Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
f8408a3d26 Tests, tooling and the served scripts are TypeScript (#392)
The page and the service worker were strict TypeScript; the tests, the
build, the home page's generator, the load tests, boot.js and the
directory's site.js were plain JavaScript that nothing checked. All of
it is TypeScript now, in five programs, each with its own globals, all
checked by npm run typecheck: the page (tsconfig.json, with boot.ts and
the directory's site.ts), the worker, Node's (tsconfig.tools.json: the
Node tests, the browser suite, the build, the site generator, the load
harness), and k6's (tsconfig.k6.json, with @types/k6).

Node 24 runs the .ts files by stripping their types, so they hold only
TypeScript that erases (erasableSyntaxOnly) and import each other by
.ts name; package.json says "type": "module" for it, and Dockerfile.web
moves to Node 24 to run build.mts. k6 2.3 strips its scripts' types
itself.

The browser suite's page.evaluate calls reach the page's globals; the
page's tsc run now also writes its declarations to target/page-types,
which the suite's program includes, so those calls are typed by the
page's own code rather than by hand-written copies.

boot.ts is compiled by build.mts with swc, as the worker is, and named
by the hash of what is served. The directory's build has no Node, so
site.js is compiled from site.ts and committed (node web/build.mts
--directory-script), and tests/directory-script.ts fails if they drift.

Checked: the site generator's 139 pages are byte for byte what the
JavaScript made; the page build's app.js is identical and only boot.js
(now minified) and its hash differ; contrast, page-smoke, page-unit,
native-bridge, the browser suite (96 passed, 2 skipped) and the
directory's and ipx's Rust tests pass; k6 parses each load script. The
load tests themselves did not run: they build a release binary outside
the capped builder. .agents/skills/security-audit is an installed
skill's, not ours, and is left as it is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 02:23:22 +00:00
1471b9b9d0 ipx-web without curl, which CVE-2026-92392 affects in caddy:2's 8.22.0 (#237)
Nothing in the image ran it: Caddy is Go, and there has been no healthcheck since #218.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 17:45:19 +00:00
f9870938bf ipx-web: the page in its own container, behind Caddy (#203)
web/build.mjs builds a static site, web/dist, with the icons and typeface
beside the pages; Dockerfile.web serves it with Caddy, which passes /api
and /media to ipx on the same origin, so cookies, live updates and
Cloudflare Access work as before. ipx serves no page any more: build.rs
and every include_str! of the web files are gone, and its image is built
without node.

What ipx did to the page as it served it is kept another way. Caddy asks
ipx before serving a page (forward_auth): /api/page-check sends a browser
not signed in to /login and a non-admin away from /admin, and refuses them
/admin.js; /api/login-check sends someone Access vouches for past the
form; a page asked for with ?token= goes to /api/signin, which sets the
cookie. The theme and the admin link, once written into the page per
person, are set by web/boot.js in <head> from the theme cookie and the
last visit, before the first frame, and /api/me brings the version and
the account's theme from before.

Caddy strips the Cf-Access-* headers from every peer but TUNNEL_PEER, the
address cloudflared's requests come from, which is the boundary
trusted_proxies drew; ipx then trusts only Caddy's address.

The browser suite runs Caddy in front of its daemon, so it tests what
production would run. Not deployed: production's cutover is on #203.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 14:03:22 +00:00