete."></figure>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="feature">
+      <div class="say">
+        <h3>Pick up where you left off</h3>
+        <p>The player keeps your place in every episode, on every device.</p>
+      </div>
+      <figure class="frame"><img class="cut player" src="/shots/player.webp" width="950" height="80" loading="lazy"
+        alt="The player along the bottom of the page: the episode playing, back and forward, and how far in it is."></figure>
+    </div>
+
+    <!-- DeadAir: talk keeps its length, the quiet between it shrinks to a short pause, and the
+         episode ends sooner. CSS only; the page runs no script of its own. -->
+    <div class="feature">
+      <div class="say">
+        <h3>Cut the dead air</h3>
+        <p>Turn on DeadAir for a show and its long silences shrink to a short pause, so episodes finish sooner without anyone talking faster. You choose how long a pause to leave.</p>
+      </div>
+      <figure class="frame deadair" role="img" aria-label="A waveform whose silent gaps shrink to short pauses, so the episode ends sooner.">
+        <div class="wave" aria-hidden="true">
+          <span class="talk t1"></span><span class="hush"></span>
+          <span class="talk t2"></span><span class="hush"></span>
+          <span class="talk t3"></span><span class="hush"></span>
+          <span class="talk t4"></span><span class="hush"></span>
+          <span class="talk t5"></span><span class="hush"></span>
+          <span class="talk t6"></span>
+        </div>
+      </figure>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="feature">
+      <div class="say">
+        <h3>See what others listen to</h3>
+        <p>iPX servers can share which podcasts their listeners follow, and the directory gathers them in one place. <a href="https://directory.ipxreader.app">Browse the directory</a> to find something new and subscribe in one click.</p>
+      </div>
+      <figure class="frame"><img class="cut half" src="/shots/directory.webp" width="700" height="133" loading="lazy"
+        alt="The directory's most subscribed shows, each with its cover and how many people subscribe."></figure>
+    </div>
+
+    <dl class="also">
+      <div><dt>BitTorrent too</dt>
+        <dd>Some shows publish their episodes as torrents. iPX downloads them like any other, shares them back for as long as you choose, and a slow one never holds up the rest.</dd></div>
+      <div><dt>Subscribe to a whole list</dt>
+        <dd>Some people publish lists of podcasts they recommend, as OPML. Give iPX a list's address and it keeps a folder of those shows up to date as the list changes. Your own subscriptions move in and out the same way.</dd></div>
+      <div><dt>Sign in your way</dt>
+        <dd>Everyone signs in with a password, or with the single sign-on you already use, Cloudflare Access or Authentik. An admin adds people and decides who else is one.</dd></div>
+      <div><dt>Blogs too</dt>
+        <dd>Any RSS or Atom feed works, so the blogs you read sit beside the shows you listen to, and iPX keeps track of what you have read.</dd></div>
+    </dl>
+  </section>
+
+  <section class="then" aria-labelledby="then">
+    <h2 id="then">Since 2004</h2>
+    <p>iPodderX was one of the first podcatchers, a Mac app by Ray Slakinski and August Trometer, from the year podcasts got their name. iPX is that app rebuilt to run on your own server.</p>
+  </section>
+</main>
+
+<footer>
+  <p>iPX is free and open source under the MIT licence.</p>
+</footer>
+</body>
+</html>

