Check passwords a few at a time off the async workers, and check unknown names too (#137, #138)

The load tests (#133) sent forty clients' wrong passwords to /api/login, 54 attempts a second,
which takes no account. Everyone else's requests took 4s (median 3.96s for /api/feeds, about 20ms
otherwise) and `ipx status`, the healthcheck, 1.3s (#137): each attempt was an Argon2id check,
tens of milliseconds of CPU, run inside the handler on one of the runtime's workers, so a handful
at once held every worker the rest of the server answers on. And a wrong password for an
account's name was refused a median 31ms later than one for a made-up name (#138), since only a
name with a hash was checked: the answer read the same, the time said which names are accounts.

auth::check_password runs the check on the blocking pool, at most half the cores at once, so a
flood waits on itself, and checks a name with no account, or no password, against a fixed decoy
hash, false in the same time. Under the same flood the rest of the site answers at p95 57ms,
`ipx status` at most 90ms, the gap is 0.2ms, and twice as many attempts are answered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -11,6 +11,11 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 - Checking every feed no longer makes every icon in the feed list flash while it runs: the list keeps the icons it has already drawn.
 
+### Security
+
+- A flood of sign-in attempts no longer stalls the site for everyone else. Passwords are checked a few at a time, away from the threads that answer every other request; forty wrong passwords at a time made everything else take four seconds.
+- A wrong password is refused in the same time whether or not the name is an account here, so how long it takes no longer tells anyone which names are.
+
 ## [0.10.0] - 2026-10-05
 
 ### Added

src/auth.rs

@@ -30,6 +30,35 @@ pub fn verify_password(password: &str, stored: &str) -> bool {
         .is_ok()
 }
 
+/// How many password checks run at once: each is tens of milliseconds of CPU, and forty wrong
+/// passwords at a time, run on the async workers, made every other request wait 4s (#137).
+/// Half the cores, so a flood of sign-ins waits on itself and the rest of the server has the rest.
+static CHECKS: std::sync::LazyLock<tokio::sync::Semaphore> = std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
+    tokio::sync::Semaphore::new(std::thread::available_parallelism().map_or(1, |n| (n.get() / 2).max(1)))
+});
+
+/// What a name that is not an account is checked against, so that refusing it takes as long as
+/// refusing a wrong password does. Refused without a check, it came back 31ms sooner, and the
+/// time told anyone which names are accounts here (#138).
+static DECOY: std::sync::LazyLock<String> =
+    std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| hash_password("no account here has this password").expect("hashing a fixed password"));
+
+/// A sign-in's password against the account's hash, or against `DECOY` when there is no account
+/// or it has no password: false either way, in the same time. Off the async workers, and a few at
+/// a time; see `CHECKS`.
+pub async fn check_password(password: String, stored: Option<String>) -> bool {
+    let Ok(_turn) = CHECKS.acquire().await else { return false };
+    tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || match stored {
+        Some(h) => verify_password(&password, &h),
+        None => {
+            verify_password(&password, &DECOY);
+            false
+        }
+    })
+    .await
+    .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
 /// A session id: 256 bits of urandom, hex. Long enough that guessing is not a strategy.
 pub fn new_session_token() -> String {
     let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
@@ -76,6 +105,16 @@ pub fn name_from_header(raw: &str) -> Option<String> {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn a_sign_in_without_an_account_is_checked_all_the_same() {
+        let h = hash_password("correct horse battery").unwrap();
+        assert!(check_password("correct horse battery".into(), Some(h.clone())).await);
+        assert!(!check_password("wrong".into(), Some(h)).await);
+        assert!(!check_password("correct horse battery".into(), None).await);
+        // A decoy that does not parse is refused before any hashing, and the time says so (#138).
+        assert!(PasswordHash::new(&DECOY).is_ok());
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn a_password_verifies_only_against_itself() {
         let h = hash_password("correct horse battery").unwrap();

src/web.rs

@@ -315,11 +315,8 @@ async fn login(
 ) -> Result<Response, ApiError> {
     let name = body.name.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
     let user = state.ctx.db.user_by_name(&name).await?;
-    // The same answer either way: whether a name exists is not something to leak.
+    // The same answer either way, in the same time: whether a name exists is not something to leak.
-    let ok = user
+    let ok = crate::auth::check_password(body.password, user.as_ref().and_then(|u| u.pass_hash.clone())).await;
-        .as_ref()
-        .and_then(|u| u.pass_hash.as_deref())
-        .is_some_and(|h| crate::auth::verify_password(&body.password, h));
     if !ok {
         tracing::warn!(user = %name, "failed sign-in");
         return Ok((StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "wrong name or password").into_response());