Fetches refuse internal addresses unless fetch_internal lists them (#320)

ipx's clients had no destination policy and followed redirects
anywhere. Adding a feed returned the status or first line of whatever
answered at the address; an enclosure declared as audio was downloaded
whole from any URL and served back through /media; /api/art fetched
any image a feed named. Feeds come from publishers and anyone signed
in, so loopback, the Docker network and the LAN were all reachable.

ipx-feed's guard is a connector layer: after the name resolves and the
connection opens, before the request is written, it looks at the
peer's address and refuses anything off the public internet unless
config.toml's [general] fetch_internal lists it. Being on the
connection, it covers every request on ctx.client and feed_client,
each redirect hop, IP literals (which never reach a DNS resolver) and
a name that resolves differently the second time. reqwest's rustls
connection reports the peer address; a test run by hand checks HTTPS
gets through, since were it lost every https fetch would be refused.

The directory is on the server's own network by design
(http://ipx-directory:8100), so it moves to local_client, unguarded,
set by an admin. The browser suite and load tests serve their feeds on
loopback and list 127.0.0.1.

Not covered: librqbit's own connections (trackers, peers), which do
not go through these clients.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

crates/feed/Cargo.toml

@@ -8,12 +8,15 @@ edition.workspace = true
 anyhow.workspace = true
 atom_syndication.workspace = true
 chrono.workspace = true
+http.workspace = true
+hyper-util.workspace = true
 opml.workspace = true
 pulldown-cmark.workspace = true
 quick-xml.workspace = true
 reqwest.workspace = true
 rss.workspace = true
 serde_json.workspace = true
+tower.workspace = true
 tracing.workspace = true
 url.workspace = true