site/site.css

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* ipxreader.app. The palette is the iPodderX logo's: the radio's navy body, the sky of its
+   screen, the blue of its tuning scale, and the orange needle, which is the needle alone. The
+   typeface is the reader's own, Inter, the same file (web/InterVariable.woff2). */
+@font-face{font-family:Inter;src:url(/fonts/inter.woff2) format("woff2");font-weight:100 900;font-display:swap}
+:root{
+  --navy:#0c2238;     /* the radio */
+  --ink:#16304a;      /* body text, a step off the navy */
+  --muted:#46607a;
+  --sky:#dff0fb;      /* its screen */
+  --page:#f1f8fd;
+  --scale:#2f6aa0;    /* the tuning scale, and links */
+  --tick:#8fc2ea;     /* the scale on the dark dial */
+  --needle:#ff5500;
+  --rule:#c6d9ea;
+}
+*{box-sizing:border-box}
+html{-webkit-text-size-adjust:100%;scroll-behavior:smooth}
+body{margin:0;background:var(--page);color:var(--ink);font:400 1.0625rem/1.6 Inter,system-ui,sans-serif}
+a{color:var(--scale);text-underline-offset:.18em}
+a:focus-visible,.btn:focus-visible{outline:3px solid var(--scale);outline-offset:3px;border-radius:6px}
+main,.bar,footer{max-width:72rem;margin:0 auto;padding-inline:1.5rem}
+
+.bar{display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:space-between;padding-block:1.25rem}
+.home{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:.6rem;color:var(--navy);text-decoration:none;font-weight:800;font-size:1.25rem}
+.home img{border-radius:9px;display:block}
+.bar nav{display:flex;gap:1.5rem}
+.bar nav a{color:var(--navy);text-decoration:none;font-weight:600}
+.bar nav a:hover{text-decoration:underline}
+.bar nav{align-items:center}
+.src img{display:block}
+
+.hero{padding-block:3rem 2.5rem;max-width:46rem}
+h1{margin:0;color:var(--navy);font-weight:900;font-size:clamp(6.5rem,24vw,15rem);line-height:.82;letter-spacing:-.065em}
+.intro{margin:1.75rem 0 0;max-width:38rem;color:var(--muted);font-size:1.125rem}
+.acts{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;gap:.75rem;margin:2rem 0 0}
+.btn{display:inline-block;padding:.8rem 1.35rem;border:2px solid var(--navy);border-radius:999px;color:var(--navy);text-decoration:none;font-weight:700}
+.btn:hover{background:var(--sky)}
+.btn.primary{background:var(--navy);color:#fff}
+.btn.primary:hover{background:#1a3a5c}
+
+/* The dial: a frequency row, minor and major ticks, stations on two staggered rows as a printed
+   dial has them, and the needle, which points down at the scale and lights the station it stops
+   on rather than crossing its name. --at is where it stops: the tuned station's middle. */
+.dial{margin:1rem 0 0}
+.scale{background:var(--navy);border-radius:1.25rem;overflow:hidden}
+.track{position:relative;--at:45.8%}
+.freq{position:relative;list-style:none;margin:0;padding:1.1rem 4% 0;display:flex;justify-content:space-between;color:var(--tick);font-weight:600;font-size:.95rem;font-variant-numeric:tabular-nums}
+.freq li{width:0;display:flex;justify-content:center}  /* each number centred on its tick */
+.freq::after{content:"";position:absolute;left:4%;right:4%;top:2.6rem;height:1.6rem;
+  background:
+    repeating-linear-gradient(90deg,var(--tick) 0 2px,transparent 2px 20%) 0 0/100% 100%,
+    repeating-linear-gradient(90deg,rgba(143,194,234,.55) 0 1px,transparent 1px 2%) 0 100%/100% 45%;
+  background-repeat:no-repeat}
+.stations{list-style:none;margin:2.6rem 0 0;padding:0 1% 1.6rem;display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(12,minmax(0,1fr));align-items:start;
+  color:#cfe3f4;font-weight:550;font-size:.84rem;line-height:1.2;letter-spacing:-.01em;text-align:center}
+.stations li{padding-inline:.15rem}
+.stations li:nth-child(even){margin-top:1.7rem}
+.needle{position:absolute;top:2.35rem;height:2.7rem;left:var(--at);width:3px;margin-left:-1.5px;background:var(--needle);border-radius:2px;
+  box-shadow:0 0 0 1px rgba(12,34,56,.6);animation:tune 2.4s cubic-bezier(.3,.7,.3,1) .4s both}
+.stations .tuned{text-decoration:underline 2px transparent;text-underline-offset:.3em;animation:lit .5s ease-out 2.6s both}
+@keyframes tune{0%{left:3%}68%{left:calc(var(--at) + 7%)}86%{left:calc(var(--at) - 1.4%)}100%{left:var(--at)}}
+@keyframes lit{from{color:#cfe3f4}to{color:#fff;font-weight:800;text-decoration-color:var(--needle)}}
+@media (prefers-reduced-motion:reduce){.needle,.stations .tuned{animation-duration:0s;animation-delay:0s}}
+
+h2{margin:0 0 1.5rem;color:var(--navy);font-weight:800;font-size:clamp(1.75rem,4vw,2.4rem);line-height:1.1;letter-spacing:-.02em}
+.does,.then{padding-block:4rem 0}
+/* Each feature on one row: what it does on the left, beside the part of the app that shows it,
+   framed in the dial's navy at no more than its own size. */
+.feature{display:grid;grid-template-columns:minmax(0,22rem) minmax(0,1fr);gap:clamp(1.5rem,5vw,4rem);align-items:center;padding-block:2.5rem}
+.feature h3{margin:0 0 .5rem;color:var(--navy);font-weight:750;font-size:1.35rem;line-height:1.25}
+.feature p{margin:0;max-width:34rem}
+.frame{margin:0;justify-self:start;max-width:100%;padding:clamp(.6rem,1.6vw,1.1rem);background:var(--navy);border-radius:1.1rem}
+.frame img{display:block;max-width:100%;height:auto;border-radius:.55rem}
+/* DeadAir: the track is the episode's full length; talk keeps its width, each silence lights
+   in the needle's orange and shrinks to a pause, and the end comes in from the right. */
+.frame.deadair{justify-self:stretch;width:100%}
+.wave{display:flex;align-items:center;height:4.5rem;border-radius:.55rem;background:rgba(143,194,234,.08)}
+.talk{height:100%;background:url(/wave.svg) 0 50%/auto 100% repeat-x}
+.talk:first-child{border-radius:.55rem 0 0 .55rem}
+.t1{flex:0 0 14%}.t2{flex:0 0 19%}.t3{flex:0 0 9%}.t4{flex:0 0 16%}.t5{flex:0 0 12%}.t6{flex:0 0 10%}
+.hush{flex:0 0 4%;align-self:stretch;background:linear-gradient(var(--tick),var(--tick)) 50%/100% 2px no-repeat;border-radius:.3rem;animation:hush 7s ease-in-out infinite}
+@keyframes hush{
+  0%,14%{flex-basis:4%;background-color:transparent}
+  24%,30%{flex-basis:4%;background-color:rgba(255,85,0,.35)}
+  48%,86%{flex-basis:.8%;background-color:rgba(255,85,0,.35)}
+  100%{flex-basis:4%;background-color:transparent}}
+@media (prefers-reduced-motion:reduce){.hush{animation:none;flex-basis:.8%;background-color:rgba(255,85,0,.35)}}
+.also{margin:2rem 0 0;display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(2,minmax(0,1fr));gap:2.25rem 3.5rem}
+.also dt{color:var(--navy);font-weight:750;font-size:1.2rem;line-height:1.25}
+.also dd{margin:.45rem 0 0;max-width:34rem}
+
+
+footer{margin-top:5rem;padding-block:1.75rem 3rem;border-top:1px solid var(--rule);color:var(--muted);font-size:.95rem}
+footer p{margin:0}
+
+@media (max-width:640px){
+  main,.bar,footer{padding-inline:1rem}
+  .bar nav{gap:1rem}
+  .hero{padding-block:1.5rem 2rem}
+  .feature{grid-template-columns:minmax(0,1fr);gap:1.25rem;padding-block:1.75rem}
+  /* A wide crop at this width is too small to read: its left part, larger. */
+  .frame img.cut{width:100%;aspect-ratio:4/3;object-fit:cover;object-position:0 0}
+  .frame img.cut.player{aspect-ratio:2.4/1}
+  .frame img.cut.half{aspect-ratio:2.6/1}  /* the directory's left column */
+  .also{grid-template-columns:minmax(0,1fr);gap:1.75rem}
+  .dial{margin-inline:-1rem}
+  .scale{border-radius:0}
+  /* Six stations, the tuned one third, rather than twelve too narrow to read. */
+  .track{--at:41.7%}
+  .stations{grid-template-columns:repeat(6,minmax(0,1fr));padding-inline:2%}
+  .stations li:nth-child(-n+3),.stations li:nth-child(n+10){display:none}
+  .stations li:nth-child(even){margin-top:0}
+  .stations li:nth-child(odd){margin-top:1.7rem}
+}

site/wave.svg

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="48" height="64" viewBox="0 0 48 64" fill="#8fc2ea"><rect x="1" y="22" width="3" height="20" rx="1.5"/><rect x="7" y="10" width="3" height="44" rx="1.5"/><rect x="13" y="17" width="3" height="30" rx="1.5"/><rect x="19" y="3" width="3" height="58" rx="1.5"/><rect x="25" y="14" width="3" height="36" rx="1.5"/><rect x="31" y="7" width="3" height="50" rx="1.5"/><rect x="37" y="20" width="3" height="24" rx="1.5"/><rect x="43" y="12" width="3" height="40" rx="1.5"/></svg>

skills-lock.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "skills": {
+    "security-audit": {
+      "source": "cloudflare/security-audit-skill",
+      "sourceType": "github",
+      "skillPath": "skills/security-audit/SKILL.md",
+      "computedHash": "98b97aad2873b3b9a8e064007c25e7827b493ba27fda8bfbdb41dab586767973"
+    }
+  }
+}

tests/contrast.js

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+// Every theme's palette, checked against WCAG AA for the pairs the page actually draws. The
+// published palettes ipx borrows (Flat Remix, Paper, Adwaita...) fell short in places: an unread
+// count at 2.6:1, tags at 3.2:1. Each was tuned by hand; this keeps a new or edited theme honest.
+//
+//   node tests/contrast.js
+const fs = require('fs');
+const path = require('path');
+
+const css = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '../web/app.css'), 'utf8');
+const blocks = {};
+for (const m of css.matchAll(/^(:root(?:\[[^\]]+\])*)\s*\{([^}]*)\}/gm)) {
+  const vars = {};
+  for (const v of m[2].matchAll(/--(\w+):\s*(#[0-9a-f]{6})\b/gi)) vars[v[1]] = v[2].toLowerCase();
+  if (Object.keys(vars).length) blocks[m[1]] = vars;
+}
+
+const lum = h => {
+  const c = [1, 3, 5].map(i => parseInt(h.slice(i, i + 2), 16) / 255)
+    .map(c => c <= .03928 ? c / 12.92 : ((c + .055) / 1.055) ** 2.4);
+  return .2126 * c[0] + .7152 * c[1] + .0722 * c[2];
+};
+const ratio = (a, b) => { const x = lum(a), y = lum(b); return (Math.max(x, y) + .05) / (Math.min(x, y) + .05); };
+
+// [colour, grounds it is drawn on, minimum]. 4.5 for text, 3 for an icon, dot or bar.
+const RULES = [
+  ['fg', ['bg', 'panel', 'panel2', 'raise'], 4.5],
+  ['dim', ['bg', 'panel', 'panel2'], 4.5],       // metadata, labels
+  ['faint', ['bg', 'panel', 'panel2'], 4.5],     // hints, column headings, the status bar
+  ['accent', ['bg', 'panel'], 4.5],              // links, in the list and the reader
+  ['ink', ['accent'], 4.5],                      // a primary button's label
+  ['ink', ['accent2'], 4.5],                     // the unread count on its badge
+  ['accent2', ['bg', 'panel', 'raise'], 3],      // the unread dot, the EQ bars, download bars
+  ['bad', ['bg', 'panel'], 4.5],                 // error text, the Error tag, a failed toast
+  ['warn', ['bg', 'panel'], 4.5],                // the Gone tag, log warnings
+  ['good', ['bg', 'panel', 'panel2'], 3],        // the downloaded and subscribed icons
+];
+
+const base = blocks[':root'];
+const themes = {};
+for (const sel of Object.keys(blocks)) {
+  const t = sel.match(/data-theme="(\w+)"/);
+  if (!t) continue;
+  const light = /data-mode="light"/.test(sel);
+  // A theme's dark half is :root under its own block; its light half adds the light block.
+  const name = `${t[1]}${light ? ' light' : ''}`;
+  themes[name] = light
+    ? { ...base, ...blocks[`:root[data-theme="${t[1]}"]`], ...blocks[sel] }
+    : { ...base, ...blocks[sel] };
+}
+themes['modern'] = base;
+
+let bad = 0;
+for (const [name, p] of Object.entries(themes)) {
+  for (const [fg, grounds, min] of RULES) for (const g of grounds) {
+    const r = ratio(p[fg], p[g]);
+    if (r < min) { bad++; console.log(`FAIL ${name}: --${fg} on --${g} is ${r.toFixed(2)}:1, needs ${min}`); }
+  }
+  // A border the same colour as the ground it is drawn on does not show (Nordic, once).
+  if (p.line === p.panel2) { bad++; console.log(`FAIL ${name}: --line is --panel2, so borders on it vanish`); }
+}
+// Glass draws its text on a coloured wash, or on a panel that lets the wash through, so its hex
+// grounds are not what the text lands on. Sample the wash the way the browser composites it, on a
+// laptop, a phone and a tablet, and hold the text to AA wherever it is darkest or lightest.
+const washes = [...css.matchAll(/radial-gradient\((\d+)% (\d+)% at (\d+)% (\d+)%,var\(--wash(\d)\)/g)]
+  .map(m => ({ rx: +m[1], ry: +m[2], cx: +m[3], cy: +m[4], n: m[5] }));
+const rgba = (sel, n) => {
+  const m = css.slice(css.indexOf(sel + ' {')).match(new RegExp(`--wash${n}:rgba\\((\\d+),(\\d+),(\\d+),([\\d.]+)\\)`));
+  return [[+m[1], +m[2], +m[3]], +m[4]];
+};
+const rgb = h => [1, 3, 5].map(i => parseInt(h.slice(i, i + 2), 16));
+const hex = c => '#' + c.map(v => Math.round(v).toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
+const over = (c, a, g) => g.map((x, i) => c[i] * a + x * (1 - a));
+for (const [name, sel] of [['glass', ':root[data-theme="glass"]'], ['glass light', ':root[data-theme="glass"][data-mode="light"]']]) {
+  const p = themes[name];
+  const tint = washes.map(w => [w, rgba(sel, w.n)]).reverse();  // the first listed is drawn on top
+  const sm = css.slice(css.indexOf(sel + ' {')).match(/--glass-sheen:rgba\((\d+),(\d+),(\d+),([\d.]+)\)/);
+  const sheen = [[+sm[1], +sm[2], +sm[3]], +sm[4]];
+  const worst = {};
+  for (const [W, H] of [[1440, 900], [390, 844], [1024, 1366]])
+    for (let x = 0; x <= W; x += W / 40) for (let y = 0; y <= H; y += H / 40) {
+      let g = rgb(p.bg);
+      for (const [w, [c, a]] of tint) {
+        const d = Math.hypot((x - w.cx * W / 100) / (w.rx * W / 100), (y - w.cy * H / 100) / (w.ry * H / 100));
+        g = over(c, a * Math.max(0, 1 - d), g);
+      }
+      // The list sits on the bare wash; the sidebar, detail pane and dialogs on 70% panel over it,
+      // and a panel's top-left corner under its sheen at full strength.
+      const panel = over(rgb(p.panel), .7, g);
+      for (const [gn, gc] of [['the wash', g], ['a panel', panel], ['a panel\'s sheen', over(...sheen, panel)]])
+        for (const fg of ['fg', 'dim', 'faint', 'accent', 'bad', 'warn']) {
+          const r = ratio(p[fg], hex(gc)), k = `--${fg} on ${gn}`;
+          if (!(k in worst) || r < worst[k]) worst[k] = r;
+        }
+    }
+  if (!washes.length) { bad++; console.log('FAIL glass: no wash gradients found in app.css'); }
+  for (const [k, r] of Object.entries(worst))
+    if (r < 4.5) { bad++; console.log(`FAIL ${name}: ${k} is ${r.toFixed(2)}:1 at worst, needs 4.5`); }
+}
+if (bad) process.exit(1);
+console.log(`OK: ${Object.keys(themes).length} palettes clear AA for every pair the page draws`);

tests/data/access-test.jwks.json

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+{
+ "keys": [
+  {
+   "kid": "k1",
+   "kty": "RSA",
+   "alg": "RS256",
+   "use": "sig",
+   "e": "AQAB",
+   "n": "1T_jY4dGnU5YJonLMXdTyqFdV2J-67t5NTmTP1mf6kEYw_lW1xWB7306w8XOiplWD9cEDviKh6vQbmTTXL6-z8WnG-9YeRsPOOv0vb8txiuzJZ10ZQDBpbDdfidcESryl6ts7-ApsFz27B060wmHTwL4pywQw4wwmrubkiRwvpidzBpmDlkGZHdy3XV2TTfzQwwTtTuCR6Fd6D8lfK0XL6J5UC-RTH8_v9XEjF7DnI_bflB0olEwAqJ0-3E4xOj9okLOO5sfwE2SZk4yEMhFV4xqjtv8EN0KMT6BGIGs_VPDrSVtt23sEMsDOmeO6Pf9C6bkXy6faREpsX4einQykw"
+  }
+ ]
+}

tests/data/rss2.xml

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
     <description>A synthetic feed used by the parser tests.</description>
     <ttl>45</ttl>
     <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
+    <itunes:category text="Technology"><itunes:category text="Podcasting"/></itunes:category>
+    <itunes:category text="News"/>
 
     <item>
       <title>Episode One</title>

tests/dom-stub.js

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// The stub DOM the page's script is loaded against, shared by page-smoke.js and
+// native-bridge.js. It is deliberately thin: enough for every handler the script wires at load
+// to find what it reaches for, and no more.
+//
+// `media` swaps the bare `#audio` proxy for something with the parts of HTMLMediaElement that
+// matter -- a prototype carrying the real accessors, and events that actually dispatch -- because
+// native.ts replaces that surface on the element and a proxy that answers everything would prove
+// nothing about whether it worked.
+const vm = require('vm');
+
+function makeContext(html, script, { media = false } = {}) {
+  // Ids in the page, and in the markup the script builds for its dialogs.
+  const ids = new Set([...(html + script).matchAll(/\bid=(?:"([^"]+)"|([^\s>"']+))/g)].map(m => m[1] || m[2]));
+  const missing = [];
+
+  const el = (name) => new Proxy({ style: { setProperty(){}, getPropertyValue(){ return ''; } }, dataset: {}, classList: { add(){}, remove(){}, toggle(){}, contains(){ return false; } },
+    value: '', textContent: '', innerHTML: '', hidden: false, children: [], firstElementChild: null,
+    appendChild(){}, removeChild(){}, remove(){}, insertAdjacentHTML(){}, addEventListener(){},
+    setAttribute(){}, getAttribute(){ return null; }, select(){}, setSelectionRange(){}, focus(){},
+    replaceWith(){}, querySelector(){ return el('nested'); }, querySelectorAll(){ return []; },
+    play(){ return Promise.resolve(); }, pause(){}, closest(){ return null; } },
+    { get: (t, k) => k in t ? t[k] : undefined, set: (t, k, v) => (t[k] = v, true) });
+
+  const body = el('body');
+  const audio = media ? makeMediaElement() : null;
+  if (media) {
+    // native.ts reads has-video off the body to decide whether the host takes the file, so this
+    // one has to be a real set rather than something that always says no.
+    const classes = new Set();
+    body.classList = {
+      add: c => classes.add(c), remove: c => classes.delete(c),
+      toggle: (c, on) => (on === undefined ? (classes.has(c) ? classes.delete(c) : classes.add(c)) : on ? classes.add(c) : classes.delete(c)),
+      contains: c => classes.has(c),
+    };
+  }
+
+  const document = {
+    querySelector(sel) {
+      if (sel === '#audio' && audio) return audio;
+      if (sel.startsWith('#') && !ids.has(sel.slice(1))) { missing.push(sel); return null; }
+      return el(sel);
+    },
+    querySelectorAll: () => [],
+    createElement: () => el('created'),
+    addEventListener(){}, body,
+    documentElement: { dataset: {} },
+  };
+
+  const ctx = {
+    document, console, crypto: require("crypto").webcrypto, performance,
+    window: { isSecureContext: false, addEventListener(){} },
+    localStorage: { getItem: () => null, setItem(){}, removeItem(){} },
+    navigator: { clipboard: undefined, sendBeacon(){}, mediaSession: undefined },
+    fetch: (url) => Promise.resolve({
+      ok: true, status: 200, text: () => Promise.resolve(''),
+      json: () => Promise.resolve(
+        String(url).includes('/api/settings')
+          ? { schedule: 'every 60m', every_mins: 60, download_dir: '/tmp', max_total_gb: 0, max_age_days: 0 }
+          : String(url).includes('/api/users')
+            ? [{ id: 1, name: 'admin', admin: true, password: true }, { id: 2, name: 'sam', admin: false, password: false }]
+            : /\/api\/(popular|directory)/.test(String(url))
+              ? [{ id: 'f', title: 'A Feed', image: null, subscribers: 2, subscribed: true },
+                 { id: 'g', title: null, image: null, subscribers: 1, subscribed: false }]
+              : /entries/.test(String(url)) ? { total: 0, entries: [] } : []),
+    }),
+    EventSource: function () { this.close = () => {}; },
+    MediaMetadata: function () {},
+    Blob: function () {},
+    getComputedStyle: () => ({ backgroundColor: '' }),
+    setTimeout, clearTimeout, setInterval, clearInterval,
+    confirm: () => false, prompt: () => null, alert(){},
+    Date, Math, JSON, Object, Array, String, Number, Promise, Error, FormData: function(){},
+    URLSearchParams, encodeURIComponent, decodeURIComponent, parseInt, parseFloat, isNaN,
+  };
+  if (media) {
+    ctx.HTMLMediaElement = MediaElement;
+    ctx.Event = Event;
+    ctx.isFinite = isFinite;
+    ctx.CSS = { escape: s => String(s) };
+  }
+  ctx.globalThis = ctx;
+  ctx.window.location = { href: '', hash: '' };
+  ctx.location = ctx.window.location;
+
+  return { ctx, missing, audio, body, ids };
+}
+
+/* ---- just enough HTMLMediaElement for the shim to be worth testing ---- */
+
+function Event(type) { this.type = type; }
+
+function MediaElement() {
+  this._src = ''; this._t = 0; this._dur = NaN; this._paused = true;
+  this._ready = 0; this._vol = 1; this._rate = 1;
+  this._listeners = {};
+  this.dataset = {}; this.classList = { add(){}, remove(){}, toggle(){}, contains(){ return false; } };
+  // Every call that reached the real element, so a test can say the host took over rather than
+  // the element quietly playing as well.
+  this.calls = [];
+}
+MediaElement.prototype.play = function(){ this.calls.push('play'); this._paused = false; return Promise.resolve(); };
+MediaElement.prototype.pause = function(){ this.calls.push('pause'); this._paused = true; };
+MediaElement.prototype.load = function(){ this.calls.push('load'); };
+MediaElement.prototype.addEventListener = function(name, fn, opts){
+  (this._listeners[name] || (this._listeners[name] = [])).push({ fn, once: !!(opts && opts.once) });
+};
+MediaElement.prototype.dispatchEvent = function(ev){
+  for (const l of (this._listeners[ev.type] || []).slice()) {
+    if (l.once) this._listeners[ev.type] = this._listeners[ev.type].filter(x => x !== l);
+    l.fn(ev);
+  }
+  return true;
+};
+MediaElement.prototype.removeAttribute = function(name){ this.calls.push('removeAttribute:' + name); if (name === 'src') this._src = ''; };
+MediaElement.prototype.setAttribute = function(){};
+MediaElement.prototype.getAttribute = function(){ return null; };
+const accessor = (k, field, log) => Object.defineProperty(MediaElement.prototype, k, {
+  configurable: true,
+  get(){ return this[field]; },
+  set(v){ if (log) this.calls.push(k + ':' + v); this[field] = v; },
+});
+accessor('src', '_src', true);
+accessor('currentTime', '_t', true);
+accessor('volume', '_vol');
+accessor('playbackRate', '_rate');
+Object.defineProperty(MediaElement.prototype, 'duration', { configurable: true, get(){ return this._dur; } });
+Object.defineProperty(MediaElement.prototype, 'paused', { configurable: true, get(){ return this._paused; } });
+Object.defineProperty(MediaElement.prototype, 'readyState', { configurable: true, get(){ return this._ready; } });
+
+function makeMediaElement(){ return new MediaElement(); }
+
+module.exports = { makeContext, vm };

tests/load/browse.js

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+import http from 'k6/http';
+import { check, sleep } from 'k6';
+import { BASE, FEEDS, ITEMS, as, me, pick, feedId, p95 } from './lib.js';
+
+// An evening's browsing: twenty-five people at once opening their feed list, All Subscriptions,
+// a feed, a search, the Directory and a feed's page in it. Each answer's budget is well above what
+// it takes now, so it fails on a query that has started asking once per feed -- the Directory
+// asked the database three questions a feed until 0.10.0 -- not on a slow minute. Fifty measured
+// the queue for what was SQLite's one connection (#136) more than any query.
+export const options = {
+  scenarios: {
+    evening: {
+      executor: 'ramping-vus',
+      stages: [{ duration: '15s', target: 25 }, { duration: '45s', target: 25 }, { duration: '10s', target: 0 }],
+    },
+  },
+  thresholds: {
+    http_req_failed: ['rate==0'],
+    checks: ['rate==1'],
+    // About twice each one's p95 on 2026-10-05 on Tower, and no less than 50ms, where a few ms
+    // either way is noise. SQLite: 89, 17, 10, 22, 112, 126ms; Postgres: 54, 34, 24, 44, 71, 88ms.
+    'http_req_duration{name:feeds}': p95(200, 150),
+    'http_req_duration{name:all-entries}': p95(50, 100),
+    'http_req_duration{name:feed-entries}': p95(50, 100),
+    'http_req_duration{name:search}': p95(60, 100),
+    'http_req_duration{name:directory}': p95(250, 200),
+    'http_req_duration{name:listed}': p95(300, 200),
+  },
+};
+
+export default function () {
+  const u = me();
+  const feeds = http.get(`${BASE}/api/feeds`, as(u, 'feeds'));
+  check(feeds, { 'your thirty feeds': r => r.status === 200 && r.json().length === 30 });
+
+  const all = http.get(`${BASE}/api/entries?limit=50&filter=all&sort=published&dir=desc`, as(u, 'all-entries'));
+  check(all, { 'All Subscriptions, a page of it': r => r.status === 200 && r.json().entries.length === 50 });
+
+  const f = pick(feeds.json());
+  const one = http.get(`${BASE}/api/feeds/${f.id}/entries?limit=50&sort=title&dir=asc`, as(u, 'feed-entries'));
+  check(one, { 'a feed of yours, every item': r => r.status === 200 && r.json().entries.length === ITEMS });
+
+  // Every generated item mentions the weather, in its text, not its title.
+  const found = http.get(`${BASE}/api/entries?q=weather&limit=50`, as(u, 'search'));
+  check(found, { 'a search of everything you read': r => r.status === 200 && r.json().total === 30 * ITEMS });
+
+  const dir = http.get(`${BASE}/api/directory`, as(u, 'directory'));
+  check(dir, { 'the whole Directory': r => r.status === 200 && r.json().length === FEEDS });
+
+  const listed = http.get(`${BASE}/api/directory/${feedId(Math.floor(Math.random() * FEEDS))}`, as(u, 'listed'));
+  check(listed, { "a feed's page in the Directory": r => r.status === 200 && r.json().items.length === ITEMS });
+
+  sleep(1 + Math.random() * 2);
+}